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1 Introduction
‘Nothing useless is, nor low;
Each thing in its place is best;
And what seems but idle show
Strengthens and supports the rest.’1
Global warming, according to an alarming report recently released by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), is accelerating more 
rapidly than scientists had previously anticipated.2 In order to limit its 
impact, the report calls for a 45% reduction in emissions from 2010 levels 
by 2030 and their complete elimination by around 2050.3 Achievement of 
these targets requires ‘rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented’ actions on 
the part of all nations.4 China, however, as the largest emitter and exporter 
of carbon dioxide emissions,5 faces legal problems when it comes to using 
one potential measure to fight climate change, namely duties on carbon-
intensive exports.6 Owing to the controversial China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths decisions,7 China is prohibited from using export duties 
to address any environmental problems, including those associated with 
climate change.8 This is unfortunate because a number of climate studies, 
including the well-known Stern Review on the economics of climate 
1 ‘The Builders’ by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-1882). His ‘A Psalm of Life’ was 
the fi rst English poem to have been translated into Chinese and was the earliest poem to 
be translated into Chinese from any modern Western language.
2 UN, ‘Statement by the Secretary-General on the IPCC Special Report Global Warming 
of 1.5 ºC’, 8 October 2018, available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/state-
ment/2018-10-08/statement-secretary-general-ipcc-special-report-global-warming-15-%
C2%BAc, (visited 14 November 2018).
3 IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 
1.5°C approved by governments’, 8 October 2018, https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/
summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-
by-governments/, (visited 14 November 2018).
4 Ibid.
5 China’s export-related emissions constituted 7% of total global carbon emissions in 2011, 
which is larger than the overall emissions produced by the third or fourth largest emitters 
in the world, namely India (6%) and Russia (5%) in 2015. Union of Concerned Scientists, 
‘Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions’, 11 October 2018, https://www.ucsusa.org/
global-warming/science-and-impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html#.
XAvmyCh97IV, (visited on 22 November 2018).
6 China describes export duties as a type of instrument to ‘effectively control greenhouse 
gas emissions’. For further information, see UNFCCC, ‘Second National Communication 
on Climate Change of the People’s Republic of China’, October 2004, at 15, http://unfccc.
int/resource/docs/natc/chnnc1exsum.pdf, (visited on 1 January 2019).
7 For further discussion, see Chapter 3.
8 Apart from those on 84 products that fall within the maximum levels provided in Annex 
6 of China’s Accession Protocol. For further information, see Chapter 2.
2 Chapter 1
change,9 its follow-up article,10 and a World Bank research paper,11 have 
suggested that Chinese export duties could be useful for reducing carbon 
leakage, an issue also worrying the West.12 Considering the potential nega-
tive environmental impact of this jurisprudence, there is a need to consider 
‘greening’ the World Trade Organization (WTO) ban on China’s export 
duties. This introductory chapter establishes the scope, structure, and meth-
odology of the present study.
1.1 Scope of the study
This subsection defines the scope of the study. It begins with an introduction 
of the major research question, namely whether categorically prohibiting 
China from using export duties limits its capacity to protect the environ-
ment, and, if so, what are the solutions to provide China with policy space 
without opening the floodgates to protectionism. The analysis of this ques-
tion is closely related to three key issues concerning the use of export duties 
in this way, which are discussed in turn. The section concludes with a brief 
discussion of the overall aims of the study.
1.1.1 Should WTO law allow China to use export duties to address trade-
related environmental concerns and, if so, what form should these 
duties take?
Following the high-profile China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths 
cases, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in July 2016 
brought a third case, China—Raw Materials II. This case again calls into 
question China’s export duties on certain raw materials.13 As in the earlier 
two cases, the products subject to export duties in China—Raw Materials II 
are key components of such high-value products as automotive parts, elec-
tronics, and chemicals. In responding to the third set of charges brought by 
9 Nicholas Stern, ‘The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review’ (Cambridge, 2007), at 
552.
10 Lorraine Hamid, Nicholas Stern, and Chris Taylor, ‘Refl ections on the Stern Review (2): 
A Growing International Opportunity to Move Strongly on Climate Change’, 8(1) World 
Economics (2007), at 176.
11 Brian R. Copeland, ‘International Trade and Green Growth’, No. 6235 World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper (2012).
12 For instance, as part of her European Green Deal, the upcoming President of the Euro-
pean Commission has proposed a ‘Carbon Border Tax’ aiming at avoiding carbon leakage 
and ensuring a level playing fi eld for European companies. Ursula von der Leyen, ‘A 
Union that strives for more: My agenda for Europe’, 16 July 2019, at 5, https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/sites/beta-political/fi les/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf, 
(visited on 1 August 2019).
13 This case is possibly on inactive status. The DSB agreed to establish a panel on 8 
November 2016, but the panelists have not yet been chosen after more than two years.
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the US and EU, China has argued that its export duties are justified as part 
of an environmental policy designed to tackle trade-related pollution under 
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT).14 
The Appellate Body (AB) already ruled in the first two cases, however, that 
China cannot invoke GATT Article XX to justify export duties under any 
circumstances. The pressing question here, therefore, is whether WTO law 
should allow China to invoke the environmental exceptions enumerated in 
Article XX if China’s export duties truly serve environmental purposes.
After the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions, many 
scholars sympathized with China, especially given that most WTO 
members remain free to impose duties on exports for any purpose.15 None 
of them, however, has sufficiently challenged the widely held perception 
that export duties are not meant to be used for environmental purposes, and 
China’s environmental justification is a mere pretext for an industrial policy 
designed to limit the access of international companies to vital natural 
resources in China.16 Based on this perception, even though China’s right 
to invoke the public policy exception was denied, ‘a public policy problem 
does not really seem to exist’.17 In this context, the outcry over unfairness to 
deny China’s right to invoke the WTO environmental exceptions has been 
criticized for being rather ‘superficial’.18
The above negative perception is understandable because export duties 
have not served traditionally as an instrument in the service of environ-
mental protection. Furthermore, in China—Raw Materials and China—Rare 
Earths China lacked convincing environmental justification. In order to 
minimise China’s chances of circumventing WTO rules, the complaining 
governments thus chose to deny its right to invoke Article XX.19
14 Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China, ‘Offi cial from the Department 
of Law and Treaty Comments on EU Appealing to the WTO against China’s Export 
Management Measures on its Raw Materials’, 21 July 2016, http://english.mofcom.gov.
cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201607/20160701365930.shtml, (visited on 1 
January 2019).
15 For further discussion on the reception of the WTO ban on China’s export duties, see 
Chapter 3.
16 Lothar Ehring, ‘Nature and Status of WTO Accession Commitments: “WTO-Plus” 
Obligations and Their Relationship to Other Parts of the WTO Agreement’, in Marise 
Cremona, Peter Hilpold, Nikos Lavranos, Stefan Staiger Schneider, and Andreas R. 
Ziegler (eds), ‘Refl ections on the Constitutionalisation of International Economic Law’ (Brill, 
2013), at 361.
17 Ibid., at 361.
18 Ibid., at 359. For further information, see Chapter 3.
19 Marco Bronckers and Keith E. Maskus, ‘China–Raw Materials: A Controversial Step 
Towards Evenhanded Exploitation of Natural Resources’, 13(2) World Trade Review 
(2014), at 402.
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It is, however, one thing to propose strictly scrutinizing any environmental 
reasoning behind export duties, but quite another to absolutely ban these 
duties merely for the reason that they look suspicious.20 This thesis thus 
calls for a balanced approach that would provide China with policy space to 
protect the environment without opening the floodgates to protectionism. 
Such policy space would not only benefit China, but also the world when it 
comes to fighting climate change.21
The environmental concerns associated with an absolute ban on China’s 
export duties are not merely hypothetical.22 For instance, in the past, China’s 
export duties on such energy-intensive products as steel, aluminum, coal, 
chemical products, and fertilizers were applauded by some commentators, 
who see their potential to reduce carbon emissions in China.23 Indeed, a 
large proportion of carbon emissions produced by China is export-related.24 
A number of climate studies thus have suggested China explore the poten-
tial of its export duties and make them a credible climate policy tool.25 This 
very important issue is, however, neglected in the current discussion of the 
absolute ban on China’s export duties.26
20 Even an author like Ehring with a critical view of the unfairness concerns may agree 
that such unfairness should not prevent a country from pursuing ‘fundamental societal 
interests’. As he correctly put it, ‘one needs to ask whether the values protected by Article 
XX truly can be threatened by the obligations at stake’. See Ehring (2013), above n 16, at 
359.
21 Moreover, in the past, several major international environmental groups opposed a WTO 
decision prohibiting the US from adopting a measure designed to protect sea turtles 
outside its territorial waters. A decision that prohibits China from addressing environ-
mental problems occurred in its own territory can be expected to elicit a similarly strong 
reaction from the public. ICTSD, ‘Shrimp-Turtle Ruling Gets Lukewarm Reaction from 
All Sides’, 2 (40) Bridges (1998).
22 For further discussion on the practice of WTO members to use export duties for environ-
mental purposes, see Chapter 4.
23 For further discussion on the potential of China’s export duties to tackle carbon leakage, 
see Chapter 6.
24 ‘About twenty-fi ve percent of China’s carbon emissions are caused by manufacturing 
products that are consumed abroad’. Export-related emissions produced by China thus 
constituted 7% of total global carbon emissions in 2012, see Zhu Liu, ‘China’s Carbon 
Emissions Report 2015’, Energy Technology Innovation Policy Research Group (2015), at 
1, https://scholar.harvard.edu/fi les/zhu/fi les/carbon-emissions-report-2015-fi nal.pdf 
(visited on 1 January 2019). This number is larger than the overall emissions produced 
by the third or fourth largest emitters in the world, namely India (6%) and Russia (5%) in 
2015. See Union of Concerned Scientists (2018), above n 5.
25 For further information, see Chapter 6.
26 It is noteworthy that, while China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths concerned only 
natural resources, the decisions in these cases also in effect prohibit China from imposing 
export duties on other intermediate and final goods. For further discussion on the 
missing piece in the reception of China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions, 
see Chapter 3.
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With respect to the protectionist concern, China may impose supplementary 
restrictions on domestic consumption as part of ‘export duties plus’. Such 
measures are by nature much less protectionist than the ones at issue in 
China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths. It is thus important to reveal 
this blind spot in the present study.
Given the actual concerns over environmental protection and the possi-
bilities to minimise the protectionist practices, a complete ban on China’s 
export duties seems to be rather simplistic and more based on the fear of 
abuse than cool-headed assessment of self-interest. What is needed, as 
provided in this thesis, is a more sophisticated response that, on the one 
hand, provides China with policy space to protect the environment, and, on 
the other hand, prevents such right from being abused. Furthermore, this 
thesis also provides solutions to expand this desirable policy space in light 
of the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions. The following 
discussion introduces the three fundamental issues concerning the use of 
export duties to address trade-related environmental concerns in China.
1.1.2 Trade-related environmental concerns and the controversies 
surrounding the use of export duties to address them
This discussion begins with an introduction of key economic hypotheses 
concerning the adverse effects of increasing trade on environmental quality 
and goes on to present empirical evidence for the existence of such concerns 
in China. It concludes with an assessment of the practical advantages and 
disadvantages associated with using export duties to address environ-
mental concerns and of the need for more sophisticated rules to regulate 
them.
1.1.2.1 Local and global environmental problems exacerbated by trade
The relationship between increasing trade and environmental quality is 
complicated. On the one hand, trade promotes economic growth, which in 
turn tends to improve a country’s environment in the long run. Thus the 
so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve indicates that, once a particular 
critical level of income has been reached, countries generally switch 
economic activity away from more highly polluting sectors, such as manu-
facturing, to less polluting sectors, such as services.27 Moreover, within a 
given industry, less clean techniques tend to be replaced with cleaner ones.28 
On the other hand, though, an increase in trade can have adverse effects on 
environmental quality at both local and global levels.
27 Jeffrey A. Frankel, ‘The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some 
Prescriptions’, RWP12-014 HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series (2012), at 6.
28 Ibid.
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There is thus to begin with the problem of negative environmental exter-
nalities associated with the manufacture of products for export. These exter-
nalities could be localized in the form of ordinary water or soil pollution. 
Global environmental externalities, by contrast, such as increased carbon 
emissions generated by the manufacture of carbon-intensive products for 
export, can negatively affect the global climate.
The problem of negative environmental externalities in certain countries 
can be exacerbated by international trade. Thus, according to the so-called 
‘pollution haven hypothesis’, polluting industries tend to relocate to juris-
dictions with less stringent environmental regulations, which are thereby 
encouraged to specialize in relatively less clean activities and to export their 
products to countries with higher environmental standards.29 For instance, 
a 2019 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
research suggests that non-OECD countries generally export more carbon-
intensive goods to OECD countries.30
An empirical study based on a sample of over 12,000 Japanese manufac-
turing firms, for instance, showed that, although outsourcing imposes addi-
tional transport costs, large firms with high environmental regulation costs 
prefer either to displace entire production processes or at least the more 
environmentally damaging aspects of those processes to other countries, 
‘leav[ing] a large and profitable headquarters in the home country’.31 China 
is among the popular destinations for outsourcing.32
1.1.2.2 Trade-related environmental problems in China
As the largest exporter in world merchandise trade, China’s economic 
growth has been largely dependent on trade.33 At the same time, however, 
this rapid economic growth has created environmental challenges.34 In the 
period from 2001 to 2005, for instance, some 54% of the water in China’s 
29 Ibid., at 7
30 ‘In OECD countries, imported carbon emissions from both OECD and countries outside 
the OECD area have been growing, with the latter increasing proportionally more than 
the former’. See Grégoire Garsous, ‘Trends in policy indicators on trade and environ-
ment’, No.1 OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers (2019), at 12.
31 Matthew A. Cole, Robert J. R. Elliott, and Toshihiro Okubo, ‘International Environmental 
Outsourcing’, 150(4) Review of World Economics (2014), at 658.
32 Yanfang Lyu, ‘Evaluating carbon dioxide emissions in undertaking offshored production 
tasks: the case of China’, 116 Journal of Cleaner Production (2016).
33 David Barboza, ‘In Recession, China Solidifi es Its Lead in Global Trade’, 14 October 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/business/global/14chinatrade.html (visited 
on 1 January 2019).
34 YaleEnvironemnt360, ‘China at Crossroads: Balancing The Economy and Environment’, 
14 November 2013, https://e360.yale.edu/features/china_at_crossroads_balancing_
the_economy_and_environment (visited on 1 January 2019).
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seven main rivers was deemed unsafe for human consumption.35 In terms 
of air pollution, China has, since 2005, become the world’s largest source 
of sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions.36 Empirical research shows that an 
increase in exports may have contributed to these problems.
Thus, looking again at the period from 2001 to 2005, 40% of products 
exported from China were associated with serious consequences for air 
quality and 44% with serious consequences for water quality.37 In 2007, the 
manufacture of products for export produced 15%, 21%, 23%, and 21% of 
four of the country’s major air pollutants, respectively industrial primary 
fine particular matter (PM2.5), SO2, nitrogen oxides (NOx), and nonmethane 
volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs).38 Research also shows that approx-
imately 19% of the premature mortality (208,500 deaths) related to PM2.5 in 
China in 2007 is attributable to the manufacture of products for export, a 
figure that is ‘150% higher than the recorded Chinese traffic fatalities in the 
same year’.39 These environmental problems have also worried other coun-
tries. So it is that, while the outsourcing of high-pollution manufacturing to 
China has ‘resulted in an overall beneficial effect for the US public health’, 
this outcome has been achieved ‘at the expense of air quality deteriora-
tion over the western US and the populous Chinese regions’ owing to the 
combined effects of changes in emissions and atmospheric transport.40
35 World Bank, ‘Cost of pollution in China: economic estimates of physical damages’, 
1 February 2007, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/782171468027560055/
Cost-of-pollution-in-China-economic-estimates-of-physical-damages (visited on 1 
January 2019).
36 Shenshen Su, Bengang Li, Siyu Cui, and Shu Tao, ‘Sulfur Dioxide Emissions from 
Combustion in China: From 1990 to 2007’, 45(19) Environmental Science & Technology 
(2011).
37 Tao Hu, ‘Analysis of the Resource and Environment Defi cit of China’s Foreign Trade’, 
18(2) China Population, Resources and Environment (2008), at 205.
38 H. Zhao, Q. Zhang, S. Davis, D. Guan, Z. Liu, H. Huo, J. Lin, W. Liu, and K. He, ‘Assess-
ment of China’s virtual air pollution transport embodied in trade by a consumption-
based emission inventory’, 15(12) Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics (2015).
39 ‘The European Union, North America, and East Asia, the largest three importing regions 
for Chinese goods (at 24, 21, and 13% of total export value, respectively), were associ-
ated with an estimated 47,000, 45,100 and 27,100 premature deaths in China from PM2.5 
exposures in 2007, respectively’. See Haikun Wang, Yanxu Zhang, Hongyan Zhao, Xi Lu, 
Yanxia Zhang, Weimo Zhu, Chris P. Nielsen, Xin Li, Qiang Zhang, Jun Bi and Michael B. 
McElroy, ‘Trade-driven relocation of air pollution and health impacts in China’, 738(8) 
Nature Communications (2017).
40 Jintai Lin, Da Pan, Steven J. Davis, Qiang Zhang, Kebin He, Can Wang, David G. Streets, 
Donald J. Wuebbles, and Dabo Guanc, ‘China’s international trade and air pollution in 
the United States’, 111(5) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America (2014).
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Turning now to climate change, China overtook the US as the world’s 
leading source of carbon emissions in 200841 and currently emits more 
than the US and EU combined.42 An increase in energy-intensive exports 
from China has exacerbated the problem of carbon emissions, as indicated 
by, for instance, an increase in the portion of China’s energy consumption 
embodied in exports from 14% in 1980 to 22% in 2005.43 In 2012, China’s 
export-related emissions even constituted 7% of total global carbon emis-
sions, exceeding those produced by the third (6%) or fourth (5%) largest 
emitters.44
That being said, however, international trade should not be held responsible 
for all of China’s environmental challenges. It is in this regard noteworthy 
that many polluting or energy-intensive products are produced and also 
consumed in China through, for instance, massive investments in urban 
infrastructure and energy systems.45 The use of export duties, then—which 
by definition target exports rather than domestic consumption—to address 
environmental concerns in China raises a number of objections, which will 
now be dealt with in turn.
1.1.2.3 Controversies surrounding the use of export duties
Although export duties could be used to address negative environmental 
externalities,46 their use in this capacity is, however, subject to the concerns 
over effectiveness and protectionism. Regarding the former one, export 
duties may in effect lower the domestic prices of targeted products rela-
tive to those paid by foreign consumers.47 This may incentivise domestic 
consumption and in turn undermine the effectiveness of export duties to 
reduce the manufacture of targeted products. Regarding the latter one, 
when the targeted products are industrial inputs, export duties may in 
effect subsidise domestic downstream producers by providing them with 
preferential access to those inputs.
41 Elisabeth Rosenthal, ‘China Increases Lead as Biggest Carbon Dioxide Emitter’, 14 June 
2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/world/asia/14china.html (visited on 
1 January 2019).
42 Robert Rapier, ‘China Emits More Carbon Dioxide Than The U.S. and EU Combined’, 
1 July 2018 https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/07/01/china-emits-more-
carbon-dioxide-than-the-u-s-and-eu-combined/ (visited on 1 January 2019).
43 Liping Li, ‘Research on the Construction of China’s Green Trade System’, 18(2) China 
Population, Resources and Environment (2008), at 201.
44 Liu (2015), above n 24.
45 UNEP, ‘China Outpacing Rest of World in Natural Resource Use’, 2 August 2013, https://
www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/press-release/china-outpacing-rest-world-
natural-resource-use (visited on 1 January 2019).
46 WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2010’, (WTO Publications, 2010), at 128 and 136, https://
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report10_e.pdf (visited 
on 1 January 2019).
47 Ibid., at 131.
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Countries are thus generally advised to rely on traditional environmental 
measures such as pollution taxes designed to target production rather than 
exportation.48 However, should such traditional environmental measures 
prove to be infeasible in financial or practical terms, the question remains 
whether countries should be permitted to use export duties as an interim 
alternative to address trade-related concerns.49 This question is not purely 
theoretical, and, in responding to it, for instance, the EU’s proposal 
concerning the multilateral rules regulating export duties did provide 
countries with environmental regulatory autonomy by incorporating GATT 
Article XX.50
Moreover, a number of climate studies have suggested that export duties 
may also play a positive role in tackling carbon leakage, an issue occurs 
when energy-intensive industries shift production to countries that have 
weaker controls. This problem has largely impeded the efforts of advanced 
economies to keep raising their carbon prices. It thus has been argued that 
carbon-outsourced countries could either agree importing countries to 
adopt border tax adjustments or impose ‘export taxes on energy-intensive 
manufacturing goods themselves’.51 Given that the former option might 
risk sparking a trade war, export duties are considered an alternative to 
ensure a level playing field for Western manufacturers.52
These various disadvantages and advantages associated with the use of 
export duties to address trade-related concerns indicate that either complete 
abandonment of or unqualified support for this approach would be too 
simplistic. What is needed, rather, is a more sophisticated response that 
balances environmental and economic interests.
1.1.3 Aims of this study
The main purpose of this research is, accordingly, to address environmental 
concerns over the absolute ban on China’s export duties under WTO law. 
The research question addressed here is two-fold: First, whether China 
should be allowed to use export duties to address local or global environ-
mental concerns and, second, if the answer is in the affirmative, whether 
it is possible, without opening the floodgates to protectionism, to provide 
China with the requisite policy space in light of the China-Raw Materials and 
48 Ibid., at 147.
49 For further information, see Chapter 4.
50 Daniel Crosby, ‘WTO Legal Status and Evolving Practice of Export Taxes’, 12(5) ICTSD 
Bridges (2008).
51 Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, ‘Four Changes to Trade Rules to Facilitate 
Climate Change Action’, No.10 PIIE Policy Brief (2013), https://www.piie.com/publica-
tions/policy-briefs/four-changes-trade-rules-facilitate-climate-change-action, (visited 
4 September 2019).
52 For further discussion, see Chapter 6.
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China-Rare Earths decisions. Moreover, this study also reveals the blind spot 
over a less protectionist alternative to export duties, namely ‘export duties 
plus’ that are imposed in combination with supplementary restrictions on 
Chinese consumption. This study has broader implications. To begin with, 
the analysis offered here stands to yield insights regarding ways to correct 
WTO precedents. This may also serve to illustrate options to resolve the 
persistent blocking of the appointment of AB members by the US within 
the WTO’s legal framework.53 Moreover, the discussion of whether China’s 
export duties could ever be justified under the GATT Article XX contrib-
utes to on-going attempts to clarify the requirements under the chapeau of 
Article XX in the wake of the EC—Seal Products case.54
1.2 Structure of the analysis
This thesis consists of three parts. The first part, ‘Setting the Scene: The 
Background and Reception of the WTO Cases Against China’s Export 
Duties’, introduces the WTO cases against China’s export duties. The second 
and third parts, ‘Preliminary Analysis: Would an Absolute Prohibition 
on China’s Export Duties Constrain the County’s Capacity to Protect the 
Environment’ and ‘Final Analysis: Is There a Way for China to Use Export 
Duties Legally in Order to Achieve Environmental Goals under WTO Law?’, 
include discussion of whether the WTO should allow China to use these 
duties to protect the environment and, if so, how it should go about doing 
so. The brief account of each of these parts that follows here provides an 
overview of the study and helps to explain the choice of methodology.
1.2.1 Description of Part I: Setting the Scene
The first chapter provides background for and recounts the reception of 
the absolute ban on China’s export duties. Chapter 2 provides an overview 
of the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions and the 
China—Raw Materials II case (possibly inactive).55 Chapter 3 describes in 
further detail the reception of the two WTO decisions through a review 
of English and Chinese language literature relating to concerns about the 
absolute prohibition on China’s export duties. It makes clear that neither 
53 For further discussion, see Chapter 9.
54 Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS 
Agreements: A Reconstruction’, 109(1) American Journal of International Law (2015); 
Gracia Marín Durán, ‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC–Seal 
Products: Avoiding a Confl ict between GATT Article XX-Chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT 
Agreement’, 19(2) Journal of International Economic Law (2016).
55 WTO Dispute DS508, ‘China — Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials’; WTO Dispute 
DS509, ‘China — Duties and other Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Mate-
rials’.
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the potential role of export duties in addressing trade-related environmental 
problems nor the real purpose of China’s export duties has yet been fully 
examined. These gaps are the subject of the analysis presented in Part II.
1.2.2 Description of Part II: The Extent to which an Absolute Ban on China’s 
Export Duties Would Constrain the County’s Capacity to Protect the 
Environment
The discussion in Part II, then, concerns whether China should be allowed 
under WTO law to use export duties to address environmental concerns. 
Chapter 4 analyses the practice of WTO members that lend support to 
the use of export duties to reduce local or global pollution under certain 
circumstances. In Chapter 5, the actual motive behind China’s export duties 
is investigated from a legal perspective with an account of the legislative 
process for enacting them and their changing role under the Guidelines of 
China’s Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (for 2006-2010, 
2011-2015, and 2016-2020, respectively) and in relation to specific subsec-
tors. The same chapter also explains why these plans are a trustworthy indi-
cator by discussing a series of observations on the drafting, enactment, and 
implementation stages of them. In Chapter 6, the conclusion is offered that 
China should indeed be afforded the policy space to adopt export duties as 
a means to address carbon emission leakage.
1.2.3 Description of Part III: A Basis under WTO Law for China’s Use of 
Export Duties to Address Environmental Concerns
The discussion in Part III relates to the potential for China to legally enact 
export duties as part of its environmental policy. Chapter 7 begins with 
an assessment of the feasibility of judicial means to ease the constraints 
imposed by the China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earths decisions. This 
discussion includes an exhaustive examination of possible interpreta-
tions from the perspectives of both non-WTO norms and WTO law and a 
proposal for a nuanced approach that departs implicitly from the China-Raw 
Materials and China-Rare Earths decisions. In terms of a political correction, 
the feasibility and implications of adopting an amendment, waiver, or 
authoritative interpretation allowing China to enact export duties under 
GATT Article XX are explored. Chapter 8 focuses on an important follow-up 
question whether Article XX requires ‘export duties plus’ to always treat 
domestic and foreign consumers in an identical manner. It suggests that, 
while Article XX generally requires ‘export duties plus’ to impose identical 
charges on domestic consumers, ‘export duties plus’ might be justified for 
differentiating between consumers from Annex I and non-Annex I parties 
under the UNFCCC. A feasible option for restricting Chinese consumption 
could involve broadening the existing scope of products that are subject to 
consumption taxes. Lastly, Chapter 9 reviews the findings of the previous 
chapters and discusses their major implications.
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1.3 Methodology
Regarding the methodology of this study, a doctrinal approach is employed 
in Part I that involves pairing the legal constraints imposed by the WTO 
with interpretations of China’s export duties that are ‘as neutral and consis-
tent as possible’.56 To achieve this objective, the facts in the three WTO cases 
and the reasoning behind the AB’s interpretation disallowing the duties (in 
a manner consistent with Article XX) are first summarized in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3, a survey of options put forward in the Western and Chinese 
scholarship just mentioned is presented as a means of evaluating the AB’s 
interpretation, including a consideration that has been missing from the 
current discussion regarding the practical necessity of correcting the AB’s 
interpretation.
Part II adopts a more normative approach that involves questioning the 
reasonableness of the AB’s interpretation of China’s export duty commit-
ments from three perspectives, namely WTO members’ use of export duties 
for public policy goals, current trends in the regulation of export restric-
tions, and their potential role in China’s environmental policy. Thus, based 
on the author’s research during fellowship at the WTO, Chapter 4 provides 
case studies of countries that have imposed various export restrictions for 
environmental goals in the period from 2009 to 2016 that have been deemed 
legal. In light of these case studies, the provisions regulating export restric-
tive measures in all of the WTO accession protocols and 50 regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) that have entered into force in the period from 2012 to 
2016 are examined in order to determine whether an absolute prohibition on 
China’s export duties is consistent with the regulatory preference for fiscal 
restrictions over quantitative restrictions on exports. Chapter 5 addresses 
the practical relevance of this normative analysis by suggesting two ways 
of understanding the true motivations behind China’s export duties and 
thus of assessing whether such duties could be imposed in the future for the 
primary purpose of targeting pollution outsourcing. Some of the findings 
are based on interviews with former Chinese officials. Chapter 6 provides 
a case study of the potential role of export duties in confronting outsourced 
carbon emissions in China, an issue that was not addressed in the previous 
WTO cases.
Part III marks a return to a comparative and doctrinal approach, offering 
alternative ways in which China might be provided with the policy space 
to use export duties for environmental purposes. With specific reference to 
the WTO’s de facto doctrine of stare decisis, Chapter 7 provides a compara-
tive perspective by taking into account the practices of tribunals at various 
levels, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
56 Jan M. Smits, ‘The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic’ (Edward Elgar, 2013), at 13.
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slavia (ICTY), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
and the highest courts of appeals in the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, and 
China, all of which offer references for the AB’s departure from previous 
decisions.57 A further comparative perspective, this time with reference 
to CJEU jurisprudence, is provided in Chapter 8 as a means to clarify the 
requirements under the chapeau of Article XX.
Chapter 9 provides a review of the findings of the previous chapters in 
order to discuss positive implications of ‘greening’ the absolute ban on 
China’s export duties.
57 For further discussion on the limitations of this comparative approach, see Chapter 7.

Part I:
Setting the Scene: 
The Background and Reception 
of the WTO Ban on China’s 
Export Duties

2 Three WTO Cases Against China’s 
Export Duties
WTO members are generally free to impose export duties, though some 
of them may be restricted in doing so by special commitments.58 China is 
under such a restriction, since it committed in Paragraph 11.3 of China’s 
Protocol of Accession (Paragraph 11.3) to maintaining no export duties apart 
from those on 84 products that fall within the maximum levels provided 
in Annex 6 of that protocol (Annex 6). Although China maintained export 
duties on only 58 products at the time of its accession,59 it began in 2006 
to impose them on so-called high-energy-intensive, high-pollution, and 
resources-based products including both raw materials and other products 
such as aluminum, steel, coal, chemical products, and fertilizers.60 Some of 
them are not included in Annex 6. Justification was offered for these prac-
tices in the name of environmental protection, but several WTO members 
were unconvinced and chose to litigate against the specific duties on raw 
materials. This chapter introduces the facts and key issues of those duties 
in dispute.
2.1 Facts of the export duties in CHINA – RAW MATERIALS, CHINA – RARE 
EARTHS, and CHINA – RAW MATERIALS II
In late 2009, the US, EU, and Mexico brought the first case, which became 
known as China-Raw Materials because the products at issue included such 
raw materials as bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon 
carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc.61 These materials, 
which were subject to export duties ranging from 10% to 40%, are essential 
for manufacturing steel, aluminium, and various chemicals, as well as their 
downstream products.62 The complainants claimed that the export duties 
58 These special commitments can be found in the accession protocols of WTO–Mongolia 
(1997), WTO–Latvia (1999), WTO–China (2001), WTO–Saudi Arabia (2005), WTO–
Vietnam (2007), WTO–Ukraine (2008), WTO–Russia (2012), WTO–Montenegro (2012), 
WTO–Tajikistan (2013), WTO–Kazakhstan (2015), and WTO–Afghanistan (2016). For 
further information, see Chapter 4.
59 WTO Panel Reports, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/R; WT/DS395/R; WT/DS398/R, adopted 5 July 2011, footnote 176.
60 The duties on the latter group was applauded by some commentators, who see their 
potential to reduce carbon emissions in China. For further discussion, see Chapter 6.
61 Ibid., para 7.59.
62 Ibid., para 2.2.
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in these cases were inconsistent with the obligations specified under Para-
graph 11.3.
China did not contest this claim. It did, however, argue that those duties 
could be justified for environmental reasons under GATT Article XX. It 
thereby raised two questions. The first one regarding whether Article XX 
could be applied to the China’s special commitments on export duties. The 
second one regarding whether China’s export duties could meet the eligi-
bility requirements under Article XX. A joint panel report issued in July 2011 
provided negative answers to both questions, and the panel’s finding was 
subsequently supported by the AB report of January 2012.63 Following the 
recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), China removed 
the disputed export duties on 1 January 2013.64
In 2012, even before China had implemented the DSB’s recommendations 
in this case, the US, EU, and Japan brought the second case, which became 
known as China-Rare Earths. This time the complainants asserted that 
China’s export duties of from 15 to 25% on 82 products—of which 52 were 
rare earths products, 15 tungsten products, and 9 molybdenum products—
were not covered by Annex 6.65 For the complaining governments, this case, 
like the previous one, was about access to important industrial raw mate-
rials. China for its part argued that the duties in dispute had been imposed 
in an effort to reduce environmental risks along the production chain of the 
raw materials at issue and that they were therefore, once again, justified 
under Article XX. Largely following the reasoning in China-Raw Materials, 
the panel and the AB in China-Rare Earths rejected China’s arguments,66 
and on 20 May 2015 China fully implemented the rulings by removing the 
export duties in dispute.67
On 13 July 2016, the US brought the third case against China’s export 
duties.68 The ones in dispute, ranging from 5% to 20%, had been imposed on 
10 raw materials, namely antimony, cobalt, copper, graphite, lead, magnesia, 
63 WTO AB Reports, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/AB/R; WT/DS395/AB/R; WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 30 January 2012.
64 Status report by China, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Mate-
rials, WT/DS394/19/Add.1; WT/DS395/18/Add.1; WT/DS398/17/Add.1, adopted 
18 January 2013.
65 WTO Panel Reports, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, 
and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R; WT/DS432/R; WT/DS433/R, adopted 26 March 2014, 
para 7.30. and 7.46.
66 WTO AB Reports, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, 
and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R; WT/DS432/AB/R; WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 
7 August 2014.
67 Understanding Between China and the United States Regarding Procedures Under 
Articles 21 And 22 Of the DSU, WT/DS431/17, adopted 26 May 2015.
68 China — Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials — Request for consultations by the 
United States, WT/DS508/1; G/L/1147, adopted 14 July 2016.
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talc, tantalum, tin, and chromium.69 These export duties, in addition to 
one on indium, were subsequently challenged by the EU on 19 July 2016.70 
Although the duties at issue were prohibited by Paragraph 11.3, China again 
tried to justify its practice by referring to Article XX.71 The two complaining 
governments argued that China’s arguments were without merit on the 
grounds that Article XX had been held to be not applicable to a breach of 
Paragraph 11.3 in China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earths. In November 
2016, the DSB agreed to create a WTO panel to examine the third case. But 
the panellists have not yet been chosen after more than two years. Presum-
ably this case is currently on inactive status.72 On the other hand, China has 
already removed the export duties at issue according to its Tariff Plan for 
2018 and the most recent one for 2019.73
In the above three cases, the applicability of Article XX to China’s export 
duty commitments has been subject to continuing dispute. The next section 
first briefly illustrates the reasoning of the panels and the AB that disallows 
China to invoke the environmental exceptions under Article XX in China – 
Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths. Moreover, although Article XX was 
found not available to justify the use of export duties in these two cases, 
China was still given the chance to present its environmental defences for 
the sake of argument. These defences will be introduced subsequently in 
order to show the rationale of China’s export duties.
2.2 The applicability of GATT Article XX to China’s export duty 
commitments
WTO law is silent on the relationship between GATT Article XX and China’s 
export duty commitments in its accession protocol. This kind of silence may 
have different meanings in different contexts,74 so the panel and the AB are 
mandated to offer clarity according to ‘customary rules of interpretation of 
69 Ibid.
70 China — Duties and other Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Mate-
rials  —  Request for consultations by the European Union, G/L/1148; WT/DS509/1, 
adopted 25 July 2016.
71 WTO Secretariat, ‘China Blocks US Panel Request in Dispute over Raw Materials’, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/dsb_26oct16_e.htm 26 October 2016, 
(visited 27 December 2018).
72 The WTO website shows that ‘The Dispute Settlement Body has agreed to create a 
panel, but the panellists have not yet been chosen’, see https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds508_e.htm, (visited 27 December 2018).
73 China’s Tariff Plan for 2018, see http://gss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengce-
fabu/201712/P020171215531852388756.pdf, (visited 27 December 2018). China’s Tariff 
Plan for 2019, see http://gss.mof.gov.cn/mofhome/guanshuisi/zhengwuxinxi/
zhengcefabu/201812/P020181221619892272965.pdf, (visited 27 December 2018).
74 AB Reports, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/
AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 31 May 2000, para 138.
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public international law’.75 Although these customary rules are not further 
specified in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), the AB has determined that Articles 31, 32, 
and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) can serve as 
points of reference for discerning the relevant customary rules.76 Following 
these methods of interpretation, the panels and the AB examined China’s 
five major arguments in support of applying Article XX to the violations of 
export duty commitments. The five arguments are as follows.
2.2.1 Incorporation theory77
The silence on the applicability of Article XX to Paragraph 11.3 means that 
it is unclear whether WTO members intended to permit China to impose 
export duties in a manner consistent with Article XX, which thus is open 
to interpretation. In an effort to ascertain the common intention of WTO 
members, the complainants in China—Raw Materials referred to an ‘incorpo-
ration theory’ according to which the defences of Article XX were available 
only for two types of violations: those that involve GATT provisions and 
those that incorporate Article XX justifications by reference.78
This theory was inspired by China—Publications and Audiovisual Products 
in which China sought to apply Article XX to another commitment in 
Paragraph 5.1 of its accession protocol.79 The AB in that case found that the 
introductory clause of Paragraph 5.1, ‘without prejudice to China’s right to 
regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement’, provided 
a textual basis for incorporating Article XX.80 In other words, if there is 
75 Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes.
76 AB Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/
DS2/AB/R, adopted on 29 April 1996, para 17. Article 31 of the VCLT requires a treaty 
interpreter to commence the process of interpretation in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty, in their context, and in light of the treaty’s objective 
and purpose. When an interpretation according to Article 31 of the VCLT ‘leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure’ or ‘leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unrea-
sonable’, a treaty interpreter may have recourse to supplementary means of interpreta-
tion, such as ‘the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’, 
as stated in Article 32 of the VCLT. Article 33 of the VCLT considers the roles languages 
can play in treaty interpretation.
77 Borrowed from André de Hoogh, ‘The Relationship between China’s Protocol of Acces-
sion and the GATT, 1994: China – Rare Earths and the Incorporation Theory — Off with 
its Head! (Part 1)’, available at http://www.rug.nl/news/2014/05/rare-earths, (visited 
18 June 2017).
78 WTO Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para 7.111.
79 WTO DISPUTE DS363, ‘China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services 
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products.’
80 WTO AB Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/AB/R 21, 
adopted on 21 December 2009, paras 216-233.
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such language present that allows the incorporation of Article XX, then this 
means that WTO members intended to allow the application of Article XX 
to a non-GATT provision.
Following this approach, although China’s export duty commitments lack 
the same introductory clause of Paragraph 5.1, it in China—Raw Materials 
argued that several other provisions in its Protocol of Accession and Acces-
sion Working Party Report could provide a textual basis for incorporating 
Article XX.81 The panel, however, rejected this line of reasoning.82 In its 
view, if the common intention of WTO members had been to make Article 
XX applicable to Paragraph 11.3, they would have included a reference 
more expressly to this effect such as the introductory clause of Paragraph 
5.1.83
In its appeal of the decision, China argued that the mere absence of an 
express reference to Article XX in Paragraph 11.3 did not mean that WTO 
members intended to exclude its applicability.84 In response, the AB 
examined the ordinary meaning and context of Paragraph 11.3 and identi-
fied three things that reflected the intention of WTO members to exclude 
the applicability of Article XX. First, the ‘exceptional circumstances’ in 
Annex 6 of China’s Protocol of Accession that justified the use of export 
duty commitments did not include Article XX.85 Second, Paragraph 11.3 
confirmed that China could impose export duties in conformity with 
Article VIII of the GATT 1994, and not as per Article XX.86 Third, while both 
Paragraphs 11.1 and 11.2 of China’s Protocol of Accession refer to the GATT 
1994 in general, Paragraph 11.3 does not include such a reference that can be 
interpreted as incorporating Article XX.87
2.2.2 Inherent right
In China—Raw Materials, China developed a second major argument by 
stating that it should be allowed, based on its inherent right to regulate 
trade for the promotion of conservation and public health, to impose export 
duties in a manner consistent with GATT Article XX, unless it had explic-
81 WTO Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, paras 7.125. and 7.133. From a contextual 
perspective, China argued that Paragraph 170 of its Accession Working Party Report, 
which includes a subsection titled ‘Taxes and Charges Levied on Imports and Exports’, 
can support its argument.
82 Ibid., para 7.151.
83 Ibid., para 7.154.
84 WTO AB Reports, China – Raw Materials, para 274.
85 Ibid., para 284.
86 Ibid., para 291.
87 Ibid., para 293.
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itly abandoned this right.88 The panel, however, found that China had, in 
fact, exercised this right when concluding its accession protocol.89 In the 
appeal, China argued that, given the silence on the relationship between 
Article XX and its export duty commitments, the assumption that it had 
abandoned its right to invoke Article XX distorted the balance of rights and 
obligations established in its accession protocol, particularly in the light of 
the objectives of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion (the ‘WTO Agreement’).90 In the end, although the AB acknowledged 
sustainable development as one of the objectives of the WTO Agreement, it 
nevertheless found that none of the objectives provides ‘specific guidance’ 
on the question of applicability.91
2.2.3 A holistic approach
In China—Rare Earths, China criticized the approach of the AB in China – 
Raw Materials for being insufficiently ‘holistic’ in addressing its arguments 
relating to the purpose of the WTO Agreement.92 For China, the result 
of the non-applicability ruling was inconsistent with the fundamental 
‘objective of sustainable development’ as provided for in the preamble 
of the WTO Agreement.93 Although the panel agreed with China’s criti-
cisms in this respect, going so far as to suggest that an interpretation that 
prevented China from enacting necessary environmental measures had 
the potential to become ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’,94 it did 
not consider the non-applicability of Article XX to China’s export duty 
commitments to be the proper legal context in which to address the issue. 
Instead, the panel pointed to environmental policy instruments other than 
export duties that China could legally use under WTO law.95 Since China 
had never proven that export duties were ‘the only type of instrument’ to 
address the proclaimed environmental issues, the panel believed that the 
China – Raw Materials decision would not prevent China from pursuing its 
environmental goals.96 It is uncertain, however, whether the AB would also 
subscribe to this reasoning.97
88 WTO Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para 7.155.
89 Ibid., para 7.156.
90 WTO AB Reports, China – Raw Materials, para 305.
91 Ibid., para 306.
92 WTO Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para 7.105.
93 Ibid., paras 7.108-7.110.
94 Ibid., para 7.111.
95 Ibid., para 7.112.
96 Ibid., para 7.117.
97 China did not appeal against this fi nding which left no chance for the AB to review this 
particular reasoning.
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2.2.4 Integration theory98
In China—Rare Earths, China developed a novel argument that its export 
duty commitments was integrally linked to the GATT 1994 from a systemic 
perspective.99 Following this approach, China argued that each provision 
in its accession protocol was integral to one or another of the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement in the light of Paragraph 
1.2 of China’s accession protocol and Article XII:1 of the WTO Agree-
ment.100 China further argued for the need to evaluate which Multilateral 
Trade Agreement relates intrinsically to Paragraph 11.3. For the Chinese 
government, since both the export duty commitments and the GATT 1944 
involved regulation of trade in goods, the former one should automatically 
become part of the latter one. Conversely, since Article XX applied to all 
provisions in the GATT 1994, it should also apply to China’s export duty 
commitments.101
The panel identified two underlying premises in China’s argument and 
refuted both.102 First, the panel adopted a narrow interpretation of the 
language in Paragraph 1.2 and Article XII:1, finding that these provisions 
only suggested that China’s Protocol of Accession was an integral part of the 
WTO Agreement, rather than specifically making the export duty commit-
ments an integral part of the GATT 1994.103 Second, the panel disagreed 
with the premise that China’s export duty commitments were intrinsically 
related to the GATT 1994 because the latter did not require WTO members 
to eliminate export duties.104
Notably, however, one panellist supported China’s position,105 arguing that 
there should be various ways for WTO members to express their common 
intention regarding the relationship between a provision of an accession 
98 Borrowed from André de Hoogh, ‘The Relationship between China’s Protocol of Acces-
sion and the GATT 1994: China – Rare Earths and the Incorporation Theory — Off with 
its Head! (Part 2)’, available at http://www.rug.nl/rechten/organization/vakgroepen/
int/guild-blog/blogs/rare-earths-and-the-incorporation-theory-off-with-its-head-part-2, 
(visited 18 June 2017).
99 WTO Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para 7.75.
100 Ibid., paras 7.76-7.90. For China, the term ‘the WTO Agreement’ in Paragraph 1.2 of its 
Protocol of Accession referred to the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments annexed to it. Moreover, Article XII:1 of the WTO Agreement stipulates that the 
accession of WTO members shall apply to the WTO Agreement and its Multilateral Trade 
Agreements. In China’s view, Article XII:1 suggested that the provisions in its Accession 
Protocol should be part of one of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
101 Ibid., para 7.100.
102 Ibid., para 7.76.
103 Ibid., paras 7.80-7.94.
104 Ibid., para 7.95.
105 Ibid., para 7.3.2.1.8.
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protocol and other WTO agreements such as the GATT 1994.106 In deter-
mining the common intention of members regarding how China’s export 
duty commitments interacted with Article XX, the panellist found that those 
commitments, by their very nature, expanded China’s obligations under 
the GATT 1994 because the export duty commitments and such GATT 
provisions as Article II and Article XI:1 deal with the overlapping subject 
matter of border tariff duties.107 Moreover, this dissenting panellist also 
supported the aforementioned opinion that if WTO members had intended 
to exclude public policy exceptions under Article XX, they would have said 
so explicitly.108 This opinion was also shared by three third-parties, namely 
Argentina, Brazil, and Russia.
It is noteworthy that more third-parties involved in the appeal process 
contesting the denial of China’s right under Article XX than were involved 
in China—Raw Materials.109 China, however, instead of appealing the whole 
inapplicability decision, requested the AB to only reverse part of the panel’s 
finding, namely Paragraph 1.2 and Article XII:1 of the WTO Agreement fail 
to make its export duty commitments an integral part of the GATT 1994.110 
This request was rejected by the AB which emphasised that Paragraph 1.2 
and Article XII:1 were only general provisions designed to connect China’s 
Protocol of Accession with the WTO Agreement and its Multilateral Trade 
Agreements.111 To further determine the relationship between Article XX 
and China’s export duty commitments in the accession protocol, a thorough 
analysis of all the relevant provisions should be required. Thus, while the 
lack of textual reference to Article XX in China’s export duty commitments 
under Paragraph 11.3 is not dispositive in and of itself,112 both the text and 
context of Paragraph 11.3 were held to suggest that WTO members did not, 
after all, intend to allow for the applicability of Article XX.113
2.2.5 Article 30(3) of the VCLT114
In its appeal of China—Rare Earths, China developed a new argument ac-
cording to which its export duty commitments constituted a subsequent 
106 Ibid., para 7.131.
107 Ibid., para 7.136.
108 Ibid., para 7.137.
109 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Russia.
110 WTO AB Reports, China – Rare Earths, para 5.13.
111 Ibid., para 5.51.
112 Ibid., para 5.61.
113 Ibid., paras 5.63-5.65.
114 In its efforts regarding China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths, then, it appears that 
China has exhausted conventional approaches for affi rming the applicability of GATT 
Article XX to Paragraph 11.3. China’s arguments based on Article 30(3) of the VCLT thus 
demonstrate a desire to explore new solutions from the perspective of public interna-
tional law. Various options from this perspective will be examined in Chapter 7.
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agreement as described in Article 30(3) of the VCLT. For China, those 
commitments had modified GATT Article XI:1, for which reason Article 
XX should apply to the modified Article XI:1, i.e., the provision outlining 
China’s export duty commitments.115 China’s argument here was dismissed 
by the AB, which found that it had failed to provide sufficient support for its 
reasoning in light of public international law.116
Although none of the above arguments was accepted, the panels in both 
cases continued assessing China’s environmental defences under Article 
XX. This following section shows why these defences have been found 
unconvincingly.
2.3 Defences under Article XX(b) and XX(g)
GATT Article XX lays out a number of specific instances in which WTO-
inconsistent measures could be justified subject to the requirements under 
a two-tiered test. The first tier of the test requires China’s export duties to 
meet the requirements under any subparagraphs of Article XX. If those 
duties are provisionally justified, the second tier of the test further requires 
them to satisfy the requirements under the chapeau of Article XX.
 In China – Raw Materials, China invoked both subparagraphs (b) and (g) 
of Article XX to argue that imposing export duties on the raw materials at 
issue would not only preserve exhaustible natural resources but also protect 
the local environment in China.117 Article XX(b) permits WTO members to 
adopt a measure that is ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health’. For the Chinese government, the duties at issue should benefit from 
this provision because they would reduce local pollution generated during 
the production of coke, magnesium, manganese, and silicon carbide.118 In 
contrast, the complainants argued that these duties were actually adopted 
to provide Chinese companies with preferential access over their foreign 
competitors to the raw materials at issue.119
In an attempt to prove that its export duties had contributed materially to 
the reduction of pollution caused by the extraction of raw materials, China 
submitted two empirical studies showing that these duties decreased the 
demand for exports and therefore, in turn, decreased domestic produc-
tion.120 The accuracy of these studies was, however, questioned by the panel 
115 Ibid., para 5.69.
116 Ibid., para 5.70.
117 Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para 7.356 and para 7.470.
118 Ibid., para 7.519.
119 Ibid., para 7.522.
120 Ibid., para 7.519.
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on the grounds that they did not account for pollution that might be gener-
ated by additional production in the domestic downstream sector.121 In the 
absence of an appropriate domestic restriction, export duties were likely to 
increase such production and thus to undermine their material contribution 
to reducing pollution.122
Moreover, the panel also questioned the necessity of China’s export duties 
as an environmental policy instrument. In the panel’s view, China had the 
capacity to achieve the same environmental goal by replacing the duties at 
issue with various alternative measures, namely investment in more envi-
ronmentally friendly technologies, further encouragement and promotion 
of the recycling of consumer goods, increasing environmental standards, 
investing in ‘infrastructure necessary to facilitate recycling scrap’, stimu-
lating greater local demand for scrap material without exhausting local 
supply, and introducing production restrictions or pollution controls on 
primary production.123 Following its analysis, the panel found that China’s 
export duties were not justified under Article XX(b).
With respect to Article XX(g), a provision that permits WTO members to 
impose measures that ‘relate to the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource’, China argued that the export duties on fluorspar would reduce 
domestic production of the resource by decreasing foreign demand.124 
However, the evidence submitted to the panel showed that, after the 
imposition of export duties, the domestic extraction of fluorspar in fact 
increased in response to a substantial increase in its domestic consump-
tion.125 Thus these duties were found to not satisfy the purpose test under 
Article XX(g).126 Moreover, the panel also found that the imposition of 
these duties had not been ‘even-handed’ because China did not impose any 
similar restrictions on domestic consumption. In the panel’s view, although 
the term ‘even-handed’ did not require identical treatment of domestic 
and foreign consumers, the imposition of all limitations solely on foreign 
consumers was clearly not acceptable.127
In China—Rare Earths, China only invoked Article XX(b) to justify the use 
of export duties on the rare earth minerals, tungsten, and molybdenum.128 
Clearly having learnt some lessons from China—Raw Materials, when 
China imposed the duties on these raw materials, it made several official 
121 Ibid., para 7.533.
122 Ibid., para 7.538.
123 Ibid., para 7.566.
124 Ibid., para 7.427.
125 Ibid., para 7.429.
126 Ibid., para 7.435.
127 Ibid., para 7.465.
128 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para 7.49.
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announcements regarding its environmental objectives in doing so.129 
These announcements, however, failed to convince the panel that the 
duties in dispute were truly adopted to protect the environment because no 
explanation had been offered regarding how controlling the exports would 
contribute to a decrease in the pollution associated with the production of 
raw materials.130 Moreover, the panel found that China’s export duties did 
not make a material contribution to reducing the pollution because there 
was no corresponding measure restricting domestic consumption.131 The 
mere imposition of export duties, rather than helping to control the produc-
tion of raw materials, would encourage more intensive use of them by 
China’s domestic downstream industries.132 Furthermore, various alterna-
tive measures were found to be available to China. 133 In the subsequent 
analysis regarding the requirements of the chapeau, China’s export duties 
were found to constitute a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’ 
because they were not actually tailored to protect the environment.134
The above assessment suggests that China’s export duties were unlikely to 
be adopted for environmental purposes, largely owing to the lack of corre-
sponding restrictions on domestic consumption of the targeted raw mate-
rials. This being the case, the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths 
decisions that deny China’s right to invoke Article XX seem to be accepted. 
After all, the duties in dispute would never be justified under Article XX. 
It is noteworthy, however, that these decisions also prohibit China from 
justifying any future export duties, no matter on raw materials or not, even 
if those duties could contribute meaningfully to environmental protection. 
Moreover, an absolute prohibition on China’s export duties seems a fairly 
stringent finding, especially given that most WTO members remain free to 
impose duties on exports for any purpose. In this context, the China—Raw 
Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions have raised several concerns, 
which are discussed in the next chapter.
129 Ibid., paras 7.162-7.164.
130 Ibid., para 7.166.
131 Ibid., para 7.179.
132 Ibid., para 7.176.
133 ‘(i) increase volume restrictions on mining and production; (ii) establish effective pollu-
tion controls on mining and production; (iii) impose a resources tax on consumption; (iv) 
impose a pollution tax; and (v) develop and impose an export licensing system.’ Ibid., 
paras 7.185-7.187.
134 Ibid., paras 7.191-7.192.

3 The Reception of the Ban on China’s 
Export Duties: Concerns, Solutions, 
and the Missing Piece
The high-profile China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths cases have 
been the subject of considerable discussion by practitioners and scholars. A 
large part of this discussion has focused on two major concerns regarding 
the AB’s interpretation in effect denying China’s right to justify the use of 
export duties under GATT Article XX. First, this interpretation in favour of 
an absolute ban on China’s export duties appears to be erroneous because 
it neglects several important considerations. Second, such an erroneous 
interpretation would result in negative implications for China and for the 
WTO in general. Thus various legal solutions to these concerns have been 
proposed, though none has been implemented to date, thereby raising 
the question of whether the ban even merits being corrected in practice. 
This chapter accordingly offers a comprehensive assessment of the current 
literature on the necessity of providing China with the policy space to 
impose export duties. The following discussion first introduces the debate 
on the two major concerns over the ban on China’s export duties and then 
describes the various legal solutions that have been proposed. The discus-
sion concludes by addressing what has been missing from the current 
discussion, namely whether an absolute ban on export duties would in 
practice prevent China from protecting the environment—which is of great 
importance in terms of efforts to correct the China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths decisions.
3.1 Erroneous interpretation based on an overly rigid textual 
analysis
The WTO panels and AB have traditionally taken a textual approach to 
interpretation. This choice was initially motivated in part by a desire to 
avoid accusations of bias from individual members and thereby to establish 
the credibility of the WTO as the new institution took shape.135 As applied in 
the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths cases concerning China’s 
export duty commitments, the textual analysis has incurred criticism over 
its rigidity in failing to take into account all of the necessary considerations 
for a correct interpretation, given the fact that China has never explicitly 
135 Richard H. Steinberg, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and 
Political Constraints’, 98(2) The American Journal of International Law (2004), at 261.
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relinquished its right to use export duties in a manner consistent with 
Article XX. These neglected considerations are illustrated as follows.
First, accession protocols are essentially different from other multilateral 
trade agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement. The former ones are 
often loosely drafted because the acceding country lacks the bargaining 
power that could provide either the necessary checks and balances to 
produce carefully-drafted rules or the legal competence to establish a 
precise meaning for a given term.136 Thus a strict textual approach to acces-
sion protocols—as if they had been negotiated and drafted with such care 
that any omission, in this case the lack of reference to Article XX in China’s 
export duty commitments, represents a ‘deliberate choice’ by the parties—
seems in this context a dubious hermeneutic.137
Moreover, unlike other multilateral trade agreements, China’s accession 
protocol does not focus on a single subject matter, such as trade in goods or 
services.138 Instead, the protocol covers subjects across the entire spectrum 
of the WTO Agreement and therefore cannot be understood in isolation.139 
In this sense, explicit reference to GATT Article VIII in Paragraph 11.3 does 
not amount to the exclusion of all other provisions in the GATT, such as 
Article XX.140 Otherwise, it would necessary to make the absurd assump-
tion that some fundamental provisions in the GATT, such as Article I, ‘Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment’, and Article III, ‘National Treatment’, are not 
applicable to China’s export duty commitments.141 In this context, it would 
be redundant for Paragraph 11.3 to state explicitly, ‘consistent with the 
GATT 1994’, a term that the AB found could establish the applicability of 
Article XX to Paragraph 11.3, because this is the precondition that is tacitly 
agreed upon in China’s accession protocol.142
Second, the value of the interests protected by Article XX is too significant 
to be signed away in a silent manner. The supreme status of Article XX is 
based on its function as the last resort for members within the WTO frame-
work, thus maintaining the delicate balance of the entire WTO regime.143 
136 Julia Ya Qin, ‘Reforming WTO Discipline on Export Duties: Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, Economic Development and Environmental Protection’, 46(5) Journal of 
World Trade 1147 (2012), at 1157.
137 Ibid.
138 Qin (2012), above n 135, at 1156.
139 Ibid.
140 Bin Gu, ‘Applicability of GATT Article XX in China–Raw Materials a Clash within the 
WTO Agreement’, 15(4) Journal of International Economic Law (2012), at 1024.
141 Ibid.
142 Delei Pend and Bohua Gong, ‘Comments on The Findings About the Application of 
GATT Article XX in China Raw–Materials’, 5 International Business Research (2011), at 29.
143 Ying Liu, ‘The Applicability of Environmental Protection Exceptions to WTO-Plus Obli-
gations: In View of the China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths Cases’, 27(1) Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2014), at 127.
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It may be incorrect to assume that Article XX should apply to all WTO agree-
ments because a few of them do not have this exception.144 Such an absence 
could, however, be carefully negotiated by all WTO members. In contrast, 
the absence of a reference to Article XX in China’s accession protocol may 
well be a drafting error which should not be considered as negotiating away 
the right to regulate the public good, especially in the absence of ‘thorough 
and sufficiently open debate amongst all stakeholders’.145
Third, the significant value under Article XX is closely related to the 
objective and purpose of the WTO Agreement, which should be among 
the considerations in treaty interpretation according to Article 31 of the 
VCLT. In China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths, China was unable 
to invoke Articles XX(b) and (g), the provisions referring to the values 
that WTO members have agreed to reaffirm in the preamble of the WTO 
Agreement that articulates the organization’s ‘mission’.146 In this context, 
the silence regarding the applicability of Article XX in China’s accession 
protocol should not amount to a waiver of China’s essential rights to pursue 
environmental objectives.147 In other words, the ‘expressio unius approach’ 
adopted by the AB ‘can easily be reversed by reference to a more teleolog-
ical approach to interpretation’.148 In this sense, the AB could have engaged 
in a ‘courageous’ interpretation that allowed for the availability of Article 
XX defences for violations of non-GATT obligations even in cases in which 
there is no specific language regarding their incorporation.149
Fourth, China’s export duty commitments in Paragraph 11.3 have a special 
nature as a WTO-plus obligation.150 One major reason to deny China’s right 
under Article XX is based on a textual difference between Paragraph 11.3 
and Paragraphs 11.1 and 11.2. The latter ones broadly refer to the GATT 1994 
in general, which in the view of the AB textually incorporated all the GATT 
provisions including Article XX, whereas Paragraph 11.3 only refers to a 
specific GATT provision, namely Article VIII. This led the AB to conclude 
that there is a common intention to exclude the applicability of Article XX to 
Paragraph 11.3.151 This conclusion is, however, considered suspect. Unlike 
Paragraphs 11.1 and 11.2, both of which emphasize obligations already 
144 Ehring (2013), above n 16, at 359.
145 Bronckers and Maskus (2014), above n 19, at 401.
146 Ilaria Espa, ‘The AB Approach to the Applicability of Article XX GATT In the Light of 
China – Raw Materials: A Missed Opportunity?’, 46(6) Journal of World Trade (2012), at 
1420-1421.
147 Gu (2012), above n 139, at 1029.
148 Eric W Bond and Joel P. Trachtman, ‘China–Rare Earths: Export Restrictions and the Limits 
of Textual Interpretation’, 15(2) World Trade Review (2016), at 208.
149 Espa (2012), above 145, at 1421.
150 Jingdong Liu, ‘Accession Protocols: Legal Status in the WTO Legal System’, 48 Journal of 
World Trade (2014), at 123.
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existent under the GATT 1994, Paragraph 11.3 includes two types commit-
ments, namely the elimination of export duties as a WTO-plus obligation and 
the use of fees connected with importation and exportation as an existent 
GATT obligation. 152 In this context, while Paragraph 11.3 emphasizes the 
existent obligation concerning fees by referring to GATT Article VIII, it does 
not need to do so with regard to the WTO-plus obligation concerning export 
duties through reference to any GATT provision, including Article XX.153 In 
this context, the absence of a reference to either the GATT 1994 in general or 
Article XX in specific should not be considered a common intention to prevent 
China from adopting export duties in a manner consistent with Article XX.
Fifth, although China’s export duty commitments under Paragraph 11.3 
do not have a corresponding obligation under the GATT 1994, there is a 
systemic relationship between them, based on which Article XX should 
apply to Paragraph 11.3.154 The reason is that the use of export duties is 
inherently related to the GATT disciplines on customs tariffs and export 
restrictions.155 In this context, contrary to the AB’s finding that there should 
be a textual connection between Article XX and Paragraph 11.3, the latter’s 
systemically intrinsic relationship with the GATT 1994 is sufficient to enable 
China to justify the violation of it under Article XX.156 As a counter-argu-
ment, this approach may generate arbitrary results because there seems to 
be no clear-cut standard for determining the intrinsic relationship between 
a WTO-plus obligation and the subject-matter of one particular multilateral 
trade agreement.157
The above survey shows that the textual approach adopted by the AB is 
certainly too rigid compared with a more teleological approach which may 
eventually find China’s right to protect public policy. However, one can 
hardly argue that the preference over the textual approach in these cases is 
legally wrong. On the contrary, abandoning the textual approach for some 
good purpose may constitute a kind of activism on the part of the AB in 
taking up issues that should have been addressed by the ‘legislative branch’ 
of the WTO.158 In contrast, a more compelling line of argument correctly 
questions the reasonableness or even legality of the premise that China 
152 Liu (2014), above n 150, at 123.
153 Ibid.
154 Jiaxiang Hu, ‘Reconsideration of Applicability of Article XX in GATT: From the Perspec-
tive of the Relationship Between GATT 1994 and Other Multilateral Trade Agreements 
in Goods’, 6(2) Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 
(2014) at 15.
155 Qin (2012), above n 135, at 1156.
156 Hu (2014), above 153, at 34.
157 Ehring (2013), above n 16, at 357-358.
158 Danielle Spiegel-Feld and Stephanie Switzer, ‘Whither Article XX? Regulatory Autonomy 
Under Non-GATT Agreements After China–Raw Materials’, 38 Yale Journal of Interna-
tional Law Online (2012), at 28.
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could silently sign away its important right to protect public policy under 
Article XX.159 Its persuasiveness, however, largely depends on whether the 
values protected by Article XX are truly at stake which is discussed next.
3.2 Negative implications caused by an absolute ban on China’s 
export duties
Two major concerns over environmental protection and fairness have been 
raised. First, an absolute ban on China’s export duties may unduly limit 
China’s policy space when it comes to protecting the environment.160 More-
over, as the criteria set out in China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths 
may also apply to the export duty commitments of other acceded members, 
including Mongolia, Latvia, Saudi Arabia, Montenegro, and Tajikistan, their 
policy space for the use of export duties could be similarly constrained.161 
Second, the two decisions may further increase the inequality of the already 
existing two-tier membership structure of the WTO, thus potentially 
undermining the legitimacy of the organization as a whole. In this subsec-
tion, these negative implications and counter-arguments against them are 
reviewed.
3.2.1 Environment-related concerns
Although China’s export duties failed to meet the requirements of the 
environmental exceptions under Article XX in China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths, this, in the view of some commentators, does not neces-
sarily mean that the duties would never be consistent with Article XX.162 
Accordingly, China’s policy space for environmental protection would 
likely be constrained by a wholesale prohibition on the imposition of 
export duties.163 Moreover, these decisions might also prevent China from 
using export duties as a climate policy tool, an issue unaddressed in either 
China—Raw Materials or China—Rare Earths.164
159 For further discussion, see Chapter 7.
160 Bin Gu, ‘Mineral Export Restraints and Sustainable Development—Are Rare Earths 
Testing the WTO’s Loopholes?’, 14(4) Journal of International Economic Law (2011), at 
783.
161 Baris Karapinar, ‘Defining the Legal Boundaries of Export Restrictions: A Case Law 
Analysis’, 15(2) Journal of International Economic Law (2012), at 461.
162 For further discussion on whether China’s export duties can ever be justifi ed under 
Article XX, see Chapter 8.
163 Cai Fang, ‘What Are the Lessons from China – Raw Materials?’, China Environment News, 
available at http://cwto.mofcom.gov.cn/article/m/201202/20120207978584.shtml, 
(visited 18 June 2017).
164 Ibid. Also see Baris Karapinar and Kateryna Holzer, ‘Legal Implications of the Use of 
Export Taxes in Addressing Carbon Leakage: Competing Border Adjustment Measures’, 
10(1) New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law (2012), at 34. For further 
discussion, see Chapter 6.
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Besides the potential constraints on China’s policy space to protect the envi-
ronment, an absolute ban on its export duties may leave no room for China 
to develop a sound environmental policy within the WTO legal framework. 
It has been argued that, if Article XX is found to be applicable, China could 
have advanced its export duties in order to meet the meet the requirements 
of the environmental exceptions, as for instance, introducing corresponding 
limits for domestic consumption.165 On the contrary, however, the extreme 
constraint of the absolute ban on its export duties appears to have pushed 
China to resort to such non-market means as compelling mergers of small 
and medium-sized producers of raw materials with a few large state-owned 
enterprises.166
The persuasiveness of the above environmental arguments is, however, 
diminished by two major counter-arguments. The first one calls into ques-
tion of the significance of export duties as an environmental measure. It has 
been argued that the negative environmental impact of an absolute prohibi-
tion on export duties is very limited because the duties are at best a tempo-
rary environmental protection measure.167 This line of thought suggests 
that China’s export duties could well be replaced by other traditional envi-
ronmental policy instruments.168 For instance, when it comes to limit the 
environmental harm associated with the manufacture of certain products, 
one alternative would be to implement a quota or tax on the production.169 
In this way, the protectionist aspects of export duties would be eliminated 
while the environmental benefits would be preserved.170 Another alterna-
tive for China is to seek advanced environmental technologies from abroad 
to upgrade its out-dated production technology.171 A more controversial 
165 Bill Butcher, ‘WTO Open Trade Rules and Domestic Environmental Protection Policies: 
A Balancing Approach’, in Larry Kreiser, Soocheol Lee, Kazuhiro Ueta, Janet E. Milne 
and Hope Ashiabor (eds), ‘Environmental Taxation and Green Fiscal Reform’ (Edward Elgar 
2014), 69–81 at 77.
166 Julia Ya Qin, ‘Reforming WTO Discipline on Export Duties: Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, Economic Development and Environmental Protection’, 46(5) Journal of 
World Trade 1147 (2012), at 1178.
167 Zhixiong Huang, 12(3) ‘From “Market Access” to “Resource Acquire”—Thoughts on 
China Raw Materials, 1 Studies in Law and Business (2010), at 43.
168 Baris Karapinar, ‘China’s Export Restriction Policies: Complying With ‘WTO Plus’ or 
Undermining Multilateralism, 10(03) World Trade Review (2011), at 405.
169 Mark Wu and James Salzman, ‘Next Generation of Trade and Environment Confl icts: The 
Rise of Green Industrial Policy’, 108(2) Northwestern University Law Review (2013), at 
461. Also see Yong Li, ‘Trade Disputes Caused by Export Restrictions on Rare Earths and 
Its Countermeasures under the WTO Framework’, 13(4) Journal of Shanghai University 
of Finance and Economics (2011), at 40.
170 Ibid.
171 Brigid Gavin, ‘Sustainable Development of China’s Rare Earth Industry within and 
without the WTO’, 49(3) Journal of World Trade (2015), at 514. For further discussion on 
a different proposal about a barter exchange of frontier technologies for minerals, see Gu 
(2011), above n 159, at 803.
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alternative would be to replace export duties with other types of export 
restrictive measures such as an export quota, which could be imposed in 
a manner consistent with GATT Article XX.172 It seems to run counter to 
the WTO’s strong preference for tariffs over the less transparent non-tariff 
barriers and thus encourages China to take an undesirable path.173
The second counter-argument calls into question of the actual motive 
behind China’s export duties. It has been argued that an absolute prohibi-
tion on these duties would not practically prevent China from protecting 
the environment because it simply does not genuinely consider export 
duties to be a part of its environmental policy.174 This line of thought may 
have been provoked by the fact that the measures imposing the challenged 
export duties in the China—Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths cases did 
not cite any environmental purposes or explain sufficiently how they would 
contribute to conserving natural resources or protecting public health. 
Moreover, the absence of restrictions on domestic consumption of the raw 
materials in dispute raises the suspicion that the challenged duties were 
adopted with the intention of creating differentials between the domestic 
and international prices of raw materials in order to further such industrial 
aims as fostering Chinese downstream sectors,175 encouraging foreign 
companies to transfer production to China,176 and maintaining control of 
key natural resources for domestic supply chains.177
Arguably, China’s omission to explain the environmental rationale behind 
its export duties may in part be attributable to the manner in which 
legislation is drafted in China, which involves broad aspirational state-
ments rather than specific and detailed provisions.178 Regarding the lack 
of complementary measure to restrict the domestic consumption in China, 
one may argue that this country is just beginning to implement and enforce 
environmental legislation, so there is undoubtedly room for improve-
ment.179 In this context, one Chinese scholar has argued that rather than 
absolutely prohibiting export duties, the WTO would be better advised to 
172 Ehring (2013), above n 16, at 361.
173 Bill (2014), above n 164, at 73.
174 C.L. Lim and J.H. Senduk, ‘You Don’t Miss Your Water “Til Your River Runs Dry” Regu-
lating Industrial Supply Shortages After China—Raw Materials’, 18 Stanford Journal of 
Law, Business & Finance (2012), at 76.
175 Karapinar (2011), above n 167, at 404.
176 Gavin (2015), above n 170, at 503.
177 Elizabeth Trujillo, ‘A Dialogical Approach to Trade and Environment, 16(3) Journal of 
International Economic Law (2013), at 556.
178 Ruth Jebe, Don Mayer, and Yong-Shik Lee, ‘China’s Export Restrictions of Raw Materials 
and Rare Earths: A New Balance Between Free Trade and Environmental Protection?’, 
44(4) George Washington International Law Review (2012), at 639.
179 Ibid., at 641.
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provide China with guidance regarding how to properly use export duties 
to protect the environment.180
In contrast, his Western counterparts appear to have a more critical view 
of China’s actual motives. For instance, although the Chinese government 
removed the export duties at issue in accordance with the China—Raw 
Materials and China – Rare Earths decisions, the more recent China—Raw 
Materials II dispute raises the concern that Chinese industrial policymakers 
are exploiting ‘the WTO’s “free pass” for temporary breach to their advan-
tage without major consequence’ and thus there are ‘little incentives for 
authorities to constrain similar behavior in the future’.181 One may chal-
lenge such perceptions by referring to China’s voluntary adjustment of 
its environmental policy in reaction to the China – Rare Earths including 
‘the improvement of environmental regulations on rare earths’ and ‘the 
mobilization of local governments to better implement rare earths indus-
trial polices which cover the areas of mining, production, circulation, and 
industry consolidation’.182 This line of thought, however, appears to implic-
itly support the first counter-argument concerning the usefulness of export 
duties for protecting the environment.
The above survey shows that the question relating to the usefulness of 
export duties to protect the environment is of the greatest importance. Its 
answer would determine the seriousness of the environmental problems 
caused by the China—Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths decisions. 
Moreover, without knowing the answer, no matter what China reacts to 
these decisions, its reaction could always be interpreted as acting in bad 
faith. The abolish of export duties could be seen as supporting the claim 
that the declared environmental purpose of these duties was a mere pretext, 
whereas to keep imposing export duties is certainly exploiting the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism for temporary breach. The current literature, 
however, provides no clear answer to this crucial question.183
180 Xiaoyong He, ‘The Relationship Between Article XX of the GATT and Protocol on the 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China—A Rational Approach to China Raw Mate-
rials’, 11(6) Law Science (2012), at 66.
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Review (2017), at 674.
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Changes’, 52(2) Journal of World Trade (2018), at 329. For the author, the change of envi-
ronmental policy after the China – Rare Earths shows that ‘China supports the WTO DSS, 
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183 For further discussion on this issue, see Chapter 4.
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3.2.2 Inequality-related concerns
Compared with the environment-related concerns, it is more certain that the 
China—Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths decisions would exacerbate 
the inequality-related problems in the WTO. Surely no one would disagree 
that the acceded WTO members generally do not enjoy de jure equality with 
the founder ones within the organization because the former ones are very 
often required to make so-called ‘WTO-plus’ commitments during their 
accession.184 China’s export duty commitments serve as a good example 
because WTO members are generally free to impose export duties. This 
inequality caused by the two-tier membership system, standing in sharp 
contrast with the original aim of the WTO,185 raises such serious concerns 
as the legalist tendencies of the WTO.186 In this context, a further denial 
of the right of China, as already a second-class member, to protect public 
policy under Article XX would cause a significant imbalance in the rights 
and obligations which may raise a serious constitutional issue for WTO 
jurisprudence187 or even challenge the international rule of law in the long 
run.188  Aside from commitments regarding export duties, the China—Raw 
Materials and China – Rare Earths decisions may also increases the inequality 
under the two-tier membership system with respect to other ‘WTO-plus’ 
commitments. Following the criteria set out in the decisions, an exception 
clause in a multilateral trade agreement is generally not applicable to a 
violation of a country-specific commitment in an accession package unless 
the clause is specifically incorporated into the text.189
Besides exacerbating the division between new and other members, the two 
decisions may also increase the inequality among those acceded members 
which have made export duties commitments. Following the criteria set out 
in these decisions, six of these member nations, China, Mongolia, Latvia, 
Saudi Arabia, Montenegro, and Tajikistan, are prohibited from imposing 
export duties in any event, while the other five, Vietnam, Ukraine, Russia, 
184 Steve Charnovitz, ‘Mapping the Law of WTO Accession’, in Steve Charnovitz, ‘The 
Path of World Trade Law in the 21st Century’ (World Scientifi c Publishing, 2014). Also see 
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to the International Rule of Law? – Refl ections in Light of the Raw Materials and Rare 
Earths Disputes’, in Jianwei Wang and Weiqing Song (eds), ‘China, the European Union, 
and the International Politics of Global Governance’ (Springer, 2016).
185 The original aim of the WTO was to create a single regime applying to all members, 
or at least to those groups of members sharing a comparable economic situation. See 
Bronckers and Maskus (2014), above n 19, at 400.
186 Mitali Tyagi, ‘Flesh on a Legal Fiction: Early Practice in the WTO on Accession Protocols’, 
15(2) Journal of International Economic Law(2012), at 297.
187 Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘Export Control of Natural Resources: WTO Panel Ruling on the 
Chinese Export Restrictions of Natural Resources’, 3(2) Trade, Law and Development 
(2011), at 286-287.
188 Burnay and Wouters (2016), above n 183, at 13.
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Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan, retain the ability to impose export duties in 
a manner consistent with GATT Article XX.190 This result is objectionable 
because there is no good reason why the generally-accepted public policy 
exceptions ‘cannot be invoked by all WTO Members in respect of the same 
type of obligation’.191
3.3 Proposed legal solutions and the missing piece in current 
discussion
Various legal solutions have been proposed to address the concerns 
discussed above through an alteration of the absolute ban on China’s export 
duties. In a judicial way, there is a call for a new interpretation that allows 
China to justify the use of export duties under Article XX. For instance, from 
the perspective of public international law, Qin has proposed that China’s 
export duty commitments be considered as either a subsequent agreement 
or subsequent practice of WTO members modifying GATT Article XI under 
Article 30 of the VCLT.192 In the context of WTO law, a more holistic inter-
pretation has been proposed that gives greater weight to the objective of 
sustainable development as recognized in the preamble to the WTO Agree-
ment in order to enable China to use export duties in a manner consistent 
with Article XX.193
 In a non-judicial way, China is advised to request that the WTO’s decision-
making body either approve an amendment to current WTO disciplines 
on export restrictions in order to incorporate Article XX into China’s 
commitment on export duties194 or adopt an authoritative interpretation 
that corrects the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions.195 
In the case of an amendment, Russia’s export duty commitments offer 
guidance.196 Having learned the lessons of China’s omission in the drafting 
of its export duty commitments, Russia created a new section in the 
‘Schedules of Concession and Commitments’ annexed to the GATT 1994 
in which to record its export duty commitments.197 In order to make use of 
such an approach, China could request that the WTO’s Ministerial Confer-
ence approve an amendment to its export duty commitments that either 
transfers them to its own ‘Schedules of Concession and Commitments’ or 
190 Qin (2012), above n 135, at 1152.
191 Bronckers and Maskus (2014), above n 19, at 400.
192 Julia Ya Qin, ‘Conundrum of WTO Accession Protocols: In Search of Legality and Legiti-
macy’, 55(2), Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), at 404.
193 Liu (2014), above n 150, at 132.
194 Minyou Yu and Chuanhai Hu, ‘Be Careful About the Negative Implications from China–
Raw Materials Rulings’ 11(14) Journal of International Trade (2012), at 64.
195 Liu (2014), above n 150, at 751.
196 Qin (2012), above n 135, at 1160.
197 Ibid.
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directly incorporates Article XX.198 Alternatively, China may also request 
that the Ministerial Conference or General Council adopt an authoritative 
interpretation that corrects China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths 
decisions.199
China, however, seems to lack confidence in convincing the WTO members 
or the AB to support the proposed legal solutions. On the one hand, it has 
not sought help from the WTO’s decision-making body to date. On the 
other hand, China is also reluctant to develop a new interpretation in the 
more recent China—Raw Materials II case, otherwise it could have responded 
more actively in the settlement process. This raises the question of whether 
the absolute ban on China’s export duties even merits being corrected in 
practice.
This thesis argues that neither the WTO members nor the AB would be 
interested in altering the absolute ban merely because the textual approach 
adopted by the AB in China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths was 
criticized for being too rigid. As shown in Section 3.1, the adherence to the 
text-first approach in these cases may not be a clear-cut error in a strictly 
legal sense though the silence on the relationship between Article XX and 
China’s export duty commitments does provide the AB with interpretive 
space to adopt a more ideal approach, for avoiding all the negative implica-
tions caused by a rigid textual analysis as discussed in Section 3.2.
Similarly, the general concerns for unfairness alone would also be insuf-
ficient to convince the WTO members or the AB to support the proposed 
legal solutions. Indeed, although the preamble of the WTO Agreement 
calls for ‘the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade 
relations’, discriminatory treatment against certain acceded members is in 
practice permitted.200 In this context, the WTO decisions that exacerbate the 
inequality among WTO members concerning the use of export duties seems 
to be just adding one more example to the existing discriminatory treatment 
in the WTO. As argued by Ehring, nothing in WTO law or ‘superior interna-
tional law’ prohibits WTO members from taking advantage of an acceding 
member during negotiations.201
198 Yu (2012), above n 193, at 64.
199 Liu (2014), above n 150.
200 As a result, ‘the argument that non-discrimination is constitutional principle of the WTO 
is facetious at best’. See Charnovitz (2014), above n 183.
201 ‘There is, however, no legal basis for this claim of discrimination because the WTO prohi-
bitions on discrimination apply to Members’ treatment of trade, but not to the negotia-
tion of WTO agreements, nor does superior international law contain a norm prohibiting 
the unequal treatment of equal situations (despite the principle of sovereign equality) 
when it comes to negotiating international agreements’. See Ehring (2013), above n 16, at 
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In contrast, the environmental concern is of great importance in deciding 
whether WTO members or the AB should support a correction of the 
China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions. Even an author like 
Ehring with a critical view of the unfairness concerns may agree that the 
discrimination applied to the negotiation of accession protocols should not 
prevent a country from pursuing ‘fundamental societal interests’.202 As he 
correctly put it, ‘one needs to ask whether the values protected by Article 
XX truly can be threatened by the obligations at stake’.203 Thus, to justify his 
argument in favour of an absolute ban on China’s export duties, he claimed 
that the environmental concerns are merely ‘the fog created by political 
statements and litigation advocacy’ and ‘a public policy problem does not 
really seem to exist’.204 Interestingly, this similar view was also repeatedly 
emphasized by the complainants and the panels as an attempt to justify the 
denial of China’s right under Article XX.205 In this sense, all of them seem 
to agree that, if disallowing China to impose export duties would indeed 
prevent it from protecting the environmental under certain circumstances, 
the decisions placing an absolute ban on China’s export duties should be 
reconsidered. Otherwise, the discussion of those environmental concerns is 
of more academic interest than practical importance.206
 The current literature, however, provides no clear answer to the crucial 
question of whether an absolute ban on China’s export duties would in 
practice constrain its policy space to protect the environment. In particular, 
there is a lack of research examining the validity of the two counter-argu-
ments relating to the usefulness of export duties to protect the environment 
and to the real purpose of China’s export duties. The next steps involve 
filling in the missing piece in current discussion through an examination of 
practices of WTO members that support the use of export duties to protect 
the environment (Chapter 4), the actual motive behind China’s export 
duties (Chapter 5), and the potential role of the duties in tackling carbon 
leakage, which remained unaddressed in China—Raw Materials and China—
Rare Earths (Chapter 6).
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Part II:
Preliminary Analysis: 
Would an Absolute Prohibition 
on China’s Export Duties 
Constrain the County’s 
Capacity to Protect the 
Environment?

4 An Absolute Ban on Export Duties 
Would Prevent a Country from Protecting 
the Environment Under Certain 
Circumstances
The previous chapter presents a popular view which appears to suggest 
that an absolute ban on export duties would not prevent a country from 
protecting the environment. According to this view, on the one hand, 
targeting exports tends to be less effective than directly regulating the 
production that causes local or global pollution, for which reason the 
duties should be generally replaced with such traditional environmental 
measures as pollution taxes. On the other hand, even if it may sometimes be 
meaningful to target exports, counties could use quantitative export restric-
tions, such as quotas. Thus an absolute ban on China’s export duties would 
not prevent China from protecting the environment because it could still 
impose quantitative export restrictions in a manner consistent with WTO 
law.
The above perception is, however, rather arbitrary because it ignores the 
practice of WTO members in two respects. First, although export resections 
can hardly be the best option to protect the environment, they are certainly 
not rarely used for that purpose. Section 4.1 provides a survey of this kind 
of practice in the period from 2009 to 2016 based on the WTO’s environ-
mental database.207 Furthermore, the same survey reveals the preference 
of countries for export duties over quantitative restrictions, owing to some 
major drawbacks of the latter option compared with export duties. The 
actual examples of country practices to use export duties to reduce local or 
global pollution are also discussed.
The second type of ignorance is in the field of the practice to regulate export 
restrictions. Section 4.2 shows that environmental regulatory autonomy of 
countries is always protected in the regulation of such export restrictions 
as duties or quotas at both the multilateral and regional levels by incorpo-
rating general or specific exceptions. This observation is based on a survey 
provided in Section 4.3 of the provisions or proposals limiting the use of 
export restrictions in WTO agreements and 50 select regional trade agree-
ments (RTAs) that have entered into force in the period from 2012 to 2016. 
The same survey also illustrates the regulatory preference of WTO members 
for export duties over quantitative restrictions.
207 It contains all environment-related notifi cations submitted by WTO members as well as 
environmental measures and policies mentioned in the Trade Policy Reviews of WTO 
members.
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4.1 Practice of WTO members to restrict exports for 
environmental purposes in the period from 2009 to 2016
Based on a survey of the practice of WTO members to impose export restric-
tions as a means to achieve environmental goals in the period from 2009 to 
2016, this section offers two observations. First, it is fair to claim that export 
restrictions are widely used to fulfil the requirements under multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs). Second, compared with the practice to 
achieve MEA-related goals, the use of export restrictions to address non-
MEA-related issues is less frequent but certainly not unusual. Third, when 
it comes to using export restrictions to tackle non-MEA-related problems, 
WTO members prefer duties over quantitative export restrictions. This 
section discusses these observations and offers actual examples of country 
practices to use export duties to reduce local or global pollution.
4.1.1 General observations and actual examples of country practices 
to use export duties to reduce local or global pollution
Regarding the first observation of the practice to use export restrictions to 
implement MEAs, the WTO Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) data show that 
such restrictive measures as export bans are widely used to achieve the 
goals under two major MEAs, namely the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the Montreal Protocol) and the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES). The former one is designed to protect the ozone layer by phasing 
out the consumption and production of numerous substances that are 
responsible for ozone depletion, whereas the latter one is an agreement 
calling for international cooperation to safeguard certain species from over-
exploitation, in order to preserve limited natural resources.
The wide use of export restrictions especially export bans to achieve the 
objectives of the Montreal Protocol and the CITES can be explained by 
the fact that these treaties explicitly authorize the participant countries 
to impose export restrictions on certain targeted products. The Montreal 
Protocol, for instance, requires contracting parties to not only ban the import 
of controlled substances from non-parties but also restrict the exports 
of controlled substances to non-parties.208 The CITES also includes such 
import and export restrictions with non-parties in order to prevent them 
from functioning as transit countries for illegal trade in certain species.209
208 Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol.
209 OECD, ‘Trade Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, 9 February 2000, 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/trade-measures-in-multilateral-environmental-
agreements_9789264180611-en;jsessionid=SnsDsvs6SiUMXGCjZWliMkLV.ip-10-240-5-
115 (visited on 1 January 2019), at 174.
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One major reason for requiring countries to restrict exports under these 
treaties is to prevent trade from exacerbating the existing problems. For 
instance, at the 2013 meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, 
the large exports of whale products from Iceland to Japan and Norway 
under their respective reservations to the convention raised the concern 
that the increased trade in whale products would risk undermining the 
global efforts to protect endangered whales.210 Thus Iceland was recom-
mended to remove its reservation and then to restrict the exports of whale 
products.211 Moreover, export restrictions may also induce behaviour 
change. For instance, part of the rationale behind the obligations to restrict 
exports under the Montreal Protocol is to ‘maximizing participation in the 
protocol’.212 The reasoning is that, compared with the situation of losing 
access to the controlled substances entirely, non-party countries would 
prefer joining the Protocol which only limits their consumption of the 
controlled substances.213
This above observation shows that export restrictions could contribute to 
treaty-based environmental objectives though, as mentioned above, those 
restrictions are mostly adopted in the form of ban. In contrast, when it 
comes to protecting non-treaty-based environmental values, WTO members 
prefer such comparatively mild restrictions as duties over embargos. One 
possible reason could be that, unlike the substances that are responsible for 
ozone depletion, most of the targeted products for non-treaty-based envi-
ronmental purposes are not required to be completely eliminated (Table 1). 
According to the survey of the use of export restrictive measures to achieve 
non-MEA-related goals, WTO members (nearly 18% of all members) 214 had 
restricted the exports of various products ranging from raw materials to 
finished product in the period from 2009 to 2016 (Table 1). The following 
part offers actual examples of country practices to use export duties to 
reduce local or global pollution.
For instance, Sri Lanka, a country with an abundance of quartz deposits, 
once adopted export duties on quartz minerals in order to reduce the pollu-
tion associated with the mining activities.215 These activities are known to 
cause such local environmental problems as surface water pollution, soil 
210 AWI, ‘AWI Comments on Iceland’s Commercial Whaling and Trade in Whale Products’, 
https://awionline.org/sites/default/fi les/uploads/documents/AWICommentsonIce-
landRev9-15-14.pdf, (visited 28 May 2018).
211 Ibid.
212 UNEP Ozone Secretariat, ‘Briefi ng Note on Non-Party Trade Provisions’, April 2016, 
http://conf.montreal-protocol.org/meeting/oewg/oewg-37/presession/Background_
documents/Briefi ng_note_on_non-party_trade.pdf (visited on 1 January 2019).
213 OECD (2000), above n 208, at 176.
214 The WTO currently has 164 members.
215 WT/TPR/S/237/Rev.1, para 110.
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erosion, or groundwater pollution.216 Thus when the Supreme Court of Sri 
Lanka in 2007 stopped the mining activities of a quartz production company 
on environmental grounds, this decision was praised for achieving a major 
victory for environmental justice.217
A critical view of the above example may suggest that the proclaimed 
environmental concerns could be used as a pretext for providing quartz 
processing companies in Sri Lanka with a favourable access to the indus-
trial inputs. This line of thought, however, could hardly apply to the case of 
Bangladesh in which its government once imposed export duties on bricks 
to protect the environment.218 It is difficult to discern any industrial purpose 
in these duties which, on the contrary, have very strong environmental 
grounds. According to a Pulitzer Center report, entitled ‘Bangladesh’s Air 
Pollution Problem Grows, Brick by Brick’, the brickmaking businesses in 
Bangladesh should be blamed for the serious air pollution in that country.219 
Its capital city Dhaka was ranked by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
as the top 50 cities with the highest annual PM2.5 pollution.220 Moreover, 
brick manufacturing would also cause soil degradation and thus threaten 
the sustainable agriculture in Bangladesh.221 These environmental prob-
lems, however, was once exacerbated by an increase in exports of bricks 
to India. These increasing exports are believed to be caused by an envi-
ronmental campaign in India to reduce carbon emissions which includes 
a restriction on domestic brickmaking industry and a duty-free treatment 
on brick imports from Bangladesh.222 This may explain why the Bangla-
desh government believed that the use of export duties on bricks would 
‘discourage production of these products’.223
216 Environmental Justice Atlas, ‘Dambulla Quartz Mining Case, Sri Lanka’, https://www.
ejatlas.org/print/dambulla-quartz-mining-case (visited 15 June 2019).
217 Ibid. ‘Specifi cally, the court appealed to Article 12(1) of the constitution claiming the right 
to a clean environment and the principle of inter-generational equity with respect to the 
protection and preservation of the environment that in this case was under threat for 
quarry mining’.
218 WT/TPR/S/270, at 49. ‘ceramic building bricks (25%) in order to discourage production 
of these products’.
219 ‘The kiln operations alone — while representing just 1 percent of the country’s GDP — 
generate nearly 60 percent of the particulate pollution in Dhaka’. See Sohara Mehroze 
Shachi and Larry C. Price, ‘Bangladesh’s Air Pollution Problem Grows, Brick by Brick’, 
Pulitzer Center, 5 September 2018, https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/bangladeshs-
air-pollution-problem-grows-brick-brick (visited 15 June 2019).
220 Ibid.
221 Debashish Biswas, ‘The Drivers and Impacts of Selling Soil for Brick Making in Bangla-
desh’, 62(4) Environmental Management (2018).
222 Kongkon Karmaker, ‘Brick exports: brisk business, but eco-worries mount’, The Daily 
Star, 12 April 2011, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-181387 (visited 15 June 
2019).
223 WT/TPR/S/270/Rev.1, para 74.
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An interesting aspect of the Bangladesh example is that the export duties 
at issue could contribute to reduce both the local pollution such as PM2.5 
and the global carbon emissions. Similarly, China also once claimed to have 
adopted export duties on such so-called ‘highly polluting and high-energy-
consuming products’ as aluminum, coal, chemical products, and fertilizers 
in order to address both local and global environmental problems.224 
Although some of the duties were clearly WTO-inconsistent, no dispute was 
raised, possibly for the reason that these duties could not potentially provide 
Chinese industry with advantages compared with those disputed in China – 
Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths. Moreover, these duties were applauded 
by some commentators, who see their potential to reduce carbon emissions 
in China as the largest emitter and exporter of carbon dioxide emissions,225 
though a critical view suggests that China should target more energy-
intensive products including such higher value-added ones as electronics, 
machinery, metal products, and textiles in order to make these duties a cred-
ible climate policy tool.226 A detailed discussion is presented in Chapter 6.
The above actual examples of country practices show that export duties 
would contribute to reducing local or global pollution under certain circum-
stances, possibly because the theoretically best environmental policies are 
not always feasible in financial or practical terms. Instructive in this context 
is a 2003 research study suggesting that if the implementation of pollution 
taxes is too ‘costly’ to get public support in the MERCOSUR countries, they 
could apply export duties as an alternative to improve environmental qual-
ity.227 Similarly, a 2005 International Monetary Fund (IMF) study recom-
mended that Liberia impose an export duty as part of environmental policy 
until the country has sufficient tax ‘administration capacity’ to regulate 
production.228 Thus, as will be discussed in Section 4.2, the environmental 
224 WT/TPR/S/230, at 44. ‘From time to time, China has been revising its export tax rates 
or adjusting the list of commodities subject to export taxes, or levying special export 
taxes, with a view to curtailing exports of certain products, including restricting exports 
of highly polluting and high-energy-consuming products; promoting environmental 
protection; improving sustainable economic development; and conserving natural 
resources’.
225 For instance, China’s export duties may be reinterpreted as an indirect carbon-pricing 
system which is similar to the EU-ETS at the time. See Tancrede Voituriez, Xin Wang, 
‘Can Unilateral Trade Measures Significantly Reduce Leakage and Competitiveness 
Pressures on EU-ETS-Constrained Industries? The Case of China Export Taxes and VAT 
Rebates’, Climate Strategies Working Paper (2009).
226 Susanne Dröge, ‘Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices’, Climate Strate-
gies Working Paper (2009), at 67.
227 Carlos M. Gómez G. and Carlos E. Gómez C, ‘Could the Desire for a Better Environ-
ment Lead to Political Options Against Free Trade? Insights from MERCOSUR’, (2003), 
at 3, available at http://www3.uah.es/econ/Papers/TradeEnvGomezG03.pdf, (visited 
18 June 2017).
228 Arnim Schwidrowski and Saji Thomas, ‘Forestry taxation in Africa: the case of Liberia’, 
International Monetary Fund Publications (2005), at 3.
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regulatory autonomy with respect to export duties is always preserved for 
WTO members at both the multilateral and regional levels, except for the 
absolute ban on China’s export duties.
4.1.2 Preference for export duties over quantitative export restrictions 
in practice
One may argue that the environmental regulatory autonomy with respect 
to China’s export duties is still there because China could simply adopt 
such quantitative restrictions as quotas which ‘fall simply under Article 
XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and benefit from exceptions under Article XX’.229 
Indeed, export quotas could in theory replace duties in order to achieve 
the same purpose of limiting exports. In practice, however, WTO members 
expresses a strong preference for duties over quotas. Thus the former-
mentioned survey shows that 17 WTO members (59%) in the period from 
2009 to 2016 chose to use export duties compared with the fact that only 2 
members (7%) preferred export quotas to pursue non-treaty-based environ-
mental purposes. Such preference could be explained in the following three 
respects.
First, compared with export duties, export quotas have to be allocated to 
various exporting firms, which thus have a great incentive to obtain the 
privilege to trade, for such quotas often make a product’s world market 
price higher than the domestic price. As a result, exporting firms may waste 
additional resources in rent-seeking activities.230 In other words, export 
quotas are not as economically efficient as export duties.
Second, rent-seeking activities may also increase the risk of corruption 
and the attendant welfare losses. Ukraine’s export quotas on grain in 2006, 
for example, raised such concerns, with a Working Paper from the World 
Bank suggesting that the export quotas should be replaced with export 
duties.231 Indeed, when it comes to ensure food security, the EU chose to 
impose export duties rather than export quotas on cereals as ‘a precau-
tionary measure to avoid an overheating of the EU cereals market’.232 As 
another example, in 2004, as part of its efforts to protect the environment, 
the Chinese government imposed export quotas on coke that resulted in the 
doubling of the world market price for this commodity; as a consequence, 
229 Ehring (2013), above n 16, at 361.
230 Shantayanan Devarajan, Delfi n Go, Maurice Schiff, and Sethaput Suthiwart-Narueput, 
‘The Whys and Why Nots of Export Taxation’, No.1684 World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Series (1996), at 10.
231 Stephan v. Cramon and Martin Raiser, ‘The quotas on grain exports in Ukraine: ineffec-
tive, ineffi cient, and non-transparent’, No. 38596 World Bank Working Paper (2006), at 10.
232 European Commission, ‘Export tax on cereals’, IP/97/408, 14 May 1997. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-97-408_en.pdf (visited on 8 July 2018).
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many Chinese firms bribed officials in order to obtain the export quotas and 
thus reap the benefits of the higher international price.233 In the aftermath, 
many experts suggested that the Chinese government should replace export 
quotas with export duties.234
Third, export quotas may also result in a greater loss of government reve-
nue.235 When a government imposes export duties, it enjoys the benefits of 
the tax; but it cannot always acquire the quota rent from export quotas, even 
when they are auctioned.236 Therefore, if a country replaces export duties 
with export quotas, it stands to lose a large amount of tax revenue, money 
that could have been used to protect the environment. Thus, for example, 
China once imposed export duties on textile products and used the revenue 
to reduce the environmental damage caused by textile industry.237
Aside from the three major drawbacks just detailed—the loss of resources 
through rent-seeking activities, the risk of corruption, and the loss of 
government revenue—the replacement of export duties with export quotas 
would entail losses for import countries. Export quotas, almost by defini-
tion, do not allow for a supply response to an increase in demand, and as a 
result they create larger welfare losses than export duties when the targeted 
products are inelastic staple goods, such as industrial raw materials.238 
It is for this reason that there was no strong objection to China’s export 
duties on rare earths, while global markets responded strongly when the 
export quotas were subsequently introduced on these goods.239 Therefore, 
if a country replaces export duties with export quotas, its trading partners 
may find it more difficult to obtain industrial inputs that are necessary for 
manufacturing supply chains.
Thus, any argument for the replacement of export duties with quantitative 
restrictions would be inconsistent with the general economic rationales 
and common practice of WTO members. Indeed, considering all the disad-
vantages of quantitative restrictions, an OECD Trade Policy Paper even 
suggested that RTAs ‘could be used as a regulatory tool in order to favour 
the use of export taxes in situations where export restraint is desirable, 
233 EEO, ‘Corruption Scandals Concerning Export Quotas on Coke in Shanxi’, 2007.
234 Xinhuanet, ‘The Adjustment of China’s Export Quotas on Rare Earths Products’, 
7 November 2013.
235 K.C. Fung and Jane Korinek, ‘Economics of Export Restrictions as Applied to Industrial 
Raw Materials’, No. 155 OECD Trade Policy Papers (2013), at 18.
236 Ibid., at 18.
237 CCICED, ‘2006 Annual Report’, http://www.china.com.cn/tech/zhuanti/wyh/2008-
02/13/content_9734281_5.htm.
238 Siddhartha Mitra, Tim Josling, ‘Agricultural Export Restrictions: Welfare Implications 
and Trade Disciplines’, IPC Position Paper (2009), at 9.
239 Fung and Korinek (2013), above n 234, at 32.
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rather than quantitative export restrictions’.240 The regulatory preference 
for export duties over quantitative restrictions on exports is discussed in the 
next section.
4.2 Environmental regulatory autonomy and regulatory 
preference at both the multilateral and regional levels
Based on the WTO’s environmental database, the above survey provides 
two important observations of country practices to use export duties. First, 
export duties could be useful to reduce local or global pollution under 
certain circumstances. Second, WTO members generally prefer export 
duties over quantitative restrictions, owing to some major drawbacks of 
the latter option compared with duties. These findings are also echoed in a 
survey of the WTO members’ practice to regulate export restrictions at both 
the multilateral and regional levels. A detailed discussion follows.
4.2.1 Environmental regulatory autonomy with respect to export 
restrictions
The environmental regulatory autonomy with respect to both export 
quantitative restrictions and export duties is generally preserved for WTO 
members at the multilateral level. With respect to quantitative restrictions, 
although they are generally prohibited under GATT Article XI, Article XX(b) 
and (g) permit WTO members to impose quantitative restrictions on exports 
for various environmental purposes. The former one could be used to 
address such local pollution problems as those threatening ‘human, animal 
or plant life or health’, whereas the latter one is more suitable for tackling 
such global environmental problems as climate change.241
Similarly, the founding members of the WTO also have the environmental 
regulatory autonomy with respect export duties since duties are generally 
available to them, except for Australia which committed to refraining from 
export duties on certain mineral products in the Goods Schedules annexed 
to the GATT 1994. But these duties could be justified for environmental 
purposes under Articles XX(b) or XX(g).
In the context of acceded members, 17 of them have committed to restrict 
the use of export duties in their accession protocols which, unlike other 
standard WTO agreements, do not have any exception clause (Table 2). 
According to the criteria set out in China – Raw Materials and China – Rare 
Earths decisions, 11 of those members can justify the use of export duties 
240 Ibid.
241 For further discussion, see Chapter 8.
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under Article XX(b) or (g), whereas the other six seem to have implicitly 
negotiated away their environmental regulatory autonomy with respect to 
export duties.242
One might wonder whether those countries would ever have agreed to 
give up such autonomy if this issue was explicitly raised during the acces-
sion negotiations. Or perhaps, reputational-wise, no one would ever ask a 
sovereign state to give way its right to protect the environment, especially 
in such imbalanced negotiations as those for access to the WTO, for not 
being perceived to be unjust or immoral. Indeed, one could hardly do so 
even in a more balanced multilateral negotiation as, for instance, the EU’s 
proposal generally prohibiting the use of export duties did recognize the 
environmental regulatory autonomy of WTO members by incorporating 
Article XX.243 Interestingly, this proposal was rejected by several countries 
including China.244 About three years later, the EU launched the China – 
Raw Materials case and claimed that China had silently signed away its right 
to protect the environment under Article XX, as part of the ‘entry fee’ to the 
WTO.245 If China would have been informed of this hidden cost earlier, it 
might have acted differently towards the EU’s proposal.
These observations of the environmental regulatory autonomy are also 
echoed at the regional level. Based on WTO databases, this thesis examines 
the provisions limiting the use of export restrictions in 50 select RTAs that 
have entered into force in the period from 2012 to 2016.246 Thirty-nine out 
of the them directly incorporate GATT Article XX as the general exception 
clause. Although Article XX is not fully incorporated in 11 of the RTAs 
(22%), these latter agreements include general exceptions that are similar to 
Article XX(a) to XX(h). In other words, all 50 RTAs in this survey either fully 
incorporate Article XX(b) and (g) or include environmental exceptions that 
are similar to the former provision (Table 3 and 4). Thus the environmental 
regulatory autonomy with respect to both export duties and quantitative 
restrictions are preserved for all contracting parties at the regional level.
Furthermore, two EU RTAs, namely EU-Cameroon (2014) and EU-Côte 
d’Ivoire (2016), specifically permit the other parties to use export duties on 
a temporary basis to protect the environment under certain circumstances. 
On the one hand, the EU appears to have recognized the usefulness of 
export duties as an environmental measure. On the other hand, there seems 
242 China, Mongolia, Latvia, Saudi Arabia, Montenegro, and Tajikistan.
243 Crosby (2008), above n 49.
244 Ibid.
245 Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, para 7.112.
246 There are 61 RTAs that have entered into force in the period from 2012 to 2016, of which 
50 RTAs provide texts in English according to WTO databases.
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to be a regulatory preference for export duties over other export restrictive 
measures. A detailed discussion of such regulatory preference is presented 
in the following subsection.
4.2.2 Regulatory preference for export duties over quantitative restrictions
There is a clear regulatory preference for export duties over quantitative 
restrictions at the multilateral level. As introduced above, the latter ones are 
generally prohibited under the GATT 1994, whereas only 18 members have 
committed to restrict the use of export duties. In the period before 2011, 
WTO-plus provisions on export duties were incorporated into the acces-
sion protocols of six acceded members, including WTO-Mongolia (1996),247 
WTO-Latvia (1998),248 WTO-China (2001),249 WTO-Saudi Arabia (2005),250 
WTO-Vietnam (2006),251 and WTO-Ukraine (2008).252 Like the commitments 
made by Australia, most of these WTO-plus provisions provide a list of 
products that are not to be subject to export duties (‘positive list’).253 Unusu-
ally, China’s Protocol of Accession provides a negative list that allows the 
imposition of export duties on only 84 specific products with a maximum 
level (‘negative list’).254
247 WTO–Mongolia (1996): Protocol for the Accession of Mongolia to the Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, 25 July 1996, WT/ACC/MNG/11; 
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Mongolia, 27 June 1996, WT/ACC/
MNG/9, para 24.
248 WTO–Latvia (1998): Protocol of Accession of Latvia to the Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, 23 October 1998, WT/ACC/LVA/35; Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of Latvia to the World Trade Organization, 30 September 
1998, WT/ACC/LVA/32, paras 67-69.
249 WTO–China (2001): Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 23 
November 2001, WT/L/432, para 11.3; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
the People’s Republic of China, 1 October 2001, WT/ACC/CHN/49, paras 155-156.
250 WTO–Saudi Arabia (2005): Protocol on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
November 2005, WT/L/627 11; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the World Trade Organization, 1 November 2005, WT/
ACC/SAU/61, para 184.
251 WTO–Vietnam (2006): Protocol on the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 15 
November 2006, WT/L/662; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, 
27 October 2006, WT/ACC/VNM/48, paras 256-260.
252 WTO–Ukraine (2008): Protocol on the Accession of Ukraine, 13 February 2008, 
WT/L/718; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine to the World Trade 
Organization, 25 January 2008, WT/ACC/UKR/152, paras 228-240.
253 This term was borrowed from the use of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ lists in the context of 
trade in services and investment. See European Commission, ‘Services and investment in 
EU trade deals Using ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ lists’, April 2016.
254 Ibid.
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By contrast, the 11 that concluded after 2011 reflect a tough approach to 
export duties, in that 5 of them, namely WTO-Russia (2011),255 WTO-Monte-
negro (2011),256 WTO-Tajikistan (2012),257 WTO-Kazakhstan (2015),258 and 
WTO-Afghanistan (2015),259 include provisions regulating export duties 
(Table 2). In these provisions, the earlier practice of providing a positive list 
that prohibits countries from imposing export duties on certain products 
has been gradually replaced by a negative list that specifies the products on 
which countries are permitted to impose export duties. However, compared 
with the general prohibition on quantitative export restrictions under GATT 
Article XI, the limits on export duties in accession protocols are still much 
less stringent which appears to reflect the regulatory preference for duties 
over quantitative restrictions.260
Similarly, at the regional level, this regulatory preference is found in the 
select 50 RTAs that have entered into force in the period from 2012 to 2016 in 
two respects.261 First, regarding the limits on the scope of products subject 
to export restrictions, most RTAs (82%) generally prohibit contracting 
parties from using quantitative export restrictions by directly incorporating 
GATT Article XI. In contrast, less than half RTAs (44%) have a general prohi-
255 WTO–Russia (2011): Protocol on the Accession of the Russian Federation, 17 December 
2011, WT/MIN(11)/24; WT/L/839; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the 
Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization, 17 November 2011, WT/ACC/
RUS/70; WT/MIN(11)/2, paras 621-638.
256 WTO–Montenegro (2011): Protocol on the Accession of Montenegro, 17 December 2011, 
WT/MIN(11)/28; WT/L/841; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Monte-
negro to the World Trade Organization, 5 December 2011, WT/ACC/CGR/38; WT/
MIN(11)/7, paras 130-132.
257 WTO–Tajikistan (2012): Protocol on the Accession of the Republic of Tajikistan, 11 
December 2012, WT/L/872; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Tajikistan to 
the World Trade Organization, 6 November 2012, WT/ACC/TJK/30, paras 166-169.
258 WTO–Kazakhstan (2015): Protocol on the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 30 
July 2015, WT/L/957; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organization, 23 June 2015, WT/ACC/KAZ/93, paras 
528-540.
259 WTO–Afghanistan (2015): Protocol on the Accession of the Islamic Republic of Afghani-
stan, 21 December 2015, WT/MIN(15)/39; WT/L/974; Report of the Working Party on 
the Accession of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the World Trade Organization, 13 
November 2015, WT/ACC/AFG/36; WT/MIN(15)/6, paras 140-145.
260 Exceptionally, according to Paragraph 132 of its Working Party Report, Montenegro 
committed not to apply or reintroduce any export duty as from the date of accession. 
See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Montenegro to the World Trade 
Organization, WT/ACC/CGR/38, 5 December 2011.
261 There are 61 RTAs that have entered into force in the period from 2012 to 2016, of which 
50 RTAs provide texts in English according to WTO database.
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bition on export duties.262 Moreover, another 15 RTAs lack any provision for 
restricting the use of export duties.263
It is noteworthy that, all the RTAs involving China does not limit the use of 
export duties,264 whereas those involving the EU requires the contracting 
parties to either stop imposing export duties on any products265 or provide 
a negative list.266 This striking contrast between their attitudes towards the 
regulation of export duties may have developed into a series of confron-
tations between the EU and China in front of the WTO. However, even a 
party like the EU with enthusiasm for banning export duties, it provides 
contracting parties with the policy space to use duties for environmental 
purposes in all the RTAs. Furthermore, when export restraint is desirable 
for its trading partners to achieve certain objectives such as environmental 
protection, the EU prefers the use of duties over quantitative restrictions by 
incorporating specific exception clauses in some RTAs.
These specific exceptions that are tailor-made for the use of export duties 
represent the second type of regulatory preference at the regional level. 
Indeed, compared with WTO law, 24% of RTAs choose to restrict or exclude 
the use of the WTO specific exception to quantitative export restrictions, 
namely GATT Article XI:2(a), whereas 32% of RTAs actively create new 
specific exception to export duties which include three RTAs involving 
the EU. Thus, under EU-Cameroon (2014), Cameroon could impose 
export duties in the event of ‘serious public finance problem’ or ‘the need 
for greater environmental protection’. Likewise, EU-Côte d’Ivoire (2016) 
permits Côte d’Ivoire to impose export duties on a temporary basis for 
‘income, protection for infant industry or environmental protection’. More-
262 2012: Japan–Peru, Korea–United States, United State–Colombia, United States–Panama; 
2013: Canada–Panama, EU–Central America, EU–Colombia and Peru, EU–Serbia, 
Korea–Turkey, Turkey–Mauritius; 2014: Canada–Honduras, EU–Georgia, EU–Moldova, 
Korea–Australia, Singapore–Chinese Taipei; 2015: Canada–Korea, EU–Bosnia and Herze-
govina, EAEU, Japan–Australia, Korea–New Zealand, SADC–Accession of Seychelles; 
2016: Turkey–Moldova.
263 Most of the RTAs that do not limit export duties involve at least one party from Asia, 
including Chile–Malaysia (2012), GCC–Singapore (2013), Malaysia–Australia (2013), 
New Zealand–Chinese Taipei (2013), Chile–Viet Nam (2014), Hong Kong–Chile (2014), 
Iceland–China (2014), Switzerland–China (2014), Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)–India (2015), Australia–China (2015), Korea–Viet Nam (2015), Turkey–
Malaysia (2015), and Japan–Mongolia (2016).
264 Iceland–China (2014), Switzerland–China (2014), Australia–China (2015), and China–
Korea (2015).
265 It is noteworthy that 6 of 10 RTAs involving the EU, namely EU–Central America (2013), 
EU–Colombia and Peru (2013), EU–Serbia (2013), EU–Georgia (2014), EU–Moldova 
(2014), and EU–Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015), generally prohibit export duties.
266 EU–ESA (2012), EU–Cameroon (2014), EU–Ukraine (2014), and EU–Côte d’Ivoire (2016).
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over, EU-Ukraine (2014) in a more general sense allows Ukraine to apply a 
safeguard measure in the form of a surcharge to the export duty on certain 
products when the cumulative volume of the exports of these products 
exceeds a trigger level.267
In fact, these regulatory preferences as observed above have existed for 
a long time. For instance, an OECD Trade Policy Paper in 2012 examined 
93 RTAs, which have been concluded before 2010, and found some of the 
agreements clearly show contracting parties’ preference for export duties 
over quantitative restrictions by allowing the former one to be imposed 
on a wider range of products than the latter one.268 The same paper thus 
suggests that this type of practice ‘could be used as a regulatory tool in 
order to favour the use of export taxes in situations where export restraint 
is desirable, rather than quantitative export restrictions’.269 Such a policy 
recommendation is likely to be motivated by the advantages of export 
duties compared with quantitative restrictions as discussed in the previous 
section.
 4.3 Conclusions
From an environmental perspective, this chapter shows that any arguments 
in favour of an absolute ban on export duties are inconsistent with the prac-
tice of WTO members in two respects. First, the actual examples of country 
practices show that export duties could be useful to reduce local or global 
pollution under certain circumstances, because the theoretically best envi-
ronmental policies are not always feasible in financial or practical terms. 
Thus the environmental regulatory autonomy with respect to export duties 
is always preserved for WTO members at both the multilateral and regional 
levels,270 except for the controversial ban on China’s export duties. In this 
sense, it is one thing to propose strictly scrutinizing any environmental 
reasoning behind export duties, but quite another to ban these duties 
without any reasoning. The arbitrary nature of the latter one is apparent.
267 Annex I – D of EU–Ukraine (2014).
268 Jane Korinek and Jessica Bartos, ‘Multilateralising Regionalism: Disciplines on Export 
Restrictions in Regional Trade Agreements’, No. 139 OECD Trade Policy Papers (2012), at 
36.
269 Ibid.
270 This conclusion is based on the surveys of WTO members’ practice in the period from 
2009 to 2016 and the provisions limiting the use of export restrictions in 50 select RTAs 
that have entered into force in the period from 2012 to 2016. For further information, see 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
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Second, the suggestion that export duties should be substituted by export 
quotas seems to lack any sound theoretical basis. In sharp contrast, an 
OECD Trade Policy Paper actually suggested the contrary,271 possibly 
owing to the major disadvantages of quantitative restrictions compared 
with duties: (i) the loss of resources through rent-seeking activities, (ii) 
the risk of corruption, and (iii) the loss of government revenue. Moreover, 
quantitative restrictions also create additional challenges for importing 
countries that need access to such inelastic staple goods as raw materials. 
The OECD opinion is echoed by the practice of WTO members which show 
a clear preference for export duties over quantitative restrictions.
To conclude this chapter, both the practice and rationales suggest that 
export duties would remain meaningful for countries to reduce local or 
global pollution under certain circumstances. Thus, at least in theory, an 
absolute ban on export duties could prevent China from enacting important 
environmental protections. Relevant to these considerations is the issue of 
China’s actual motive for seeking to impose export duties, which is taken 
up in the following chapter.
Table 1: Practice of WTO Members: export restrictive measures to protect the environment 
(non-international obligations)
No. Members Export Restrictions Products Environmental Purposes
2009
1 Brazil ‘prior authorization’ ‘a relatively large number 
of products’
‘environmental reasons’272
2 Fiji export bans ‘round logs’ ‘environmental reasons’273
3 Guatemala export bans ‘logs of more than 11 cm in 
diameter’
‘environmental reasons’274
4 Maldives export bans ‘certain marine species’ ‘environmental reasons’275
5 Solomon 
Islands
export duties timber, fish and other raw 
materials 
‘help protect the 
environment’276
272273274275276
271 Korinek and Bartos (2012), above n 267.
272 WT/TPR/S/212, at 60. ‘Prior authorization is required from various agencies for exports 
of a relatively large number of products, generally for safety, health, security or environ-
mental reasons, or when they are subject to export quotas’.
273 WT/TPR/S/213, at 67. ‘Exports of round logs are banned for environmental reasons and 
to promote downstream processing, which provides an implicit subsidy to processors at 
the expense of forest owners, by lowering the domestic price’.
274 WT/TPR/S/210, at 53-54. ‘Export prohibitions are mainly imposed for reasons of 
national security, protection of Guatemala’s heritage or for environmental reasons’.
275 WT/TPR/S/221, at 28. ‘Exports of certain marine species are prohibited for environ-
mental reasons’.
276 WT/TPR/S/215, at 35. ‘The authorities indicate that export taxes are a practical and 
cost-effi cient means of raising revenue and that they encourage downstream domestic 
processing and help protect the environment’.
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2010
6 Benin export bans ‘unprocessed teak wood 
and charcoal’
 ‘protect natural 
resources’277
7 China export duties ‘highly polluting and 
high-energy-consuming 
products’ 
‘promoting environmental 
protection; improving 
sustainable economic 
development; and 
conserving natural 
resources’278
8 Malaysia export duties ‘timber, live animals, ash 
and residues, precious 
metals, copper, and 
ferrous waste and scrap’
‘conserve the 
environment’279
9 Sri Lanka export duties quartz ‘protect the 
environment’280
10 United States ‘export control’ crude oil energy conservation281
2011
11 Australia ‘export control’ ‘wood and wood chips’ ‘protecting environmental 
and heritage values’282
12 Cambodia export duties ‘certain unprocessed raw 
materials and products
‘protect human health’283
export quotas ‘certain wood products’ ‘preserve exhaustible 
natural resources’284
277278279280281282283284
277 WT/TPR/S/236/BEN, at 111. ‘Following a shortage on the domestic market and in order 
to protect natural resources, since 1997 exports of unprocessed teak wood and charcoal 
have been banned’.
278 WT/TPR/S/230, at 44. ‘From time to time, China has been revising its export tax rates 
or adjusting the list of commodities subject to export taxes, or levying special export 
taxes, with a view to curtailing exports of certain products, including restricting exports 
of highly polluting and high-energy-consuming products; promoting environmental 
protection; improving sustainable economic development; and conserving natural 
resources’.
279 WT/TPR/S/225, at 35. ‘According to the authorities, the main objective of these taxes is 
to promote the use of locally produced commodities in domestic downstream industries 
as well as to conserve the environment. The authorities are of the view that export taxes 
on timber allow them to better manage sustainable development of Malaysian forest’.
280 WT/TPR/S/237/Rev.1, para 110. ‘Sri Lanka’s legislation allows the use of export duties 
and cesses to ensure the availability of raw materials for higher-value-added industries 
and to promote further processing of local materials; fi nance export promotion activities; 
and protect national security, archaeological items, and the environment’.
281 WT/TPR/S/235, at 50. ‘the Bureau of Industry and Security is responsible for the admin-
istration of export controls under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the Mineral 
Leasing Act, the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act, and the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act’.
282 WT/TPR/S/244, at 60. ‘Export controls on wood and woodchips are for the purpose of 
protecting environmental and heritage values’.
283 WT/TPR/S/253, at 44, ‘Cambodia levies export taxes on certain unprocessed raw mate-
rials and products to encourage local processing, encourage exports of fi nished products, 
and protect human health’.
284 Ibid. ‘According to the authorities, these procedures conform to GATT Article XX(g), 
which allows trade measures to be taken to preserve exhaustible natural resources, when 
such measures complement domestic conservation policies’.
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13 Congo export duties ‘certain types of timber’ ‘forest species to be 
promoted’285
14 India export duties ‘various raw materials’ ‘preserve natural 
resources’286
15 Nepal export bans various products ‘protection of wildlife, 
human health, and to 
conserve the biodiversity 
and environment’287
‘export permission’ ‘some timber products and 
forest resources’
‘biodiversity and 
environment 
conservation’288
export duties ‘mainly vegetables, maize, 
rice, wheat, oil cake, sand 
and stones, and some 
wood’
‘protect environment 
(discourage environment 
degradation)’289
16 Papua 
New Guinea
export bans ‘certain trees (balsa, 
blackbean, cordial, ebony, 
rose wood, teak and all 
conifers)’
‘environmental reasons’290
export duties skins ‘conservation reasons’291
17 Paraguay export bans ‘unprocessed or semi 
processed wood 
(roundwood or logs) of 
any species’
‘environmental reasons’292
18 Thailand export licensing a few items of animal 
products and raw 
materials
‘animal preservation, 
public health, forest 
conservation, and 
conserve exhaustible 
natural resources’
285286287288289290291292
285 WT/TPR/S/240, at 42. ‘The export of certain types of timber (forest species to be 
promoted) are subject to a charge of 2 per cent of the Ex-Works (EWK) value per cubic 
metre of raw timber exported, which goes to the Ministry of the Environment’.
286 WT/TPR/S/249, at 76. ‘Export taxes are used as a policy instrument to, inter alia, ensure 
domestic supply of raw materials for higher-value-added industries, promote further 
processing of natural resources, ensure an “adequate” domestic price, and preserve 
natural resources’.
287 WT/TPR/S/257, at 39. ‘Nepal bans the export of certain products for various reasons 
(Table III.7)’.
288 Ibid. at 40.
289 Ibid. ‘According to the authorities, they are levied to protect environment (discourage 
environment degradation), ensure food security, and discourage trade diversion to 
neighbouring countries (such as India)’. ‘The authorities state that export tax on wood is 
needed to protect the environment’.
290 WT/TPR/S/239, at 48. ‘Exports of certain trees (balsa, blackbean, cordial, ebony, rose-
wood, teak and all conifers) are prohibited for environmental reasons’.
291 Ibid. ‘Exports of skins are taxed for conservation reasons’.
292 WT/TPR/S/245, at 68. ‘Some other restrictions are for both environmental purposes and 
the development of a domestic industry, with the resulting increase in the value added 
of production. For example, under Law No. 515/94 of 9 December 1994, as amended by 
Law No. 2.848/05, the export of all unprocessed or semi processed wood (roundwood or 
logs) of any species is banned’.
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19 Zimbabwe export duties ‘live wildlife specimens 
and fertile eggs’
conservation reasons293
‘export permit’ ‘indigenous plants and 
wildlife’ 
conservation reasons294
2012
20 Turkey export bans various agricultural goods ‘environmental, health or 
cultural reasons’295
21 Philippines export duties ‘plantation (non-native) 
logs’
‘sustainable supply of 
domestic timber’296
22 China export bans various products ‘domestic considerations 
regarding environmental 
and human health 
protection, and 
preservation of natural 
resources’297
export quotas raw materials including 
coal and rare earths
‘help conserve natural 
resources or protect the 
environment’298
23 Côte d’Ivoire export duties ‘wood in log form’ ‘forest conservation and 
development’299
export ‘prior 
authorization’ or 
bans
certain goods such as 
ivory and some species of 
logs
‘protect the fauna and 
flora’300
24 Korea export bans ‘uncut pieces of natural 
granite stones’
 ‘preserve natural 
resources’301
25 Bangladesh export duties  bricks ‘brick production is not 
environmentally 
friendly’302
293294295296297298299300301302
293 WT/TPR/S/252, at 44. ‘Exports of live wildlife specimens and fertile eggs are report-
edly subject to an ad valorem levy of 20%, collected by the National Parks and Wild Life 
Management Authority’.
294 Ibid. ‘The Authority administers the permit system governing the movement of all wild-
life within Zimbabwe and across its borders (sections (2)(vi) and (3)(iii))’.
295 WT/TPR/S/259, at 53. ‘Turkey prohibits exports of 12 items (by broad category, mostly 
agricultural goods) for environmental, health or cultural reasons (Table III.14)’.
296 WT/TPR/S/261, at 50. ‘Only plantation (non-native) logs are subject to an export tax 
(20% of f.o.b.)’.
297 WT/TPR/S/264, at 59-60. ‘mainly because of China’s international obligations and 
domestic considerations regarding environmental and human health protection, and 
preservation of natural resources’.
298 Ibid. ‘The authorities believe that these export restrictions could help conserve natural 
resources or protect the environment’.
299 WT/TPR/S/266/CIV, at 127. ‘Exports of wood in log form are subject to a reforestation 
tax of 2 per cent of the reference value used as the basis for the DUS; the Customs Admin-
istration collects this tax on behalf of the Treasury.  In addition, Ivorian logs exported or 
sold on the domestic market are subject to a felling tax and a special forest conservation 
and development tax’.
300 Ibid., at 129. ‘The exportation of certain goods requires prior authorization; there are also 
prohibitions in place, chiefl y to protect the fauna and fl ora (Table III.9)’.
301 WT/TPR/S/268, at 81. ‘The negative list of banned exports … … and preserve natural 
resources (uncut pieces of natural granite stones)’.
302 WT/TPR/S/270, at 49. ‘ceramic building bricks (25%) in order to discourage production 
of these products’.
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2013
26 Costa Rica export 
‘authorization’
‘coffee, bulk sugar, fish, 
molluscs and crustaceans’
‘public health, 
environmental 
protection’303
27 Indonesia export bans ‘sand, soil and top soil’ ‘protection of the 
environment and 
ecology’304
export 
‘authorization’
‘oil and gas’ ‘sustainable and efficient 
management of oil and gas 
as non-renewable natural 
resources; prevention of 
excessive exploitation and 
environmental damage’305
export duties ‘leather and wood; crude 
palm oil; raw cocoa; and 
mineral ore products’
‘safeguard the 
environment’306
2014
28 Malaysia export duties ‘timber, live animals, ash 
and residues, crude 
petroleum, precious 
metals, nickel, copper, and 
ferrous waste and scrap’
‘conserve the 
environment’; ‘better 
manage sustainable 
development of the 
Malaysian forest’307
29 Myanmar export duties ‘gems, gas, crude oil, teak 
and conversions, and 
timber and conversions’
‘preserve natural 
resources’308
30 Tonga ‘export restriction’ ‘out-of-season exports of 
sea cucumber’ 
 ‘conservation purposes’309
2015
31 Madagascar export duties forestry products ‘These levies are paid into 
the National Forestry 
Fund, whose aim is 
sustainable exploitation of 
this subsector’.310
32 Thailand export duties ‘certain sawn wood and 
hides’
‘conserving the 
environment’311
303304305306307308309310311
303 WT/TPR/S/286, at 9. ‘Certain exports (such as coffee, bulk sugar, fi sh, molluscs and 
crustaceans) are subject to authorization for reasons of public health, environmental 
protection or quality assurance. The exportation of various species of wood logs is 
prohibited’.
304 WT/TPR/S/278, at 55.
305 Ibid., at 56.
306 Ibid., at 58.
307 WT/TPR/S/292, at 59. ‘According to the authorities, the main objective of these taxes is 
to promote the use of locally produced commodities in domestic downstream industries 
as well as to conserve the environment; export taxes on timber allow them to better 
manage sustainable development of the Malaysian forest’.
308 WT/TPR/S/293, at 42. ‘according to the authorities, this is to preserve natural resources’.
309 WT/TPR/S/291, at 34.
310 WT/TPR/S/318, at 88.
311 WT/TPR/S/326, at 64. ‘the authorities had indicated that export taxes are primarily for 
the purpose of conserving the environment, are applied in a non-discriminatory manner 
and are not intended to be protection for domestic industries nor trade barriers’.
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2016
33 Fiji export bans ‘round logs’ ‘environmental reasons’312
34 Sri Lanka export duties ‘cashew nuts (fresh and in 
shells), raw vein quartz 
and semi-finished 
products of iron or non-
alloy steel’
‘protecting the 
environment’313
35 Solomon 
Islands
export duties various goods including 
logs, fish, and timber
‘a practical and cost-
efficient means of … … 
protect the 
environment’314
312313314
Table 2: WTO limits on export duties
No.  (1994-2011) Export Duties
Scope Specific Exception General Exception
 1 GATT 1994 Allow 
 2 GATT Australia Goods Schedules Positive list No GATT Article XX
 3 WTO-Mongolia (1996) Positive list No No
 4 WTO-Latvia (1998) Positive list No No
 5 WTO-China (2001) Negative list Yes No
 6 WTO-Saudi Arabia (2005) Positive list No No
 7 WTO-Vietnam (2006) Positive list No GATT Article XX
 8 WTO-Ukraine (2008) Positive list No GATT Article XX
 9 WTO-Russia (2011) Positive list No GATT Article XX
10 WTO-Montenegro (2011) Ban No No
11 WTO-Tajikistan (2012) Negative list No No
12 WTO-Kazakhstan (2015) Negative list No GATT Article XX
13 WTO-Afghanistan (2015) Negative list Yes GATT Article XX
312 WT/TPR/S/330, at 42. ‘Exports of round logs are banned for environmental reasons and 
to promote downstream processing, which provides an implicit subsidy to processors at 
the expense of forest owners, by lowering the domestic price’.
313 WT/TPR/S/347, at 57. ‘With a view to ensuring the availability of raw materials, 
promoting further processing of local materials, fi nancing export promotion activities, 
protecting national security, and protecting the environment, Sri Lanka applies both 
export duties and a cess on certain goods’.
314 WT/TPR/S/349, at 34. ‘The authorities consider export taxes a practical and cost-effi cient 
means of raising revenue that could also encourage downstream domestic processing 
and help protect the environment’.
62 Part II: Preliminary Analysis
Table 3: RTAs limits on quantitative export restrictions
No.  RTAs Quantitative Export Restrictions
Scope Specific Exception General Exceptions
2012
1 Canada-Jordan315 General ban  GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
2 Chile-Malaysia316 General ban  GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
3 EFTA-Hong Kong317 General ban  GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
4 EFTA-Montenegro318 General ban  GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
5 EFTA-Ukraine319 General ban  GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
6 EU-ESA320 Negative list  No Yes
7 Japan-Peru321 Negative list GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
8 Korea-United States322 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
9 CIS323 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
10 United State-Colombia324 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
11 United States-Panama325 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
2013
12 Canada-Panama326 Negative list GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
13 Costa Rica-Singapore327 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
14 EU-Central America328 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
315316317318319320321322323324325326327328
315 Canada–Jordan (2012): Free trade agreement between Canada and Jordan, 1 October 
2012, WT/REG335.
316 Chile–Malaysia (2012): Free trade agreement between Chile and Malaysia, 25 February 
2012, W/REG330.
317 EFTA–Hong Kong (2012): Free trade agreement between Hong Kong, China and the 
EFTA States, 1 October 2012, WT/REG322.
318 EFTA–Montenegro (2012): Free trade agreement Montenegro and the EFTA states, 
1 September 2012, WT/REG323.
319 EFTA–Ukraine (2012): Free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EFTA States, 1 June 
2012, WT/REG315.
320 EU–ESA (2012): Interim economic partnership agreement between the European Union 
and the ESA states (Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe), 14 May 2012, 
WT/REG307.
321 Japan–Peru (2012): Free trade agreement between Japan and Peru, 1 May 2012, WT/
REG309.
322 Korea–United States (2012): Free trade agreement between the United States and the 
Republic of Korea, 15 March 2012, WT/REG311.
323 CIS (2012): Treaty on a Free Trade Area between members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), 20 September 2012, WT/REG343.
324 United State–Colombia (2012): Free trade agreement between the United States and 
Colombia, 15 May 2012, WT/REG314.
325 United States–Panama (2012): Free trade agreement between the United States and 
Panama, 31 October 2012, WT/REG324.
326 Canada–Panama (2013): Free trade agreement between Canada and Panama, 1 April 
2012, WT/REG334.
327 Costa Rica–Singapore (2013): Free trade agreement between Costa Rica and Peru, 1 June 
2013, WT/REG342.
328 EU–Central America (2013): Agreement establishing an Association between the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other, 
1 August 2013, WT/REG332.
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15 EU-Colombia and Peru329 General ban GATT XI:2(a) Yes
16 EU-Serbia330 General ban No  Yes
17 GCC-Singapore331 General ban Restricted Yes
18 Korea-Turkey332 General ban GATT XI:2(a) Yes
19 Malaysia-Australia333 General ban GATT XI:2(a) Yes
20 New Zealand-Chinese Taipei334 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
21 Turkey-Mauritius335  General ban GATT XI:2(a) Yes
22 Ukraine-Montenegro336 Negative list GATT XI:2(a) Yes
2014
23 Canada-Honduras337 Negative list GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
24 Chile-Viet Nam338 Negative list GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
25 EFTA-Central America339 General ban  No GATT XX
26 EU-Cameroon340 General ban  No Yes
27 EU-Georgia341 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
28 EU-Moldova342 General ban GATT XI:2(a) Yes
329330331332333334335336337338339340341342
329 EU–Colombia and Peru (2013): Trade Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, 1 March 2013, 
WT/REG333.
330 EU–Serbia (2013): Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the 
other part, 1 September 2013, WT/REG285.
331 GCC–Singapore (2013): Agreement between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 
the Republic of Singapore, 1 September 2013, WT/COMTD/N/45/Rev.1.
332 Korea–Turkey (2013): Free trade agreement between the Republic of Korea and Turkey, 
1 May 2013, WT/REG339.
333 Malaysia–Australia (2013): Free trade agreement between Australia and Malaysia, 
1 January 2013, WT/REG340.
334 New Zealand–Chinese Taipei (2013): Agreement between New Zealand and The Sepa-
rate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on economic cooperation, 
1 December 2013, WT/REG348.
335 Turkey–Mauritius (2013): Free trade agreement between Turkey and Mauritius, 1 June 
2013, WT/REG341.
336 Ukraine–Montenegro (2013): Free trade agreement between Ukraine and Montenegro, 
1 January 2013, WT/REG338.
337 Canada–Honduras (2014): Free trade agreement between Canada and Honduras, 
1 October 2014, WT/REG364.
338 Chile–Viet Nam (2014): Free trade agreement between Viet Nam and Chile, 1 January 
2014, WT/REG365.
339 EFTA–Central America (2014): Free trade agreement between the EFTA states and Central 
America - Costa Rica and Panama, 19 August 2014, WT/REG357.
340 EU–Cameroon (2014): Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership 
Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Central Africa Party, of the other part - Protocol, 4 August 2014, WT/REG274.
341 EU–Georgia (2014): Deep and comprehensive free trade area concluded as a part of the 
association agreement between the European Union and Georgia, 1 September 2014, 
WT/REG354.
342 EU–Moldova (2014): Deep and comprehensive free trade area concluded as a part of 
the association agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, 
1 September 2014, WT/REG352.
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29 EU-Ukraine343 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
30 Hong Kong-Chile344 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
31 Iceland-China345 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
32 Korea-Australia346 General ban Restricted GATT XX
33 Singapore-Chinese Taipei347 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
34 Switzerland-China348 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
2015
35 ASEAN-India349 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
36 Australia-China350 General ban GATT XI:2(a) Yes
37 Canada-Korea351 Negative list GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
38 China-Korea352 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
39 EFTA-Bosnia and Herzegovina353 Positive list GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
40 EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina354 General ban No Yes
41 EAEU355 General ban No Yes
42 Japan-Australia356 General ban Restricted GATT XX
43 Korea-New Zealand357 General ban Restricted GATT XX
343344345346347348349350351352353354355356357
343 EU–Ukraine (2014): Deep and comprehensive free trade area concluded as a part of the 
association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine, 23 April 2014, WT/
REG353.
344 Hong Kong–Chile (2014): Free trade agreement between Hong Kong, China and Chile, 
9 October 2014, WT/REG356.
345 Iceland–China (2014): Free trade agreement between Iceland and China, 1 July 2014, WT/
REG355.
346 Korea–Australia (2014): Free trade agreement between the Republic of Korea and 
Australia, 12 December 2014, WT/REG359.
347 Singapore–Chinese Taipei (2014): Agreement between Singapore and the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on economic partnership, 19 
April 2014, WT/REG350.
348 Switzerland–China (2014): Free trade agreement between Switzerland and China, 1 July 
2014, WT/REG351.
349 ASEAN–India (2015): Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Between the Republic of India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1 July 
2015, WT/REG372.
350 Australia–China (2015): Free trade agreement between Australia and China, 20 December 
2015, WT/REG369.
351 Canada–Korea (2015): Free trade agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea, 
1 January 2015, WT/REG362.
352 China–Korea (2015): Free trade agreement between China and the Republic of Korea, 20 
December 2015, WT/REG370.
353 EFTA–Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015): Free trade agreement between the EFTA States 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 January 2015, WT/REG360.
354 EU–Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015): The Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 July 2015, WT/REG242.
355 EAEU (2015): Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, 1 January 2015, WT/REG358.
356 Japan–Australia (2015): Economic partnership agreement between Japan and Australia, 
15 January 2015, WT/REG361.
357 Korea–New Zealand (2015): Free trade agreement between the Republic of Korea and 
New Zealand, 20 December 2015, WT/REG367.
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44 Korea-Viet Nam358 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
45 SADC-Accession of Seychelles359 General ban No Yes
46 Turkey-Malaysia360 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
2016
47 EU-Côte d’Ivoire361 General ban No Yes
48 Japan-Mongolia362 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
49 Korea-Colombia363 Negative list GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
50 Turkey-Moldova364 General ban GATT XI:2(a) GATT XX
358359360361362363364
Table 4: RTAs limits on export duties
No.  RTAs Export Duties
Scope Specific Exception General Exception
2012
1 Canada-Jordan Not mentioned
2 Chile-Malaysia Not mentioned
3 EFTA-Hong Kong Positive list No GATT Article XX
4 EFTA-Montenegro Positive list No GATT Article XX
5 EFTA-Ukraine Positive list No GATT Article XX
6 EU-ESA Negative list Yes Yes
7 Japan-Peru General ban Yes GATT Article XX
8 Korea-United States General ban Yes GATT Article XX
9 CIS Negative list No GATT Article XX
10 United State-Colombia General ban Yes GATT Article XX
11 United States-Panama General ban Yes GATT Article XX
2013
12 Canada-Panama General ban Yes GATT Article XX
13 Costa Rica-Singapore Positive list No GATT Article XX
14 EU-Central America General ban No GATT Article XX
15 EU-Colombia and Peru General ban No  Yes
16 EU-Serbia General ban No Yes
358 Korea–Viet Nam (2015): Free trade agreement between The Republic of Korea and Viet 
Nam, 20 December 2015, WT/REG371.
359 SADC–Accession of Seychelles (2015): Accession of Seychelles to the Southern African 
Development Community Trade Protocol, 25 May 2015, REG368.
360 Turkey–Malaysia (2015): Free trade agreement between Turkey and Malaysia, 1 August 
2015, WT/REG379.
361 EU–Côte d’Ivoire (2016): Economic partnership agreement between Côte d’Ivoire and the 
European Union, 3 September 2016, WT/REG258.
362 Japan–Mongolia (2016) has additional exception clauses that allow either party to consult 
with the other regarding the imposition of export restrictions for the purpose of stabi-
lizing the prices of primary commodities or promoting a particular industry ‘with a view 
to raising the general standard of living of its people’.
363 Korea–Colombia (2016): Free trade agreement between Colombia and the Republic of 
Korea, 15 July 2016, WT/REG375.
364 Turkey–Moldova (2016) has additional exception clauses that allow either party to 
impose export restrictions in accordance with procedures set out in the dispute settle-
ment clause in circumstances in which compliance with the limits on export restrictions 
leads to a serious shortage of one of the exporting country’s essential products.
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17 GCC-Singapore Not mentioned
18 Korea-Turkey General ban Yes Yes
19 Malaysia-Australia  Not mentioned 
20 New Zealand-Chinese Taipei Not mentioned 
21 Turkey-Mauritius General ban No Yes
22 Ukraine-Montenegro Negative list No Yes
2014
23 Canada-Honduras  General ban Yes GATT Article XX
24 Chile-Viet Nam Not mentioned
25 EFTA-Central America  Negative list No GATT Article XX
26 EU-Cameroon  Negative list Yes Yes
27 EU-Georgia  General ban No GATT Article XX
28 EU-Moldova  General ban No Yes
29 EU-Ukraine  Negative list Yes GATT Article XX
30 Hong Kong-Chile  Not mentioned 
31 Iceland-China  Not mentioned 
32 Korea-Australia General ban Yes GATT Article XX
33 Singapore-Chinese Taipei  General ban No GATT Article XX
34 Switzerland-China Not mentioned  
2015
35 ASEAN-India Not mentioned 
36 Australia-China Not mentioned 
37 Canada-Korea General ban  Yes GATT Article XX
38 China-Korea Not mentioned 
39 EFTA-Bosnia and Herzegovina Positive list No GATT Article XX
40 EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina  General ban No Yes
41 EAEU General ban No Yes
42 Japan-Australia General ban  Yes GATT Article XX
43 Korea-New Zealand  General ban  Yes GATT Article XX
44 Korea-Viet Nam  Not mentioned 
45 SADC-Accession of Seychelles General ban  No  Yes
46 Turkey-Malaysia Not mentioned 
2016
47 EU-Côte d’Ivoire Negative list Yes Yes
48 Japan-Mongolia Not mentioned 
49 Korea-Colombia  Negative list Yes GATT Article XX
50 Turkey-Moldova General ban No GATT Article XX
5 A Legally-based Assessment of the Actual 
Motives Behind China’s Export Duties
As introduced in Chapter 3, one perception that flourish the ban on China’s 
export duties is that the declared environmental purposes of these duties 
is a mere pretext for a policy designed to further an economic goal. This 
perception may have been provoked by the fact that the measures imposing 
the challenged export duties in the China—Raw Materials and China – Rare 
Earths cases did not cite any environmental purposes or explain sufficiently 
how they would protect the environment. Moreover, the absence of restric-
tions on domestic consumption of the raw materials in dispute in effect 
created differentials between the domestic and international prices of raw 
materials, which raises the suspicion that the challenged duties were actu-
ally adopted to indirectly subsidize Chinese downstream sectors.
There are at least two good reasons for doubts. First, measures could fall 
short of their original purposes when they are put into effect. Thus some 
scholars have argued that the WTO would be better advised to provide 
China with guidance regarding how to properly use export duties to protect 
the environment.365 Second, most importantly, even if the duties in dispute 
were actually adopted for an industrial purpose, the question is how greatly 
could this result be generalised. As introduced in the previous chapter, 
China’s export duties on such so-called ‘highly polluting and high-energy-
consuming products’ as aluminum, coal, chemical products, and fertilizers 
were applauded by some commentators, who see their potential to reduce 
carbon emissions in China as the largest emitter and exporter of carbon 
dioxide emissions. It is insensible to ban them outright without any assess-
ment.
Thus this chapter proposes a legally-based approach that takes into account 
the role of export duties in the Chinese legislative framework for environ-
mental protection. Admittedly, the tendency for Chinese legislation to take 
the form of broad aspirational statements rather than detailed provisions 
complicates efforts to determine the specific purpose of and rationale for a 
given measure.366 This chapter, accordingly, rather than focusing on textual 
analysis of relevant legal documents, looks first to the legislative process 
that generated the export duties in order to identify the common intention, 
if there was one, of decision-makers when designing China’s export duties. 
365 For further information, see Chapter 3.
366 Jebe, Mayer, and Lee (2012), above n 177, at 639.
68 Part II: Preliminary Analysis
The fundamental premise of this analysis is that the actual motives behind 
a measure or policy are likely to be determined by the missions of the 
government organs that participate in its formation process. The key actors 
are accordingly discussed in Section 5.1 along with their potential actual 
motives through an analysis of the mandate of each.
While this approach has the capacity to determine the potential motives 
behind a measure, it also has limits. For one thing, when a measure has been 
formulated by various government organs, each with its own mandate, the 
mandate that takes priority is not always clear. A key indicator is necessary, 
which function, it is argued in Section 5.2, China’s five-year plans could 
serve in terms of discerning the purpose of export duties. The same section 
also explains why these plans is a trustworthy indicator by discussing a 
series of observations on the drafting, enactment, and implementation 
stages of them. Section 5.3 subsequently provides a textual analysis of the 
Guidelines of the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (which 
cover the period from 2006 to 2020) and relevant subsector Five-Year Plans 
in order to reveal the motives behind China’s export duties at various points 
in time. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter with an answer to the question of 
whether China might in earnest make use of export duties in the future as 
part of its environmental policy.
5.1 The potential actual motives behind China’s export duties
This section first introduces the formation process of export duties in 
China by reviewing relevant legislation. Subsequently, the key actors in 
this process and their different missions are discussed in order to find the 
potential motives behind China’s export duties.
5.1.1 The formation process of export duties in China
According to the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Import and 
Export Duties, which is the major legislation regarding export duties, the 
State Council, as the highest organ of State administration which is chaired 
by the premier and consists of the heads of each cabinet-level executive 
departments,367 is responsible for formulating the ‘the tariff items, tariff 
nomenclature heading numbers and tariff rates as prescribed in the 
367 State Council Organization Chart, http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/03/
content_281474985533579.htm, (visited 22 June 2018). ‘The State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, namely the Central People’s Government, is the highest executive 
organ of State power, as well as the highest organ of State administration. The State 
Council is composed of a premier, vice-premiers, State councilors, ministers in charge of 
ministries and commissions, the auditor-general and the secretary-general’.
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Customs Import and Export Tariffs of the People’s Republic of China (here-
inafter referred to as the Tariffs)’.368 Thus the State Council has the power to 
decide which products are subject to export duties.
Article 4 of the same regulation stipulates that the ‘tariff items, tariff nomen-
clature heading numbers and tariff rates in the Tariff’ could be readjusted 
by the Customs Tariff Commission which ‘shall be established by the State 
Council’.369 Moreover, the Customs Tariff Commission can also decide ‘the 
goods subject to temporary tariff rates, the tariff rates and time limit’.370 The 
Customs Tariff Commission can not only modify the existing regular export 
duties (upon the approval of the State Council) but also create new interim 
duties on exports (without the approval of the State Council).
The interim export duties are of significance with regard to the implementa-
tion of China’s export duty commitments. Unlike the regular export duties 
which are decided strictly in accordance with Paragraph 11.3 of China’s 
Accession Protocol that only permit China to impose duties on 84 products 
within maximum rate, interim export duties are those duties that explicitly 
violate Paragraph 11.3 in two ways: either to be imposed on impermissible 
products which are outside the scope of 84 products, or to be imposed on one 
of 84 products but above the maximum rate. Thus, the export duties at issue 
in China – Raw Materials, China – Rare Earths, and China – Raw Materials II
are all interim export duties that were solely decided by the Customs Tariff 
Commission. In this context, the Customs Tariff Commission seems to be 
the key to investigate the motives behind those WTO-inconsistent export 
duties.
368 Article 3 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Import and Export Duties, 
No.392, 1 January 2004, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chine-
selaw/200411/20041100311020.shtml, (visited 21 June 2018). ‘The tariff items, tariff 
nomenclature heading numbers and tariff rates as prescribed in the Customs Import and 
Export Tariffs of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Tariffs) and 
the Import Tariff Rates of the People’s Republic of China for Entry Articles (hereinafter 
referred to as the Import Tariff Rates for Entry Articles) which are formulated by the State 
Council shall form an integral part of the present Regulations’.
369 Ibid., Article 4.
370 Ibid. ‘The Customs Tariff Commission shall be established by the State Council. The 
Customs Tariff Commission shall be responsible for readjusting and interpreting tariff 
items, tariff nomenclature heading numbers and tariff rates in the Tariffs and the Import 
Tariff Rates for Entry Articles, which shall take effect upon the approval of the State 
Council; it makes decisions on the goods subject to temporary tariff rates, the tariff 
rates and time limit; it makes decisions on the rate of tariff quota, the imposition of 
antidumping duties, countervailing duties, duty under safeguard measures, retaliatory 
duties; makes decisions on the implementation of other measures in relation to customs 
duties and the application of tariff rates under special circumstances, and exercises the 
other functions as provided for by the State Council’.
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The Customs Tariff Commission was created in 1987 and initially consisted 
of 16 members from various cabinet-level executive departments under 
the State Council.371 From an institutional perspective, this Commission 
functions as a consultative platform in the context of which officials can 
collaborate in designing various duties including regular or interim duties 
on imports and exports, tariff quota, antidumping duties, countervailing 
duties, duty under safeguard measures, retaliatory duties, and other duties 
under special circumstances.372 According to the Rules of Procedure of the 
Customs Tariff Commission, the Commission normally meets every three 
months; its daily business is carried on through an office in the Ministry 
of Finance (the ‘Office’).373 A major task of this Office is to provide prelimi-
nary opinion on the proposal submitted by members of the Customs Tariff 
Commission.374
Once a preliminary consensus among the heads of the Office and repre-
sentatives of the relevant members of the Customs Tariff Commission on 
a proposal, for instance imposing interim export duties on rare earth prod-
ucts, is reached, the imposition of these duties is to be further discussed 
in the Customs Tariff Commission meeting which requires all members to 
attend.375 In order to approve theses export duties, a consensus among the 
Commission members is necessary.376 Therefore, it seems fair to claim that 
the imposition of China’s export duties is motivated by a common inten-
tion of the Commission members. In this context, the mandates of these 
members are of importance to expose the rationale behind China’s export 
duties.
5.1.2 Different missions of the relevant actors in deciding export duties
Following several changes in its membership, the Customs Tariff Commis-
sion has always consisted of 12 members since 2003 though the departments 
from which these members come are different. The members who decided 
the disputed export duties in China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths 
were from the Customs Tariff Commission in the period from 2008 to 2012. 
The official list of the composition of these members is as follows (Table 5). 
371 Notice of the General Offi ce of the State Council on Adjusting the Composition of the 
Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council, the State Council, Guo Ban Fa [1987] 
No. 12.
372 Article 4 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Import and Export Duties.
373 Rules of Procedure of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council, the Customs 
Tariff Commission, Shui Wei Hui [1999], No. 3, http://sczjd.jl.gov.cn/fgdh/gjjbwfg/
lvyj/200606/t20060629_147408.html, (visited 21 June 2018).
374 Ibid., Article 5.
375 Ibid., Article 4.
376 Ibid., Article 9.
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This composition of Customs Tariff Commission members has not much 
changed to date (Table 6).377
It is noteworthy that , none of the Customs Tariff Commission members 
is from the Ministry of Environmental Protection which is responsible 
for ‘establishing a sound basic system for environmental protection’ and 
‘attaining national pollution reduction targets’ relevant to ‘pollution 
to water, air, soil and by noise, light, odor, solid wastes, chemicals, and 
vehicles’.378 In this context, there appeared to be no environmental voice in 
deciding export duties during the Customs Tariff Commission meeting.379 
Therefore, the export duties adopted in the period from 2008 to 2012 were 
not likely to reduce the pollutions associated with the manufacture of 
targeted products in China. This may explain why China failed to provide 
strong environmental justification for its export duties under GATT Article 
XX(b) in China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths.
By contrast, one of the Tariff Commission members is from the Ministry 
of Land and Resources which has the mission ‘to be responsible for the 
planning, administration, protection and rational utilization of such natural 
resources as land, mineral and marine resources in the People’s Republic 
of China’.380 Thus, in the Customs Tariff Commission meeting concerning 
a proposal to impose export duties on natural resources, the Commission 
member from the Ministry of Land and Resources could examine whether 
these proposed duties would help the Ministry to achieve the aforemen-
tioned conservation purposes. In other word, the potential purposes 
of export duties adopted in the period from 2008 to 2012 could include 
conservation of natural resources. This assumption is, however, inconsistent 
with China’s failure to justify its export duties under GATT Article XX(g) 
in China—Raw Materials. The evidence in this case showed that, after the 
imposition of export duties, the extraction of targeted products in China in 
fact increased in response to a substantial increase in its domestic consump-
tion.381
377 Notice of the General Offi ce of the State Council on Adjusting the Composition of the 
Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council, the State Council, Guo Ban Fa [2017] 
No. 66, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211986.htm#, 
(visited 21 June 2018).
378 Ministry of Environmental Protection, ‘Mandates’, http://english.sepa.gov.cn/About_
MEE/Mandates/, (visited 22 June 2018).
379 Though the Ministry of Environmental Protection could attend the Customs Tariff 
Commission office meeting to give an opinion on a preliminary proposal of export 
duties. Article 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State 
Council.
380 Ministry of Land and Resources, ‘Responsibilities of the Ministry of Land and Resources’, 
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/about/mission/200710/t20071015_656461.htm, 
(visited 22 June 2018).
381 Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para 7.429.
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This inconsistency could be possibly explained by the fact that the forma-
tion process of export duties also involves an important Tariff Commission 
member from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, as part 
of which the Industrial Raw Materials Division is responsible for regulating 
the raw materials industry concerning non-ferrous materials, gold, rare 
earth minerals, and so on.382 One of the responsibilities of this Ministry is 
to promote industrial development which could compete with conserva-
tion of natural resources.383 These two goals cannot go hand in hand to the 
extent that export duties are adopted to provide domestic industry with a 
favourable access to raw materials which often incentivises the domestic 
consumption. Thus, the adoption of export duties could in effect accelerate 
the extraction of targeted natural resources. This result goes against the goal 
of conserving natural resources.
For a similar reason, the above industrial goal could also compete with the 
purpose of reducing carbon emissions, a proclaimed environmental goal 
of China’s export duties according to the survey provided in the previous 
chapter,384 to the extent that these duties aim to provide domestic industry 
with a favourable access to energy-intensive industrial inputs and thus to 
incentivise the domestic consumption and manufacture of these products. 
This result is inconsistent with the mission of another important Tariff 
Commission member, namely the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) which operates as the national climate change agency. 
For the Chinese government, fighting climate change, in contrast with 
addressing domestic environmental concerns, needs a strong cooperation 
of different government agencies which calls for ‘a powerful facilitative 
focal point at the macro level’.385 In this context, the NDRC, which is often 
referred to as ‘the little State Council’ due to its broad range of responsi-
bilities, is a suitable agency to lead China’s climate change actions which 
include ‘organizing the formulation of key strategies, plans and policies 
in addressing climate change’, ‘taking the lead with related ministries in 
attending international negotiations of climate change’, ‘undertaking 
relevant work in regard to the fulfilment of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change at national level’, and ‘undertaking compre-
hensive coordination of energy saving and emission reduction’.386
382 State Council, ‘Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’, http://english.gov.
cn/state_council/2014/08/23/content_281474983035940.htm, (visited 18 June 2018).
383 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, ‘Function’ http://www.scio.gov.cn/
ztk/xwfb/jjfyr/35081/jgjs35086/Document/1490727/1490727.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
384 For further information, see Table 1: Practice of WTO Members: export restrictive 
measures to protect the environment (non-international obligations).
385 NDRC, ‘Institutional Arrangements on Climate Change in China’, 23 April 2014, https://
unfccc.int/sites/default/fi les/china-institutional_arrangement_in_china.pdf, (visited 
on 1 January 2019).
386 NDRC, ‘Main Functions of the NDRC’, available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/, 
(visited on 22 June 2018).
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The above analysis of the relevant actors in deciding export duties in the 
period from 2008 to now offers two useful observations as to assess the 
actual motives behind these duties. First, the actual motives could exclude 
the environment purpose of addressing such concerns associated with the 
manufacture of targeted products as air or water pollutions because the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection is absent from the formation process 
of export duties. Second, the actual motives could include conserving 
natural resources, fighting climate change, and promoting industrial 
development because the presence of relevant agencies in deciding export 
duties. However, as discussed above, the industrial purpose cannot go hand 
in hand with the former two environmental purposes. In order to find the 
actual motives, the next section proposes that China’s Five-Year Plans could 
serve as a key indicator to shed light on the priority of competing policy 
purposes.
5.2 China’s Five-Year Plan as a trustworthy policy indicator
Before any further discussion of the actual motives behind China’s export 
duties in the context of the Five-Year Plan, it may be necessary to explain 
why these plans are trustworthy, since one should not always believe every-
thing one hears. For instance, having learnt some lessons from China—Raw 
Materials, when China imposed the export duties on rare earth minerals, it 
made several official announcements regarding its environmental objectives 
in doing so.387 As introduced in Chapter 2, these announcements failed to 
convince either the complainants or the panel in China – Rare Earths. Thus 
one may ask why should China’s Five-Year Plan be a trustworthy policy 
indicator rather than a pretence.
It is, however, far too costly and time consuming to use these plans as a 
pretext since their formulation process is long and complex.388 For instance, 
the formulation of the Guidelines of China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan 
(2016-2020) took three years and included four major stages.389 Phrase I
(March to December 2013) aimed to provide a mid-term evaluation of 
implementation of China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). This evalu-
ation, which was drafted by the NDRC, needs to be approved by the State 
Council and the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, a perma-
nent organ of the national legislature.390 Based on the mid-term evaluation 
387 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras 7.162-7.164.
388 At the stage of drafting the Five-Year Plan, the State Council, as the highest organ of State 
administration, is constitutionally tasked with drafting each Five-Year Plan, offi cially the 
‘Guidelines of the Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development’ (or 
‘Guidelines of the Five-Year Plan’).
389 Cyberspace Administration of China, ‘How to draft a Five-Year Plan’, http://www.cac.
gov.cn/2016-03/23/c_1118414992.htm, (visited 21 June 2018).
390 Ibid.
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report, Phrase II (December 2013 to March 2015) aimed to produce so-called 
Basic Ideas of China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan. At this stage, the NDRC 
entrusts think tanks with policy research concerning 25 important topics 
through public procurement. Based on the research outcomes, the NDRC 
drafted the Basic Ideas and submitted it to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State Council. Subsequently, at 
Phrase III (March to October 2015), the Politburo Standing Committee of 
the CPC, a committee consisting of the top leadership of the CPC, organized 
a team including scholars and local officials in order to publish the CPC 
Central Committee’s Proposal on Formulating the Thirteenth Five-year 
Plan. Based on this proposal, at Phrase IV (October 2015 to March 2016), the 
NDRC started to draft the Guidelines of China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan 
which involves public consultation391 and expert review.392 The final draft 
was subject to the approval of the State Council.
Moreover, China’s Five-Year Plan is one of the few leading matters that 
need to be endorsed by the National People’s Congress, the most authorita-
tive organ of state power in China. For instance, aside from ‘examine and 
approve’ the Five-year Plan, the Congress also exercises other functions and 
powers such as ‘to amend the Constitution’, ‘to supervise the enforcement 
of the Constitution’ and ‘to enact and amend basic laws governing criminal 
offences, civil affairs, the State organs and other matters’.393 This shows the 
important role of Five-Year Plan in China’s governance system.
To ensure the implementation of these plans, the Guidelines of the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) began to introduce two corresponding concepts, 
which are referred to as expected targets and restricted targets, in order 
to ensure its implementation. The former one includes soft targets to be 
achieved primarily through market forces with indirect support from the 
government.394 The Eleventh Five-Year Plan included 14 expected targets, 
including two economic growth targets, namely gross domestic product 
(the goal being a 7.5% annual increase) and GDP per capita (the goal being a 
6.6% annual increase). Restricted targets, on the other hand, are hard targets 
that the government should actively fulfil. For instance, officials need to 
reach the restricted targets in order to ascend the career ladder.395 In order to 
implement the Guidelines of China’s Five-Year Plan, various cabinet-level 
executive departments under the State Council would develop relevant 
subsector Five-Year Plans based on their missions.
391 The public can make suggestions through various forms such as email, SMS, and letter.
392 55 involved experts are specializing in different fi elds such as economics, science and 
technology, public administration, law, and environmental protection.
393 Article 62 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
394 Central Government, ‘The change of targets in the new Five-Year Plan’, http://www.gov.
cn/ztzl/2006-03/07/content_220639.htm, (visited on 21 June 2018).
395 Tiechuan Hao, ‘The Legal Binding Effect of China’s Five-Year Plan’, http://theory.
people.com.cn/GB/41038/5354249.html, (visited 18 June 2017).
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The implementation appears successful according to the popular percep-
tion in the West of ‘China, Inc.’.396 It suggests that one major factor making 
the organization of China unique among countries is the ‘state control over 
planning and inputs’, whereby ‘the Chinese state translates shareholder 
control into coordinated action to fulfil its policy objectives’.397 In this 
process, China’s Five-Year Plan plays an important role in setting the policy 
tone, ‘unlike other countries, such as India, where the Five-Year Plan serves 
merely as an aspirational guide’.398
This is why the content of China’s Five-Year Plan is often used as evidence 
to show the intention of China. For instance, the Made in China 2025 initia-
tive, which has worried the EU and US, is explicitly stated in the Guidelines 
of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). Moreover, the complaining 
governments in China—Rare Earths also referred to several subsector 
Five-Year Plans in order to prove the industrial purpose of China’s export 
duties.399 These practices provide additional reasons for using the Five-Year 
Plans to discern the actual motives behind China’s export duties. Thus 
the next section assesses the function of export duties in the context of the 
Guidelines of the Eleventh to Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2006-2020) and 
relevant subsector Five-Year Plans in order to find whether the adoption 
these duties is motivated by environmental or the competing industrial 
considerations.
5.3 The different roles of export duties in the context of 
Eleventh to Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2006-2020)
This section examines the different roles of export duties in Eleventh to 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in order to offer observations of whether these 
duties are considered as environmental measures or industrial policies 
during the period of 2006 to 2020. The outcome of this analysis is summa-
rized in the tables at the end of this chapter (Table 7-9).
5.3.1 Period of 2006-2015: economic development as a dominant purpose
To begin with, according to the Guidelines of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
(2006-2010), China was to impose export restrictive measures on so-called 
high-energy-intensive, high-pollution, and resources-based products, 
396 Mark Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’, 57(2) Harvard 
International Law Journal (2016), at 264.
397 Ibid., at 275.
398 Ibid., at 276.
399 For instance, the Twelfth Five-Year Development Plan for New Materials Industry, see 
AB Report, China – Rare Earths, para 7.401.
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known as ‘HHR products’, in order to ‘optimize the trade mix’.400 These 
export restrictive measures, according to the interpretation of the NDRC, 
included export duties.401
The specific role of export duties is difficult to glean from the vague phrase 
‘optimize the trade mix’, but the position of the phrase within the Five-Year 
Plan may shed some light on the issue. From a contextual perspective, this 
phrase is the title of a section in Chapter 35. This chapter is titled ‘Acceler-
ating the Transformation of Approaches to Developing Foreign Trade’, and 
it is concerned with increasing the exports of high value-added products. 
For instance, the introduction part of this chapter states that ‘in accordance 
with the requirements of exerting comparative advantages, making up for 
insufficient resources, expanding development space, and increasing added 
value, the country will actively develop foreign trade and promote the 
transformation of foreign trade from quantity increase to quality improve-
ment’. By contrast, the two chapters that stipulate the goals of reducing 
pollution and conserving natural resources make no reference to any export 
restrictive measures, including export duties.402 In this context, the major 
role of export duties during the period from 2006 to 2010 would appear to 
have been that of supporting domestic industry.
This prioritization of industrial goals likewise characterized the Guidelines 
of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015).403 In Chapter 51 titled ‘Optimize 
the Trade Mix’, the introduction part of which states that ‘continue to stabi-
lize and expand external demand, accelerate the transformation of foreign 
trade development mode, and promote the transformation of foreign trade 
development from scale expansion to quality efficiency improvement, and 
from cost advantage to comprehensive competitive advantage’, export 
restrictive measures on HHR products are described as a means of ‘gaining 
new export strengths’, an aim that again includes the increase of high-tech 
exports. By contrast, the three chapters that stipulate the aims of conserving 
natural resources, reducing pollution, and reducing carbon emissions make 
no reference to any export restrictive measures, including export duties.404 
400 Guidelines of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Develop-
ment, 14 March 2006, http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841_10.htm, 
(visited 18 June 2017).
401 National Development and Reform Commission, ‘Improving Export Structure’, http://
www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-03/18/content_230121.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
402 Chapter 24 ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection’ and Chapter 25 ‘Improving Resources 
Management’.
403 Guidelines of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, 
16 March 2011, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-03-17/055622129864.shtml, (visited 18 
June 2017).
404 Chapter 21 ‘Combating Climate Change’, Chapter 22 ‘Improving Resources Manage-
ment’, and Chapter 24 ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection’.
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As in the period from 2006 to 2010, then, so also in the period from 2011 
to 2015 any export duties would appear to have been largely considered 
industrial policies.
Indeed, the term ‘optimize the trade mix’ are also found in the subsector 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Developing the Non-ferrous Metal Industry. 
As an industrial plan issued by the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (a Tariff Commission member mandated to promote industrial 
development), in Chapter 6 ‘Implementation’, Section 5, titled ‘Promote 
international exchanges and cooperation’, it states that ‘We encourage the 
import of non-ferrous metal resources and products, and strictly limit the 
export of HHR products and primary deep-processing products in accor-
dance with WTO rules’. The same section shows that the aim of such export 
restriction is to ‘optimize the trade mix’.
It is noteworthy that the vague phrase ‘optimize the trade mix’ and 
undefined scope of HHR products could have confused some other 
government agencies to the extent that they considered export duties as 
an environmental measure in their subsector Five-Year Plans. For instance, 
the Ministry of Land and Resources, as another Tariff Commission member 
mandated to conserve natural resources, once issued a subsector Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan relevant to export duties.405 In Chapter 10, titled ‘Techno-
logical progress and innovation’, Section 35, titled ‘Deepen reform and 
promote the construction of market system’, considered export policy 
a means to control mineral production by stating that ‘we will adjust the 
total supply of land and minerals through measures concerning planning 
and investment, taxes, environmental protection, and import and export’ 
in order to ‘improve the macro-control mechanism of land and resources’.
The same as the Ministry of Environmental Protection, although this agency 
mandated to address domestic pollution is absent in the formation process 
of export duties, these duties are explicitly referred to in the subsector 
Eleventh Five-Year and Twelfth Plans for Environmental Protection.406 In 
the former Plan, Chapter 5 titled ‘Implementation’, Section 2 titled ‘New 
mechanism’, it suggests that export duties, together with resource taxes and 
consumption taxes, could be used to ‘improve environmental economic 
policies’. In the latter one, Chapter 8 titled ‘Improve policy measures’, 
Section 12 titled ‘International cooperation’, export duties are considered 
an instrument to ‘safeguard China’s environmental rights and interests’ by 
curbing the ‘export of high-energy and high-emission products’ (Table 8).
405 The Eleventh Five-Year Plan for the Ministry of Land and Resources (2006-2010), http://
www.yic.cas.cn/xxfw/ggxx/200701/t20070117828754.html, (visited 18 June 2017).
406 The National Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection (2006- 2010), Guo Fa 
[2007] No. 37, promulgated by the State Council on 22 November 2007.
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The rationale behind the imposition of export duties has been explained 
in research by the Policy Research Centre for Environment and Economy 
(PRCEE), a think-tank affiliated with the Ministry of Environmental Protec-
tion. After calculating the pollution caused by exports from 2003 to 2007, 
the PRCEE concluded that 20% of SO2, 20% of COD, and 30% of CO2 in 
China could be attributed to exports of HHR products.407 This being the 
case, export duties could be adopted as a means to fulfil the restricted envi-
ronmental targets in the Guidelines of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year 
Plans.408 Indeed, the restricted environmental targets in the former Guide-
lines are to reduce the SO2 and COD, as useful measures of air and water 
pollution, by 10% annually; In the Guidelines of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 
the restricted environmental targets call for annual reductions of SO2 and 
COD by 8%.409 Thus, the Ministry of Environmental Protection has made 
several policy recommendations for restricting the production of HHR 
products, such as cancelling export tax rebates, prohibiting the processing 
trade, and imposing export duties.410
Owing to the prioritization of the industrial purposes of export duties in the 
Guidelines of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plans, the above consid-
erations of the Ministry of Land and Resources and the efforts made by the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection did not produce the desired effect. 
Their unrealized environmental initiatives, however, may have incentivized 
China to try its luck under the environmental exceptions of Article XX in 
China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths. Without convincing environ-
mental rationale and justification, this move then provoked the complaining 
governments to take an extremist stance and reject China’s right to invoke 
the provision.
Beyond the proclaimed environmental purposes in these cases, export 
duties could also have been considered a measure to combat climate change 
in the period from 2006 to 2015 in order to the restricted targets in the 
Guidelines of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plans. The target in the 
former Guidelines is to reduce 20% GDP per unit of energy use (‘energy 
intensity’) annually. In the Guidelines of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the 
restricted environmental targets call for annual reductions of energy 
intensity by 16%, and greenhouse gases by 17% per capita and per unit of 
GDP (‘carbon intensity’). Thus, the State Council once issued the Plan for 
Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction for the Eleventh Five-Year 
407 Tao Hu, ‘Analysis on The Environment Defi cit of China’s Export’, 18(2) China Population 
Resources and Environment (2008), at 13.
408 Jun Pang, ‘Green Trade in China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan’ 3 Environment and Sustain-
able development (2011), at 27.
409 Chapter III of the Guidelines of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015).
410 The Ministry of Environmental Protection, ‘2007 Category of High-Pollution and High-
Environmental-Risk Products’. The Ministry of Environmental Protection, ‘2011 Category 
of High-Pollution and High-Environmental-Risk Products’.
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Plan Period.411 In Section 2, titled ‘Control production, adjust and optimize 
the structure’, this subsector Five-Year Plan suggests that ‘adjusting export 
tax rebates, increasing export tariffs’ could be used to restrict ‘the export 
of high-energy-consumption and high-pollution products’ in order to 
eventually ‘control the excessive growth of industries with high energy 
consumption and high pollution’ (Table 9). In a same manner, the Plan for 
Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction for the Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan in Chapter VIII, titled ‘Developing Energy Conservation and Emission 
Reduction Economic Policy’, Section 8, titled ‘Improve energy conservation 
and emission reduction economic policies’, mandated the imposition of 
export duties to restrict the exports of energy-intensive and high-pollution 
products.
This consideration may explain why, despite the export duties at issue 
in the China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths cases, the Chinese 
government during the above period also imposed duties on the exports of 
certain energy-intensive products including steel, aluminum, coal, chemical 
products, and fertilizers, which was applauded by some commentators as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The limited scope of targeted products, 
however, raised the concern over the real contribution of these duties in 
targeting carbon emissions. In other words, to make export duties as a cred-
ible climate policy tool, China could have targeted more energy-intensive 
products, especially those higher value-added ones which significantly 
contribute to its economic growth.412 This shortcoming again could be 
attributed to the prioritization of the economic purposes of export duties in 
the above Guidelines of Five-Year Plans.
5.3.2 Period of 2016-2020: a clear shift to environmental protection
In contrast with the above the Guidelines of the Eleventh and Twelfth 
Five-Year Plans, the Guidelines of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-
2020), however, has shifted the focus to environmental protection in 
two respects.413 First, the industrial role of export duties is completely 
abandoned in the new Guidelines. Compared with the Guidelines of the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan, in the section titled ‘Optimize the Trade Mix’, the 
reference to export restrictive measures targeting HHR products has been 
deleted. Second, export duties are explicitly referred as part of China’s envi-
ronmental policy. In Chapter 47, titled ‘Improve Mechanisms for Ensuring 
Ecological Security’, the use of export duties as an environmental measure 
411 Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
Period, the State Council, Guo Fa [2007] No. 15.
412 Dröge (2009), above n 225, at 67.
413 Guidelines of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Devel-
opment (2016-2020), March 2016, available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfb-
ghwb/201603/P020160318573830195512.pdf, (visited 18 June 2017).
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is raised in the statement that ‘We will establish an eco-tax system that covers 
certain areas, including mining, resource consumption, pollutant discharge, 
and the import and export of resource products’ (emphasis added).414
This shift is also reflected in the relevant subsector Five-Year Plans 
concerning the industrial development none of which refers to either export 
duties or export restrictions in general. However, the specific environmental 
considerations behind China’s export duties are difficult to glean from the 
vague phrase ‘an eco-tax system’. From a contextual perspective, the phrase 
‘resource products’ seems to suggest the purpose of conserving natural 
resources. This assumption, however, seems to be inconsistent with the fact 
that export duties are not mentioned in the relevant subsector Five-Year 
Plans concerning the conservation of natural resources.
Indeed, the new development of China’s resource taxes appears to suggest 
that these taxes are more suitable than export duties to protect natural 
resources. China has been making use of resource taxes on the manufacture 
of various mineral products since 1984.415 The rate and scope of such taxes, 
however, have been too limited to solve the problem of overexploitation 
of resources, as shown in the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths 
cases.416 To reinforce current resource taxes, the subsector Thirteenth Five-
Year Plan concerning protecting natural resources mandates changing the 
method by which they are calculated from ‘a fixed amount of tax per unit 
of a product’ to ‘a percentage tax of the value of a product’.417 This latter 
calculation method, in effect a value-based resource tax, is believed to be 
more effective address the concern of overexploitation of resources.418 
According to a recent notice from the Ministry of Finance, the scope of 
products subject to value-based resource taxes has been broadened from 
6 types, including rare earths, to 24 types beginning 1 July 2016.419 Given 
the progress achieved by reinforcing resource taxes, there appears to be 
less incentive for China to choose export duties, which as already noted 
represent a less-than-optimal option for conserving natural resources.
414 Translated by Compilation and Translation Bureau, Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.
pdf, (visited 18 June 2017).
415 Xinhuanet, ‘Reform on Resource Taxes’, May 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
fortune/2016-05/10/c_128974414.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
416 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras 7.182. – 7.185.
417 People, ‘The Countdown to the Reform on Resource Taxes’, 4 June 2016, http://fi nance.
people.com.cn/n1/2016/0604/c1004-28411574.html, (visited 18 June 2017).
418 Xinhuanet (2016), above n 414. Also see NDB, ‘Environmental Highlights in Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan’, 4 March 2016, http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2016-03-04/988819.
html, (visited 18 June 2017).
419 Ministry of Finance, ‘The Notice to Reform Resource Taxes’, May 2016, http://szs.mof.
gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/201605/t201605101984605.html, (visited 18 June 
2017).
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The environmental purpose of export duties in the new Guidelines is also 
less likely to address the local pollution associated with the manufacture of 
HHR products. Indeed, unlike the previous subsector Five-Year Plans for 
Environmental Protection, the subsector Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Envi-
ronmental Protection lists various policy instruments for use in fulfilling 
their environmental aims without referring to export duties.420 This change 
could be explained by the new development of China’s environmental 
protection tax.421 The introduction of these taxes aims to replace pollution 
fees, which was the instrument that China traditionally used to target 
such environmental problems as air or water pollutions.422 As instituted in 
1982, the system of pollution fees, however, has long been criticized for its 
dependence on administrative intervention by local governments.423 Such 
dependence in practice leads to weak enforcement of pollution fees because 
local governments tend to promote polluting companies in the pursuit of 
economic development. Unlike pollution fees, environmental protection 
taxes are collected by local tax authorities who are independent of local 
governments.424 This latter manner of collection would thus solve the 
problem of weak enforcement, an issue that China once claimed could be 
addressed by export duties. In this sense, the new environmental protection 
taxes could alleviate the need for export duties to address local environ-
mental concerns.
It is noteworthy that, unlike the above domestic environmental concerns 
which could be addressed by the newly introduced resources taxes and 
environmental protection taxes,425 the concern of climate change is currently 
not able to be addressed by carbon taxes owing to economic and adminis-
trative considerations.426 Thus, a potential environmental purpose of export 
duties in the new Guidelines could be to reduce carbon emissions. This 
assumption gains support from the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Reducing 
420 The subsector Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection, available at http://
www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/05/content_5143290.htm, (visited 18 June
2017).
421 Xinhuanet, ‘To Impose Environmental Protection Taxes in 2018’, December 2016, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-12/26/c_1120184613.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
422 People, ‘The Environmental Protection Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China’, 10 
June 2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0610/c1001-27134414.html, (visited 
18 June 2017).
423 Chinadialogue, ‘China Issues Draft on Environmental Protection Taxes to Combat 
Pollution’, 11 June 2015, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/
en/7975-China-issues-draft-on-environmental-taxes-to-combat-pollution (visited 18 
June 2017).
424 Xinhuanet, ‘Environmental Taxes In 2016’, 21 March 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
fortune/2016-03/21/c_1118396224.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
425 The environmental protection taxes, however, only target air, water, and noise pollution, 
leaving unaddressed the target of reducing carbon emissions. Annex I of the Environ-
mental Protection Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China.
426 For further discussion, see Chapter 6.
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Carbon Emissions, in which, Section 3 titled ‘Create a low carbon industry 
system’ considers export restrictions on HHR products as a climate policy 
tool to ‘accelerate the adjustment of industrial structure’.427 To further assess 
this assumption, the next chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
potential of China’s export duties to combat climate change.
 5.4 Conclusions
This chapter investigated the actual motives behind China’s export duties 
in two respects using a more legally-based approach. First, from a policy 
formation perspective, an analysis of the composition of China’s Customs 
Tariff Commission—which has played a vital role in designing its export 
duties—in the period since 2008 shows that the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, which is charged with reducing local pollution in China, has 
long been absent from the formation process for China’s export duties. 
By contrast, the mandates of the other three long-standing members of 
the commission—to promote industrial development, conserve natural 
resources, and combat climate change—seem to have had considerable 
influence over the formation of China’s export duties.
In the second part of this chapter, the Five-Year Plan was identified as a 
trustworthy indicator of the true purpose of China’s export duties.428 The 
Guidelines of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plans (for 2006-2010 
and 2011-2015, respectively) imposed export duties on so-called HHR 
product—those defined as high-energy-intensive, high-pollution, and 
resources-based—as part of efforts to ‘optimize the trade mix’ or ‘gain 
new export strengths’, vague phrases from which it is difficult to deduce a 
specific purpose. A textual analysis of these plans in context showed clearly, 
however, that China had prioritized the industrial purposes of the duties. 
This finding goes a long way towards explaining why the export duties 
were found not to have been adopted for environmental purposes under 
GATT Article XX in China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths.
The vague language, especially the term ‘high-energy-intensive, high-pollu-
tion, and resources-based’, in the plans may also have confused the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection. In the subsector Eleventh and Twelfth Five-
Year Plans for Environmental Protection, this ministry referred explicitly 
427 Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Reducing Carbon Emissions, Guofa [2016] No. 61, http://
www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-11/04/content_5128619.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
428 For instance, it is far too costly and time consuming to use these plans as a pretext since 
their formulation process is long and complex. Moreover, these plans are often used as 
evidence to show the intention of China in practice. The complaining governments in 
China—Rare Earths thus referred to several Five-Year Plans in order to prove the actual 
purpose of China’s export duties. For further information, see Section 5.2.
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to export duties as a part of ‘environmental economic policies’ intended 
to ‘safeguard China’s environmental rights and interests’.429 In pursuit of 
this objective, it developed a list of high-pollution and high-environmental-
risk products and recommended imposing export duties on some of them 
together with proper measures to also restrict domestic consumption. These 
initiatives from the ministry, however, owing to its insignificant role in 
the formation process of the export duties and their prioritized industrial 
purpose under the Guidelines of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plans, 
were not reflected in the policy that eventually took shape.
It is ironic that although the efforts of the Ministry of Environmental Protec-
tion have not produced the desired effect, its environmental initiatives, 
as a form of evidence, may have incentivized China to try its luck under 
Article XX. For China, while the export duties in dispute were adopted 
for an industrial purpose, they might have indeed reduced the pollution 
associated with the manufacture of certain targeted products.430 Based on 
those potential good side-effects, China was trying to justify the bad aim 
of its duties.431 This move provoked the complaining governments to take 
an extremist stance and reject China’s right to invoke the environmental 
exceptions at all.
Possibly owing to lessons learned from the China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths cases, China has done away with all of the disputed 
export duties and stopped their industrial role in its Guidelines of the Thir-
teenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). Moreover, departing from the previous 
vagueness, the new guidelines also make clear that export duties in 
combination with other taxes on production and consumption could form 
part of a new ‘eco-tax system’ designed to ‘ensure ecological security’.432 
An analysis of the relevant subsector five-year plans shows further the 
decreasing role of export duties in conserving natural resources or reducing 
local pollution associated with manufacturing as first-best options, such 
as recently introduced resources and environmental protection taxes, have 
been adopted to address these concerns.
429 For further information, see Section 5.3.1. Moreover, the vague language might have also 
confused the Ministry of Land and Resources which, as a Tariff Commission member 
mandated to conserve natural resources, once issued a subsector Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
relevant to export duties.
430 For instance, China adduces two empirical studies in China – Raw Materials which show 
that ‘elimination of the export duty of 20% on manganese metal would imply an increase 
in production by 4.28%’; ‘eliminating the 40% export duty on coke would increase 
domestic production of coke by 2.2%’. See Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, paras 
7.519-7.520.
431 This line of thoughts is clearly inconsistent with Article XX. It is unclear, however, 
whether a good aim would always be defeated by some bad side-effects under Article 
XX. For further discussion, see Chapter 8.
432 For further information, see Section 5.3.2.
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As a consequence of these shifts in policy, the most likely environmental 
role for China’s export duties in the future is to combat climate change. 
According to the language regarding climate change in the new subsector 
five-year plans, exports of HHR products are to be strictly controlled in 
order to ‘create a low-carbon industrial system’. In this context, considering 
their advantages over quantitative export restrictions as discussed in the 
previous chapter, export duties could be a suitable border measure to 
combat climate change. The following chapter provides a detailed assess-
ment of the potential role of export duties in this regard, an issue that has 
not yet been addressed adequately in the literature about the negative 
impacts of the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions.
Table 5: Customs Tariff Commission members in the period from 2008 to 2012
Members 2008 to 2012
Director Minister of Finance
Deputy Director Deputy Secretary General of the State Council
Other members Deputy Director of National Development and Reform Commission
Deputy Minister of Commerce
Deputy Minister of Industry and Information Technology
Deputy Minister of Land and Resources
Deputy Minister of Agriculture
Deputy Director of General Administration of Customs
Chief Economist of the State Administration of Taxation
Deputy Director General of General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine
Deputy Director of Legal Affairs Office
Assistant Minister of Finance
Table 6: Comparing the Customs Tariff Commission members in the period from 2008 to 2012
and from 2017 to now
Members 2008 to 2012 2017 to Now
Director Minister of Finance Minister of Finance
Deputy Director Deputy Secretary General of the State 
Council
Deputy Secretary General of the State 
Council
Other members Deputy Director of National 
Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC)
Deputy Director of National 
Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC)
Deputy Minister of Commerce Deputy Minister of Commerce
Deputy Minister of Industry and 
Information Technology
Deputy Minister of Industry and 
Information Technology
Deputy Minister of Land and Resources Deputy Minister of Land and Resources
Deputy Minister of Agriculture Deputy Minister of Agriculture
Deputy Director of General 
Administration of Customs
Deputy Director of General 
Administration of Customs
Chief Economist of the State 
Administration of Taxation
Changed to: Deputy Director of the 
State Administration of Taxation
Deputy Director General of AQSIQ Deputy Director General of AQSIQ
Deputy Director of Legal Affairs Office Deputy Director of Legal Affairs Office
Assistant Minister of Finance Changed to: Deputy Minister of 
Finance
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Table 7: Comparing the Guidelines of the Eleventh to Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2006-2020)
Period 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020
Chapter Chapter 35
‘Accelerating the 
Transformation of 
Approaches to Developing 
Foreign Trade’
In accordance with the 
requirements of exerting 
comparative advantages, 
making up for insufficient 
resources, expanding 
development space, and 
increasing added value, the 
country will actively 
develop foreign trade and 
promote the transformation 
of foreign trade from 
quantity increase to quality 
improvement. By 2010, the 
total import and export of 
goods and services trade 
aims to reach 2.3 trillion US 
dollars and 400 billion US 
dollars respectively.
Chapter 51
‘Optimize the Trade Mix’
Continue to stabilize and 
expand external demand, 
accelerate the 
transformation of foreign 
trade development mode, 
and promote the 
transformation of foreign 
trade development from 
scale expansion to quality 
efficiency improvement, 
and from cost advantage to 
comprehensive competitive 
advantage.
Chapter 47
‘Improve Mechanisms 
for Ensuring Ecological 
Security’
We will build up 
institutions for ecological 
progress, establish sound 
systems for ecological risk 
prevention and control, and 
improve capabilities to 
respond to ecological and 
environmental emergencies 
in order to keep China 
ecologically secure.
Section Section 1
‘Optimize the trade mix’
Section 1
‘Gaining new export 
strengths’
Section 1
‘Ecological and 
Environmental Protection 
Systems’
Content Focusing on self-owned 
brands, independent 
intellectual property rights 
and independent 
marketing, the government 
will guide enterprises to 
enhance their 
comprehensive 
competitiveness. Support 
the export of autonomous 
high-tech products, 
electromechanical products 
and high value-added 
labour-intensive products. 
Strictly implement labour, 
safety, and environmental 
protection standards, and 
regulate the composition of 
export costs, restrict the 
exports of ‘HHR products’. 
Maintain the existing 
export competitive 
advantage and accelerate 
the cultivation of new 
advantages in technology, 
brand, quality and service 
as the core competitiveness. 
Enhance the quality and 
grade of labour-intensive 
export products and 
expand the export of 
mechanical and electrical 
products and high-tech 
products, restrict the 
exports of ‘HHR products’.
We will accelerate the 
establishment of diverse 
compensation mechanisms 
for ecological restoration 
and conservation efforts, 
and improve the 
mechanism linking fund 
allocation to ecological 
protection performance. 
We will establish an eco-
tax system that covers 
certain areas including 
mining, resource 
consumption, pollutant 
discharge, and the import 
and export of resource 
products.
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Table 8: Comparing the subsector Five-Year Plans relevant to environmental protection 
(2006-2020)
Period 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020
Chapter Chapter 5
‘Implementation’
Chapter 8
‘Improve policy measures’
Export duties 
are not 
mentioned.Section Section 4
‘New mechanism’
Section 12
‘International cooperation’
Subsection Subsection 2
‘Improve environmental 
economic policies’
In the resource tax, consumption 
tax, import and export tax 
reform, full consideration of 
environmental protection 
requirements, explore the 
establishment of an 
environmental tax s
Paragraph 2
Actively participate in 
environmental and trade-related 
negotiations and the formulation 
of relevant rules, strengthen the 
coordination of environment and 
trade, and safeguard China’s 
environmental rights and 
interests. Study and adjust the 
import and export tax policy for 
products with “high pollution 
and high environmental risks” to 
curb the export of high-energy 
and high-emission products.
Table 9: Comparing the subsector Five-Year Plans relevant to climate change (2006-2020)
Period 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020
Section Section 2
‘Control production, 
adjust and optimize the 
structure’
Section 8
‘Improve energy 
conservation and emission 
reduction economic 
policies’
Section 3
‘Create a low carbon 
industry system’
Subsection Subsection 3
‘Control the excessive 
growth of industries with 
high energy consumption 
and high pollution.’
Subsection 34
‘Improve tax support 
policies’
Subsection 1
‘Accelerate the adjustment 
of industrial structure’
Content Strictly control new high-
energy, high-pollution 
projects…… Implement 
policies that limit the 
export of high-energy-
consumption and high-
pollution products. 
Continue to use measures 
such as adjusting export 
tax rebates, increasing 
export tariffs, reducing 
export quotas, and 
including some products 
in the prohibited 
categories of processing 
trade, and controlling the 
export of high-energy-
consumption and high-
pollution products.
Implement the national 
preferential policies for 
supporting energy 
conservation and emission 
reduction income tax and 
value-added tax…… 
Improve and implement 
tax incentives for 
comprehensive utilization 
of resources and 
renewable energy 
development. Adjust 
import and export tax 
policies to curb the export 
of high-energy and high-
emission products.
The low-carbon 
development will be 
regarded as an important 
driving force for economic 
upgrading and efficiency 
improvement under the 
new normal and promote 
the transformation and 
upgrading of industrial 
structure……. We will 
change the export model, 
strictly control the export 
of HHR products, and 
focus on optimizing the 
export structure.
6 A Neglected Issue: 
Negative Impacts on China’s Capacity 
to Fight Climate Change
Thus far, this thesis has shown that an absolute ban on export duties 
would hamper China’s progress for environmental protection, especially 
on addressing the issue of carbon leakage. Such problems occur when 
energy-intensive industries shift production to countries that have weaker 
or no such controls in order to evade the effects of a state’s carbon pricing 
policies.433 Unfortunately, such negative environmental impacts caused by 
the China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths decisions have received 
inadequate attention in the literature on the two cases.434
A possible reason for this neglect is that export duties have only rarely been 
used to reduce carbon emissions. In fact, in distinction from the conven-
tional declarations that the duties serve environmental purposes that were 
introduced in Chapter 4, only two countries had imposed export duties to 
for addressing issues associated with climate change. One is Bangladesh 
which once imposed export duties on bricks in order to counter a climate 
action of India that in effect outsourced the polluting brickmaking industry 
to Bangladesh.435 In a much more extensive manner, China, as the other 
one, had imposed duties on the exports of a range of energy-intensive prod-
ucts in the period from 2009 to 2016.436 This practice has been recorded in 
China’s second communication to the UNFCCC as a type of instrument to 
‘effectively control greenhouse gas emissions’.437
Despite limited practice, however, export duties might have already contrib-
uted more to combating climate change than their popular counterparts, 
namely import duties on energy-intensive products for reducing carbon 
433 Pachauri, R.K. and Reisinger, A. (eds), Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (IPCC, 2007) at 
665.
434 To the best of the author’s knowledge, in English literature about the two cases, only 
Baris Karapinar and Kateryna Holzer have pointed out this problem by arguing that ‘as 
the Panel and the Appellate Body in the China-Raw Materials dispute clarifi ed, China and 
potentially other new Members with similar commitments cannot even resort to article 
XX exceptions to justify the duties they impose on their exports. Therefore, the use of 
an export tax as a climate policy tool is not possible for these countries’. But they did 
not discuss the particular question concerning the potential of China’s export duties to 
combat climate change. See Karapinar and Holzer (2012), above n 181, at 34.
435 Pulitzer Center (2018), above n 218.
436 For further information, see Chapter 4.
437 UNFCCC (2004), above n 6, at 15.
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leakage. The latter ones have never been put into practice though they have 
received far more attention than export duties from trade lawyers. This bias 
is unfortunate because a number of climate studies have suggested that 
export duties could be useful for curtailing carbon leakage,438 especially 
in the context of China as ‘the world’s most unbalanced virtual emissions’ 
trader, for its emissions associated with its exports being eight times those 
associated with its imports.439 In the global context, China in 2012 was 
responsible for 28% of global carbon emissions, about one-quarter of which 
were created by the manufacture of export products,440 meaning that 7% of 
total global carbon emissions in that year were attributable to just this part 
of the Chinese economy.
To explore the neglected issue of China’s constrained policy space to 
fight climate change, this chapter provides a comprehensive assessment 
of the advantages and disadvantages of considering export duties as part 
of climate change policy. This chapter also examines arguments that cast 
doubt on the significance of export duties for China’s overall climate policy 
and refutes them based on the country’s recent actions to combat climate 
change.441
6.1 Proposed options to tackle carbon leakage
Climate change is an environmental externality caused by market failure, 
and one key policy measure to correct this failure is to place a price on 
carbon emissions.442 Current climate policies are, however, applied asym-
metrically, a circumstance that creates incentives for emission-intensive 
economic activity to migrate away from regions where the price of carbon 
emissions is higher.443 This is the situation often referred to as carbon 
leakage, and it seriously undermines collective efforts to combat climate 
438 For instance, the well-known Stern Review on the economics of climate change, its 
follow-up article, and a World Bank research paper, etc. For further discussion, see 
Section 6.2.
439 Zhu (2015), above n 18, at 1.
440 Ibid.
441 First, given the fact that China’s export duties, mostly on primary products, have so 
far only targeted a ‘small fraction of the emissions from its exports’, China may not be 
willing to extend export duties to major wealth-creating export sectors given its over-
arching goal of economic development. Second, China could replace export duties with 
alternative measures targeting the production of high-energy-intensive products in order 
to achieve the same climate goal. See Glen P. Petersb, Dabo Guanc, Klaus Hubacekd, ‘The 
Contribution of Chinese Exports to Climate Change’, 36 (9) Energy Policy 3572 (2008), at 
3576.
442 UNEP and WTO, ‘Trade and Climate Change: A Report by the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme and the World Trade Organization’ (2009), at 90.
443 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, (Cambridge University Press, 
2015), at 63.
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change. Carbon leakage is a consequence of the unequal carbon prices all 
over the world, and three basic options have been proposed to address this 
problem.444
The first option is to pursue a global international agreement that imposes 
a similar carbon cost on all emitters.445 The recent achievement in this area 
is the Paris Agreement, which went into force on 4 November 2016. Unlike 
the earlier Kyoto Protocol, which exempts developing countries from 
restrictions on emissions, the Paris Agreement requires that all nations take 
measures to combat climate change, though it bases this requirement on the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, which recognizes 
historical differences between the contributions of developed and devel-
oping countries to climate change. As a result, whereas the Paris Agreement 
requires that developed countries ‘continue taking the lead by undertaking 
economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets’, developing countries 
are ‘encouraged’ to move, over time, towards the reduction targets set by 
developed countries.446 It would therefore be overly optimistic to expect all 
countries to have similar carbon prices in the near future.
As an alternative, the second option for confronting carbon leakage is to 
reduce the net carbon costs of domestic production in emission outsourcing 
countries.447 Thus, for instance, when the EU launched the emissions 
trading system (EU ETS) in 2005, which requires emitters to purchase 
carbon emission permits, it included the free allocation of allowances, 
a mechanism to exempt certain companies from limits on carbon emis-
sions. Under this mechanism, the manufacturing industry received 80% 
of its allowances for free at the beginning of the EU ETS.448 While the free 
allocation of allowances shields internationally competing industries in 
the EU from carbon leakage, it also raises concerns about the potential of 
this mechanism to undermine the overall effectiveness of the EU ETS.449 
To address this problem, 57% of the total amount of allowances was to be 
auctioned, instead of being freely allocated, in the current trading period 
(2013-2020).450 However, assuming that the decrease in free allocation will 
make the EU ETS more effective, the problem of carbon leakage may recur 
owing to increased carbon prices in the EU.
444 Michael Grubb, Thomas Counsell, ‘Tackling Carbon Leakage: Sector-Specifi c Solutions 
for a World of Unequal Carbon Prices’, Carbon Trust Report (2010), at 30.
445 Ibid.
446 Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement, done at Paris, 12 December 2015, UN / FCCC.
447 Grubb and Counsell (2010), above n 419, at 32.
448 European Commission, ‘Free Allocation’, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
allowances_en (visited on 1 January 2019).
449 Energypost, ‘To Make European Climate Policy Work, We Need to Put a Carbon Price on 
Imports’, reporter Emil Dimantchev, 5 March 2015.
450 European Commission, above n 414.
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In an effort to resolve this dilemma, a third option has been proposed to 
address the difference in carbon prices across international borders, namely 
a carbon-based border tax adjustment (BTA).451 The first type of BTAs, 
which is often referred to as import BTAs, requires carbon-outsourcing 
countries to impose duties on the energy-intensive imports from carbon-
outsourced countries. A typical import BTA can be found in a French 
proposal of 2010 that mandates the adoption of a EU-wide carbon tax on 
imports,452 though this proposal has been heavily opposed by such EU 
members as Germany. Another example can be found in the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act, also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill 
after the US legislators who cosponsored it, which requires that importers 
purchase emissions credits from an ‘international reserve allowance 
program’.453 This bill was passed by the US House of Representatives in 
2009 but was eventually rejected by the Senate.454
To date, however, no import BTA has been implemented. Concerns have 
been raised over the legality of import BTA, an issue that has long been 
discussed within the legal profession. However, as concluded by many 
lawyers, although any requirement for a carbon-based tax on imports could 
potentially violate GATT Article II and Article III, such a violation could be 
justified by the environmental exceptions under Article XX.455 Thus, it has 
been so fully argued that ‘governments cannot hide behind the pretext that 
WTO law prevents them from using their markets, through trade-related 
measures, for environmental progress: WTO law is no excuse for environ-
mental inaction’.456
Indeed, the more important reason for the inaction on import BTAs is 
perhaps on the political side. For instance, while the French President 
Emmanuel Macron has recently introduced his idea of imposing import 
BTAs, a major concern is whether such proposal would ever receive 
political support from major European business groups, given the risk that 
451 Grubb and Counsell (2010), above n 419, at 36. See more discussion in Stéphanie Monjon 
and Philippe Quirion, ‘Border Adjustments - Implications of Design Options’, in Arttu 
Makipaa (ed), ‘Competitive Distortions and Leakage in a World of Different Carbon 
Prices’ (European Parliament, 2008), 35-43.
452 Nature, ‘France Unveils Carbon Tax’, reporter Declan Butler, 15 September 2009.
453 Harro van Asselta, Thomas Brewerb, ‘Addressing Competitiveness and Leakage 
Concerns in Climate Policy: An Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and 
the EU’38 (1) Energy Policy 42 (2010), at 45.
454 TIME, ‘Why the Climate Bill Died’, reporter Bryan Walsh, 26 July 2010.
455 For instance, Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Chapter 15: Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax 
Adjustments Under WTO law’, in Geert Van Calster and Denise Prévost (eds), ‘Research 
Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO’, (Edward Elgar Publication, 2013).
456 Barbara Cooreman, ‘Global Environmental Protection through Trade: A Systematic Approach to 
Extraterritoriality’ (Edward Elgar, 2016), at 281.
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these carbon tariffs could spark a trade war.457 They have good reasons to 
worry because import BTAs would almost certainly face strong political 
opposition from developing countries. Especially in the context of the 
above-mentioned principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, 
it would be considered ‘inherently unfair’ to penalize developing countries 
through the imposition of BTAs,458 and this unfairness may further under-
mine efforts to engage emerging economies to binding commitments to 
reduce emissions.459
Against this background, export duties, another type of border-levelling 
mechanism, have been proposed as an alternative to import BTAs which 
will be discussed next (Chart 1).
Chart 1: Export duties as an alternative to import BTAs
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457 Frédéric Simon, ‘BusinessEurope warms to Macron’s EU carbon tariff idea’, EURACTIV, 
29 April 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/emissions-trading-scheme/news/
businesseurope-warms-to-macrons-eu-carbon-tariff-idea/ (visited on 16 June 2019).
458 Robyn Eckersley, ‘The Politics of Carbon Leakage and the Fairness of Border Measures’, 
24 (4) Ethics & International Affairs (2010), at 367.
459 John Whalley, Simon J. Evenett, ‘The G20 and Green Protectionism: Will We Pay the Price 
at Copenhagen?’, No. 14 Policy Brief of the Centre for International Governance Innova-
tion (2009).
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6.2 Export duties as an alternative to import BTAs
The idea of export BTAs was perhaps inspired by a success story with 
voluntary export restraints in a dispute involving the US and Canada in 
1996.460 In this case, Canada was accused by the US of unfairly subsidizing 
its lumber industry. In order to avoid potential import duties on its lumber 
products, Canada agreed to impose substantial duties on its lumber exports 
to the US. Thus, these export duties brought economic benefits for Canada 
in terms of the tax revenue that balanced out the import duties, whereas the 
US producers would be protected from high competition from Canada.
This same logic may also be applied to the choice of border-levelling mecha-
nism. As discussed above, the rationale of import BTAs is to increase the 
carbon costs on energy-intensive imports from countries that have weak 
climate policies. Alternatively, those carbon-outsourced countries may also 
impose duties on their energy-intensive exports by themselves in an effort 
to achieve the same objective. Compared with the import BTAs which risk 
sparking a trade war, export duties could assuage the concerns regarding 
the above-mentioned financial unfairness since the revenue is collected 
by the carbon-outsourced countries, which are generally also developing 
countries. For this reason, export duties have the potential to integrate 
developing countries into a global carbon-reduction scheme.
Such potential was recognized by the well-known Stern Review on the 
economics of climate change which referred to the use of export duties and 
incomplete value-added tax (VAT) rebates in China.461 Its follow-up article 
in 2007 further compared China’s export duties on such energy-intensive 
products as aluminium and cement with the EU ETS and concluded that the 
former one was more effective at some point.462 A similar comparison was 
later made by two economists in 2009 who found that China’s export duties 
on aluminium and steel were comparable to the EU ETS in terms of carbon 
460 Benito Müller and Anju Sharma, ‘Trade Tactic Could Unlock Climate Negotiations’, 
SciDev.Net (2005).
461 ‘For example, after the abolition of a global quota system, China had offered to raise its 
export tariffs and reduce export tax rebate rates to help manage the entry of their textiles 
into the EU and US markets. Under this arrangement, the revenues would have been 
paid to the Chinese government, but EU and US producers would have been protected 
from high competition from abroad’. Stern (2007), above n 9, at 552.
462 Hamid, Stern, and Taylor (2007), above n 10, at 176. ‘This compares well to the cost 
imposed by the EU ETS [emissions-trading scheme] on fi rms in these sectors. At allow-
ance prices of €20/t CO2, the impact is estimated at 1% for integrated steel and 4% for 
aluminum, based on the increase in electricity prices. Current prices for EU ETS allow-
ances are €2 to €5 euros, implying far smaller impacts’. Also see Pauwelyn (2013), above n 
436, at 503.
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price.463 In this context, as proposed by a 2012 World Bank research paper, 
export duties could play a positive role in future negotiations aimed at 
reducing carbon leakage.464 This, as suggested by a 2013 PIIE policy study, 
would address the competitive concerns of Western nations so that they 
would be better able to facilitate their political economy of raising carbon 
prices.465
From a critical perspective, one may question the determination of China 
to impose export duties on a wide range of energy-intensive products at 
the cost of slowing down its economic growth. For instance, it has been 
argued that, if the problem of carbon leakage is to be tackled effectively, 
China needs to impose export duties on more higher value-added products 
including electronics and machinery which would lead to higher costs to 
the Chinese economy.466 However, as long as the overarching policy goal 
of China is to maintain a steady growth rate of 10% annually, it is not likely 
to ‘extend export taxes to major wealth-creating export sectors’, a move 
that ‘would be needed to make an export tax approach credible’.467 The 
following section refutes this old view based on China’s recent actions to 
combat climate change.
6.3 China’s export duties as a credible climate policy tool
Although the framework legislation for export duties does not refer 
explicitly to carbon leakage, as introduced in the previous chapter, the 
State Council once issued the Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission 
Reduction for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Period (2006-2010), a comprehen-
sive environmental policy at the highest levels of government, mandates 
exploration of the potential of export duties to reduce carbon emissions.468 
Thus, the Customs Tariff Commission began to impose export duties on 
certain energy-intensive products in 2007 and 2008. As discussed above, this 
practice has been applauded by some commentators, who see the potential 
of export duties to combat carbon leakage.
Indeed, given the fact that China is the largest emitter and exporter of carbon 
dioxide emissions, export duties could effectively curb China’s carbon 
leakage if the country were willing to target more energy-intensive products. 
463 Tancrede Voituriez and Xin Wang, ‘Can Unilateral Trade Measures Signifi cantly Reduce 
Leakage and Competitiveness Pressures on EU-ETS-Constrained Industries? The Case of 
China Export Taxes and VAT Rebates’, Climate Strategies Working Paper (2009), at 28.
464 Copeland (2012), above n 11, at 41.
465 Mattoo and Subramanian (2013), above n 51.
466 Petersb, Guanc, Hubacekd (2008), above n 440, at 3576.
467 Dröge (2009), above n 225, at 67.
468 For further information, see Chapter 5.
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There are at least three good reasons for China to develop a genuine climate 
policy despite the associated negative impact on its economic growth.
First, the short-run economic losses caused by targeting traditional energy-
intensive industries could be justified by the long-run benefits through 
the development of new low-carbon technologies and sectors.469 Even 
the authors with a critical view of China’s export duties suggested that 
a credible climate policy would provide China with economic benefits 
over the longer term.470 Indeed, despite the potential negative impacts 
on traditional industries, climate action could also offer future economic 
opportunities for countries to develop new low-carbon industries.471 Thus, 
boosting long-term economic growth and tackling climate change could 
go hand in hand. Indeed, for the Chinese government, the imposition of 
export duties on a wide range of energy-intensive products could represent 
a way to advance in the global value chain. A widely-quoted description of 
China’s economic mode is that the country must sell 800 million shirts in 
order to buy one Airbus A380.472 In an effort to improve its standing among 
world producers, China has long been promoting its high-tech industries, 
which generally produce much less carbon emissions than traditional 
low-end manufacturing. The existing strong energy-intensive sectors in 
China, however, could prevent other Chinese firms from developing green 
technologies.473 In this context, export duties were considered part of the 
restrictions on the traditional energy-intensive industries in the subsector 
Five-Year Plans relevant to climate change (2006-2020).474
Second, the aforementioned doubts are based on the assumption that 
China needs to maintain ‘a steady growth rate of 10% annually’.475 This, 
however, does not fit today’s reality.476 One important reason is that the 
469 Alexander Roth and Georg Zachmann, ‘Learning for decarbonisation’, Bruegel Policy Brief, 
8 November 2018, http://bruegel.org/2018/11/learning-for-decarbonisation/?utm_
source=GDPR&utm_campaign=09e7baca4d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_11_08_09_13&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_7c51e322b7-09e7baca4d-278610661 (visited on 1 January 2019).
470 ‘If export taxes have induced modernisation of domestic production, this approach yields 
three benefi ts for the Chinese economy altogether.’ See Dröge (2009), above n 225, at 67. 
‘However, over the longer term it is in the interest of both Western countries and China 
to lower the energy and carbon intensity of its production practices, as the advantages of 
producing in China are immense’. See Petersb, Guanc, and Hubacekd (2008), above n 432, 
at 3576.
471 Ibid.
472 China Daily, ‘Bo: 800 Million Shirts for One Airbus A380’, 5 May 2005.
473 ‘Finally, we fi nd that an existing strong sector can fail to develop new technologies (elec-
tric vehicles in Italy)’. See Bruegel (2018), above n 467, at 10.
474 See Chapter 5.
475 Dröge (2009), above n 225, at 67.
476 For instance, China’s economy only grew by 6.9% in 2015. BBC, ‘China economic growth 
slowest in 25 years’, 19 January 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-35349576 
(visited 15 June 2019).
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Chinese government needs to accommodate the public concerns over 
environmental protection. Given the fact that energy-intensive industries 
have created such environmental challenges as air pollution in China, 
the negative economic impacts caused by climate action could also be 
politically justified by an improved environment in China. Indeed, largely 
relying on coal-fired power, China’s rapid economic development has come 
at the cost of environmental damage. Thus, in late 2016, Beijing issued two 
highest-level pollution alerts which advised residents to stay indoors;477 
for while the maximum safe level of fine particulate matter (PM2.5), a key 
air pollutant, is 25 micrograms per cubic meter, the level in China’s capital 
peaked at just below 300. Since long-term exposure to high levels of this 
pollutant are known to cause lung damage and other respiratory illnesses, 
there is widespread public anger over the state’s inability to control it. As 
a fundamental part of the solution, China has no choice but to reduce the 
scale of its energy-intensive industries.
Third, if China makes export duties as a credible climate policy instru-
ment, they could be used to counter BTAs involving carbon-outsourcing 
countries and thereby enhance international cooperation on climate change. 
For instance, the European Parliament in 2014 required the European 
Commission to examine the feasibility of asking steel importers to purchase 
emission allowances for the purpose of ‘eliminating the phenomenon of 
carbon leakage’.478 Moreover, the more recent development shows that the 
EU may indeed have prepared to impose a carbon border tax.479 Although 
China may respond by initiating WTO litigation or even a trade war, such 
approaches would inevitably be self-defeating and undermine international 
cooperation. A more favorable option in terms of tackling carbon leakage 
would be to exempt China from the BTAs by allowing it to voluntarily 
impose export duties on energy-intensive products.480
To accommodate the above considerations, China at the end of 2014 an-
nounced its plans to halt the increase in its carbon emissions around 2030.481 
477 BBC, ‘China Smog: Beijing Issues Second Ever Pollution Red Alert’, 8 December 2015.
478 European Parliament, ‘Post-2020 reform of the EU Emissions Trading System’, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/579092/EPRS_BRI(2016)579092_
EN.pdf. Moreover, environmental standards could also play a role under the new meth-
odology of EU trade defense rules. European Commission, ‘EU puts in place new trade 
defence rules’, 20 December 2017, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/
index.cfm?id=1774 (visited on 23 July 2018).
479 Alan Beattie, ‘Carbon border tax sends signals for trade deals’, FT, 29 May 2019, https://
www.ft.com/content/016adba8-82ed-11e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b (visited 15 June 2019). 
Also see Von der Leyen (2019), above n 12.
480 For instance, ‘any export tax on the exportation of carbon-intensive products (as China 
is reported doing) must be deducted from the US tax on imports’. See Pauwelyn (2013), 
above n 436, at 503.
481 White House, ‘U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change’, 11 November 2014.
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This target was further confirmed in the Paris Agreement, which was ratified 
by China in 2016. As the first major developing country to set a total emis-
sions peak target, China is committed to reducing its carbon emissions per 
unit of GDP by 60-65% compared to 2005 levels in order to meet the 2030 
target date.482 If it is to achieve this ambitious goal, China must accelerate 
the transformation of its current development mode, which relies largely on 
energy-intensive industries. The country has thus, for the first time, incor-
porated a limit on energy consumption into its Guidelines for the Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). Thus, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
relevant subsector Thirteenth Five-Year Plan considers export duties, as 
part of export control policy, an instrument to ‘create a low carbon industry 
system’.
As another major part of its climate action, China has also developed emis-
sions trading system. To date, 56 jurisdictions worldwide, 35 national and 
21 subnational, have implemented emissions trading systems.483 China 
became one of them in 2011 when the government began establishing 
carbon trading pilot programs in seven provinces and cities as part of 
its Guidelines of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015).484 These pilot 
programs were transitioned into a national emissions trading system at the 
end of 2017. As the world’s largest carbon trade market, this national emis-
sions trading system will target some energy-intensive sectors, including 
power, petrochemicals, chemicals, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, 
building production and materials, pulp and paper, and aviation.485 Some 
sectors, including trade and services, however, are not included in this 
trading system owing to administrative difficulties; simply put, the targeted 
sectors are much easier for government officials to monitor.
As a result of these compromises, China’s national emissions trading 
system will cover less than half of its total carbon emissions.486 Carbon taxes 
have been proposed as a means to target the other half. In order to facilitate 
administration of these taxes, China may impose them on such upstream 
sectors as energy and mining. Given the emissions trading that takes place 
in some industries, however, it becomes difficult to distinguish the energy 
consumed by industries that are covered by national emissions trading 
system from the energy consumed by those that are not covered. China may 
therefore need to impose carbon taxes further downstream; but doing so 
again raises the specter of administrative complexities.
482 Xinhuanet, ‘China’s Legislature Ratifi es Paris Agreement on Climate Change’, 3 Sep tem -
ber 2016.
483 Jeff Swartz, ‘China’s National Emissions Trading System’, No.6 ICTSD Series on Climate 
Change Architecture (2016), at 7.
484 Ibid., at 12.
485 Ibid., at 17.
486 Alvin Powell, ‘Tackling Carbon Emissions in China’, Harvard Gazette (2016).
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Looking beyond such logistical challenges, China may also need to consider 
the significant economic impacts of such carbon pricing. Currently, only a 
few developed countries have enacted or proposed carbon taxes.487 As an 
example of the difficulties involved, Australia in 2012 implemented detailed 
carbon taxes, only to have a new government repeal them in 2014.488 China 
must accordingly consider how to mitigate any significant negative impacts 
of carbon taxes. Against this background, China’s export duties may serve 
as an interim tool for combating carbon leakage until an economy-wide 
carbon tax is feasible in financial or practical terms. Thus even the author 
who once questioned the credibility of China’s export duties as a climate 
policy tool suggested that export duties could be ‘a first step to find agree-
ments on carbon constraints with major EU trade partners from emerging 
economies’.489
6.4 Conclusions
Wrapping up the preliminary analysis offered in this thesis, this chapter 
discusses the potential of China’s export duties to address carbon leakage. 
As has been seen, carbon leakage is caused by variability in worldwide 
carbon prices, and it significantly undermines global efforts to combat 
climate change. While a worldwide agreement to equalize carbon costs is 
not realistic in the near future, support is growing for BTAs designed to 
address cross-border differences in carbon prices. From the perspective 
of carbon-outsourcing countries, a feasible BTA would target imports of 
energy-intensive products from countries with weak climate policies, which 
generally have less advanced economies. In the light of the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibility’,490 this approach may, however, 
be considered unfair to carbon-outsourced countries and could lead to a 
trade war.
Export duties have been proposed as an alternative in response to such 
concerns about BTAs. Using this approach, carbon-outsourced countries 
could achieve the same objectives as a BTA by targeting exports of energy-
intensive products and generating tax revenue. This was the thinking 
behind China’s imposition of export duties on certain energy-intensive 
487 Carbon Tax Center, ‘Where Carbon Is Taxed’, http://www.carbontax.org/where-carbon-
is-taxed/, (visited on 21 June 2018).
488 BBC News, ‘Australia Votes to Repeal Carbon Tax’, 17 July 2014, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-28339663, (visited on 21 June 2018).
489 ‘Nevertheless, as a fi rst step to fi nd agreements on carbon constraints with major EU 
trade partners from emerging economies, an export tax could be part of an emerging 
picture. From a political point of view, the benefi t of this approach is its positive effect on 
the exporters’ budget, making it a potential way to fi nance carbon policies in developing 
and emerging countries’. Dröge (2009), above n 225, at 67.
490 Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement.
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products in 2007 and 2008, a move that has been applauded by some 
commentators as a promising means to confront the country’s carbon 
leakage problem. Admittedly, there remain doubts as to whether China 
would make export duties a credible climate policy tool by targeting more 
energy-intensive products because this move would have a negative impact 
on China’s economic growth. Such negative impacts, however, could be 
justified by the long-run benefits through the development of new low-
carbon technologies, an improved environment in China, and the potential 
to counter BTAs on China’s exports, not to mention the urgency of deliv-
ering the global emissions reduction targets.
In theory, China could replace export duties with such alternative measures 
as carbon taxes or an emissions trading system, but the administrative 
and economic challenges associated with such steps are formidable. Thus, 
for example, China’s emissions trading system covers less than half of its 
total carbon emissions, and, the adoption of an economy-wide carbon tax 
to address the other half of the emissions is still under discussion, carbon 
leakage continues. Under these circumstances, export duties could serve as 
an important tool for confronting the problem.
Based on the findings reported in Part II, the preliminary conclusion is 
offered that the WTO ban on China’s export duties would constrain its 
policy space to protect the environment, particularly in the context of 
climate change. The China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions 
have already made it clear that China cannot justify export duties using the 
environmental exceptions under Article XX. To provide the country with 
desirable policy space in this regard, a legal option that involves greening 
these decisions is needed. This issue is addressed in Part III; first, in Chapter 
7, a determination is made concerning whether there is indeed a path for 
China to impose export duties for environmental reasons legally under 
WTO law. Next, in Chapter 8, China’s policy space for adopting export 
duties as an environmental measure under Article XX is assessed.
Part III:
Final Analysis: 
Is There a Way for China to Use 
Export Duties Legally in Order 
to Achieve Environmental 
Goals under WTO Law?

7 Is There a Legal Path to a Desirable Policy 
Space for China Under WTO Law?
The foregoing analysis refutes the view in support of an absolute ban 
on China’s export duties in two respects. First, this simple prohibition is 
inconsistent with both the economic rationales and the practice of WTO 
members. Second, although China had prioritized the industrial purposes 
of export duties in the past, this role, however, has been substantially 
altered in the Guidelines of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) which 
make clear that export duties in combination with other taxes on produc-
tion or consumption could form part of a new ‘eco-tax system’. This good 
attempt is impeded by the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths 
decisions, according to which China’s export duties cannot be justified for 
environmental purposes. A solution is thus needed to provide China with 
appropriate policy space.
 The current literature includes suggestions that the ban on China’s export 
duties be altered by either judicial or political means. On the one hand, the 
AB could adopt a new interpretation to correct the China—Raw Materials 
and China—Rare Earths rulings. This approach faces a preliminary issue 
that has not been sufficiently recognized in the current literature, namely 
whether the AB could ever be convinced to depart from its previous deci-
sions; the fact is that, in more than 20 years of jurisprudence, the AB has 
never explicitly reserved itself. Moreover, it is also challenging to develop a 
new substantive argument to prove China’s right under Article XX after the 
previous two cases.
A political approach, on the other hand, would require China to request 
instead that the WTO’s decision-making body issue an amendment, waiver, 
or authoritative interpretation establishing China’s right to invoke Article 
XX. In pursuing this approach, a major challenge for China would be to 
garner sufficient support from other WTO members. For though not all 
political corrections of this sort necessarily require a consensus among 
members, the latter would presumably prefer not to break the general taboo 
against formal voting. This is another important issue that has yet to be 
addressed in the literature.
This chapter thus provides a comprehensive assessment of those 
approaches in order to find the most feasible way to ‘greening’ the WTO 
ban. It begins with a consideration of the likelihood that the AB would 
reconsider the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions. On 
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this point, the conclusion is reached that the AB could either overrule or 
(preferably) distinguish the absolute ban on China’s export duties. The 
merits of substantive arguments in support of China’s right under Article 
XX are then assessed in Sections 7.3 and 7.4, for determining which new 
interpretation would most likely be acceptable to the AB. All possible inter-
pretative options based on both WTO norms and non-WTO norms in public 
international law are taken into account. The next consideration is the 
likelihood that a political correction would loosen the ban on China’s export 
duties in light of treaty provisions concerning the adoption of amendments, 
waivers, authoritative interpretations, or a more flexible alternative. The 
feasibility of these conceivable political corrections is further discussed in 
Section 7.6. The chapter is concluded with a comparison of the most feasible 
judicial and political corrections.
 7.1 Possible options to depart from the absolute ban on 
China’s export duties
Various new interpretations of the relationship between China’s export 
duty commitments and GATT Article XX have been proposed that would 
enable the use of the duties for environmental purposes. Such interpreta-
tions, however, would involve departing from the China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths decisions, something that the AB seems reluctantly to do 
given the apparent de facto stare decisis regime in WTO dispute settlement. 
To address this issue, possible legal options for the AB to depart from prec-
edent in the context of WTO jurisprudence are considered in the following 
subsection. The advantages and disadvantages of those options are further 
assessed in the context of the practice of other selected tribunals at the inter-
national, regional, and national levels, based on which this section proposes 
the most feasible approach, relatively speaking, for the AB to reconsider the 
absolute ban on China’s export duties.
7.1.1 Feasibility to depart from WTO jurisprudence
This part explores the potential options to depart from the previous 
AB reports supporting an absolute ban on China’s export duties. First 
of all, given the fact that ‘there is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute 
settlement’,491 one obvious way to get rid of the China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths decisions is to simply ask the AB to ignore them. But, as 
will be discussed below, this option is objectionable owing to its profoundly 
negative impacts on such important values as the legal certainty. This is 
why, as noted by former ICJ President Gilbert Guillaume, following prec-
491 WTO Secretariat, ‘Legal Effect of Panel and AB Reports and DSB Recommendations and 
Rulings’, available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settle-
ment_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
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edents is very common in international jurisdictions even if these interna-
tional tribunals are in fact not formally obliged to comply with precedent.492 
In support of a jurisprudence constante regime in the multilateral trading 
system, this part discusses the other three options, namely explicit over-
ruling, implicit overruling, and distinguishing, that could enable the AB to 
balance the precedential value and the flexibilities to loosen the grip of its 
settled jurisprudence.
7.1.1.1 Unwise to abandon the precedential value
WTO dispute settlement system is mandated to provide ‘security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system’.493 Thus, for the purpose 
of creating ‘legitimate expectations among WTO Members’, the AB in 
Japan—Alcoholic Beverages suggested that its reports ‘should be taken into 
account where they are relevant to any dispute’.494 This raises the ques-
tion of whether a panel or the AB itself may depart from an AB report in a 
relevant dispute.
In practice, the AB has never explicitly departed from its previous deci-
sions.495 In contrast, a panel had expressly challenged the AB’s decisions in 
US — Stainless Steel (Mexico). By acknowledging that the AB had reversed 
two panel decisions supporting the use of zeroing methodology in admin-
istrative review, the US — Stainless Steel (Mexico) panel still ‘felt compelled 
to depart from’ the AB’s previous approach against the US’s zeroing 
methodology.496 For the AB, such departure from its ‘well-established’ 
jurisprudence had ‘serious implications for the proper functioning of the 
WTO dispute settlement system’.497 The AB thus in the same case required 
that subsequent panels should not be ‘free to disregard the legal interpreta-
tions and the ratio decidendi’ contained in previous AB reports unless ‘cogent 
reasons’ were presented for departing from them.498
The precedential value of AB reports, however, has drawn strong criti-
cism from the US government. For instance, in its Trade Representative’s 
2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, the US claimed that 
requiring panels to follow prior AB decisions absent ‘cogent reasons’ was 
492 Gilbert Guillaume, ‘The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators’, 2(1) 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2011), at 12.
493 ‘The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system’. Article 3,2 of the DSU.
494 AB Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/
DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, at 14.
495 Implicitly, the AB seems to have changed its position on the so-called aim and effects test 
in the EC—Asbestos. For further discussion, see Section 7.1.3.4.
496 Panel Report, US — Stainless Steel (Mexico), para 7.106.
497 AB Report, US—Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras 161-162.
498 Ibid., paras 158-160.
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inconsistent with WTO rules.499 The US appeared to suggest that the only 
interpretation that panels should follow was the authoritative interpreta-
tion adopted by WTO members under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement 
though, in practice, the only one request made for an authoritative interpre-
tation was rejected by the US itself.500
This thesis argues that China should not support the US position even if 
the denial of the precedential value of AB reports could help China alter the 
absolute ban on its export duties. As correctly noted by the EU as a third 
participant in US — Stainless Steel (Mexico), ‘in practice most international 
tribunals do give certain weight to precedents when dealing with similar 
legal issues’.501 The reason behind such common practice is rather self-
evident which is for ‘the maintenance of security and stability’ as a primary 
function of law.502
That being said, however, ‘[t]he cult of the precedent is thus just as 
dangerous as the rejection of precedent’.503 It is thus important to strike a 
balance between legal certainty and flexibility. The options to introduce 
flexibility into the WTO’s precedent system are discussed as follows.
7.1.1.2 Option I: explicit overruling based on ‘cogent reasons’
Within the framework of jurisprudence constante, a departure from precedent 
requires a tribunal to provide a good explanation in order to preserve the 
authority of precedent. That is to say, ‘judicial precedents would only be 
devoid of authority if judges felt no need to offer reasons for their actions in 
those instances when they choose not to follow them’.504 Thus the AB has 
introduced the concept of ‘cogent reasons’.
The panel in the US—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China) case 
defined the notion of ‘cogent reasons’ further in relation to four types of 
situations.505 The first requires an authoritative interpretation under Article 
499 Offi ce of the United States Trade Representative, ‘2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 
Annual Report’, at 28
500 Ibid. For further discussion about the use of authoritative interpretation to greening the 
ban on China’s export duties, see Section 7.7.
501 Para 7.20. The EU referred to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Court and the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes. For further discussion about the practice of selected 
tribunals, see next subsection.
502 AB Report, US—Stainless Steel (Mexico), footnote 313.
503 Guillaume (2011), see above n 492, at 23.
504 Neil Duxbury, ‘Distinguishing, overruling and the problem of self-reference’, in ‘The 
Nature and Authority of Precedent’, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 112.
505 Panel Report, US—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para 7.317.
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IX:2 of the WTO Agreement that departs from a prior AB interpretation, 
an option that is to be discussed in Section 7.6 of this chapter. The other 
three situations require demonstration that a prior AB interpretation proved 
to be either unworkable, in conflict with another provision of a covered 
agreement, or based on a factually incorrect premise. In view of these latter 
three criteria, Feng, a lawyer representing the Chinese government in the 
China—Rare Earths, has argued that there are indeed ‘cogent reasons’ for 
the AB to ‘correct’ the interpretation that it handed down in the China—Raw 
Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions.506
It is noteworthy that, although the notion of ‘cogent reasons’ has been clari-
fied by a panel decision, there has been no successful attempt at offering 
‘cogent reasons’ in front of the panels or the AB. Moreover, in the past 20 
years, the AB has never explicitly departed from its prior decisions. The 
very infrequency appears to suggest that express overruling based on 
‘cogent reasons’ is the first-best option in practice.
7.1.1.3 Option II: distinguishing
China may find a way that enable the AB to implicitly alter the China—Raw 
Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions by distinguishing them. Indeed, 
a common reason to not follow a precedent is that an earlier case does not 
apply to the instant one due to a distinction between them, which is often 
referred to as distinguishing. It is noteworthy that, in the more obvious form 
of distinguishing, if two cases are materially different, the earlier one is not 
really a precedent to the later one. In contrast, and more relevant to this 
chapter, is the more subtle form of distinguishing, namely ‘where a court 
departs from a precedent by making a particular ruling depend on the pres-
ence of a more extensive range of material facts’.507 For instance, assuming 
that a tribunal in an earlier case decided that facts A and B should lead to 
outcome X. In a later case when facts A and B obtain, the tribunal may still 
choose to not follow the earlier case by distinguishing it and deciding that 
outcome X should be caused by facts A, B and C. Thus, by adding to the 
conditions necessary for applying a precedent, the restrictive distinguishing 
in effect amends an earlier case by narrowing its applicable scope.
An obvious example of distinguishing WTO precedents can be found in the 
Indonesia—Import Licensing Regimes case in which the AB expressly distin-
guished its long-established sequence of analysis under GATT Article XX. 
In this case, Indonesia requested the AB to the reverse the panel’s findings 
under Article XX because the panel did not follow the ‘well-established 
sequence of analysis under Article XX’ by assessing the chapeau of Article 
506 Xuewei Feng, ‘On the Feasibility of Self-Correction of the AB’s Previous Decision: 
Lessons from China-Rare Earths’, 2(1) China and WTO Review (2015), at 182.
507 Ibid., at 115.
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XX without first examining the applicable paragraphs, namely paragraphs 
(a), (b), and (d) in the present case.508 The sequence of analysis under 
Article XX was first set out in US—Gasoline in which the AB held that the 
analysis was two-tiered: first, provisional justification under the applicable 
paragraphs; second, further appraisal under the chapeau of Article XX.509 
This two-tiered sequence was highlighted in US—Shrimp as reflecting 
‘not inadvertence or random choice, but rather the fundamental structure 
and logic of Article XX’.510 Thus, the panel in Indonesia—Import Licensing 
Regimes, choosing to only examine the measure under the chapeau of Article 
XX appears to be inconsistent with the AB’s prior decisions.
However, rather than reversing the panel’s findings, the AB held that, to 
first examine the applicable paragraphs, as the ‘normal sequence’, aimed to 
provide panels with the ‘necessary tools to assess the requirements of the 
chapeau’, namely to determine whether a discriminatory measure at issue 
was arbitrary or unjustifiable within the meaning of the chapeau and which 
‘conditions’ prevailing in different countries are relevant in the context of 
the chapeau.511 Thus, to distinguish between the normal circumstances and 
the ‘particular circumstances’ in which a panel might be able to analyse the 
elements under the applicable paragraphs that were relevant to assess the 
requirements of the chapeau ‘even when the sequence of analysis under 
Article XX has not been followed’,512 the AB held that a panel might deviate 
from the ‘normal sequence’ in the ‘particular circumstances of the case’ 
provided that the panel had made findings under the applicable paragraphs 
in order to complete the analysis of the chapeau.513 In this way, the AB effec-
tively amended the sequence of analysis under Article XX by allowing a 
deviation under certain circumstances.
Compared with express overruling, however, the use of distinguishing has 
limitations. Although a tribunal could use distinguishing to amend a prec-
edent by adding conditions, these conditions should be based on a material 
508 AB Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, 
WT/DS477/AB/R, WT/DS478/AB/R, and Add.1, adopted 22 November 2017, para 5.86.
509 In US – Gasoline, the AB stated: ‘In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may 
be extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the 
particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to (j) – listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy 
the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other 
words, two-tiered: fi rst, provisional justifi cation by reason of characterization of the 
measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the same measure under the introduc-
tory clauses of Article XX’ at 20.
510 AB Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755, para. 119.
511 AB Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, 
WT/DS477/AB/R, WT/DS478/AB/R, and Add.1, adopted 22 November 2017, para 
5.99.
512 Ibid., 5.100.
513 Ibid., 5.101.
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distinction between the precedent and the present one. After all, ‘the judge 
who tries to distinguish cases on the basis of materially irrelevant facts is 
likely to be easily found out’.514 Thus, when the important facts of two cases 
are identical, a tribunal may choose to overrule a precedent by ‘declaring 
that, at least where the facts of a case are materially identical to those of the 
case at hand, a new ruling should be followed instead’.515 In this way, the 
tribunal is de facto repealing a previous judgement rather than amending it.516
7.1.1.4 Option III: implicit overruling
It is noteworthy that the AB may have overruled its prior decisions in an 
implicit manner. Relevant here is the EC—Asbestos case in which the AB 
appeared to have implicitly overruled its prior decisions that explicitly 
rejected the ‘aim and effect’ test. This test was reinstated when the AB 
changed its established framework for analysing ‘likeness’ under GATT 
Article III in order to balancing trade and non-trade values. Specifically, in 
examining the ‘likeness’ of chrysotile asbestos fibres, which are known to 
be highly carcinogenic, to other fibres,517 the AB maintained the guise of 
the previous framework by ‘squeezing health effects into its competition-
oriented framework’ rather than simply adopting a new framework.518
The framework for analysing ‘likeness’, which was first established in 
the Report of the Working party on Border Tax Adjustments,519 consists of 
four general criteria: (i) the properties, nature, and quality of the products 
in question; (ii) the end uses of the products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and 
habits; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products.520 Since these four 
general criteria simply serve as tools for sorting and examining the relevant 
evidence,521 the assessment of ‘likeness’ necessarily depends on the legal 
provision at issue.522 In the case of GATT Article III, the competitive rela-
tionship between products is of particular importance in this regard.523
514 Ibid., at 114.
515 Ibid., at 117.
516 Ibid., at 115.
517 WTO AB Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Contai-
ning Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 12 March 2001.
518 Robert Howse, Comments on ‘Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO’, Opinio 
Juris (2012), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/11/vjil-symposium-robert-
howse-comments-on-interpretation-and-institutional-choice-at-the-wto/, (visited 10 June 
2018).
519 Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, adopted 2 December 1970.
520 AB Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243, para 101.
521 Ibid, para 102.
522 Ibid, para 103.
523 Ibid, para 117.
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Following this competition-oriented framework, the panel in EC—Asbestos 
relied largely on the second criterion, which addressed the end uses of 
products, to conclude that chrysotile asbestos fibres and certain other 
fibres were ‘like products’ under Article III:4.524 The AB, however, with one 
member dissenting, was concerned about the consequences of ruling that 
a product with enormous health and safety risks was ‘like’ certain much 
safer substitutes.525 It then linked the health risks associated with the carci-
nogenic fibres to ‘consumer preferences’, another of the four general criteria 
for assessing ‘likeness’. Approaching the case from this perspective, the AB 
reasoned that, because the ultimate consumer might cease to buy a product 
associated with serious health problems,526 the relevant manufacturers 
would likely weigh the risks of including chrysotile asbestos fibres in their 
products. In this respect, the AB changed its previous competition-oriented 
framework by giving the priority to public health and thus reversed the 
panel’s conclusion that the carcinogenic fibres and their safer substitutes 
were ‘like products’.527
To sum up, three options are theoretically available for the AB to not follow 
the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions, namely explicit 
overruling based on ‘cogent reasons’, implicit overruling, and distin-
guishing. Given the fact that the AB is a relatively young tribunal, it could 
be beneficial to examine the practice of other more mature tribunals from 
which a most feasible option, relatively speaking, might be discerned. This 
analysis is discussed in the next subsection.
7.1.2 Moves by other tribunals to deviate from precedent: Inspirations for 
the AB to reconsider China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths
The problem of how to avoid undesirable precedents is not unique to the 
AB. Tribunals at the international, regional, and domestic levels have faced 
similar problems and have developed ways of dealing with them. This 
subsection provides a comparative analysis of these practices by the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and the highest courts 
of appeals in the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, and China. The aim here is 
524 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 2001, as modifi ed by AB Report WT/
DS135/AB/R, DSR 2001:VIII, p. 3305, para 84.
525 Robert Howse, Comments on ‘Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO’, Opinio 
Juris (2012), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/11/vjil-symposium-robert-
howse-comments-on-interpretation-and-institutional-choice-at-the-wto/, (visited 10 June 
2018).
526 AB Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243, para 122.
527 Ibid, para 126.
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to draw inspirations for the AB to reconsider the absolute ban on China’s 
export duties.
7.1.2.1 The choice of tribunals at the international, regional, and national levels
In general, the comparison with the select international or regional tribunals 
has often been made by either the AB itself or relevant literature.528 With 
regard to international tribunals, an analysis of the practice of the ICJ and 
ICTY could provide the AB with references on how the other international 
tribunals departed from precedents. With regard to select regional tribunals, 
similar to the AB, many judgements of the CJEU have trade-related aspects 
which could provide the former one with references on how to balance trade 
and non-trade interests. In contrast, although the ECtHR does not examine 
trade-related issues, its judgement may shed light on how the AB could 
accommodate environmental interests from a human rights perspective. 
Moreover, compared with international and regional tribunals, the national 
ones may have more experience with how to avoid undesirable precedents. 
In order to have an overview of the practice in both common law and civil 
law countries, this part examines the techniques of the highest appeal courts 
in the United Kingdom, Japan, and China to avoid undesirable precedents.
This comparison has its limitations because the select tribunals have 
different institutional features from the AB. According to certain criteria, 
the WTO dispute settlement is the least legalistic option.529 The experi-
ence of the select tribunals thus may not be directly borrowed. That being 
said, however, the mandate of those tribunals may not significantly differ 
from the one of the WTO, namely, to provide ‘security and predictability’. 
Therefore, the practice in other jurisdiction may still provide the AB with 
inspirations to depart from China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths.
7.1.2.2 Practice of international tribunals
7.1.2.2.1 International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Although Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states 
that the ICJ’s judgments ‘has no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect of that particular case’, the ICJ has developed rules of de 
facto stare decisis by ‘closely following its earlier judgements’.530 Relevant 
in this context is the holding of the ICJ in the Cameroon—Nigeria case that 
528 See AB Report, US—Stainless Steel (Mexico) and Guillaume (2011), see above n 492.
529 Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, ‘International Institutions: An International Organiza-
tion Reader’ (MIT Press, 2001), at 139.
530 August Reinisch, ‘The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The 
Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a More Effective System? Some Refl  ections 
From the Perspective of Investment Arbitration’, in Isabelle Buffard, James Crawford, 
Alain Pellet and Stephan Wittich (eds), ‘International Law between Universalism and Frag-
mentation: Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner’, (Brill, 2009), at 123.
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it could depart from its own precedent if ‘there is cause not to follow the 
reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases’.531 It must be observed, however, 
that the ICJ has never explicitly departed from a prior judgment, having 
consistently chosen the options to implicitly overrule or distinguish the 
undesirable judgement.
The practice of implicit overruling is observed in a series of ICJ judgments 
concerning alternative methods of maritime delimitation.532 One, often 
referred to as the equidistance method, requires that maritime boundaries 
between states follow a median line, every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points on the respective coasts. In contrast, the second 
method, which is result-oriented, requires application of equitable prin-
ciples in order to achieve equitable results. In other words, tribunals are 
not bound by the aforementioned equidistance method and thus enjoy ‘a 
significant degree of discretion which, however, comes at the cost of consis-
tency and predictability’.533In its 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf ruling, the 
ICJ imposed a delimitation on the continental shelf in accordance with the 
second approach by ‘taking account of all relevant circumstances,’ including 
geological factors.534 The choice of result-oriented approach seems to have 
caused uncertainty regarding maritime delimitation.535
The ICJ became aware of the problems and implicitly ‘reversed its 
jurisprudence’.536 It began with the 1985 Libya—Malta case in which the ICJ 
considered the equidistance line as the starting point for marine delimita-
tion.537 The result of equidistance method could be adjusted if such a correc-
tion is justified by geographic or other circumstances in order to achieve 
equitable results.538 The large discretion conferred by the result-oriented 
approach is thus constrained by the preliminary use of equidistance 
method. This implicit overruling was confirmed and further generalised 
in the 2001 Bahrain—Qatar and 2009 Romania—Ukraine cases.539 As a result, 
531 ICJ Judgement, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), adopted on 11 June 1998, para. 28.
532 Guillaume (2011), see above n 492, at 11.
533 Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland, ‘Public International Law (5th Edition)’, (Routledge, 2015), at 
325.
534 ICJ Judgement, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), 
adopted on 20 February 1969.
535 ‘The law appeared increasingly uncertain and even arbitrary’. See Guillaume (2011), see 
above n 492, at 11.
536 ICJ Judgement, Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), adopted on 3 June 1985, 
para 40.
537 Ibid., para 42.
538 Kaczorowska-Ireland (2015), above n 533, at 326.
539 Guillaume (2011), see above n 492, at 12. ICJ Judgement, Maritime Delimitation and Terri-
torial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), adopted on 16 March 2001; 
ICJ Judgement, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine), adopted on 
3 February 2009.
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the ICJ ‘abandoned’ the original approach adopted in 1969 by ‘successive 
strokes without recognizing its original mistake’.540
The use of implicit overruling and distinguishing is also apparent in a series 
of judgments concerning access to the ICJ by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (FRY), later Serbia and Montenegro, during the special period from 
27 April 1992, when the FRY declared independence, to 1 November 2000, 
when it was admitted to the United Nations. By implicitly overruling and 
distinguishing precedents, the ICJ in a series of cases involving genocide 
claims found its jurisdiction over the FRY as a respondent but reached an 
opposite conclusion when the FRY was an applicant.
The first of these cases was brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993 
against the FRY for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. The ICJ 
determined in its 1996 judgment that it had jurisdiction over the FRY.541 The 
reason is that when the FRY had, in asserting its independence, declared 
that it would abide strictly by all of the international commitments that the 
former Yugoslavia had entered into, this commitment included the Geno-
cide Convention, Article IX of which permits a party to the convention to 
bring a case ‘relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the 
present Convention’ before the ICJ. It is noteworthy that the FRY did not 
challenge the jurisdiction by arguing that it was not a member of the United 
Nations because the ICJ ‘shall be open to the states parties to the present 
Statute’ pursuant to Article 35(1) of the Statute.542 The reason behind this 
strategy seemed to be consistent with the political narrative of the Milošević 
regime.543
After the change of the Milošević regime in 2000, the new FRY government 
abandoned the insistence on the FRY as a continuation of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and applied for membership of the United 
Nations as a new state. When the FRY was admitted to the United Nations 
as a new member, thereby establishing that it had not been a United Nations 
540 Guillaume (2011), see above n 492, at 12.
541 ICJ Judgement, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), adopted on 11 July 1996, para 
17.
542 ‘1. The Court shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute. 2. The conditions 
under which the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to the special provisions 
contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall 
such conditions place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court. 3. When a 
state which is not a Member of the United Nations is a party to a case, the Court shall 
fi x the amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court. This 
provision shall not apply if such state is bearing a share of the expenses of the Court’.
543 Vojin Dimitrijević and Marko Milanović, ‘The Strange Story of the Bosnian Genocide 
Case’, 21(1) Leiden Journal of International Law (2008), at 72.
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member in 1993, it challenged the above 1996 judgement.544 By referring 
to Article 35(1) of the Statute, the FRY argued that the ICJ could not have 
asserted jurisdiction the FRY were not a member of the United Nations. 
Based on this change of fact, the FRY filed an application for revision of the 
1996 judgment according to Article 61(1) of the Statute, which permits an 
application for revision of a judgment based on the discovery of decisive 
new factors. The ICJ did not, however, consider the FRY’s membership 
in the United Nations in 2000 a decisive factor regarding the question of 
personal jurisdiction over it in the 1996 judgment. From the ICJ’s perspec-
tive, the period from 1992 to 2000 was for the FRY ‘sui generis’, during which 
the FRY considered itself bound by the Genocide Convention.545 Thus 
the ICJ in its 2003 judgment ruled that the FRY’s admission to the United 
Nations in 2000 did not constitute a new fact relating to potential revision of 
the 1996 judgment. It is noteworthy that Article 35(2) of the Statute permits 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction over a non-party to it ‘subject to the special provisions 
contained in treaties in force’. In this context, the 2003 judgment appears to 
suggest that Article IX of the Genocide Convention meets the requirements 
under Article 35(2) and thus extends the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the FRY 
as a non-member of the United Nations or a non-party to the Statute.546
A different approach involving the option of implicitly overruling was 
taken, however, in a later case, which this time was brought by the FRY 
against ten member States of NATO for the military bombing of the territory 
of Yugoslavia and other alleged violations of international law.547 Following 
the 2003 judgment just described, although several respondents claimed 
that the FRY ‘cannot rely on its acquiescence as respondent in one case in 
order to found jurisdiction as Applicant in this case’,548 the FRY argued 
that the ICJ should have personal jurisdiction over it as a party to Article 
IX of the Genocide Convention pursuant to Article 35(2) of the Statute. 
Concerning this argument, the ICJ, with reference to the drafting history, 
544 UN Security Council, 3116th Meeting Resolution S/RES/777, adopted on 16 September 
1992; UN General Assembly, Recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992, 
A/RES/47/1, adopted on 22 September 1992.
545 ICJ Judgement, Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), adopted on 3 February 2003, paras 54–64.
546 Ibid.
547 ICJ Judgements, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium); Legality of Use 
of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada); Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. 
France); Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Germany); Legality of Use of Force 
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy); Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Nether-
lands); Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal); Legality of Use of Force 
(Yugoslavia v. Spain); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America), adopted 
on 15 December 2004.
548 ICJ Judgement, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), adopted on 15 
December 2004, para 97.
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interpreted the term ‘treaties in force’ under Article 35(2) restrictively and 
held that it only applied to the treaties in force by the date on which the 
ICJ Statute itself had entered into force (24 October 1945).549 Accordingly, 
the Genocide Convention, which entered into force on 12 January 1951, 
was found to be irrelevant to this case. The ICJ thus in its 2004 judgment 
concluded that it had lacked jurisdiction over the case brought by the FRY 
(Serbia and Montenegro in 2004) because the latter did not, at the time of 
the institution of the present proceedings, namely 1999, have access to the 
ICJ under either Article 35(1) of the Statute, namely being a state party to 
the ICJ Statute, or Article 35(2), namely ‘subject to the special provisions 
contained in treaties in force’. This 2004 judgment thus seemed to implicitly 
overrule the above 2003 case in which the ICJ found its jurisdiction over the 
FRY on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention. According to a 
judge ad hoc in the 2003 case, a possible reason behind this overruling is 
that ‘the Court which sat in 2004 was not the same Court which sat in 2003’ 
and the majority had formed in 2004 within the ICJ wanted to use the 2004 
case to ‘sink’ the 2003 judgement.550
This 2004 judgment was, however, distinguished in a third case, this one 
brought by Croatia against the FRY for alleged violations of the Genocide 
Convention in 1999. Croatia invoked Article IX of the Convention as the 
basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. During the proceedings, with reference to 
the 2004 judgment, the FRY raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ on the grounds that Croatia had filed its application before the 
FRY had been admitted to the United Nations, when it was not a party to 
the Statute, so that the conditions under Article 35(2) of the Statute were not 
met. While recognizing that some of the facts and legal issues that had been 
dealt with in the previous cases were relevant to the present case, the ICJ 
considered that, since none of those decisions were given between the same 
parties of the present case, by virtue of Article 59 of the Statute, the previous 
judgments had no effect of res judicata on the present case.551 Concerning 
the question of whether the conditions under Article 35(2) of the Statute 
were met, departing from its approach in the 2004 judgment, the ICJ did not 
emphasize the legal status of the FRY (then Serbia) in relation to the Statute 
at the time of the filing of the application.552 Instead, the ICJ held that there 
were certain situations in which realism and flexibility were called for to 
determine the jurisdiction. Thus, because Croatia could have instituted 
a new proceeding to overcome the issue of access, the question of access 
549 Ibid., para 96.
550 Vojin Dimitrijević and Marko Milanović, ‘The Strange Story of the Bosnian Genocide 
Case’, 21(1) Leiden Journal of International Law (2008), at 82.
551 ICJ Judgement, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), adopted on 18 November 2008, para 53.
552 Ibid., para 58.
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should not be an obstacle to the ICJ’s jurisdiction.553 Subsequently, the ICJ 
drew a distinction between the 2004 judgment and Croatia’s case based on 
the fact that the FRY was the applicant in the former case but the respondent 
in the latter. The ICJ also relied on two further facts in reaching its conclu-
sion. First, Croatia had exercised care in instituting the proceedings, doing 
so at a time when the FRY had filed the cases against NATO countries. 
Apparently, the FRY considered that it had the capacity to participate in the 
Court’s proceedings. Second, because Croatia had submitted its Memorial 
after 2000, the ICJ concluded that the conditions under Article 35(1) had 
been satisfied and that it thus had jurisdiction over the FRY.554
The above assessment shows that, like the AB, the ICJ has also never explic-
itly overruled a prior judgment. In order to introduce flexibilities, it chooses 
to implicitly overrule or distinguish precedent.
7.1.2.2.2 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The ICTY Statute is silent on the issue of stare decisis. The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in the Aleksovski case appeared to support the rules of de facto stare 
decisis by emphasising the ‘interests of certainty and predictability’ to follow 
its previous judgements.555 In the same case, however, the Appeals Chamber 
also held that it should be free to depart from the previous judgements for 
‘cogent reasons in the interests of justice’ which refers to two situations: first, 
a previous decision has been decided ‘on the basis of a wrong legal prin-
ciple’, and, second, a previous decision ‘has been given per incuriam, that is a 
judicial decision that has been “wrongly decided, usually because the judge 
or judges were ill-informed about the applicable law”.’556 In practice, the 
Appeals Chamber has explicitly reversed previous holdings in several cases.
In Kordić and Čerkez, for instance, the Appeals Chamber explicitly over-
ruled its judgements in Vasiljević and Krstić about the permissibility of 
cumulative convictions based on the same act.557 In the latter cases, the 
Appeals Chamber held that the same conduct should not be convicted of 
both murder and persecution under Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICTY Statute) because the offence of murder 
553 Ibid., paras 79–90.
554 Therefore, ‘the Court’s jurisprudence on the question of access in these cases with regard 
to Serbia’s status cannot be deemed consistent and coherent’. See Hanqin Xue, ‘Compe-
tent Parties—Jurisdiction ratione personae’, in ‘Jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice’, (Brill, 2009), at 152.
555 Appeals Chamber Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, adopted on 30 May 2001, 
paras 107-108.
556 Ibid.
557 Appeals Chamber Judgement, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, adopted on 17 
December 2004, para 1040.
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is subsumed by that of persecution.558 This finding was considered to incor-
rectly apply the legal test relating to cumulative convictions as set out in the 
Čelebići case which permitted multiple convictions on the basis of the same 
conduct provided that this conduct related to distinct crimes of which each 
one under a provision of the ICTY Statute contains ‘a materially distinct 
element not contained in the other’.559 Thus, through the correction of the 
Vasiljević and Krstić judgements, the Appeals Chamber further clarified 
the standards of Čelebići test emphasising the legal elements of each crime 
at issue rather than on the underlying conduct of the accused in order to 
‘ensuring that the convictions entered fully reflect his criminality’.560
Similarly in Žigić, the Appeals Chamber explicitly overruled its Čelebići 
judgement that permitted a reconsideration of a final judgement.561 In the 
Appeals Chamber’s view, unlike the review proceedings that require a party 
to provide ‘evidence of a new fact’, the application for such reconsideration 
only requires a party to assert an Appeal Judgement is in error ‘allowing 
in effect the submission of a second appeal’.562 The right to such reconsid-
eration could be easily abused as evident in the Žigić case in which Mr. 
Žigić makes ‘no serious attempt to establish the existence of a clear error’ 
but merely to file ‘frivolous application’.563 To protect the ‘the interests of 
justice’ to the victims or convicted person, the Appeals Chamber, thus, 
concluded that that there was no mechanism to reconsider a final judgment 
other than the review process foreseen by the ICTY Statute.564
A more recent example is the 2013 Perišić case, in which the majority of the 
Appeals Chamber held that ‘specific direction remains an element of the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting liability’ and that ‘no conviction for aiding 
and abetting may be entered if the element of specific direction is not estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt’.565 Judge Liu offered a dissenting opinion 
and, one year later, as presiding judge joined with other judges in the 2014 
Šainović et al. case to explicitly overrule the Perišić Appeal Judgement, 
558 Appeals Chamber Judgement, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, adopted on 25 February 2004, 
para 146; Appeals Chamber Judgement, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, adopted on 19 April 
2004, para 231.
559 Dario Kordi and Mario Cerkez, above n 557.
560 Ibid., para 1033.
561 Appeals Chamber Decision on Zoran Žigić’s Motion for Reconsideration of Appeals 
Chamber Judgement, adopted on 26 June 2006, para 9. ‘In light of these considerations, 
the Appeals Chamber has come to the view that cogent reasons in the interests of justice 
demand its departure from the majority opinion in the Čelebići Judgement on Sentence 
Appeal’.
562 Ibid., para 8.
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid., para. 9.
565 Appeals Chamber Judgement, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić, adopted on 28 February 2013, 
para 36.
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stating that the finding, namely specific direction is an element of the actus 
reus of aiding and abetting liability, in the Perišić is ‘in direct and material 
conflict with the prevailing jurisprudence on the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting liability and with customary international law in this regard’.566
The Trial Chambers, on the other hand, unlike the Appeals Chambers, 
tend to distinguish a precedent when compelled to depart from it.567 For 
example, the Trial Chamber was required to examine whether the Yugoslav 
Peoples’ Army artillery attack against the Old Town of Dubrovnik on 6 
December 1991 should be convicted of the offences of (a) devastation not 
justified by military necessity, (b) unlawful attacks on civilian objects, and 
(c) destruction or wilful damage of cultural property.568 After acknowl-
edging that the Appeals Chamber case law, namely the abovementioned 
Čelebići test, ‘on a theoretical basis’, would support finding cumula-
tive convictions for those three offences due to their materially distinct 
elements,569 the Trial Chamber held that the ‘essential criminal conduct’ 
in the present case is ‘directly and comprehensively reflected’ in the third 
offence, namely destruction or wilful damage of cultural property.570 Thus, 
by emphasizing the ‘particular circumstances’ concerning the offences at 
issue, the Trial Chamber, explicitly amending the Čelebići test, found that 
the conduct at issue would only lead to the conviction of destruction or 
wilful damage of cultural property for ‘the interests of justice and the 
purpose of punishment’.571
The above practice of the Appeals Chambers shows that, when a judicial 
institution is compelled to depart from a prior decision, it may bravely 
admit that a previous ruling was flawed. This provides the AB with support 
to adopt the option of explicit overruling. Moreover, given that both the 
Appeals Chambers and the AB are the highest appeal institutions, the 
different approaches between the Appeals Chambers and the Trial Cham-
bers suggests that, if necessary, the AB could take a bolder step than a panel 
by explicitly correcting its prior decisions.
566 Appeals Chamber Judgement, Prosecutor v. Nikola Sainovic, Nebojsa Pavkovic, Vladimir 
Lazarevic and Sreten Lukic, adopted on 23 January 2014, paras 1649-1651.
567 ‘As regards Trial Chambers, they have generally taken for granted the need to abide by 
Appeals Chambers’ holdings’. See Guido Acquaviva, Fausto Pocar, ‘Stare decisis’, Max 
Planck Encyclopedias of International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1683?prd=EPIL (visited on 1September 
2019).
568 Trial Judgement, Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, adopted on 31 January 2005, para 452.
569 Ibid., para 452.
570 Ibid., para 454.
571 Ibid., para 455.
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7.1.2.3 Practice of regional tribunals
7.1.2.3.1 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
Like the ICTY and the ICJ, the ECtHR has developed rules of de facto stare 
decisis for ‘the interests of legal certainty’, ‘the orderly development of the 
Convention case-law’ and ‘foreseeability and equality before the law’.572 
It has been argued that ‘the original Court was extremely reluctant to 
expressly overrule established interpretations of the Convention’.573 The 
option of implicit overruling is thus applied in a number of old cases. For 
instance, the Court in Huber held that to provide district attorneys with 
multifarious roles of investigator, authoriser of detention, and prosecutor 
was inconsistent with inconsistent with Article 5(3) of the Convention 
regarding the independence of judicial officer.574 This conclusion is sharply 
contrary to a prior judgement, namely Schiesser, according to which 
another district attorney in a similar situation was found consistent with 
Article 5(3).575 The Court thus implicitly overruled Schiesser ‘by not 
expressly acknowledging that they were overruling their earlier case law’.
Another example is the Borgers case in which the participation of the 
Belgian avocat general in the deliberations of the Court of Cassation was 
found inconsistent with the fair trial commitments under Article 6(1) of the 
Convention,576 despite that such practice was permitted according to the 
prior judgment of Delcourt v Belgium.577
The contemporary Court appears more willing to adopt the option of 
explicit overruling. For instance, in order to increase legal certainty 
regarding the scope of ‘civil rights and obligations’ under Article 6(1) of 
the Convention, the Court in Pellegrin v France explicitly overruled it case-
law which ‘contains a margin of uncertainty’.578 The Court thus adopted 
a functional criterion approach based on which it ‘wishes to put an end to 
the uncertainty which surrounds application of the guarantees of Article 
6(1) to disputes between States and their servants’.579 Eight years later in 
Vilho Eskelinen and Others, this functional criterion approach was, however, 
found unable to bring about ‘a greater degree of certainty in this area as 
intended’.580 The Court thus explicitly overruled the Pellegrin approach by 
572 Cossey v. the United Kingdom [1991] 13 EHRR 622, ECHR 21, para 35.
573 Alastair Mowbray, ‘An Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Approach 
to Overruling its Previous Case Law’, 9(2) Human Rights Law Review (2009), at 183.
574 Huber v. Switzerland [1990] A 188, para 43.
575 Schiesser v. Switzerland [1979] 2 EHRR 417.
576 Borgers v. Belgium [1993] 15 EHRR 92.
577 Delcourt v. Belgium [1970] 1 EHRR 355, para 29.
578 Pellegrin v France [1999] 31 EHRR 26, para 60.
579 Ibid., para 61.
580 Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [2007] 45 EHRR 985, ECHR 2007-II, para 55.
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introducing a new test to determine the applicability of Article 6(1) to civil 
servants.581
Another example is the Kudla case regarding unreasonable delays in the 
determination of judicial cases by national courts. Although both Article 
6(1), right to ‘a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time’, and 
Article 13, right to ‘an effective remedy before a national authority’, of the 
Convention could potentially apply to such complaints, the Court previ-
ously declined to apply the latter provision which imposed less stringent 
requirements than Article 6(1).582 This original approach was reconsidered 
‘forcing applicants to bring their Article 6(1) unreasonable delay complaints 
to Strasbourg rather than having them resolved domestically’.583 Given 
‘the continuing accumulation of applications’,584 the Court thus in Kudla v 
Poland explicitly overruled its prior judgements by recognising ‘the need 
to examine the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 taken separately, in 
addition to its earlier finding of a violation of Article 6(1)’.585 In other words, 
the application of Article 13 would require ‘States to establish effective 
domestic remedies to deal with complaints of unreasonable delay in court 
proceedings’.586
The Court may also explicitly overrule precedent ‘to ensure that the inter-
pretation of the Convention reflects societal changes and remains in line 
with present-day conditions’.587 Illustrative in this context is the Christine 
Goodwin case, which concerned Article 8 of the Convention on respect for 
private life. The applicant in the case argued that the government of the 
United Kingdom had violated this provision by failing to recognize her 
gender reassignment.588 The relevant precedents, such as the Rees judge-
ment of 1986, suggested that the government’s refusal to alter the register of 
births or to issue new birth certificates updating individuals’ gender status 
could not be considered a prohibited interference with the right to respect 
for private life under Article 8.589 However, after recognizing that ‘it should 
not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous 
cases’, the Grand Chamber in 2002 held that its interpretation must also take 
into account ‘the changing conditions’ within the contracting states and to 
581 Ibid., para 56.
582 Kudla v. Poland [2002] 35 EHRR 11, para 146. For instance, Kamasinski v. Austria [1991] 13 
EHRR 36.
583 Mowbray (2009), above n 573, at 192.
584 Kudla, above n 582,  para 148.
585 Ibid., para 149.
586 Mowbray (2009), above n 573, at 192.
587 Goodwin and Liberty (intervening) v. United Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 447, ECHR 2002-VI, 
para 60.
588 Ibid.
589 Rees v. United Kingdom [1987] 9 EHRR 56. Cossey v. the United Kingdom [1991] 13 EHRR 
622, ECHR 21.
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ensure that the rights under the Conventions continued to be ‘practical and 
effective’ by maintaining ‘a dynamic and evolutive approach’.590 Thus, by 
looking at the ‘present-day conditions’,591 the Grand Chamber explicitly 
overruled its precedents by holding that the appropriate interpretation and 
application of the Conventions should favour the applicant in the present 
case and thus found that the respondent government was in violation of its 
obligation under Article 8.592
In addition to the above examples of explicitly and implicitly overruling, 
Chambers of the ECtHR once adopted the option of distinguishing in the 
Kopecký case which concerned an applicant’s claim for the restitution of 
coins belonging to his father. The key issue in this case was whether the 
applicant had in his possession the coins under the meaning of Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
states that ‘every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoy-
ment of his possessions’.593 A Chamber of the ECtHR held that the ‘present 
case should be distinguished from the case law’ in which the applicants 
‘were excluded from the very beginning from the possibility of having the 
property restored’ and on which the claims ‘did not amount to a legitimate 
expectation’.594 In the present case, however, a ‘genuine dispute’ was found 
to exist regarding whether the applicant could meet the requirements of 
the measure at issue, and thus the Court found that the applicant had a 
‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining effective enjoyment of the property 
right at issue.595 In the view of the Chamber, the use of distinguishing in 
this case aimed to prevent the protection of the rights under the European 
590 Goodwin, above n 587, para 74.
591 Ibid., para 75.
592 Ibid., para. 93. ‘While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, 
it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it 
should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases 
(see, for example, Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001-I, § 70). 
However, since the Convention is fi rst and foremost a system for the protection of human 
rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent 
State and within Contracting States generally and respond, for example, to any evolving 
convergence as to the standards to be achieved’ (para 74).
593 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights.
594 Kopecký v. Slovakia [2005] 41 EHRR 43, ECHR 2004-IX, para 27.
595 Ibid., para 27. ‘In this respect the present case should be distinguished from the cases of 
Malhous v. the Czech Republic and Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic referred 
to above or the case of Brezny & Brezny v. Slovakia (application no. 23131/93, Commis-
sion decision of 4 March 1996, DR 85, pp. 65-83) in which the Court and the Commission 
respectively found that the applicants’ claims for restitution of property did not amount 
to a legitimate expectation in the sense of the Court’s case-law. In those cases the appli-
cants were excluded from the very beginning from the possibility of having the property 
restored as it was obvious either that they failed to meet the relevant requirements or that 
their claim clearly fell outside the relevant law’.
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Conventions on Human Rights and its protocols from being revealed 
‘ineffective and illusory’.596 This judgement was, however, reversed by the 
Grand Chamber.597
Besides offering support to the option of overruling and distinguishing, 
the above practice also provides a useful observation of the interaction 
between the Grand Chamber and a Chamber. The former one does not 
only correct the decisions made by a Chamber, but also has no hesitation in 
departing from its own inappropriate judgements. In contrast, although the 
AB has explicitly reversed the panel reports in several occasions,598 it has 
never explicitly departed from its prior decisions. This reluctance to have 
any self-corrections could explain the extremist stance of the US to deny 
the precedential values of the AB reports. In this context, the AB may have 
additional reasons to consider the option of overruling in a future case.
7.1.2.3.2 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
The CJEU supports the rules of de facto stare decisis as ‘there are passages in 
the judgements where the weights and the number of the previous deci-
sions seen almost to be felt to be such as to make them binding in fact, if 
not in theory’.599 In practice, the Court has explicitly overruled its previous 
decisions in several occasions. A good example is the change in the doctrine 
of common origin from the HAG I case to the HAG II case. HAG 1 concerned 
the ‘Hag’ trademark on decaffeinated coffee that was registered by the 
German firm Hag AG in both Germany and Belgium in the early twentieth 
century; a Belgian ‘Hag’ trademark was subsequently assigned to a Belgian 
subsidiary of the German firm, namely Hag S.A. After the Second World 
War, Hag S.A. was seized by the Belgian government, and the Belgian ‘Hag’ 
trademark was assigned by Hag S.A. to Van Zuylen Frères. When Hag AG 
began to export its German ‘Hag’ decaffeinated coffee to Luxembourg in 
1972, Van Zuylen Frères, defending its Benelux ‘Hag’ trademark, brought 
a case in Luxembourg to stop the import of the German product. Seeking 
to promote the free movement of goods, the Court in HAG I held that a 
596 Ibid., para 29.
597 The Grand Chamber Judgement, Kopecký v Slovakia, adopted on 28 September 2004, 
para 52.
 ‘In the light of the foregoing it can be concluded that the Court’s case-law does not 
contemplate the existence of a “genuine dispute” or an “arguable claim” as a criterion for 
determining whether there is a “legitimate expectation” protected by Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1. The Court is therefore unable to follow the reasoning of the Chamber’s majority on 
this point.’
598 For instance, the AB in the US—Stainless Steel (Mexico) case expressed deep concern over 
what it viewed as ‘serious implications for the proper functioning of the WTO dispute 
settlement system’ caused by the panel’s decision to ‘to depart from well-established AB 
jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues’.
599 Gunnar Beck, ‘The Legal Reasoning of the ECJ II’ in ‘The legal reasoning of the Court of 
Justice of the EU’, (Hart Publishing, 2013), at 238.
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prohibition based solely on identical marks having a common origin would 
be incompatible with EU law, an approach often referred to as the doctrine 
of common origin.600
Years after the HAG I judgment, CNL-Sucal, the successor of Van Zuylen 
Frères, began to export its ‘Hag’ decaffeinated coffee from Belgium to 
Germany. In the HAG II case, Hag AG sought to exercise its German trade-
mark rights in order to prohibit imports of Belgian ‘Hag’ decaffeinated 
coffee into Germany. This time, the Court held ‘it necessary to reconsider 
the interpretation’ in HAG I ‘in the light of the case-law which has devel-
oped with regard to the relationship between industrial and commercial 
property and the general rules of the Treaty, particularly in the sphere of the 
free movement of goods.601 Subsequently, the Court found that the doctrine 
of common origin did not apply to situations in which the event separated 
a trademark from its original owner without the owner’s consent. Thus, 
the HAG II judgment explicitly repeals the HAG I judgment by replacing 
the doctrine of common origin with the doctrine of ‘consensual’ common 
origin.602 A possible reason behind this overruling is that ‘the ruling in 
HAG I, which had been delivered sixteen years earlier, was out of step with 
subsequent developments in the case law on intellectual property rights 
and out of step with the evolving perception of the internal market’.603
A more recent example of explicit overruling was the 2008 Metock case, 
which concerned the question whether Directive 2004/38 regarding the 
right of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the EU precluded member states from requiring that a non-EU 
citizen have had prior lawful residence in order to benefit from its provi-
600 ECJ, Case 192–73 Van Zuylen fr`eres v. Hag (‘HAG I’) [1974] ECR 731.
601 Case C-10/89 S.A. CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG (‘HAG II’) [1990] ECR 3711, para 10. 
‘Bearing in mind the points outlined in the order for reference and in the discussions 
before the Court concerning the relevance of the Court’s judgment in Case 192/73 Van 
Zuylen v HAG [1974] ECR 731 to the reply to the question asked by the national court, it 
should be stated at the outset that the Court believes it necessary to reconsider the inter-
pretation given in that judgment in the light of the case-law which has developed with 
regard to the relationship between industrial and commercial property and the general 
rules of the Treaty, particularly in the sphere of the free movement of goods’.
602 Robert S. Smith, ‘The Unresolved Tension Between Trademark Protection and Free 
Movement of Goods in the European Community’, 3 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law (1992), at 122. ‘Reviewing the case law of the ECJ and stressing the 
importance of the economic function of trademarks, Advocate General Jacobs proposed 
that the doctrine of common origin lacked any foundation in the EEC Treaty. Insofar as 
the facts of Hag II were concerned, the EC agreed’, at 111.
603 Takis Tridimas, ‘Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?’, in Julie 
Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis(eds.), ‘Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law’, 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), at 317.
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sions.604 In the 2003 Akrich case regarding Regulation No. 1612/68, which 
was subsequently amended by Directive 2004/38, the Court held that, in 
order to benefit from Article 10 of the regulation concerning the right to 
join an EU citizen employed in a different member state, a non-EU citizen 
spouse must indeed have had prior lawful residence in a member state.605 
However, the Court in Metock held that the 2003 judgment ‘must be recon-
sidered’ and thus explicitly overruled itself by concluding that the benefit 
of the right under Directive 2004/38 ‘cannot depend on the prior lawful 
residence of such a spouse in another Member State’.606 This explicit depar-
ture is further apparent in the subsequent Sahin case, in which the Court 
affirmed the conclusion in Metock and made no mention of Akrich.607
Aside from the above examples, the Court also adopted the option of 
explicit overruling in other cases such as Brown v Rentokil Ltd608 in which the 
Court explicitly overruled Larsson609 in order to interpret the Sex Equality 
Directive more favourably for pregnant employees.610 However, it would 
be incorrect to say that the Court is quite willing to overrule its precedents 
as a former Advocate General once stated: ‘express departures from earlier 
cases are “as few as they are celebrated”’.611 Thus, for example, a survey 
demonstrated that none of the fifty-two Grand Chamber’ decisions of 2010, 
in which nearly 1,000 citations were made to previous cases, explicitly over-
ruled its prior jurisprudence.612 The following discussion introduces the 
practice of the Court to use the other two options to deviate from case law, 
namely implicit overruling and distinguishing.
604 ECJ, Case 127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and ors v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform [2008] ECR 6241.
605 ECJ, Case 109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Hacene Akrich [2003] ECR 
9607, para 50.
606 Ibid., para 58. ‘It is true that the Court held in paragraphs 50 and 51 of Akrich that, in 
order to benefi t from the rights provided for in Article 10 of Regulation No 1612/68, 
the national of a non-member country who is the spouse of a Union citizen must be 
lawfully resident in a Member State when he moves to another Member State to which 
the citizen of the Union is migrating or has migrated. However, that conclusion must 
be reconsidered. The benefi t of such rights cannot depend on the prior lawful residence 
of such a spouse in another Member State (see, to that effect, MRAX, paragraph 59, and 
Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain, paragraph 28)’.
607 ECJ, Case 551/07 Deniz Sahin v. Bundesminister fur Inneres [2008] ECR I-10453.
608 ECJ, Case 394/96 Brown v Rentokil Ltd [1998] ECR I-4185
609 ECJ, Case 400/95 Larsson v Føtex Supermarked [1997] ECR I-2757.
610 More examples of explicit overruling see Takis Tridimas, ‘Precedent and the Court of 
Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?’, in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis(eds.), 
‘Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law’, (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 316.
611 Marc Jacob, ‘Avoiding ECJ precedents II’, in ‘Precedents and Case-Based Reasoning in the 
European Court of Justice’, (Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 159.
612 Ibid., at 160.
Chapter 7 Is There a Legal Path to a Desirable Policy Space for China Under WTO Law? 123
As an example of implicit overruling,613 the Court in Wouters simply ignored 
the Métropole judgment and reached an opposite conclusion.614 In Métropole, 
the Court rejected to balance the pro and anti-competitive effects under Ar-
ticle 101(1) TFEU and held that ‘it would be wrong, when classifying ancillary 
restrictions, to interpret the requirement for objective necessity as implying a 
need to weigh the pro and anti-competitive effects of an agreement’.615 In 
the Court’s view, an analysis of the pro and anti-competitive effects ‘can take 
place only in the specific framework’ of Article 101(3) TFEU.616 This refusal 
to balance the pro and anti-competitive effects under Article 101(1) was 
implicitly overruled in Wouters in which the Court accepted the pro and anti-
competitive effects approach by holding that, in examining the application 
of Article 101(1) to a particular case, ‘account must first of all be taken of 
the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings 
was taken or produces its effects’ and ‘it has then to be considered whether 
the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit 
of those objectives’.617 This implicit overruling was confirmed in Meca-
Medina.618
The option of distinguishing is also attractive for the Court because it ‘does 
not challenge a previous decision outright’.619 The Court thus in Keck chose 
to distinguish its earlier judgements in order to limit the scope of concerning 
measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions (MEQRs) under Article 34 
TFEU. MEQRs are more difficult to define than quantitative restrictions,620 
but in the Dassonville case, the Court found them to refer broadly to all 
rules with the potential to hinder intra-community trade.621 According to 
this definition, the key to proving that a MEQR is operative is its effect, so 
613 More examples of implicit overruling see Takis Tridimas, ‘Precedent and the Court of 
Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?’, in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis(eds.), 
‘Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law’, (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 320.
614 ECJ, Case 309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1577.
615 ECJ, Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision (M6) v Commission [2001] ECR II-2459, para 107.
616 Ibid.
617 ECJ, Case 309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1577, para 97.
618 ECJ, T-313/02 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission [2004] ECR II-3291 and 
Case 519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission [2006]  I-6991, para 42. ‘Not 
every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertak-
ings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls 
within the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC. For the purposes of application of 
that provision to a particular case, account must fi rst of all be taken of the overall context 
in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects 
and, more specifi cally, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the conse-
quential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives 
(Wouters and Others, paragraph 97) and are proportionate to them’.
619 Jacob (2014), above n 611, at 127.
620 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, ‘EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials’, Sixth Edition 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), at 639.
621 ECJ, Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para 5.
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discriminatory intent is not required.622 This broad view was affirmed by 
the Court in the Cassis de Dijon case, in which it further clarified the nature 
of MEQRs as national rules that inhibit trade and that thus differ from rules 
applicable within a country of origin, regardless of whether they discrimi-
nate against imported products.623 Following the Dassonville and Cassis de 
Dijon judgments, an increasing number of traders began invoking Article 34 
to challenge any rules perceived to limit their commercial freedom.624
This broad definition of MEQRs was narrowed in Keck in order to address 
concerns regarding potential abuse of Article 34.625 This case involved two 
traders who, in an effort to increase their market share, sold coffee in France 
below cost, a type of transaction forbidden under French law. Their activity 
thus raised the question of of whether the French rules governing such a 
selling arrangement fell within the scope of (now) Article 34 TFEU. Had 
the broad definition of MEQRs under the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon 
judgments been followed, the French rules at issue would indeed have 
been subject to this article. The Court, however, decided to ‘re-examine 
and clarify its case-law’ by explicitly distinguishing between MEQRs and 
selling arrangements from the perspective of burden-sharing.626 It held that 
‘by contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the application 
to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or 
prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within 
the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long as those provisions apply 
to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long 
as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of 
domestic products and of those from other Member States’.627 That is to say, 
MEQRs that apply to all goods would likely still impose an extra burden 
on imported goods, whereas rules concerning selling arrangements would 
impose a similar burden on all goods, provided that these rules affect 
domestic and imported goods.628 Based on this distinction, then, the Court 
limited the scope of the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon judgments.
622 Craig (2011), above n 483, at 640.
623 ECJ, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
649, para 8.
624 ECJ, Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and 
Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECRI-6097, para 14.
625 ‘In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 30 of the Treaty as a means 
of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where 
such rules are not aimed at products from other Member States, the Court considers it 
necessary to re-examine and clarify its case-law on this matter’. Ibid.
626 Ibid., paras 15-17.
627 Ibid., para 16.
628 Ibid., paras 15-16.
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A controversial example of the use of distinguishing, in a series of judg-
ments regarding national procedural autonomy, shows that this technique 
can severely restrict the scope of a precedent. The case here is Emmott, in 
which the plaintiff, an Irish citizen, applied for a judicial review of her right 
to receive a retrospective social security payment under Directive 79/7/EEC 
for the period of time during which the directive had remained unimple-
mented. Her claim had been rejected because she had failed to apply for such 
a review ‘within three months from the date when grounds for the applica-
tion first arose’.629 The Court, however, held that this time-limit requirement 
was inconsistent with EU law, reasoning that the national time-limits within 
which proceedings must be initiated by an individual against a defaulting 
member state for the purpose of protecting rights under a directive must 
run from the proper date on which the directive had been implemented.630 
Broadly speaking, the Emmott judgment could be considered to apply to 
all time-limit requirements that prevent individuals from enjoying the full 
extent of their rights under a directive owing to improper implementation 
of that directive by a member state.631 Thus, the rationale behind this ruling 
could be that member states should not profit from their own failure to imple-
ment a directive by relying on time-limit requirements in national laws.632
However, critics of this judgment seem to have prevailed over time, for 
the Court ended up increasingly distancing itself from Emmott.633 Thus the 
Court distinguished it in the subsequent Steenhorst-Neerings case with the 
argument that Emmott concerned ‘the rule of domestic law fixing time-limits 
for bringing actions’, but Steenhorst-Neerings concerned only the restriction 
of the retroactive effect of benefits claims to one year before they had been 
brought and imposed no restriction on the right of individuals to initiate a 
proceeding in order to protect the right under the directive.634 The Court 
thereby limited the scope of the Emmott judgment to the time limit imposed 
on the initiation of judicial proceedings rather than that imposed on the 
retroactive effect of benefits claims while maintaining that the latter could 
also prevent an individual, at least in part, from enjoying his or her rights 
under a directive.635
629 Ibid., para 13.
630 ECJ, Case 208/90 Theresa Emmott v. Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General [1991] 
ECR I-4269, para 23.
631 ‘Only the proper transposition of the directive will bring that state of uncertainty to an 
end and it is only upon that transposition that the legal certainty which must exist if 
individuals are to be required to assert their rights is created’. Ibid., para 22.
632 Nicola Notaro, ‘Case C-188/95, Fantask A/S and Others v. Industriministeriet (Erhvervsmi-
nisteriet), Judgment of 2 December 1997, [1997] ECR I-6783’, 35(6) Common Market Law 
Review (1998), at 1391.
633 Jacob (2014), above n 611, at 140.
634 ECJ, Case 338/91 H. Steenhorst-Neerings v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detail-
handel, Ambachten en Huisvrouwen [1993] ECR I-5475, para 21.
635 Notaro (1998), above n 632, at 1392.
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The scope of Emmott was further restricted in the Johnson case, which shared 
similar facts with Steenhorst-Neerings.636 Referring to the latter case, the 
Court held that the Emmott judgment could only apply to Emmott’s ‘partic-
ular circumstances’, which included a time limit that deprived the plaintiff 
of any opportunity to seek her right under the directive.637 Like the time 
limit in Steenhorst-Neerings, the requirement in Johnson ‘did not affect the 
right of individuals to rely on’ the directive, which thus did not fall within 
the scope of the Emmott judgment.638 The latter was thus limited to the 
restriction imposed on the initiation of judicial proceedings that absolutely 
prevented an individual from relying on a directive.
The Fantask case has been described as ‘the final stage of what could be 
called the step-by-step overruling of the Emmott judgment’.639 Unlike the 
time limit imposed on the retroactive effect of benefit claims in Steenhorst-
Neerings and Johnson, the time limit in Fantask concerned the right to apply 
for refunding charges that had been levied erroneously under Directive 
69/335/EEC of 17 July 1969 (amended by Council Directive 85/303/EEC of 
10 June 1985), which imposed a harmonized duty on the raising of capital 
by companies and prohibited any other charge relating to the registration 
of companies. Relying on this directive, Fantask, a Danish firm, and several 
other companies in 1992 asked the Trade and Companies Office to refund 
certain charges that they had paid in the period from 1983 to that year. 
Under Danish law, however, a debt becomes statute-barred after five years 
running from the date on which it became payable.
Subsequently, the Court was asked to decide whether the time limit for the 
refund action could extend prior to the date on which Denmark actually 
implemented the directive. The applicants and the commission argued that 
a limitation period under a national law should not have commenced until 
the Directive had been properly transposed; their reasoning was that the 
Emmott judgment indicated that a member state could not rely on a limita-
tion period under a national law as long as the directive in question had not 
been properly transposed into national law.640 The Court, however, with 
reference to the Steenhorst-Neerings and the Johnson judgments, held that, 
irrespective of the date of transposition, the time limit at issue commenced 
on the date on which charges became payable, provided that it was not 
discriminatory and did not interfere significantly with the exercise of EU 
636 ECJ, Case 410/92 Elsie Rita Johnson v. Chief Adjudication Offi cer [1994] ECR I-5483, paras 
26–27.
637 Ibid., para 26.
638 Ibid., paras 28 and 36.
639 Notaro (1998), above n 632, at 1390.
640 ECJ, Case 188/95, Fantask A/S and Others v. Industriministeriet (Erhvervsministeriet)[1997] 
ECR I-6783, para 45.
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rights.641 Following this judgment, the applicants lost the right to claim a 
refund of charges that had erroneously been levied under the directive at 
issue because the time limit for some of the applications for repayment had 
expired.642 Thus, by restricting the scope of the Emmott judgment to the 
‘particular circumstances’, the Court arguably overruled the Emmott judg-
ment ‘in all but name’ in an implicit manner.643
A more recent example of distinguishing is the Alimanovic case in which 
the Court narrowed the scope of the Brey judgement. In Brey, the Court had 
established the individual’s personal situation test which required national 
authorities, in examining whether a person receiving social assistance had 
become an unreasonable burden on its social assistance system, to ‘carrying 
out an overall assessment of the specific burden which granting that benefit 
would place on the national social assistance system as a whole, by refer-
ence to the personal circumstances characterising the individual situation 
of the person concerned’.644 This test was amended by the Alimanovic case 
in which the Court, acknowledging the Brey judgement, held that ‘no such 
individual assessment is necessary in circumstances such as those at issue 
in the main proceedings’.645
The above practice shows that the Court has adopted the options of explicit 
overruling, implicit overruling, and distinguishing to deviate from its 
previous judgments. Moreover, the series of judgments regarding national 
procedural autonomy shows that the use of distinguishing can severely 
restrict the scope of precedent.
641 ‘It is true that the Court held in Emmott, at paragraph 23, that until such time as a directive 
has been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual’s 
delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon him by 
the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which 
proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time’ (para 50). ‘However, 
as was confi rmed by the judgment in Case C-410/92 Johnson v Chief Adjudication Offi cer 
[1994] ECR 1-5483, at paragraph 26, it is clear from Case C-338/91 Steenhorst-Neerings v 
Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel, Ambachten en Huisvrouwen [1993] ECR 
1-5475 that the solution adopted in Emmott was justifi ed by the particular circumstances 
of that case, in which the time-bar had the result of depriving the applicant of any oppor-
tunity whatever to rely on her right to equal treatment under a Community directive (see 
also Haahr Petroleum, cited above, paragraph 52, and Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95 
Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark [1997] ECR 1-4263, paragraph 48)’. Ibid., para 51.
642 Ibid., para 44.
643 Jacob (2014), above n 611, at 142.
644 ECJ, Case 140/12 Brey [2013] EU:C:2013:565, para 64.
645 ECJ, Case 67/14  Alimanovic [2015] EU:C:2015:597, para 59. ‘It must be stated in this 
connection that, although the Court has held that Directive 2004/38 requires a Member 
State to take account of the individual situation of the person concerned before it adopts 
an expulsion measure or fi nds that the residence of that person is placing an unreason-
able burden on its social assistance system (judgment in Brey, C-140/12, EU:C:2013:565, 
paragraphs 64, 69 and 78), no such individual assessment is necessary in circumstances 
such as those at issue in the main proceedings’.
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7.1.2.4 Practice of national tribunals
7.1.2.4.1 Common law system: United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court (HoL) had been absolutely 
bound to follow all of its previous decisions since its 1898 decision of London 
Tramways Co Ltd v London Country Council which committed the Lords to 
the rule that they were irreversibly bound by their own prior decisions.646 
Under the constraint of this rule, the HoL needed to rely on the option of 
distinguishing to depart from precedent. For instance, in the case of Quin 
v Leatham, Lord Shand explicitly distinguished between, on the one hand, 
the 1898 decision of Allen v Flood, in which the defendant representing a 
group of ironworkers persuaded their employers to stop employing the 
plaintiff shipwrights, and, one the other hand, the present case in which 
the defendant aimed to injure the plaintiff ‘as distinguished from the inten-
tion of legitimately advancing their own interests’.647 Based on this ‘vital 
distinction’, the defendant’s act in Quin v Leatham thus was found to be 
prohibited.648
Although the rule of irreversible precedent was, by creating certainty in 
the law, made for the public interest, it was later on considered too rigid 
which may ‘lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the 
proper development of the law’.649 Thus, the 1966 Lords’ Practice Statement 
overruled the 1898 decision by proposing that the House of Lords could 
‘depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so’.650 The first 
example of the HoL to explicitly overrule its prior decision after the 1966 
Statement is the 1968 case of Conway v Rimmer in which the HoL unani-
mously overruled its 1942 judgement of Duncan v Cammell Laird and Co.651 
In the latter case, the HoL held that a relevant document could be withheld 
during civil proceedings in order to protect the public interest including 
the situation in which the disclosure of a document would be damaging 
to the public interest or the public interest required certain information to 
be withheld from production.652 Moreover, the same 1942 judgement also 
confirmed that ministers of the Crown could reject the production of a docu-
ment in the form of affidavit stating that the production of the document 
would be against the public interest and this affidavit should be accepted 
646 John H. Langbein, ‘Modern Jurisprudence in the House of Lords the Passing of London 
Tramways’, 53(5) Cornell Law Review (1968). ‘Although an attitude of sanctity toward 
precedent hovered over English law for most of the nineteenth century, not until London 
Tramways was the rule of irreversible precedent made absolute’.
647 House of Lords, Quinn v Leathem [1901] UKHL 2, at 5.
648 Ibid., at 6.
649 Lord Chancellor’s Practice Statement [1966] 3 All ER 77.
650 Ibid.
651 House of Lords, Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910.
652 House of Commons Library, ‘Public Interest Immunity Research Paper 96/25’, 22 
February 1996, at 5.
Chapter 7 Is There a Legal Path to a Desirable Policy Space for China Under WTO Law? 129
by the Court as conclusive.653 While the decision on the particular facts of 
Duncan v Cammell Laird and Co, as a wartime case following the ‘Thetis’ 
submarine disaster, was not questioned,654 it was criticized for allowing 
ministers of the Crown to be the ‘sole arbiters of the public interest’.655 
Twenty years later, the HoL explicitly overruled the Duncan v Cammell Laird 
and Co judgement in Conway v Rimmer in which the HoL held that the issue 
of public interest protection should be decided conclusively by the Court 
rather than a minister’s affidavit claiming public interest immunity in order 
to prevent the ministry from abusing the claim of public interest.656
As another example, R v Shivput saw the first use of the 1966 Statement in 
criminal law. In this case, the HoL overruled its Anderton v Ryan judgement 
in which the appellant, who believed that the video recorder at issue was 
stolen, was found to be not guilty of attempting dishonestly to handle a 
stolen good because there was no evidence to prove that the video recorder 
was stolen. This judgement was considered to be inconsistent with the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 which clearly stated that ‘a person may be 
guilty of attempting to commit an offence to which this section applies even 
though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible’. 
To correct this mistake, only one year after the Anderton v Ryan judgement, 
the HoL explicitly overruled it in R v Shivput in which the appellant, which 
thought his suitcase contained prohibited drugs, was held to be guilty of 
attempting to commit a drugs offence though the suitcase at issue only 
contained dried cabbage, snuff or some other harmless vegetable matter.657
Until 1 October 2009, when the role of the HoL as the highest appeal court 
in the United Kingdom was replaced by a new Supreme Court, the HoL 
explicitly applied its 1966 Statement in 21 cases.658 Although the Supreme 
Court did not re-issue the 1966 Statement, the Court in Austin v Mayor and 
Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark held that that this Statement still 
applied to it as ‘part of the established jurisprudence relating to the conduct 
of appeals’ which was further confirmed in the Court’s Practice Direction 
653 House of Lords, Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd [1942] AC 624.
654 House of Commons Library (1996), above n 652, at 6.
655 Ibid.
656 Ibid., at 7. Lord Pearce: ‘“It is not surprising” it has been said (Professor Wade, Admin-
istrative Law (2nd edn.) at p. 285) “that the Crown, having been given a blank cheque, 
yielded to the temptation to overdraw”’.
657 Criminal Attempts Act 1981
658 Louis Blom-Cooper, ‘1966 and All That: The Story of the Practice Statement’, in Louis 
Blom-Cooper QC, Brice Dickson, and Gavin Drewry (eds.), ‘The Judicial House of Lords 
1876-2009’, (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 140. ‘Thus it in the R—G case (2004) 
overruled its earlier decision on the meaning of recklessness in the R—Caldwell case 
(1982). Likewise, in Horton—Sadler (2006), the House of Lords decided to depart from the 
Walkley—Precision Forgings Ltd decision (1979)’.
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3.659 A recent illustration of the application of the 1966 Statement was seen 
in the 2016 judgement of Knauer v Ministry of Justice in which the Court 
explicitly departed from two HoL judgements, namely the 1979 judgement 
of Cookson v Knowles and the 1983 judgement of Graham v Dodds, because of 
a material change in the legal landscape concerning damages for death. In 
the Court’s view, the application of the reasoning in these judgements was 
‘illogical and their application also results in unfair outcomes’.660 Moreover, 
these unsatisfactory decisions had encouraged courts to distinguish them 
on inadequate grounds which undermined the certainty and consistency of 
law.661 To solve these problems, the Court had ‘no hesitation in concluding’ 
that it should overrule the two HoL judgements.662
7.1.2.4.2 Civil law system: Japan
As an example outside common law systems, the decisions adopted by the 
Japanese Supreme Court constitute a source of law, to which the principle 
of stare decisis thus applies.663 A lower court’s deviation from the existing 
case law of the Supreme Court constitutes grounds for appeal in both civil 
and criminal cases, though such deviation nevertheless occurs. In such 
cases, when a lower court is of the opinion that the underlying Supreme 
Court case law is, for example, out-dated and no longer appropriate, it will 
usually try to distinguish the facts at issue from that law, thereby making it 
easier for the higher court to affirm the lower’s decision.664
This technique of distinguishing is also used by the Supreme Court to avoid 
its own precedents. For instance, the Supreme Court once in the Niigata 
Prefecture Public Safety Ordinance case held that, unlike a general permit 
requirement, an advance notification requirement for a public demonstra-
tion was not against the freedom of expression because it could be justified 
659 The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, ‘Practice Direction 3: Applications for 
Permission to Appeal’. Lord Hope DPSC: ‘So the question which we must consider is 
not whether the Court has power to depart from the previous decisions of the House of 
Lords which have been referred to, but whether in the circumstances of this case it would 
be right for it to do so’.
660 UKSC, Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016] AC 908, para 23.
661 Ibid.
662 Steve Wilson, Helen Rutherford, Tony Storey, and Natalie Wortley, ‘English Legal System’, 
(Oxford University Press, 2017), Chapter 5. ‘An argument that such a change should be 
left to Parliament was rejected as the law under consideration had been made by judges 
and should be corrected by judges. The change did not have wider implications best left 
to Parliament to consider and it had been recognised by the Law Commission in a report 
that legislation was unnecessary and that there was room for judicial manoeuvre’.
663 Toshiaki Iimura, ‘The Binding Nature of Court Decisions in Japan’s Civil Law System’, 
Stanford Law School China Guiding Cases project Commentary No. 14, available at 
https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/14-Iimura-Takabayashi-Rademacher/ 
(visited on 10 June 2018).
664 Ibid.
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for the purpose of public safety.665 In a later case, however, by implicitly 
distinguishing its prior decision, the Supreme Court found that a measure 
setting out advance permit requirements could also be justified in order 
to prevent a danger to the public safety because this requirement was not 
‘much different’ than the advance notification requirement.666 In another 
example, the Supreme Court reinterpreted its precedent on the condition 
for the public to seek damages against an unconstitutional government 
action. In the Voting at Home case, the Supreme Court held that abolishing 
and failing to reinstate a voting system that enabled seriously disabled 
voters to cast votes at home did not violate the unequivocal language of the 
Constitution which is the condition to permit a recovery of damages against 
an unconstitutional government action.667 This condition was considered 
too stringent to practically prevent the public from seeking damages.668 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in the Overseas Voters case reinterpreted 
the condition to seek damages broadly in order to grant damage award to 
the overseas voters at issue against the exclusion of them from the propor-
tional representation election before 1998 and their exclusion from district 
elections after 1998.669
When no such distinction has been made, the Supreme Court must decide 
whether to correct its own case law or to overrule the lower court’s decision; 
the former option requires the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court to render 
a decision, something that rarely happens.670 For instance, the Supreme 
Court once explicitly overruled its precedent which denied the right of 
the defendant to challenge the constitutionality of government action to 
confiscate property that was owned by a third party.671 Such a right was 
subsequently conferred to the defendant by the Supreme Court in the 
Confiscation of the Third Party Property case because the court believed that 
the defendant in effect being held liable for damages caused by confisca-
tion to the third party owing the property at issue should have the right to 
challenge the confiscation order.672 As another example, the Supreme Court 
in the Patricide case explicitly overruled its prior decision that imposed a 
heavier penalty against parricide than regular homicide.673 According to the 
Criminal Code, a defendant convicted of parricide must go to jail, whereas 
a defendant convicted of regular homicide may not be necessarily subject to 
665 Shigenori Matsui, ‘Constitutional Precedents in Japan: A Comment on the Role of Prec-
edent’, 88(6) Washington University Law Review (2011), at 1675.
666 Ibid.
667 Ibid., at 1676.
668 Ibid.
669 Ibid., at 1677.
670 A decision rendered by the Grand Bench is one issued by a majority of all 15 Supreme 
Court judges.
671 Ibid., at 1674.
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
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imprisonment sentence. The constitutional challenge to the heavier penalty 
against parricide was rejected by the Supreme Court in an earlier case. 
Subsequently, in the Parricide case, recognizing that the aim of heavier crim-
inal punishment against parricide was to securing respect for parents which 
had been rejected by many countries, the majority of the Supreme Court 
held that the heavier penalty at issue that disallowed any chance to suspend 
the enforcement of the imprisonment sentence was unreasonable and thus 
explicitly overruled its precedent.674 More recently, the Supreme Court in 
a 2008 decision found that its 1966 and 1992 decisions were contrary to the 
court’s conclusion in the present case and therefore ‘should be changed’.675
As a controversial example to show that the use of distinguishing can 
severely restrict the scope of a precedent, the Supreme Court once implicitly 
overruled its prior decision on the rights of public workers to strike. The 
National Public Workers Act prohibits all types of public workers from 
striking though Article 28 of the Constitution provides them with the right 
to strike. In the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office case, the Supreme 
Court held that the right of public workers to strike could be deprived 
only when it is necessary to protect the public.676 As for the requirements 
to determining whether union leaders who solicited the illegal strike of 
public workers should be subject to criminal punishment, the Court held 
that criminal penalties could only be imposed to the union leaders if the 
strike at issue (a) was for an illegitimate purpose, (b) was accompanied 
with violence, or (c) was continued for an improperly long time.677 Possibly 
due to the strong criticism from conservative politicians in the ruling party 
and the change in the composition of the Supreme Court, the Court’s prior 
approach favouring the rights of public workers to strike was completely 
changed in the All Forest and Agricultural Public Workers, Police Office Act 
Amendment Opposition case in which the majority of the Supreme Court held 
that the strike by public workers was not only against the public nature of 
their positions but also undermined the principle of representative govern-
ment due to the influence of strike to legislation.678 By implicitly overruling 
All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office decision, the Court found that the 
leaders of a union of agricultural and forest in the present could be subject 
to criminal punishment.679
674 Ibid., at 1675.
675 Iimura, above n 663.
676 Shigenori Matsui, ‘Constitutional Precedents in Japan: A Comment on the Role of Prec-
edent’, 88(6) Washington University Law Review (2011), at 1678.
677 Ibid.
678 Ibid.
679 Ibid., at 1679.
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7.1.2.4.3 ‘Socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics’: Mainland China
Very different from the practice in the UK and Japan, the Supreme People’s 
Court in China promulgates general judicial interpretations that eluci-
date statutory provisions. According to the Chinese Constitution and the 
Legislation Law, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing 
Committee are to enact and amend basic laws. The NPC has authorized the 
C[ourt to interpret laws relating to their specific application at trial.680 Over 
the years, the Court has promulgated numerous judicial interpretations 
pertaining to various areas of law that have legal effect and can be used by 
lower people’s courts as the basis for a judgment.681 It is noteworthy that, 
unlike the above-mentioned interpretations by other judges, the Supreme 
People’s Court’s judicial interpretations are not developed by adjudging 
cases but rather through such steps as placing an interpretation on the 
agenda, discussion, drafting, and revision. Thus the judicial interpretations 
have the characteristic of generality that is evident in their titles. As an 
example, one issued in 2015 concerning guidelines for granting remedies 
in environmental infringement cases was titled ‘Supreme People’s Court’s 
Interpretation regarding Several Issues of the Application of Law in Adjudi-
cating Environmental Infringement Liability Disputes’.
When necessary, the Court does not hesitate to ‘overrule’ its judicial inter-
pretations by issuing decisions regarding their repeal. The most recent 
such decision, titled the ‘Supreme People’s Court’s Decision regarding the 
Repeal of Some Judicial Interpretations and Judicial Interpretation-Type 
Documents (12th Batch)’, was adopted in 2017 in order to abolish 15 judicial 
interpretations that had been issued in the period from 1988 to 2013.682 
According to this decision, the reasons to repeal 15 judicial interpretations 
range from these interpretations conflicting with new legislation to the 
changing conditions within China.683 Thus, when it comes to loosening the 
grip of its own precedents, the Court has fewer incentives to rely on the 
technique of distinguishing. Similarly, the generality characteristic of judi-
cial interpretations enables lower courts to get around these interpretations 
easily, even resulting in the problem of ‘different adjudicatory outcomes for 
the same type of cases or different interpretations for the same law’.684
680 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress regarding Strengthening 
the Work of Statutory Interpretation, National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 10 
June 1981.
681 Vai Io Lo, ‘Towards the Rule of Law: Judicial Lawmaking in China’, 28(2) Bond Law 
Review (2016), at 153.
682 Supreme People’s Court’s Decision regarding the Repeal of Some Judicial Interpretations 
and Judicial Interpretation-Type Documents (12th Batch), available at http://www.court.
gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-61462.html visited on 10 June 2018.
683 Ibid.
684 Lo (2016), above n 681, at 155.
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In an effort to address such threats to the credibility of the judiciary in 
China, the Supreme People’s Court began in 2010 to establish a system 
of guiding cases.685 Thus, whereas judicial interpretations that are formu-
lated and promulgated by the Court provide lower people’s courts with 
general guidance, the guiding cases demonstrate ways in which specific 
and concrete problems have been dealt with in the context of specific cases. 
The Office of Work on Guiding Cases in the Court selects and recommends 
cases from across the judicial system that are to be decided further by the 
Adjudicatory Committee of the Court. A standard guiding case consists of 
eight components: a title, keywords, a summary of the judgment, relevant 
legal rules, basic facts, the adjudicatory outcome, the reasoning behind the 
judgment, and the names of the deciding judges.686 During the period from 
January 2012 to November 2017, the Supreme Court of China issued 92 such 
guiding cases, which touched on topics including administrative law and 
procedure, civil procedure, company law, consumer protection, contract 
law, criminal law, intellectual property, labour and employment, maritime 
law, property law, torts, and unfair competition.
The lower courts, however, may not have the need to use the technique of 
distinguishing to avoid the guiding cases, one major reason being the insuf-
ficient number of guiding cases to follow owing to the slow pace of issu-
ance: as of the end of 2015, a total of only 241 cases cited guiding cases, only 
79 doing so explicitly by clearly citing the relevant guiding cases in their 
reasoning.687 Moreover, guiding cases, unlike judicial interpretations, are 
not a source of law in China and thus have less authority. The 2010 Provi-
sions regarding the Work of Guiding Cases requires only that the lower 
people’s courts ‘refer’ to the guiding cases in their adjudication of similar 
cases and not that they use the guiding cases as the ‘adjudicatory basis’.688 
The 2015 Detailed Rules on the Provisions regarding the Work of Guiding 
Cases, however, requires that, when the parties refer to a relevant guiding 
case, lower courts must indicate whether it has followed the guiding case 
and justify its approach in this regard.689
685 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case Guidance, Discussed and 
Passed by the Adjudication Committee of the Supreme People’s Court on 15 November 
2010 and Issued on 26 November 2010.
686 Detailed Implementing Rules on the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work 
on Case Guidance”, Discussed and Passed by the Adjudication Committee of the Supreme 
People’s Court on April 27, 2015 and Issued on 13 May 2015, Article 3.
687 Lo (2016), above n 681, at 163. Citing guiding cases implicitly means that the adjudicatory 
outcomes are consistent with the relevant guiding cases though these cases are not cited 
in the reasoning part.
688 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case Guidance, Article 7. Detailed 
Implementing Rules on the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case 
Guidance”, Article 10.
689 Detailed Implementing Rules, Article 11.
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7.1.3 Suggestions to loosen the grip of China—Raw Materials and China—
Rare Earths in light of the new facts of China’s export duties
The above practices by tribunals at the international, regional, and national 
levels to deviate from precedents illustrate their efforts to strike a balance 
between legal certainty and flexibility in order to deal with important public 
policy issues or simply to keep up with the times (an overview see Table 10 
at the end of this chapter).690 The major techniques of deviation, namely 
explicit overruling, implicit overruling, and distinguishing, have been 
adopted in different situations. Among the three options, it is very difficult 
to say which one is completely superior to the others because all of them 
have their advantages and limitations. Depends on the particular facts of 
given case, however, there may exist an optimal option, relatively speaking, 
based on which positive impacts would be maximised. The following 
discussion seeks to find the optimal option for the AB to depart from the 
China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths decisions.
Compared with the other two options, an explicit overruling of earlier 
precedents may generate greater clarity in the existing body of case-law. 
A good example is the Christine Goodwin case where the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber explicitly overruled its precedents based on which Article 8 of 
the ECHR does not require a full legal recognition of gender re-assignment. 
After Christine Goodwin, it is quite clear that the old judgements, such as 
Rees, are no longer applicable owing to ‘the changing conditions’ within the 
contracting states. In other words, it leaves no room to doubt whether the 
precedents before Christine Goodwin might still be applicable, as in the case 
of implicit overruling, or to what extent those precedents would apply in 
the future, as in the case of distinguishing.
It is noteworthy that Christine Goodwin overruled the previous judgements 
that were made more than 15 years ago. This long period of time provides 
the Grand Chamber with good reasons to update its case-law in order to 
reflect ‘societal changes’. In contrast, if a tribunal overrules a very recent 
decision, it may sometimes generate confusion and raises doubt about the 
direction and decisiveness of the tribunal. A classic example is the Šainović 
et al. case where the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 2014 found the Perišić 
Appeal Judgement, which was made by a different bench in 2013, was 
wrong and explicitly overruled it. Given this conflict between the different 
benches of the Appeals Chamber, it has been claimed that the ICTY jurispru-
dence on certain legal issues involved in these cases ‘remains in a state of 
690 ‘Too much adherence to precedent and there is a risk of injustice and stagnation. Too little 
observance of it, and certainty, predictability, and fairness will suffer’. See Takis Tridimas, 
‘Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?’, in Julie Dickson and 
Pavlos Eleftheriadis(eds.), ‘Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law’, (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), at 311.
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flux and fragmentation’ based on which the result of a future case ‘will very 
much depend on which judges get assigned to their Appeals Chamber’.691
The more recent WTO decision, namely China – Rare Earths, that banned 
China’s export duties was made five years ago. Although this period is 
longer than the above ICTY example, it may not be long enough for the AB 
to adopt an evolutionary approach as the Grand Chamber did in Christine 
Goodwin. In US — Shrimp, the AB adopted an evolutionary interpretation 
to update the meaning of ‘exhaustible natural resources’, which, as particu-
larly noted by the AB, was ‘actually crafted more than 50 years ago’.692 
Thus, in order to explicitly overrule China – Rare Earths, the AB may need 
to admit its interpretive errors, which it has never did, in both China – Rare 
Earths and China – Raw Materials. This seems to suggest that explicit over-
ruling may only be a second-best option for the AB to depart from the ban 
on China’s export duties.
Compared with explicit overruling, implicit overruling does not require 
the AB to provide any reasons. This approach was preferred by the ECtHR 
at its early stage.693 For instance, the original Court in Huber v Switzerland 
completely reversed its Schiesser v Switzerland judgement without acknowl-
edging the practice of overruling.694 The same approach was also adopted 
in Borgers v Belgium where the Court made findings that were directly at 
odds with its Delcourt decision but again refused to speak of overruling.695 
This practice was criticised by one dissenting judge in Borgers for failing ‘to 
do what a court that overrules an important judgment should do: it failed 
to state its reasons for doing so clearly and convincingly’.696 Indeed, as the 
AB has repeatedly emphasised, its decisions should be followed unless 
‘cogent reasons’ are presented. It is thus difficult to imagine how the AB 
would deliver a decision that is directly at odds with China – Rare Earths and 
China – Raw Materials without offering any good reasons. As a result, the 
option of implicit overruling seems to be the least feasible one for the AB to 
alter the ban on China’s export duties.
Distinguishing could be the first-best option. This technique has been 
widely used by various tribunals including the AB itself. As discussed 
above, for instance, the AB in Indonesia—Import Licensing Regimes case 
expressly distinguished its long-established sequence of analysis under 
691 Marko Milanovic, ‘The Self-Fragmentation of the ICTY Appeals Chamber’, EJIL: Talk!, at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-self-fragmentation-of-the-icty-appeals-chamber/ (visited 
on 30 July 2019).
692 AB Report, US — Shrimp, para 129.
693 Mowbray (2009), above n 573.
694 For further information, see 7.1.2.3.1.
695 Ibid.
696 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Martens at para 1.
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GATT Article XX with a distinction between the ‘normal sequence’ and the 
special one that could be adopted in the ‘particular circumstances of the 
case’. Following this approach, the AB may also draw a line between the 
‘bad’ export duties and those ‘good’ ones that would contribute to envi-
ronmental protection based on the new facts of China’s export duties as 
discussed in the previous chapters.697
It is noteworthy that the new facts of China’s export duties may also 
provide the AB with sufficient incentives to adopt the options of distin-
guishing or overruling. The AB has in a few cases departed from its strict 
textual approach in order to accommodate environmental interests, in 
particular in the US—Shrimp decision just mentioned. In that case, the AB 
adopted an ‘evolutionary’ approach according to which it interpreted the 
phrase ‘exhaustible natural resources’ broadly to include not only ‘non-
living’ resources but also living species, specifically turtles.698 The China—
Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths rulings suggest, however, that, in two 
significant respects, the AB was not convinced that the denial of China’s 
right to invoke the GATT environmental exceptions would significantly 
hinder its environmental protection efforts. First, as the complainants 
pointed out in China—Rare Earths, certain high-level Chinese documents, 
including the Guidelines of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plans (for 
the period from 2006 to 2015), make clear that China’s export duties were 
designed to increase the domestic production of high value-added down-
stream products that rely on the raw materials at issue. Second, export 
duties represent only the second-best option for protecting the environment.
However, as the preliminary analysis offered here shows, this reasoning has 
lost much of its persuasive force in light of changes in the factual context 
relating to China’s export duties. Thus the Guidelines of the Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan (for 2016-2020) explicitly prioritize the environmental 
purpose of export duties, and several subsector-level five-year plans appear 
to associate this environmental motivation with carbon leakage. Regarding 
the argument that China should always opt for the first-best option, it fails 
to take into account situations in which this option is financially or practi-
cally unavailable.699 In the case of China, as seen in Chapter 6, export duties 
could play an important role to tackle carbon leakage, an issue unaddressed 
in either China—Raw Materials or China—Rare Earths.
697 For further discussion, see section 7.4.
698 AB Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para 130. ‘From the perspective embodied in 
the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note that the generic term “natural resources” 
in Article XX(g) is not “static” in its content or reference but is rather “by defi nition, 
evolutionary”.’
699 More actual examples see Chapter 4.
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For these reasons, the AB may in the future find itself in the awkward situ-
ation of having to decide whether WTO law should prohibit China’s use of 
export duties, even as part of a genuine climate policy, despite the fact that 
the country is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Such a posi-
tion on the part of the AB is likely to meet with resistance from forces such 
as the major international environmental groups that united in opposition 
to the WTO decision that prohibited the US from adopting an extraterrito-
rial measure to protect sea turtles.700 Indeed, responding to the fact that 
global warming is accelerating even more rapidly than scientists had until 
recently anticipated, a recent and alarming IPCC report calls urgently for 
all nations to combat it through ‘rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented’ 
actions.701 The WTO’s refusal to allow China to impose export duties on 
energy-intensive products is thus inconsistent with the pro-environmental 
stance that the organization has long been projected.702
The situation would become even more awkward should a future multilat-
eral environmental agreement explicitly authorise the use of export duties 
by contracting parties for the purpose of combatting climate change. This 
much is made clear in a suggestion in a World Bank research paper that 
it would be fruitful to explore ‘alternative possible negotiated agreements 
(such as export taxes aimed at neutralizing leakage effects)’.703 In light of 
this evidence, the AB needs to address the explicit conflict between its deci-
sion and a multilateral environmental agreement.
Moreover, in the absence of such an agreement, an absolute ban on China’s 
export duties also stands to undermine international cooperation on climate 
change by triggering further WTO disputes.704 As a WTO working paper 
acknowledges, export duties ‘may respond to threats of border tax adjust-
ments abroad’ by ‘internalizing the amount of GHG tax their exports may 
700 ICTSD, ‘Shrimp-Turtle Ruling Gets Lukewarm Reaction from All Sides’, 2 (40) Bridges 
(1998).
701 ‘Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented 
changes in all aspects of society’. See IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special 
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C approved by governments’, 8 October 2018, avail-
able at https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-
report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments/, (visited 14 November 
2018).
702 For instance, the broad statement, ‘Under WTO rules, as confi rmed by WTO jurispru-
dence, members can adopt trade-related measures aimed at protecting the environment, 
subject to certain specified conditions’, is no longer valid. https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm
703 Copeland (2012), above n 11, at 41.
704 See Chapter 6.
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otherwise pay in the importing country’.705 This being the case, on the one 
hand, it would seem profoundly unfair were China to be prevented, owing 
to the two-tier membership structure of the WTO, from using export duties 
as a countermeasure. On the other hand, without access to export duties 
as a more acceptable alternative, China is likely to bring a case against any 
BTAs targeting its exports.
To conclude the argument here, the change in the factual context of China’s 
export duties—namely recognition of their potential to combat climate 
change—may provide the AB with sufficient new incentives to reconsider 
its prior decisions on the matter. In this respect at least, a new interpreta-
tion that allows China to use export duties for an environmental purpose 
remains a possibility. In this context, the best feasible option for the AB 
to depart from its China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions 
would be to distinguish them; its second-best option would be to overrule 
them. With this standard in mind, specific feasibility tests for determining 
which new interpretation is mostly acceptable to the AB are offered in the 
following three sections.
7.2 Possible options to develop a new substantive argument
The previous two sections have established that the AB could adjust the 
absolute ban on China’s export duties by overruling or distinguishing its 
prior decisions, and the new facts of China’s export duties would provide 
the AB with sufficient incentives to do so. Once the constraint of rule of 
precedent is loosened, a follow-up question is how to develop a substantive 
argument that provides China with policy space to use export duties to 
protect the environment. In other words, given the silence on the applica-
bility of the environmental exceptions under Article XX to China’s export 
duty commitments, a new argument should give meaning to that silence.
As noted by the AB, textual silence does not necessarily equal to negative 
intent of the treaty’s drafters. In the past, the AB had no hesitation in giving 
meaning to the silence concerning several procedural issues, including the 
burden of proof, the interest required to bring a claim, the admissibility of 
705 ‘The GATT does not contain any discipline on export taxes or any price-based measures 
other than the most-favoured nation principle. It is not clear to what extent national 
climate change programmes will lead to action on exports. However, some authors 
have suggested that countries whose GHG emissions are related to products destined 
for export may respond to threats of border tax adjustments abroad with the adoption 
of their own export taxes, thus internalizing the amount of GHG tax their exports may 
otherwise pay in the importing country’. Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau, Julia Reinaud, 
‘The Interface between the Trade and Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues’, 
ERSD Staff Working Paper (2011), at 4.
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amicus curiae briefs, and the principle of res judicata, doing so with reference 
to general principles of law or the practices of international tribunals.706 No 
party protested such judicial act of formulating detailed rules of procedure 
and evidence.707
When it came to interpreting a substantive silence, the AB appeared to be 
more cautious and tended to largely reply on the context and the object 
and purpose of WTO agreements.708 The Canada—Autos case, for instance, 
hinged on silence regarding the scope of SCM Agreement Article 3.1(b), 
specifically whether the article extended alike to subsidies contingent ‘in 
law’ and to subsidies contingent ‘in fact’ with respect to the use of domestic 
over imported goods. Taking into consideration the context and especially 
the object and purpose of Article 3.1(b), the AB found that this provision 
applied to subsidies contingent ‘in law or in fact’ because a narrow interpre-
tation of the silence would ‘make circumvention of obligations by Members 
too easy’.709 By contrast, a negative example is the EC—Bananas III case 
in which the AB refused to give meaning to the silence on whether WTO 
members could deviate from GATT Article XIII in their commitments to 
market access and concessions on agricultural goods by stating that, if such 
deviation were intended, WTO members ‘could, and presumably would, 
have done so’.710
A superficial look at the precedent of EC—Bananas III seems to support 
the absolute ban on China’s export duties. As the panel noted in China – 
Raw Materials, ‘if China and WTO Members wanted the defences of GATT 
Article XX to be available to violations of China’s export duty commit-
ments, they could have said so in Paragraph 11.3 or elsewhere in China’s 
Accession Protocol’.711 However, the nature of the silence in EC—Bananas III 
is fundamentally different from the one of the silence on the applicability of 
the environmental exceptions to China’s export duty commitments.
In EC—Bananas III, the EU was seeking the right to allocate tariff quota 
shares on bananas in a discriminatory manner. WTO members have, 
however, given away such right concerning trade in goods under GATT 
706 Isabelle Van Damme, ‘The Interpretation of Silence in the WTO Covered Agreements’, in 
‘Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body’ (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 136.
707 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Appellate Body and treaty interpretation’, in Giorgio Sacerdoti, 
Alan Yanovich, and Jan Bohanes (eds), ‘The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute 
Settlement System’ (Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 463.
708 Ibid., at 140.
709 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/
DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VI, 2985, para 142.
710 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distri-
bution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 59, para 
157.
711 Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, para 7.140.
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Article XIII, entitled ‘Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative 
Restrictions’. To reclaim such right concerning trade in agricultural goods, 
the EU referred to the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) which is a separate 
agreement, to a degree, shelters agricultural policies from the full impact of 
GATT disciplines.712 However, the agricultural ‘exceptions’ provided in the 
AoA are silent on this issue of administration of quantitative restrictions. 
Thus, the AB correctly decided to not give meaning to that silence because 
there is a lack of textual support in the AoA to establish a right which has 
been given away in the GATT 1994.
In contrast, one can hardly disagree that China did have the right to use 
export duties for environmental purposes before entry into the WTO. Thus, 
the key issue in China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths was whether 
China had not silently negotiated away its right to invoke Article XX 
during its accession rather than reclaiming a right which had been gener-
ally prohibited by other WTO agreements. In this context, the dissenting 
panellist in China – Rare Earths correctly suggested that if the WTO members 
wanted China to abandon the right to invoke Article XX in Paragraph 11.3, 
‘they would have said so explicitly’.713 Eventually, the AB seemed to find 
that China had implicitly waived its right to invoke Article XX in Paragraph 
11.3 based on such textual support as a specific exception clause to China’s 
export duty commitments.714
The rationale behind a new substantive argument is thus to challenge the 
existence of China’s ‘acquiescence’ to abandon its right to use export duties 
to protect the environment. This is likely to demand a lower burden of 
proof than reclaiming such right. Bearing in mind this distinction, there are 
two major approaches to develop a new substantive argument in favour of 
China’s green export duties: (i) there is textual support in China’s accession 
documents to show that China has not acquiesced in giving away its right 
to use export duties for environmental purposes, or (ii) it is legally impos-
sible for China to give away such important right in a silent way.
The first approach was largely adopted in China – Raw Materials and China 
– Rare Earths in which China spent much of its efforts on providing analyses 
of the relevant WTO provisions that indicate China’s right to invoke Article 
XX. Although all of China’s attempts to find textual support in WTO agree-
ments were eventually dismissed by the AB, it does not necessarily mean 
that China would never find such support in a future case.
712 Article 21 Final Provisions. 1. The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral 
Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provi-
sions of this Agreement.
713 7.137.
714 Article VIII, and specifi c exception
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Alternatively, the second approach directly calls into question the assump-
tion that China could legally negotiate away its right to use export duties 
to protect the environment in a silent manner. The starting point here is 
that, although WTO members have in practice required acceding members 
to make more stringent commitments as their ‘entry fee’,715 the amount of 
the charges should not be unlimited. On the one hand, the ‘entry fee’ is 
subject to the legal constraints from public international law. For instance, a 
WTO-plus commitment that requires the acceding member to abandon its 
right to ban the import of slave-made goods is very likely to be prohibited 
by a peremptory norm.716 As acknowledged by the panel in China – Raw 
Materials, the result of an absolute ban on China’s export duties is appar-
ently ‘imbalanced’ though it is not for the panel to ‘recalibrate’ it.717 This 
raises the question of whether public international law would prevent such 
imbalance.
On the other hand, WTO law itself may also impose constraints on the 
‘entry fee’. As the panel suggested in China – Raw Materials, an interpreta-
tion that prevented China from enacting necessary environmental or public 
health measures ‘would likely be inconsistent with the object and purpose 
of the WTO Agreement’ though it subsequently found that an absolute 
ban on China’s export duties would not prevent China from protecting the 
environment.718 However, as the preliminary analysis offered here shows, 
an absolute ban on China’s export duties would indeed prevent it from 
adopting an important climate policy tool. Following these approaches, the 
next two sections explore the substantive arguments that provide China 
with policy space to use export duties to protect the environment.
7.3 Feasibility tests for interpretative options based on customary 
international law or non-WTO treaties
As acknowledged by the AB, WTO rules are not intended to be read in 
‘clinical isolation from public international law’.719 In practice, all of the five 
major sources of international law, namely treaties between or among states, 
customary international law, general principles of law, judicial decisions, 
and the writings of ‘the most highly qualified publicists’, have been applied 
715 Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/
DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 
and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, para 7.112. ‘Ultimately, the acceding Member and 
the WTO membership recognize that the intensively negotiated content of an accession 
package is the “entry fee” to the WTO system’.
716 Under Article 53 of the VCLT, any treaty that confl icts with a peremptory norm is void.
717 7.160 and footnote 192.
718 Ibid., para 7.111. para 7.117.
719 AB Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/
AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, para 17.
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in settling WTO disputes.720 Jurisprudence shows that general principles of 
law, judicial decisions, and the writings of ‘the most highly qualified publi-
cists are not likely to play a significant role in giving a positive meaning to 
the silence on the relationship between Article XX and China’s export duties 
commitment.721 This section thus discusses the application of treaties and 
customary international law in settling disputes and explores the interpre-
tive options based on them.
7.3.1 Possibilities and challenges to apply customary international law or 
non-WTO treaties in settling WTO disputes
7.3.1.1 The application of customary international law
Customary international law contains rules binding on all states that apply 
automatically to WTO agreements. The AB has at times understood ‘general 
international law’ to mean customary international law. In US—Line Pipe, 
for instance, the expressions ‘customary international law rules on state 
responsibility’ and ‘general international law on state responsibility’ were 
considered synonymous,722 and in EC—Hormones the AB equated the two 
notions by referring to ‘general or customary international law’.723
Another of the AB’s expressions relating to customary international law is 
the ‘general principle of international law’. This concept appears related to 
the definition of general principles of law, for the panel in EC—Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products stated that a ‘general principle of international 
law’ implies either customary international law, general principles of law, 
or both.724 According to the definition in the Statute of the ICJ, however, 
general principles of law refer to norms in national legal systems that 
should be used differently from ‘general principles of international law’.725 
Thus, in US—Shrimp, the AB described good faith as ‘a general principle of 
law and a general principle of international law’. In this context, a general 
principle of international law could be seen as part of customary interna-
tional law.
720 The Statute of the International Court of Justice is annexed to the 1945 Charter of the 
United Nations.
721 General principles of law in practice is only used to clarify procedural issues whereas the 
other two are secondary source.
722 AB Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted on 15 February 2002, 
para 259.
723 AB Reports, European Communities - EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted on 16 January 1998, para 124.
724 Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, adopted on 29 September 
2006.
725 Christopher Greenwood, ‘Sources of International Law: An Introduction’, available at 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/greenwood_outline.pdf, (visited 18 June 2017).
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With a common intention, WTO members may contract out customary 
international law from WTO treaties. Thus the panel stated in Korea—
Government Procurement that customary international law applied to the 
extent to which the WTO treaties did not ‘contract out’ from it.726 This posi-
tion was further confirmed by the AB in US—Cotton Yarn, in which it found 
that derogation from a general international principle of proportionality of 
countermeasures could be justified only if the drafters of the WTO rules 
had expressly provided for it.727 However, the derogation from customary 
international law should not include peremptory norms as the overriding 
principles of international law.728
The challenge of applying customary international law is that, being by 
nature an unwritten source, it requires panels and the AB to identify the 
norm at issue that has attained this status. Within its jurisprudence, the AB 
has found that several provisions in the VCLT contain rules of customary 
international law, including in US—Offset Act,729 Japan—Alcoholic Beverages 
II,730 and Korea—Procurement,731 as well as in Articles 26, 32, and 48 of the 
VCLT. The AB has found other sources of customary international law as 
well. In US—Line Pipe, for example, it identified rules in Article 51 of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility as 
principles of customary international law.732 So also in the US—Shrimp case, 
the AB referred to ‘good faith’ as such a principle.
Owing to the broad application of customary international law, panels and 
the AB are very careful about applying it. Thus, in Guatemala—Cement II, the 
panel refused to recognize the concept of ‘harmless error’, which required 
a party to show injury before obtaining the right to be compensated for a 
procedural error, as part of customary international law though Guatemala 
claimed that this concept, having been recognized by the ICJ, should also be 
applied in the present case to excuse its violation of procedural rules of the 
726 Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R, adopted 
on 19 June 2000, para. 7.96.
727 AB Report, United States—Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from 
Pakistan, WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted on 8 October 2001, para 120.
728 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Application of Non-WTO Rules of International Law in WTO 
Dispute Settlement’, in ‘The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis’, Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton, Michael G. Plummer (eds.), Springer, 
2005, at 1405-1425.
729 AB Report, United States — Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/
DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted on 16 January 2003, footnote 247.
730 AB Report, Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted on 4 October 1996, footnote 17.
731 Panel Report, Korea — Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R, 
adopted on 1 May 2000, para 7.123.
732 AB Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002, DSR 
2002:IV, para 259.
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Anti-Dumping Agreement.733 Moreover, the AB also in EC—Hormones and 
US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) showed its reluctance 
to identify the status of customary international law. In the former example, 
the EU claimed that the precautionary principle, as a general principle of 
customary international environmental law, could allow it to act cautious 
‘when setting health standards in the face of conflicting scientific informa-
tion and uncertainty’.734 However, acknowledging that the status of the 
precautionary principle in international law was still debatable among 
‘academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges’, the AB held that it 
is ‘unnecessary, and probably imprudent’ for it to address the question 
of whether the precautionary principle had attained this status because 
this principle still awaited ‘authoritative formulation’.735 In the latter case 
concerning whether Article 5 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts reflects customary rules of international 
law, the AB found that it was not necessary for it to resolve this question 
because its legal analysis was not based on Article 5.736
Once a rule is found to attain the status of customary international law, the 
next step for a panel or the AB is to decide how to apply it. It is commonly 
accepted that customary international law can play a role in interpreting 
specific WTO terms. As discussed, Article 3.2 of the DSU requires that the 
panel and the AB clarify WTO regulations according to customary rules of 
interpretation. A typical example is the application of the aforementioned 
principle of good faith; although this principle can be found in neither the 
WTO Agreement nor the GATT 1994,737 the AB in US—Shrimp linked the 
balance of rights and obligations under the chapeau of Article XX with it, 
based on which linkage the text of the chapeau had been interpreted as 
prohibiting the abusive exercise of a state’s rights. In the AB’s view, this 
principle, as customary international law, provided it with ‘additional inter-
pretative guidance’.738
Whereas the AB may apply customary international law in a comple-
mentary manner, namely providing ‘additional interpretative guidance’, 
in treaty interpretation, it appears to be reluctant to apply substantive 
733 Panel Report, Guatemala — Defi nitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from 
Mexico, WT/DS156/R, adopted on 24 October 2000, para 8.22.
734 AB Report, AB Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/
DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, para 16.
735 Ibid., para 123.
736 AB Report, US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 311.
737 Several agreements attached to the WTO Agreements refer to good faith. For instance, 
Articles 3.10 and 4.3 of the DSU and Articles 24, 48.2, and 58(c) of the TRIPS.
738 AB Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, para 158.
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customary international law independently in dispute settlement.739 To 
be sure, a WTO member cannot bring a WTO complaint based solely on 
customary international law: according to Article 1.1 of the DSU, WTO 
dispute settlement only accepts a legal claim based on certain WTO agree-
ments that are listed in its Appendix 1.
Thus, the independent use of customary international law here refers to 
the gap-filling role of these non-WTO norms. Unlike the common use of 
non-WTO norms to fill in the procedural gap in WTO agreements,740 the 
gap-filling role of substantive customary international law is very limited. 
For instance, in India—Patents (US), the AB reversed a panel’s finding 
regarding the principle of ‘legitimate expectations’, pointing out that an 
interpretation should not import unintended concepts into a treaty.741 In 
other words, the principle of ‘legitimate expectations’ cannot impose an 
independent obligation on WTO members in the absence of a legal basis in 
the TRIPS Agreement.742
As an exceptional example concerning the application of substantive 
customary international law independent from WTO rules, in response 
to the argument of the US in US—Offset Act that ‘no basis or justification 
in the WTO Agreement for a WTO dispute settlement panel to conclude 
that a Member has not acted in good faith, or to enforce a principle of good 
faith as a substantive obligation agreed to by WTO Members’,743 the AB 
held that ‘Clearly, therefore, there is a basis for a dispute settlement panel 
to determine, in an appropriate case, whether a Member has not acted in 
good faith’ by referring to its previous practice of using the principle of 
good faith.744 Thus, it found a basis for applying the principle of good faith 
independently in order to assess the manner in which a WTO member 
had fulfilled its obligations but this ruling drew criticism from both WTO 
members and scholars.745 One major reason behind this criticism is that, 
unlike to independently apply procedural non-WTO norms in disputes base 
739 Jan Wouters, Dominic Coppens, Dylan Geraets, ‘The infl uence of general principles of 
law’, in ‘Liberalising Trade in the EU and the WTO A Legal Comparison’, Sanford E. Gaines, 
Birgitte Egelund Olsen, Karsten Engsig Sørensen (eds), Cambridge University Press, 
2012, at 9. ‘In other words, it seems that a claim cannot be based on customary interna-
tional law and that it can also not be invoked as a defence to justify a violation of a WTO 
provision’.
740 See subsection 1.2.3.
741 AB Report, India — Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
adopted on 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras 42 and 45.
742 Wouters, Coppens, and Geraets (2012), above n 739.
743 AB Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/
AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, para 296.
744 Ibid., para 297.
745 Minutes of Meeting Held on 27 January 2003. Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DSB/M/142, 
6 March 2003, para 57. Andrew D. Mitchell, ‘Legal Principles in WTO Disputes’, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, at 136. Wouters, Coppens, and Geraets (2012), above n 739, at 49.
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on the AB’s inherent jurisdiction, there is no legal basis for the AB to apply 
substantive customary international law to interpret provisions that do not 
specifically reflect such a rule.746 It is noteworthy that, however, this excep-
tional decision has minimal practical relevance because the AB appeared 
to suggest that a violation of a WTO provision is a necessary condition to 
find a member to not act in good faith.747 In other words, in the absence of 
a breach of a WTO treaty provision, a WTO member cannot be found to 
violate the principle of good faith.
7.3.1.2 The application of non-WTO treaties
Treaties, unlike customary international law, are binding only on the 
contracting parties. WTO jurisprudence, however, shows that non-WTO 
treaties can sometimes be applied in the process of interpreting specific 
WTO terms. For instance, in US—Shrimp, the AB interpreted the term 
‘exhaustible natural resources’ in Article XX(g) by referring to several 
modern international conventions, including the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.748
It is, however, unclear whether a WTO member could use non-WTO treaties 
to justify its violation of WTO rules. In the Chile—Swordfish case, the EU 
challenged Chilean legislation, which prohibited unloading of swordfish in 
its ports under Article 165 of its fisheries laws, before the WTO based on 
Articles V, providing for freedom of transit for goods through the territory 
of each contracting party on their way to or from other contracting parties, 
and XI, prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports or exports, of the 
GATT 1994. Chile chose, with reference to the UNCLOS, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) as an alternative forum to resolve 
the dispute and, having made various arrangements regarding the proce-
dural suspension of WTO and UNCLOS provisions, settled with the EU in 
2010.749 However, if Chile had chosen to invoke several articles concerning 
conservation of environmental resources under UNCLOS, such as Article 64 
calling for cooperation in ensuring conservation of highly migratory species 
and Articles 116 to 119 relating to conservation of the living resources of 
the high seas, in its defence in front of the AB, it is unclear whether the AB 
would allow it to do so.
746 Andrew D. Mitchell, ‘Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement’, 7(2) Melbourne Journal 
of International Law (2006), ‘these provisions do not specifi cally refl ect the principle of 
good faith beyond the general requirement that they be interpreted in good faith’.
747 AB Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/
AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, para 298.
748 AB Report, US — Shrimp, paras 128 – 132.
749 WTO Secretariat, ‘Chile — Measures affecting the Transit and Importing of Swordfi sh’, avail-
able at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds193_e.htm, (visited 
18 June 2017).
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In this context, Pauwelyn has argued that, if a non-WTO treaty binds the 
parties in a WTO dispute, this treaty then must be considered a potential 
defence.750 To support his argument, he cites the AB’s encouragement of the 
US in the US—Shrimp case to conclude treaties with other WTO members 
for the protection of sea turtles in order to avoid ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination’. In his view, such a treaty, once concluded, could be used as 
a defence against a claim of ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’. To 
date, though, no WTO member has referred to a non-WTO treaty as part of 
a defence.
7.3.2 Options based on customary international law
At the oral hearing of the appeal of China—Rare Earths, China developed 
a new argument based on Article 30(3) of the VCLT.751 Although the AB 
criticized China’s failure to provide sufficient supporting evidence for this 
argument, China may develop it further in a future dispute. In keeping with 
the proposal of Qin,752 the first issue to be examined is whether the applica-
tion of VCLT Article 30 can lead to an interpretation in support of China’s 
right to impose export duties. The next concern is the extent to which public 
international law does not support the China—Raw Materials and China—
Rare Earths decisions, which touches on the feasibility of using the principle 
of sustainable development and the principle of abuse of rights as a defence 
against the denial of China’s right under Article XX.
7.3.2.1 Paragraph 11.3 as a subsequent agreement or practice modifying WTO 
treaties
To further develop China’s argument as mentioned above, Qin proposed 
considering China’s Accession Protocol as a subsequent agreement as 
defined under VCLT Article 30(3), a provision that has been used as a basis 
for modifying WTO treaties.753 Approached this way, China’s export duty 
commitments under Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol have, in effect, 
modified GATT Article XI:1 so that this article essentially regulates them.754 
Thus, since GATT Article XX applies to Article XI:1, China is entitled 
to justify its use of export duties under the former unless the Accession 
Protocol explicitly states otherwise.
750 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Application of Non-WTO Rules of International Law in WTO 
Dispute Settlement’, in ‘The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis’, Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton, Michael G. Plummer (eds.), Springer, 
2005, at1416.
751 The AB found in US—Gasoline that the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 of the 
VCLT was part of customary international law.
752 Julia Ya Qin, ‘Conundrum of WTO Accession Protocols: In Search of Legality and Legiti-
macy’, 55(2), Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), at 404.
753 Ibid. at 404-411
754 Ibid.
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The interpretation of Paragraph 11.3 as a subsequent agreement, however, 
will face legal challenges. In particular, Article 30(3) only applies to the situ-
ation in which ‘all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later 
treaty’, that is to say in order to consider China’s Accession Protocol as a 
subsequent agreement under VCLT Article 30(3), the parties to the Protocol 
should be the same as those to the earlier treaty, namely the GATT 1994. By 
contrast, however, China’s Accession Protocol was signed between it and 
the WTO, while the GATT 1994 was signed by the original WTO members, 
of which China was not one. Therefore, Article 30(3) seems to be irrelevant 
to explain the relationship between Paragraph 11.3 and the GATT 1994.
In addressing this legal issue, Qin argued that China’s Accession Protocol 
can be treated as a multilateral agreement signed by WTO members, on 
the grounds that it represented a consensus among them.755 This argument 
is based on the approach, termed ‘functionalism’, to consider that interna-
tional organizations are mere functional vehicles for their member states.756 
In this sense, the parties to China’s Accession Protocol, as a subsequent 
agreement, are in effect the same as the parties to the GATT 1994 in its 
capacity as an earlier treaty.
Regardless of the controversial nature of the ‘functionalism’ approach,757 
it is noteworthy that the conclusion of a treaty requires the approval of 
national decision-makers, however, and only China’s parliament ratified 
its Accession Protocol.758 Therefore, if the conclusion of China’s Accession 
Protocol is considered a subsequent agreement that modifies the GATT 
1994, the functionalist perspective fails to explain why the national decision-
makers in other WTO member countries were excluded from the process of 
amendment. Furthermore, the form of China’s Accession Protocol also lacks 
the rigor of treaty texts as a subsequent agreement to the GATT 1994.
As an alternative to the functionalist perspective, Qin proposes a bold 
solution by considering China’s Accession Protocol subsequent practice 
for modifying WTO treaties. Yet while the parties to a subsequent practice 
need not necessarily to have been signatories to an earlier treaty, to consider 
China’s Accession Protocol subsequent practice faces other legal challenges. 
755 Ibid.
756 Ibid.
757 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Emergence of Functionalism in International Institutional Law: Colo-
nial Inspirations’, 25(3) European Journal of International Law (2014), at 645. ‘It turns out 
that functionalism, as developed by Reinsch, was inspired by his familiarity with colonial 
administration: colonialism and international organization both manifested cooperation 
between states. While this is no reason to discard functionalism, it does provide an argu-
ment for viewing international organizations more critically than functionalism habitu-
ally does’.
758 WTO Secretariat, ‘WTO Ministerial Conference approves China’s accession’, https://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
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It is in this respect important to note that the concept of a subsequent 
practice modifying treaties is not even mentioned in the VCLT; there was, 
during its drafting, a proposal of the ILC to include it as a means to modify 
a treaty by proposing ‘treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty establishing the agreement of the parties to modify 
its provisions’,759 but this was rejected owing to uncertainty regarding the 
effect of subsequent practice on the principle of consent and appeared to be 
the only proposed article of the ILC that was completely abandoned by the 
negotiator in 1966.760
In fact, the idea to amend or modify treaties by subsequent practice of the 
parties has still not been generally recognized by states nowadays according 
to the Fifth ILC Report (2018) on subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties.761 Although, in practice, 
the ICJ has taken a decidedly liberal approach to recognizing the role of 
subsequent practice in treaty modification,762 WTO jurisprudence, to date, 
has only recognized the role of subsequent practice in treaty interpreta-
tion.763 Considering the lack of consensus among the states on recognizing 
subsequent practice as a way to change treaties, the AB is not likely to 
introduce the new role of subsequent practice in treaty interpretation. And 
even if the AB does so, it is noteworthy that subsequent practice requires the 
common intention of the WTO members. In both China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths, however, the differing opinions among the third-party 
participants that shared the legal position of China’s Accession Protocol 
indicate a lack of common intention as required by subsequent practice. 
Thus, the argument that China’s Accession Protocol modified the GATT 
1994 is likely to be accepted by the AB.
Moreover, the argument based on subsequent practice, though aiming to 
favour China’s export duties, may not be even accepted by the Chinese 
government itself which just recently rejected the position to use subse-
quent practice ‘as a tool to expand the scope of interpretation or to covertly 
amend the treaty’ in the UN.764
759 A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-
SION 1966, Volume II Documents of the second part of the seventeenth session and of 
the eighteenth session including the reports of the Commission to the General Assembly 
U N I T E D N A T I O N S, at 91.
760 Georg Nolte, ‘Treaties and Subsequent Practice’, Oxford University Press (2013), at 130.
761 Fifth ILC Report (2018) on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to 
the interpretation of treaties, para 66.
762 Julia Ya Qin, ‘Conundrum of WTO Accession Protocols: In Search of Legality and Legiti-
macy’, 55(2), Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), at 408.
763 Ibid.
764 United Nations, General Assembly Seventy-fi rst Session Offi cial Records, 11 November 
2016, para 70.
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Lastly, aside from all the above legal difficulties involved with interpreting 
China’s Accession Protocol as either a subsequent agreement under VCLT 
Article 30(3) or subsequent practice, it is also uncertain whether the AB 
would view China’s export duty commitments under Paragraph 11.3 
of its Accession Protocol as a means to modify GATT Article XI:1; for in 
China—Rare Earths, the majority of the panel found that the commitment 
to eliminate export duties did not relate to GATT Article XI.765 That is to 
say, even if China’s Accession Protocol is generally considered a tool to 
modify the GATT 1994, the AB may still find that Article XI is not modified 
by Paragraph 11.3.
7.3.2.2 The principle of sustainable development
From China—Raw Materials to China—Raw Materials II, China has consis-
tently argued that its export duties are intended to promote sustainable 
development. This claim in turn raises the question if sustainable develop-
ment can, in the context of public international law, serve as an independent 
ground against the denial of China’s right to impose export duties under 
Article XX.
As noted several times, the AB in the US—Shrimp case used sustainable 
development as a legitimizing factor for an evolutionary interpretation 
by broadening the scope of the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ to 
include sea turtles.766 In that case, however, the AB referred to sustain-
able development as an objective in the WTO Agreement rather than as a 
principle of customary international law. As a result, the legal implications 
of sustainable development have been ‘drawn in a strictly conventional 
capacity’ when it comes to settling WTO disputes.767 For instance, the AB 
in China – Raw Materials held that the objective of sustainable development 
in the WTO Agreement does not provide ‘specific guidance’ clarifying the 
relationship between Paragraph 11.3 and GATT Article XX. Following this 
conventional approach, the AB would certainly not accept China’s defence 
against the denial of its right under Article XX solely based on the objective 
of sustainable development.
Such a defence could be feasible, however, if the AB considers sustainable 
development as a norm of jus cogens.
As peremptory norms of general international law, jus cogens norms, 
such as prohibitions of the slave trade, can invalidate conflicting rules, 
including WTO norms.768 In other words, jus cogens norms enjoy absolute 
765 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para 7.95.
766 AB Report, US – Shrimp, para 130.
767 Virginie Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of 
an Evolutive Legal Norm’, 23(2) European Journal of International Law (2012), at 386.
768 Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT.
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priority over other norms and permit of no derogation. It is accordingly 
doubtful that a panel or the AB would have the authority to nullify a 
WTO norm for a violation of jus cogens.769 In this sense, were sustainable 
development to attain the status of a jus cogens norm, the strong presump-
tion against violating such a norm would encourage an interpretation that 
allows China to use export duties for the purpose of sustainable develop-
ment.770
However, sustainable development seems to have not yet attained this 
status. For while the existence of the category of jus cogens norms is recog-
nized internationally, there is little international consensus as to which 
specific norms qualify.771 A relevant notion in the literature might be the 
‘right to life’, which is protected under every international human rights 
convention, but this right has not developed into a general prohibition 
against failing to avoid—or perhaps better, general permission to take 
measures to avoid—environmental damage that threatens the interna-
tional community as a whole.772 Moreover, tribunals have been in practice 
extremely cautious about recognizing jus cogens status owing to uncertainty 
regarding the potential implications for a tribunal’s legitimacy.773 This 
being the case, it is also unrealistic to expect the AB, which once avoided 
addressing the question of whether the precautionary principle had 
attained the status of customary international law and proposed to wait 
for ‘authoritative formulation’, to find that sustainable development has 
attained the status of a jus cogens norm.
Alternatively, it can perhaps more easily be argued that sustainable devel-
opment has attained the status of customary international law.774 Thus, the 
AB would be required to rule in favour of China’s export duties if China 
could prove, first, the notion of sustainable development conflicts with an 
absolute prohibition on China’s export duties, and, second, sustainable 
development prevails over China’s export duty commitments. However, it 
would be difficult for China to prove the existence of a conflict between 
the principle of sustainable development and the absolute prohibition on 
769 The mandate of the panel and the AB is limited to recommending that a national measure 
be consistent with WTO laws. See Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human 
Rights’, 13(4) European Journal of International Law (2002) at 756.
770 Ibid.
771 Possible norms of jus cogens include the prohibition on the use of force (e.g., an agreement 
between states to commit aggression against another state would be void), the prohibi-
tion on genocide and violations of other fundamental human rights.
772 Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, ‘State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of 
the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms’, 11 Georgetown 
Environmental Law Review (1998), at 135.
773 Matthew Saul, ‘Identifying Jus Cogens Norms: The Interaction of Scholars and Interna-
tional Judges’, 5(1) Asian Journal of International Law (2015) at 27.
774 Virginie Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of 
an Evolutive Legal Norm’, 23(2) European Journal of International Law (2012), at 385.
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China’s export duties. At least in theory, because customary international 
law is by nature less specific and explicit than a treaty provision, the latter 
is likely to prevail as lex specialis whenever a conflict arises between them.775 
Therefore, in a future case, even if the AB were to find an absolute prohibi-
tion on China’s export duties to be conflict with the principle of sustainable 
development, the prohibition would still likely to carry greater weight. 
Thus, considering the very cautious stance of the AB to identify customary 
international law and the vague nature of sustainable development, it is not 
feasible for China to rely on the principle of sustainable development as an 
independent ground against the denial of China’s right under Article XX 
in a future case though this principle may help develop a more teleological 
approach prioritizing the environmental objective under WTO law which is 
discussed in the next section.
7.3.2.3 The principle of good faith
In US—Shrimp, the AB referred to the principle of good faith for additional 
interpretative guidance in deciding whether the US passed the test under 
the chapeau of GATT Article XX.776 In the view of the AB, in the application 
of the principle of good faith, the abuse of rights should be prohibited. Thus 
the doctrine of abuse of rights, for the AB, is one application of the principle 
of good faith, which requires that a state’s right ‘must be exercised bona fide, 
that is to say, reasonably’.777
The reception of the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions 
makes the stance of the complaining governments in seeking to prohibit 
China from using export duties appear extreme and unreasonable. More-
over, this thesis also shows that this outcome would in practice constrain 
China’s policy space to protect the environment, an especially pressing 
concern in the context of global climate change. Since the doctrine of abuse 
of rights ‘prevents a Party to an agreement from exercising its rights in a 
way that is unreasonable in light of the spirit of the agreement’,778 the ques-
tion arises whether the principle relating to the abuse of rights could serve 
to address what China views as the unreasonable acts of the complainants 
in the two cases.
775 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-WTO Law? Questions of 
Jurisdiction and Merits’, 37(6) Journal of World Trade (2003), at 1025.
776 AB Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/AB/R, para. 158.
777 Ibid.
778 Thomas Cottier and Krista N. Schefer, ‘Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations’ in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick (eds.), ‘New Directions in Internati-
onal Economic Law, Essays: Essays in Honour of John H.Jackson’, (Kluwer Law International, 
2000), at 127.
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Abuse of rights has expressly served as the basis of a claim before the 
ICJ, specifically in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962), in which the Spanish government 
invoked ‘an abuse of the right of diplomatic protection’.779 Although this 
principle has never been applied independently in WTO disputes, the AB 
in US—Offset Act found a basis for applying the principle of good faith 
independently in order to assess the manner in which a WTO member had 
fulfilled its obligations. In this context, China may argue that the principle 
of abuse of rights, as part of the principle of good faith, prohibits WTO 
members from assuming that China has implicitly signed away its valuable 
rights under Article XX. Indeed, as the panel held in China—Rare Earths, 
an interpretation of WTO law that in effect prevented WTO members from 
taking necessary measures to protect the environment could be considered 
inconsistent with the object and purpose of WTO law and thus ‘manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable’.780
In US—Offset Act, however, the AB also appeared to suggest that a violation 
of a WTO provision is a necessary condition to find a member to not act in 
good faith. In this context, alternatively, China could claim that the attempt 
to deny its right to use export duties under Article XX constitutes an abuse 
of procedural rights under Article 3(10) of the DSU, according to which all 
WTO members must engage in dispute settlement procedures in good faith. 
In view of the US—Shrimp case, the denial of China’s right to impose export 
duties under Article XX could, then, constitute an unreasonably exercise of 
rights. This option is, however, less feasible than the above one because it 
requires the AB to adopt a very broad interpretation on procedural rights.
7.3.3 Options based on non-WTO treaties
As discussed above, after the US—Shrimp case, a treaty between the US 
and other WTO members designed to protect sea turtles could serve as a 
defence for the United States against a future claim of ‘arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination’. Thus, if China could conclude a treaty between it and 
the complaining governments defining the legitimate use of export duties 
to protect the environment, this treaty could be used as defence against 
a claim of the violation of China’s export duty commitments in a future 
case. However, this kind of agreement on the environmental role of China’s 
export duties is not likely to be reached because, as evident in the China—
Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths cases, the complaining governments, 
suggesting that China’s export duties could be replaced by other better 
environmental instrument, rejected to recognize the importance of export 
duties in protecting the environment.
779 Judgment of 5 February 1970 Second Phase Procedure(s): Preliminary objections, at 15.
780 Panel Reports, China –Rare Earths, para 7.111.
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 Aside from relying on a bilateral agreement, WTO members may also 
invoke a decision under the dispute settlement mechanism of a non-WTO 
treaty against a WTO complaint. Thus, by way of example, following the 
recommendations of the Resolution of the International Labour Conference 
(ILC) recommending action against Myanmar for breaching the Interna-
tional Labour Organization’s Forced Labour Convention, a number of WTO 
members at one point imposed trade embargoes against Myanmar; had 
the latter complained to the WTO, the former would have been allowed 
to use the ILC recommendations, as the later and more specific norm, as a 
defence.781 After all, the WTO may also expect other international organiza-
tions to respect an explicit WTO authorization.782
For instance, in the EC — Bananas III case, the Arbitrators found that 
Ecuador, pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU, may request authorization by 
the DSB to suspend certain TRIPS obligations as a countermeasure against 
a prior WTO violation by the EU’s import regime for bananas.783 To be 
sure, Ecuador never exercised its right to adopt such a countermeasure, but 
instead negotiated a settlement with the EU to improve market access for 
its bananas.784 But if Ecuador did suspend intellectual property protection, 
the WTO would expect the WIPO to refuse finding a violation of the WIPO 
administered treaties.
This option is, however, not available to China because export duties have 
not been authorized under any organization of non-WTO treaties. In the 
absence of such an authorization, China may argue that export duties are 
instead authorized under a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA). 
Relevant in this context, the Montreal Protocol allows for trade restrictive 
measures that are inconsistent with the GATT 1994 against non-parties. 
To date, these authorized trade restrictive measures have never been chal-
lenged, though they are believed to be protected by GATT Article XX.785 
If, however, a measure such as an export ban authorized by the Montreal 
Protocol were to fail to pass the test under Article XX,786 the Montreal 
Protocol could arguably be used as an independent defence. For instance, as 
781 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-WTO Law? Questions of 
Jurisdiction and Merits’, 37(6) Journal of World Trade (2003), at 1022.
782 Ibid., at 1023.
783 Decision by the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 
22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, 24 March 2000, DSR 2000:V.
784 See Notifi cation of Mutually Agreed Solution, EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/58, 2 July 
2001.
785 The Ozone Secretariat in 1999 issued a communication to the WTO Committee on Trade 
and Environment noting that the measures could be saved under Article XX. See Duncan 
Brack and Kevin Gray, ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO’, IISD 
Report (2003), at 20.
786 Ibid., at 21. The Director of the WTO Trade and Environment Division in 1996 suggested 
that the Protocol’s trade measures would not pass the tests under GATT Article XX.
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discussed in subsection 2.1.3, if Chile in the Chile—Swordfish case chose to 
invoke several articles concerning conservation of environmental resources 
under UNCLOS in its defence, the AB may allow it to do so.
In this context, China could refer to the Paris Agreement, which is within 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
as a defence against a WTO complaint prohibiting it from using export 
duties for fighting climate change. It is noteworthy that China in its second 
communication to the UNFCCC described its export duties as a type of 
instrument designed to ‘effectively control greenhouse gas emissions’.787 
This assertion has also received support from some research reports, 
including a 2012 World Bank research paper suggesting that export duties 
could play a positive role in future negotiations aimed at reducing carbon 
leakage.788
However, unlike the Montreal Protocol, the Paris Agreement does not 
explicitly authorize China to impose export duties. So the AB needs to 
determine whether the Paris Agreement requires, or at least permits, China 
to adopt export duties as part of its climate policy, and this determination 
could also require China to prove the necessity of export duties to combat 
climate change. Therefore, although the Paris Agreement confirms China’s 
target of halting the increase in its carbon emissions by around 2030, there 
remains enormous uncertainty regarding whether the AB would accept the 
Paris Agreement as a defence permitting a violation of China’s export duty 
commitments. Moreover, one important assumption behind this option is 
that the Paris Agreement is binding on these WTO members which could 
potentially bring a case against China’s export duties. This assumption 
is, however, challenged by the recent announcement of the United States, 
which keeps litigating against China’s export duties in the China—Raw 
Materials, China—Rare Earths and China—Raw Materials II cases, of its inten-
tion to withdraw from the Paris Agreement though it can be argued that the 
absence of the US may increase the necessity of providing China with more 
policy space to fight climate change.
To conclude the present section, all potential interpretative options based 
on non-WTO norms appear to require the AB to overrule its prior decisions 
explicitly and therefore constitute second-best options. Among them, the 
argument that China’s export duty commitments should be viewed as a 
subsequent agreement or practice modifying GATT Article XI is unlikely to 
be accepted by the AB.789 Similarly, the AB can be expected to reject argu-
787 UNFCCC (2004), above n 6.
788 Copeland (2012), above n 11, at 41.
789 The reason is that, on the one hand, the parties to the China’s Accession Protocol are not 
the same as those to the GATT 1994; and on the other hand, even China itself recently 
rejected considering subsequent practice as a tool to modify treaties.
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ments based solely on the principles of sustainable development or of the 
Paris Agreement, though these non-WTO norms could bolster an interpreta-
tion favouring China’s export duties. A more feasible second-best option 
appears to be founded on the principle of good faith which might be used to 
against the assumption that China has implicitly signed away its valuable 
rights under Article XX. Alternatively, another less feasible option would 
be to argue that the denial of China’s rights under Article XX is inconsistent 
with the principle of prohibition of abuse of rights under Article 3(10) of 
the DSU. The feasibility of various interpretative options under WTO law is 
assessed in the following section.
7.4 Feasibility tests for interpretative options based on WTO law
In this section, the feasibility of two major interpretative options under 
WTO law is assessed. The first is based largely on the major criticism of the 
China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions discussed in Chapter 
3, namely that the AB, in adhering to a strict textual approach, ignored the 
environmental concerns raised in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement. 
The discussion begins by addressing the feasibility of the AB adopting a 
more teleological approach that gives greater weight to the environmental 
aims under WTO law than in the earlier cases. Since the AB has already 
found that the preamble does not provide ‘specific guidance’ that would 
clarify the relationship between Paragraph 11.3 and GATT Article XX, such 
an approach would likely require explicit departure from its previous deci-
sions, a move that, as has been seen, constitutes a second-best approach. In 
an effort to find the most feasible solution, a second interpretative option 
is proposed that would enable the AB to distinguish the absolute ban on 
China’s export duties.
7.4.1 A more teleological approach in light of the environmental context 
in the preamble of the WTO Agreement
The preamble to the WTO Agreement addresses several important envi-
ronmental issues regarding ‘sustainable development’ and directives to 
‘preserve the environment’. This environmental context, as the AB held in 
the US—Shrimp case, ‘must add colour, texture and shading’ to its interpre-
tation.790 This ruling, however, at least in the opinion of some scholars, was 
not followed in the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths cases, and a 
group of interpretations has been proposed according to which the AB could 
take a relatively more holistic approach by emphasizing the preamble’s 
environmental context. The following discussion accordingly presents two 
ways in which the AB could adopt a new interpretation permitting China to 
790 AB Report, US – Shrimp, para 153.
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use export duties under Article XX by relying on the environmental objective 
of WTO law.
7.4.1.1 Explicitly prioritizing the object of environmental protection
If the object of environmental protection has some form of relative primacy 
in WTO law, the AB could rely on it to give meaning to the silence on the 
applicability of the environmental exceptions under Article XX to China’s 
export duty commitments. There is, however, a lack of WTO jurisprudence 
about the prioritization of a treaty’s purpose and object. In order to provide 
the AB with a good example, this discussion refers to the ECJ’s Kadi I 
judgment concerned implementation of resolutions of the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council that imposed sanctions under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter against individuals and entities alleged to be associated with 
terrorism. To give effect to these resolutions, the Council of the European 
Union adopted a regulation ordering the freezing of the funds and other 
assets of persons and entities appearing on a list annexed to the regulation. 
The appellants claimed that this regulation should be annulled because it 
infringed several of their fundamental rights, namely to respect for prop-
erty, to be heard before a court of law, and to effective judicial review.791
At first, this claim was rejected by the Court of First Instance because it 
lacked the jurisdiction to review the validity of the basis of regulation at 
issue, namely the relevant resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, which prevails over the obligations of member states under EU 
law by virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter.792 Subsequently, the claim 
of the appellants that the regulation violated their fundamental rights was 
supported by the ECJ, which held that, if it were to find a measure giving 
effect to a resolution of the UN Security Council to be inconsistent with ‘a 
higher rule of law in the Community legal order’, this finding would not 
change the ‘primacy of that resolution in international law’.793
Relevant in the context of prioritizing the object of environmental protec-
tion in WTO law is the practice of the ECJ in finding that the protection 
of fundamental rights at issue, as part of the ‘very foundations’ of the EU 
legal order,794 forms ‘the constitutional principles’ of the EU law.795 While 
791 ECJ, Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foun-
dation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (2008) 
ECRI-6351, para 59.
792 Except where these violate jus cogens. The CFI concluded that fundamental rights as 
protected by jus cogens have not been infringed. Kadi CFI judgment, paras 212-31, 
233-91.
793 Kadi (2008), above n 791, para 288.
794 Ibid., para 304.
795 Ibid., para 285.
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the Court emphasised the importance of the protection of fundamental 
rights against ‘the alleged absolute primacy of the resolutions of the Secu-
rity Council’, it also appeared to imply a ‘hierarchy of norms’ within EU 
primary law.796 Thus, from a constitutional perspective, a finding by the 
AB that a hierarchy of norms exists in WTO law in which the object of envi-
ronmental protection has primacy would support the argument that China 
cannot legally sign away its right under Article XX during the accession 
negotiations, at least not in a silent manner.
The AB, however, has never established such a hierarchy of norms. 
Although the panel held in China—Rare Earths that an interpretation of 
WTO law according to which WTO members were legally prevented from 
taking measures necessary to protect the environment could be inconsistent 
with the object and purpose of WTO law, and that such a result could also 
be ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’,797 which seems to suggest that envi-
ronmental protection is one of the fundamental values under WTO law, this 
perspective has not been confirmed by the AB. On the contrary, the WTO 
has ‘no constitutional court, no constitutional convention, and no constitu-
tional drafting process’,798 and while scholars have articulated at least three 
approaches to WTO constitutionalism,799 the use of constitutional analogies 
in analysing the WTO has not met with universal approval.800 Thus, the AB 
is unlikely to prioritize the object of environmental protection in WTO law 
explicitly. Alternatively, the following discussion assesses the feasibility of 
the AB implicitly prioritizing the object of environmental protection under 
WTO law as part of overriding principles.
796 Ibid., para 305. Also see Armin Cuyvers, ‘“Give me one good reason”: The unifi ed stan-
dard of review for sanctions after Kadi II’ 51(6) Common Market Law Review (2014), 
footnote 14.
797 Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and 
Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R and Add.1 / WT/DS432/R and Add.1 / WT/DS433/R 
and Add.1, adopted 29 August 2014, upheld by AB Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/
DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R, DSR 2014:IV, para 7.111.
798 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ‘Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline 
of International Law’, 17(3) European Journal of International Law (2006), at 650.
799 Ibid., at 651. The three approaches include constitution as institutional architecture, 
constitution as normative commitment, and constitution as judicial mediation. The fi rst 
approach highlights the institutional design of the WTO’s constitution and posits that the 
constitution serves to effi ciently resolve disputes between states. The second approach 
understands the constitution as a set of normative commitments to values such as indi-
vidual freedom and the rule of law. The last approach focuses on the role of the judiciary 
in gradually constructing a package of constitutional norms through dispute resolution.
800 Ibid.
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7.4.1.2 Implicitly prioritizing the object of environmental protection
Although the AB has not attempted to categorize various types of norms as 
constitutional or non-constitutional,801 it does in practice treat certain norms 
differently from others in adopting a more teleological approach. Thus, to 
return to a useful example, it adopted in the US—Shrimp case an evolu-
tionary interpretation that broadened the scope of ‘natural resources’ under 
Article XX(g) with reference to the environmental concerns articulated in 
the preamble.802
Another example of a more teleological approach can be found in the AB’s 
interpretation in the same case concerning the acceptance of amicus curiae 
briefs, which non-state actors have submitted in attempts to participate 
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. According to Article 13 of the 
DSU, panels have the right to ‘seek’ information from any relevant source, 
including non-state actors; in US—Shrimp, the panel refused to consider 
several amicus curiae briefs on the grounds that it had not sought them.803 
On appeal, however, the AB explicitly rejected the panel’s conclusion;804 
referring to the object and purpose of the panel’s mandate under Article 
11 of the DSU, the AB interpreted the term ‘seek’ to include accepting even 
briefs that had not been requested by the panel.805 From a constitutional 
perspective, the AB chose an active fact-finding procedure in order to 
preserve the legitimacy of the WTO dispute-settlement proceedings.806
Compared with the two examples relating to US—Shrimp, however, the 
silence regarding the applicability of Article XX to China’s export duty 
commitments would require the AB to give much greater weight to the 
environmental issues raised in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement if it 
were to support China’s right. Such a teleological approach can in fact be 
discerned in a series of decisions by the AB regarding zeroing, a calculation 
methodology employed in the context of anti-dumping efforts that is not 
explicitly prohibited by the WTO.
801 Isabelle Van Damme, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the WTO AB’, 21(3) European Journal of 
International Law (2010), at 644.
802 AB Report, US — Shrimp, paras 129–131.
803 Panel Report, US — Shrimp, para. 7.8.
804 AB Report, US — Shrimp, para 110.
805 But the panel still had the discretionary authority to reject them. AB Report, US — Shrimp, 
para 108.
806 Deborah Z. Cass, ‘The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-
generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’, 12(1) 
European Journal of International Law (2001), at 61. This interpretation is opposed by a 
large number of WTO members in a subsequent case and in practice the panel and the AB 
only address the amicus brief which is appended to a party’s submission. Arguably, this 
undermines the constitutional arguments provided by Cass. See Dunoff (2006), above n 
462, at 660.
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Specifically, during an anti-dumping investigation, the level of anti-
dumping duties is assessed based on the dumping margin, which refers to 
the gap between domestic and export prices. A positive dumping margin 
describes instances in which an export price exceeds a domestic price and a 
negative dumping margin those in which the latter exceed the former. Since 
a product under investigation usually consists of various sub-products, its 
overall dumping margin is estimated as the sum of the dumping margins of 
the various individual sub-products, which may include both positive and 
negative margins. The zeroing methodology, however, ignores the negative 
dumping margin, in effect inflating the overall dumping margin for the 
product under investigation.
Thus, in EC—Audio Cassettes, Japan complained that the zeroing practice 
of the European Communities was inconsistent with ‘fair comparison’ 
under Article 2 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code because it inflated 
dumping margins in this manner.807 This argument was rejected by the 
panel, which opined that Article 2 concerned only those circumstances in 
which domestic prices exceed export prices and that nothing in it prevented 
the European Communities from adopting its own zeroing practice.808 In 
other words, since Article 2 was silent on situations in which export prices 
exceed domestic prices, WTO members were free to exclude the negative 
dumping margin from anti-dumping investigations. Article 2 of the Tokyo 
Round Anti-Dumping Code now appears in Article 2 of the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (the ‘Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment’).
Based on Article 2, the AB in the EC-Bed Linen case made a surprising depar-
ture from the EC—Audio Cassettes decision by holding that, because the 
zeroing methodology would indeed generate unfair results, it was therefore 
inconsistent with ‘fair comparison’ under the article,809 which was exactly 
the position put forward by Japan and rejected by the panel in EC—Audio 
Cassettes. From a constitutional perspective, this hermeneutical shift reflects 
the AB’s concern regarding the negative effects of the increasingly common 
practice of zeroing on ‘the very telos of the WTO (free trade)’.810
In a series of subsequent cases, the AB held the zeroing methodology to 
be illegal in the context of, not only the original investigation, but also the 
administrative review process.811 In the US—Continued Zeroing case, the 
AB faced a challenge in interpreting Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping 
807 Panel Report, EC—Audio Cassettes, para 115.
808 Ibid., para 350.
809 AB Report, EC–Bed Linen, para 59.
810 Sungjoon Cho, ‘Global Constitutional Lawmaking’, 31(3) University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law (2014), at 23.
811 Ibid., at 13-18.
162 Part III: Final Analysis
Agreement, a provision that regulates situations in which the panel has 
found that the agreement ‘admits of more than one permissible interpre-
tation’. According to this article, WTO members can choose ‘one of those 
permissible interpretations’, a strict textual analysis of which was likely 
to support the position of the US that ‘dumping may be determined for 
individual export transactions’.812 In order to avoid validating the zeroing 
methodology, the AB therefore employed a teleological interpretation that 
prioritized the first sentence of Article 17.6(ii).813
This zeroing jurisprudence, however, was met with harsh criticism on the 
grounds that it represented judicial activism. The US, for instance, at one 
point described the invalidation of zeroing as ‘making up rules that the 
United States never negotiated’.814 Several attempts to reach a compromise 
between the jurisprudence and the opposition of the US also failed in the 
WTO.815 This being the case, when it comes to China’s export duties, even 
if the AB were to understand environmental protection to be the very telos 
of the WTO, it would still be extremely cautious in employing an approach 
similar to that employed in the zeroing jurisprudence.
Further, a more teleological approach in light of the environmental context 
of the Preamble to the WTO Agreement would also require the AB to depart 
explicitly from its prior decisions, which, again, it has never done. As an 
alternative, the following discussion accordingly seeks an interpretation 
that would enable the AB to depart implicitly from the China—Raw Materials 
and China—Rare Earths decisions.
7.4.2 A new interpretation that distinguishes the China—Raw Materials 
and China—Rare Earths decisions
While various new interpretations have been proposed to repeal the China—
Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions, the feasibility for the AB 
to amend these decisions by employing the option of distinguishing has 
not been addressed.816 In Indonesia—Import Licensing Regimes, the AB was 
requested to decide whether a panel should always follow the sequence of 
two-tiered analysis under Article XX. By distinguishing the normal situa-
tions and the ‘particular circumstances’ in which a panel might be able to 
analyse the elements under the applicable paragraphs that were relevant 
to assess the requirements of the chapeau without following the ‘normal 
sequence’, the AB narrowed the scope to apply the ‘normal sequence’ of 
812 Panel Report, US—Continued Zeroing, para 7.162.
813 Cho (2014), above n 748, at 21.
814 Communication from the United States, ‘Offsets for Non-Dumped Comparisons’, 2, TN/
RL/W/208, 5 June 2007.
815 Cho (2014), above n 748, at 23.
816 See Chapter 3.
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two-tiered analysis that was established by the AB itself in US—Gasoline. 
This example raises the question of whether the scope to apply the China—
Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions could be limited to the 
extent that provides China with policy space to protect the environment.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the EU, one of the complainants in all three cases 
against China’s export duties, once proposed a WTO agreement to restrict 
the use of export duties in the context of the Doha Development Agenda’s 
negotiations on non-agricultural market access,817 but that instance, it 
did not propose an absolute prohibition on export duties. Rather, the EU 
acknowledged their legitimate application in the context of ‘financial crises, 
infant industry, environment (preservation of natural resources), and local 
short supply’.818 In a broader context, then, when WTO members have 
sought to restrict the use of export duties through regional trade agree-
ments, contracting parties have often been provided with exceptions under 
which their use is permitted.819 By addressing the environmental issues 
associated with what China views as an extreme stance against its export 
duties, the AB could draw a clear line between protectionist export duties 
and those adopted for an environmental purpose.
In terms of its scope, Paragraph 11.3 regulates ‘all taxes and charges applied 
to exports’ except fees that are strictly related to the approximate costs of 
services rendered under GATT Article VIII. This broad notion is further 
defined in Paragraph 155 of China’s Accession Working Party Report as 
‘taxes and charges applied exclusively to exports’. The term ‘exclusively’ 
here seems to suggest that Paragraph 11.3 excludes situations in which taxes 
and charges are not applied exclusively to exports. Such situations could, 
however, be regulated under Paragraph 170 of China’s Accession Working 
Party Report, which states that ‘China would ensure that its laws and regu-
lations relating to all fees, charges or taxes levied on imports and exports 
would be in full conformity with its WTO obligations’ under a section titled 
‘Taxes and Charges Levied on Imports and Exports’.
As the AB held in China-Raw Materials, Paragraph 170 is concerned with 
internal taxes that affect imports and exports, such as value-added taxes, 
which differ from the export duty commitments under Paragraph 155. 
Following this interpretation, China’s commitments regarding taxes levied 
on exports can be classified into one or the other of two groups. The first 
includes taxes applied exclusively to exports, which are regulated by Para-
817 ICTSD, ‘WTO Legal Status and Evolving Practice of Export Taxes’, available at http://
www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-legal-status-and-evolving-practice-
of-export-taxes, (visited 18 June 2017).
818 The European Communities, Revised Submission on Export Taxes, TN/MA/W/101, 17 
January 2008, para 4(1).
819 Korinek and Bartos (2012), above n 267.
164 Part III: Final Analysis
graph 11.3 and, according to the AB’s rulings in China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths, cannot be justified under GATT Article XX. The second 
group includes taxes that do not apply exclusively to exports, which are 
regulated by Paragraph 170, a provision concerned with internal taxes.
This distinction provides grounds for a new interpretation that departs 
implicitly from the prior decisions over China’s export duties. The reason is 
that, since Paragraph 170 refers explicitly to Article III:2 of the GATT, which 
requires that internal taxes treat imported and domestic products equally, it 
can be argued that this national treatment requirement also applies to taxes 
on exported and domestically-consumed products.
A violation of this extended requirement under Article III:2, however, could 
be justified under GATT Article XX. This distinction between export duties 
and internal taxes that affect exports is further supported by a report by 
the Havana Conference indicating that one of the criteria for making this 
distinction is whether ‘they apply exclusively to imported products without 
being related in any way to similar charges collected internally on like 
domestic products’,820 language similar to that of Paragraph 155.
This distinction is important for providing China with policy space to use 
export duties for an environmental purpose. For from an economic perspec-
tive, export duties may encourage domestic sales, and this is ‘an undesir-
able consequence for a policy designed to further environmental goals’.821 
In this context, taxes applied exclusively to exports, as absolutely prohibited 
by Paragraph 11.3, are by nature not likely to be helpful in the pursuit of an 
environmental goal, which is more likely to be achieved when export duties 
are adopted in conjunction with corresponding restrictions on domestic 
consumption. This being the case, it may be wondered whether an export 
duty as defined in Paragraph 11.3 that had been adopted in conjunction 
with an internal tax, such as a consumption tax, would thereby constitute 
an internal tax under Paragraph 170.
A textual analysis of Paragraphs 155 and 170 suggests that export duties 
and internal taxes are closely related. The former, which regulate the use of 
export duties, fall under a section titled ‘Customs Tariffs, Fees and Charges 
for Services Rendered, Application of Internal Taxes to Exports’ (emphasis 
added). By contrast, Paragraph 170, which regulates the use of internal taxes 
affecting exports, falls under a section titled ‘Taxes and Charges Levied 
on Imports and Exports’. The correlation between the titles of these two 
sections suggests that export duties may indeed be understood to constitute 
internal taxes that affect exports, at least under certain circumstances.
820 Havana Report, para 42.
821 Panel Reports, China- Rare Earths, para 7.169.
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This interpretation is admittedly inconsistent with the traditional definition 
of internal taxes in the context of WTO jurisprudence. There are two deci-
sive criteria for distinguishing import duties from internal taxes according 
to the AB’s holding in the China—Auto Parts case. First, for a charge on a 
product to constitute an ordinary customs duty, the obligation to pay 
it must accrue the moment the product enters a particular customs terri-
tory (rather than when it is sold in a particular market).822 Second, for a 
charge on a product to constitute an internal tax under GATT Article III:2, 
the obligation to pay must accrue owing to an internal factor (e.g., because 
the product was re-sold or used domestically).823 Following these criteria, 
export duties do not constitute internal taxes, regardless of the existence of 
corresponding charges on domestic consumption, because the obligation to 
pay them accrues at the moment of export and because the motivation for 
the obligation is to enable the products at issue to leave a particular territory 
rather than to be sold within it.
This traditional definition of internal taxes, however, may ignore the 
distinction between those that affect imports and those that affect exports. 
To achieve a protectionist purpose with regard to imports, a country must 
impose higher charges on imported products than it does on like domestic 
products. Thus, for instance, as mentioned in Chapter 4, a Korean tax 
on imported distilled alcoholic beverages that exceeded the tax on the 
traditional national drink, soju, was found to be inconsistent with GATT 
Article III:2.824 In contrast, a country that seeks to achieve a protectionist 
purpose with regard to exports must impose higher charges on exported 
industrial inputs than on domestically-consumed industrial inputs if it is 
to be successful. This protectionist purpose, however, cannot be achieved 
by means of internal taxes in the traditional sense because such taxes in 
practice fail to distinguish between products that are exported and those 
that are consumed domestically.
In this context, it would be pointless for China, by reading Paragraph 170 
together with GATT Article III:2, to agree not to impose internal taxes that 
treat exported and domestically-consumed products differently. As the 
AB held in Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the aim of Article III:2 is to ‘avoid 
protectionism in the application of internal tax’.825 In order to make China’s 
commitment under Paragraph 170 more meaningful, this provision could 
be used to regulate instances of protectionism in which export duties 
are adopted in conjunction with similar but lower charges on domestic 
822 AB Report, China—Auto Parts, para 158.
823 Ibid., paras 162-163.
824 AB Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, 
adopted 17 February 1999, DSR 1999:I.
825 AB Report, Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II, at 16.
166 Part III: Final Analysis
consumption, in contrast with situations in which charges are ‘applied exclu-
sively to exports’ (emphasis added) as regulated by Paragraph 155.
Following this interpretation, if China’s export duties were adopted in 
isolation, they would be regulated by Paragraphs 155 and 11.3, a situation 
that could not be justified under GATT Article XX. Such an interpreta-
tion would not constrain China’s policy space to protect the environment 
because the environmental purpose of the export duties would have to be 
achieved by imposing corresponding charges on domestic consumption, as 
described in Paragraph 170 and Article III:2, provisions requiring China to 
impose charges on exported and domestically-consumed products in a non-
discriminatory manner. If China’s intent were to impose higher charges (by 
way of export duties) on exported than on domestically-consumed products 
in the pursuit of an environmental goal, Article XX could be invoked to 
determine whether such discrimination would be justified.
This interpretation is of importance in combatting carbon leakage, a 
problem caused by discrepancies in the climate policies that have been 
adopted in various countries. In order to equalize the prices of energy-
intensive products from China with those from countries that have adopted 
stricter climate measures, duties could be applied to exports of Chinese 
products. Since many of the energy-intensive products are final products, 
an increase in prices on the former would not provide support for Chinese 
industry, such support having been a major concern of the complaining 
governments in the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths cases. 
Admittedly, the imposition of export duties on energy-intensive raw 
materials, even in conjunction with similar charges on domestic consump-
tion, could still provide Chinese industry with preferential access to these 
resources. Such discrimination could, however, be addressed by Article 
XX, which provides fairly strict tests for protectionist measures, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
Aside from preserving China’s policy space for combatting climate change, 
this new interpretation could also forestall future disputes regarding its 
export duties. For the fact is that, following the China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths decisions, China has nevertheless continued to impose 
export duties on certain products, behaviour that has led the EU and US 
to bring a third case, namely China—Raw Materials II, before the WTO. 
To some extent, China’s persistence in this regard has been provoked by 
the extreme stance of the complaining governments and the contested 
outcomes of the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions. In 
this context, should the AB continue to support the complaining govern-
ments, China would still not be persuaded to abandon its export duties 
completely. Alternatively, the AB could send a clear message regarding the 
proper use of export duties—that is, in a less protectionist manner. China 
would then need to counterbalance export duties with similar charges on 
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domestic consumption in order to be compliance with Article XX, a provi-
sion that would make it difficult for the country to evade its export duty 
commitments, especially since it currently imposes consumption taxes on 
only 14 products apart from those at issue in China—Raw Materials II.826
In short, the analysis presented in this section shows that the AB is unlikely 
to accept a teleological approach informed by the environmental context 
in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement. It is instead more likely to accept 
an interpretation that draws a line between export duties of the sort at 
issue in the two previous cases, which exclusively restrict the exports, and 
‘export duties plus’ that are adopted in combination with supplementary 
restrictions on domestic consumption. Following this line of reasoning, the 
AB would not need to depart from its prior decisions explicitly in order 
to accommodate both the trade values articulated in Paragraph 11.3 and 
the environmental values articulated in the Preamble to the WTO Agree-
ment. Moreover, as in the case of the Keck proviso, this option would also 
provide guidance regarding a proper, which is to say less protectionist, way 
to impose export duties. Although this interpretation would still require the 
AB to go beyond its preferred strict textual approach, it represents the best 
among a number of unappealing paths by which the AB could surmount 
the difficulties created by the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths 
decisions. Alternatively, the AB could also distinguish export duties from 
those enacted for the purpose of combatting climate change, a move that 
would certainly provide China with the requisite policy space. Such a move 
would also, however, send the unwelcome message that China cannot use 
export duties to address domestic concerns until those concerns threaten the 
rest of the world. This distinction is, therefore, less desirable than the one 
between regular export duties and ‘export duties plus’.
It is noteworthy that the options of distinguishing or overruling only 
constitute the judicial way to alter the ban on China’s export duties. This 
outcome could also be achieved by political intervention. This approach 
has a broader scope of application than the judicial way because it could 
prevent not only the wrong outcomes caused by a bad precedent but also 
those caused by bad law. To solve the problem in the latter situation is 
usually beyond the power of a tribunal which thus tends to not rule against 
the text of law in order to avoid the charge of judicial law-making.827 The 
next two sections explore the feasibility for a political solution.
826 Regulation on Consumption Taxes, the State Council, No.539.
827 One of the exceptional cases is the Les Verts in which the Court read into Article 173 EEC 
(the current Article 263 TFEU) a right to bring a case for annulment against binding acts 
of the European Parliament though the treaty text only refers to acts of the Council and 
the Commission. By contrast, the ECJ explicitly refused to de facto alter the text of 263 
TFEU in the Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council (UPA). Case 294/83 ‘Les Verts’ v 
European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339.
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7.5 Possible options to alter the absolute ban on China’s export 
duties through a political correction
The WTO Agreement gives great power to the decision-making body, 
which consists of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. 
The former, as the organization’s most authoritative body, has the power 
to settle all matters involving any of the multilateral trade agreements;828 
since it normally meets only every other year, however, day-to-day business 
is conducted by the latter.829 As mentioned, various solutions have been 
proposed in which China would request that the decision-making body 
adopt an amendment, a waiver, or an authoritative interpretation reversing 
the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions. The theoretical 
possibilities of these solutions are examined in this section.
First, it is theoretically possible to change the outcome of the China—Raw 
Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions through an amendment of 
China’s accession protocol by, for instance, incorporating GATT Article 
XX into Paragraph 11.3.830 One may worry that there is no legal basis in 
the WTO Agreement for amending an accession protocol because neither 
Article XII, a provision dealing with accessions, nor Article X, a provision 
dealing with amendments, specifies the procedure to amend the terms 
agreed in a protocol.831 It is noteworthy, however, Paragraph 1.2 in China’s 
accession protocol clearly states that this protocol ‘shall be an integral part of 
the WTO Agreement’.832 Although there has been a considerable academic 
debate as to whether a protocol of accession can self-declare itself to be part 
of another agreement, i.e., the WTO Agreement,833 such an objection has 
never been raised in practice. The disputes regarding China’s accession 
protocol have been actually proceeded on the assumption that this protocol 
is part of the WTO Agreement based on the integration clause of Paragraph 
828 Article IV:1 of the WTO Agreement. Two plurilatural agreements set out in Annex 4 to 
the WTO Agreement are subject to different rules according to Article IV:8 of the WTO 
Agreement.
829 WTO Secretariat, ‘The WTO General Council’, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm, (visited 18 June 2017).
830 Liu (2014), above n 149.
831 This may explain why some authors did not even discuss the possibility of amending 
China’ accession protocol while proposing a change of that protocol. They instead advo-
cated the negotiation of a new plurilateral agreement. See Petros C. Mavroidis and André 
Sapir, ‘China and the World Trade Organisation: Towards a Better Fit’, Bruegel Working 
Paper Issue 6, 11 June 2019, https://bruegel.org/2019/06/china-and-the-world-trade-
organisation-towards-a-better-fi t/, (visited 10 September 2019).
832 Paragraph 1.2 of China’s Protocol of Accession.
833 For a recent overview, see Dylan Geraets, ‘Accession to the World Trade Organization:  A Legal
Analysis’, (Edward Elgar, 2018).
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1.2.834 These facts seem to suggest that China’s export duty commitments 
could be amended following the general procedural rules under Article X of 
the WTO Agreement.
Under these ordinary rules, ‘any Member’ may submit a proposal for an 
amendment to the Ministerial Conference, which then has 90 days to try to 
reach a consensus on it.835 If no consensus is forthcoming, the Conference 
may decide, by a two-thirds majority vote, to submit the proposal to the 
WTO membership for acceptance. While an amendment takes effect once 
two-thirds of members have ratified it,836 it is not binding on those that have 
not. The amendment process is thus complex and likely time-consuming.837 
To simplify this process, an alternative procedure has been suggested 
that consider China’s accession protocol as a bilateral treaty between the 
acceding country and the WTO as an organisation.838 A mutual consent of 
China and of the WTO is thus needed to amend China’s accession protocol. 
The consent of the latter one generally takes decisions by consensus or, 
failing that, by simple majority.839 Compared with the aforementioned 
ordinary procedure, this alternative option certainly looks more efficient 
because it does not require further acceptance by WTO members. On the 
other hand, it also allows the membership to take a decision with the least 
formality and a simple majority that possibly counts China. An obvious 
disadvantage of this alternative, however, is that the WTO membership at 
large may not accept this unusual legal construct.
Second, it is also theoretically possible to have a political correction through 
a waiver under Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement. This may provide 
China with a legal defence to a claim for breach of its export duty commit-
ments. The panel in EC—Bananas III, for instance, held that, although the 
tariff preferences at issue in the case were inconsistent with GATT Article 
I:1, the EU could use the Lomé Waiver as a defence to a claim that Article I:1 
834 AB Report, China – Rare Earths, para 5.19, footnote 422. ‘We note that this proposition 
has not been contested either in the present disputes or in any prior dispute involving 
China’s Accession Protocol. In addition, we take note of the Panel’s statement that, in 
all prior cases involving China’s Accession Protocol, panels and the Appellate Body 
“have proceeded on the assumption” that Paragraph 1.2 serves, inter alia, the function of 
making the obligations in China’s Accession Protocol enforceable under the DSU’.
835 The Ministerial Conference must receive a proposal for an amendment by a Member or 
one of the three specialized Councils.
836 Article X:7 of the WTO Agreement.
837 It took almost 12 years after the proposal was adopted for the fi rst amendment of a WTO 
agreement, TRIPS, to enter into force. For further information, see Section 7.6.
838 Julia Ya Qin, ‘The Challenge of Interpreting ‘WTO-PLUS’ Provisions’, 44 (1) Journal of 
World Trade (2010), at 134.
839 Article IX.1 of the WTO Agreement.
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had been violated.840 By analogy, China could request a waiver permitting it 
to impose export duties for environmental purposes.
In seeking a waiver of its export duty commitments, China must first 
request that the Council for Trade in Goods841 consider its specific policy 
objectives and its reasons for being unable to achieve them within the 
context of the commitments.842 As Mongolia’s request for a waiver of its 
export duty commitments regarding raw cashmere made clear,843 the envi-
ronmental purpose of preventing ‘extensive environmental damages and 
desertification’ constitutes legitimate justification for a member’s deviation 
from its export duty commitments.844 Thus, the purposes of China’s export 
duties such as fighting climate change are also likely to be recognized as 
legitimate justification for China to deviate from its export duty commit-
ments. In the next step in the process, the Council for Trade in Goods must, 
within a period not exceeding 90 days, submit a report to the Ministerial 
Conference or General Council.845 The support of three-fourths of WTO 
members is required for approval.846 Although a consensus is preferred 
as a statement about decision-making procedures by the Chairman of the 
General Council under Article IX of the WTO Agreement reveals,847 the 
same statement also makes clear that the preference to a consensus ‘does not 
preclude a Member from requesting a vote’.848 China thus could demand a 
840 Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX, and WT/
DS27/R/USA, paras 7.131 – 7.134.
841 Requests for waivers concerning the multilateral trade agreements in Annexes 1A, 1B 
and 1C must initially be submitted to the relevant sectoral Council.
842 Paragraph 3 of the Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
843 Communication from Mongolia, ‘Request for a Waiver, G/C/W/571 and G/C/W/580, 
26 January 2007.
844 Ibid. G/C/W/571, at 3. Footnote 3 ‘Goat heads 2002 accounted to 9,134 thousand.  By 
2005, they grew to 13,267 thousand, or by 1.5 times those in 2002.  This rapid increase in 
the number of goat heads caused devaluation in the quality of cashmere’.
845 Article IX:3(a) of the WTO Agreement.
846 Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement. But waivers for extensions of transition periods or 
periods of staged implementation require consensus as required by footnote 4 of the 
WTO Agreement.
847 Statement by the Chairman as Agreed by the General Council on 15 November 1995, 
Decision Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement, 
WT/L/93, 24 November 1995.
848 James Harrison, ‘Legal and Political Oversight of WTO Waivers’, 11(2) Journal of Interna-
tional Economic Law (2008), at 413
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vote in the absence of a consensus. This move, however, would require the 
WTO members to break the general taboo against formal voting.849
Third, an authoritative interpretation may also alter the absolute ban on 
China’s export duties. However, compared with an amendment or waiver, 
this option involves more uncertainties due to its limited legal effects. 
Although Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement accords to the Ministerial 
Conference and General Council the ‘exclusive authority to adopt inter-
pretations’ of WTO agreements, the final sentence of Article IX:2 requires 
that that an authoritative interpretation ‘shall not be used in a manner 
that would undermine the amendment provisions of Article X’. Thus, if a 
modification of the WTO ban on China’s export duties is considered to fall 
exclusively within the scope of an amendment, the option of an authorita-
tive interpretation will be unavailable for China.
Moreover, only one request has yet been made for an authoritative interpre-
tation. The very infrequency appears to suggest that authoritative interpre-
tations are not desirable in practice.850 One possible reason is to avoid the 
discussion of the demarcation line with amendments. One may thus argue 
that the role of authoritative interpretations in practice has been taken over 
by those Ministerial Decisions or Declarations under Article IV:1 (Ministe-
rial Conference) that constitute subsequent agreements on the interpretation 
of a provision of a WTO agreement within the meaning of VCLT Article 
31(3)(a). In this sense, China may request the Ministerial Conference to take 
a decision updating its accession protocol regarding the use of export duties 
to protect the environment as a ‘fudge’.851 The feasibility of these political 
corrections is discussed below.
849 An illustrative example in this regard is a 2009 call by the Egyptian ambassador for a vote 
to recognize Palestine as an observer; while many members supported the ambassador’s 
effort in political terms, they valued more highly continued adherence to the general ban 
on voting. The Egyptian ambassador was thus persuaded to drop the matter. See Craig 
Van Grasstek, ‘The History and Future of the World Trade Organization’, WTO Publica-
tions (2013), at 219.
850 Other factors to explain the non-use of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement see Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, ‘The Authoritative Interpretation Under Article 
IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, Practice 
and Possible Improvements’, 8(4) Journal of International Economic Law (2005), at 818.
851 For general discussion of the decision-making in the WTO, see Pieter Jan Kuijper, ‘WTO 
Institutional Aspects’, in Daniel Bethlehem, Isabelle Van Damme, Donald McRae, and 
Rodney Neufeld (eds.), ‘The Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law’ (Oxford, 2009). 
Mary Footer, ‘Principal rule-making’, in ‘An Institutional and Normative Analysis of the 
World Trade Organization’ (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).
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7.6 Feasibility tests for amendments, waivers, authoritative 
interpretations, or Ministerial Decisions
The previous section illustrates the challenges of various political correc-
tions. This section assesses the feasibility for China to overcome these 
challenges in light of WTO practice regarding the adoption of amendments, 
waivers, authoritative interpretations, and Ministerial Decisions.
7.6.1 Article X:1: an amendment as a formal correction
7.6.1.1 Amendments in practice
On 23 January 2017, the WTO announced an amendment to its Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, the 
first to a core WTO agreement since the organization’s establishment in 
1995.852 This amendment was based on a protocol unanimously adopted by 
WTO members in 2005, the aim of which was to improve the access of less-
affluent member states to affordable generic medicines produced in other 
countries by creating a system of compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical 
products produced solely for export.853
Under the TRIPS Agreement, WTO members can issue compulsory licences 
that permit companies to make a patented product or to use a patented 
process under licence without the consent of the patent owner when the 
reason for doing so is to protect public health. This flexibility, however, 
extends only to the domestic market in the country in which the drugs are 
produced, leaving countries without the capacity to produce generic drugs 
unable procure them at affordable prices. In order to address this issue, 
WTO members in 2003 decided to waive the restriction that limited these 
compulsory licences to local markets.854 Since the waivers were designed to 
function as temporary instruments under the WTO Agreement, the amend-
ment to the TRIPS Agreement in effect created a permanent legal basis for 
dealing with issues concerning compulsory licences.
However, the permanent legal effect of the amendment comes with a price, 
in that, compared with the adoption of a waiver, amendment procedures 
852 WTO Secretariat, ‘WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease Poor Countries’ Access to Affordable 
Medicines’, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/trip_23jan17_e.htm, 
(visited 18 June 2017). The Protocol (2001) Amending the Annex to the Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft amended a plurilateral agreement.
853 The Protocol is attached to the General Council Decision on Amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement, WT/L/641, adopted on 6 December 2005. The TRIPS Amendment itself is 
annexed to the Protocol.
854 General Council Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1, adopted on 30 August 
2003,
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are more cumbersome. For unlike waivers, amendments take legal effect 
only if at least two thirds of WTO members have deposited formal instru-
ments of acceptance with the Director-General, a process that can result 
in considerable delays;855 thus it took almost 12 years for the amendment 
to the TRIPS Agreement to enter into force. This problem could be solved, 
though, if WTO members were willing to take the necessary steps. A good 
parallel is the process for accepting the Protocol of Amendment to insert the 
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, 
which the General Council completed on 27 November 2014, marking the 
first multilateral deal in the WTO’s 21-year history; in this case, two years 
elapsed before the amendment received the necessary two-thirds accep-
tance (specifically by 110 of the 164 WTO members).856
Another disadvantage of amendments is that, even after one enters into 
force, WTO members that have not accepted it retain their rights under 
the agreements as originally drafted. The result is a two-tier system that 
undermines the effectiveness of an amendment by making it depend 
largely on the consent of a few key members. Thus, for example, a protocol 
amending Part I of the GATT 1947 was abandoned after 10 years because 
one contracting party was unable to obtain parliamentary approval.857 
Moreover, even if all members were eventually to accept the amendment 
for incorporating the new agreement, a two-tier system would still exist, 
at least temporarily, because the length of time required for the domestic 
ratification process varies considerably among WTO members. For these 
reasons, an amendment would not serve to address an urgent issue in 
practice.
7.6.1.2 Feasibility to amending China’s export duty commitments
The above practice of amendments shows that to amend China’s export 
duty commitments is not an ideal option if China needs these duties to 
address urgent environmental issues. Alternatively, it has been argued that 
China’s accession protocol could be seen as a bilateral treaty between China 
and the WTO.858
In this scenario, Article IX (Decision-Making) or Article XII (Accession) 
should apply. Either way, once the WTO as a contracting party agrees to 
amend China’s export duty commitments, no such further formal accep-
tance as ratification by individual WTO members would be required. This 
855 Article X:7 of the WTO Agreement.
856 WTO Secretariat, ‘WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement enters into force’, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_31jan17_e.htm (visited on 10 
June).
857 BISD 15S/65.
858 Qin (2010), above n 838, at 134.
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would allow the membership to take a decision with the least formality and 
thus increase efficiency. More importantly, if a consensus is not achieved, 
a majority of the votes cast under Article IX or a two-thirds majority for 
approval under Article XII would be sufficient to amend China’s export 
duty commitments. Such a decision would be binding on all WTO 
members.859 The challenge is, however, that WTO members may prefer not 
to break the general taboo against formal voting. Moreover, this alternative 
reading of the existing relationship between China’s accession protocol and 
the WTO Agreement also comes with a considerable degree of uncertainty 
because neither Article X (Amendments) nor Article XII specifies the proce-
dure for amendments to an accession protocol.860
A much more conventional view would perhaps treat China’s accession 
protocol as part of the WTO Agreement. Article X thus should apply. As 
discussed in the previous section, the effectiveness of any amendment 
designed to create a desirable policy space for China under this provision 
would be undermined if China could not get the support from all WTO 
members. The reason is that an amendment only takes effect on those that 
have ratified it. Thus, China would be unable to invoke Article XX to justify 
its export duties during any litigation with the members that are unwilling 
to ratify it.
As revealed in the China—Raw Materials, China—Rare Earths, and China—
Raw Materials II cases, the extreme stance of the complaining governments 
in denying China’s right to use export duties under Article XX shows that 
these members are accordingly unlikely to support an amendment that 
contradicts their claims in the three cases. Moreover, several third parties 
that had supported the claims of the complainants in the earlier cases would 
be similarly unlikely to agree to any such amendment. Since the unfriendly 
members number among China’s major export destinations,861 the effective-
ness of an amendment option would be greatly undermined.
The issue concerning the effectiveness of the amendment could alternatively 
be addressed through a waiver releasing WTO members from certain legal 
obligations under the WTO agreements.862 In the aforementioned case of the 
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, members that have not accepted the 
amendment can refer to the 2003 waiver decision regarding access to afford-
859 Ibid.
860 Qin thus proposed to add a special procedure to Article X. See Julia Ya Qin, ‘The Conun-
drum of WTO Accession Protocols: In Search of Legality and Legitimacy’, 55(2), Virginia 
Journal of International Law (2015).
861 In 2015, the top export destinations of China are the United States ($457B), Hong Kong 
($273B), Japan ($152B), Germany ($97.4B) and South Korea ($90.1B).
862 ACWL, ‘Giving Legal Effect to the Results of the Doha Round: An Analysis of the 
Methods of Changing WTO Law’, Background Paper for ACWL Members and LDCs 
(2006), at 9.
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able medicines from a third country. The following discussion explores the 
feasibility of a waiver as a stopgap measure that would allow China to use 
export duties under certain circumstances.
7.6.2 Article IX:3: a waiver as a stopgap measure
7.6.2.1 Waivers in practice
WTO members rely more heavily on waivers than amendments as a means 
to deviate from agreed-upon trade disciplines. Thus, while only two amend-
ments have been approved since the organization’s establishment in 1995,863 
in 2017 alone the General Council granted eight waivers.864 An individual 
WTO member may request suspension of its obligations in this way for two 
main reasons.865 One is to address capacity problems in complying with 
WTO commitments, examples being waivers that extended transitional 
periods for implementing obligations under the Customs Valuation Agree-
ment, the Individual Harmonized System waiver decisions, and the waivers 
of Cuba’s obligation under GATT Article XV:6, which article required any 
contracting party that ceased to be a member of the International Monetary 
Fund to enter into a special exchange agreement with the WTO.866
The second major reason that an individual WTO member might seek to 
be released from its obligations is in order to accommodate policy conflicts, 
that is, to retain a WTO-inconsistent measure in the furtherance of specific 
policy objectives. Rather than addressing the incapacity of a WTO member, 
this type of waiver relieves a member of an obligation that has impeded 
the achievement of certain objectives, examples being waivers that permit 
trade-related investment measures, that render compliance with specific 
commitments unnecessary, and that allow for protectionist measures, 
residual quantitative restrictions, tariff surcharges, and market integration. 
Relevant in the context of China’s export duties is Mongolia’s request in 
2007 for a five-year waiver of its export duty commitments regarding raw 
cashmere.867 For Mongolia, export duties could contribute to improve the 
863 Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 changes to WTO schedules of tariff conces-
sions; Introduction of Harmonized System 2007 changes to WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions; Introduction of Harmonized System 2012 changes into WTO schedules of 
tariff concessions; Introduction of Harmonized System 2017 changes to WTO schedules 
of tariff concessions; Former Trust Territory of the Pacifi c Islands; Trade Preferences 
granted to Nepal; Application of autonomous preferential treatment to the Western 
Balkans; Article XV:6 – Extension of waiver.
864 WTO Secretariat, The WTO 2018 Annual Report, 31 May 2018.
865 Isabel Feichtner, ‘The Law and Politics of WTO Waivers: Stability and Flexibility in Public 
International Law’, Law’ (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 52
866 Request for an extension of the waiver concerning Article XV:6 of the GATT 1994, 
WT/L/100, 12 December 2016.
867 Communication from Mongolia, ‘Request for a Waiver, G/C/W/571 and G/C/W/580, 
26 January 2007.
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competitiveness of local cashmere industry and to address ‘environmental 
concerns as the increase in exports of raw cashmere has encouraged the 
growth of goat herds that now surpass the sustainability of the country’s 
pasture lands’.868 In the same year, the Council for Trade in Goods approved 
Mongolia’s request.
Waivers can be adopted for the benefit of groups of members as well, in 
which case they are referred to as ‘collective waivers’.869 WTO members 
have generally adopted such waivers in the pursuit of three major objec-
tives. One is to defer compliance with WTO obligation, a good example 
being the 2002 suspension of the obligations of least developed country 
members with respect to pharmaceutical products under Article 70.9 of 
the TRIPS Agreement until 1 January 2016.870 The waiver of this obligation 
was part of a package of measures intended to mitigate the obligations that 
the TRIPS Agreement impose on developing countries and that affect their 
capacity to ensure affordable health care for their populations.
The second major objective of collective waivers is exemplified by the 
above-mentioned 2003 TRIPS waiver, which modified existing WTO rules. 
Unlike the 2002 TRIPS waiver decision just discussed, the 2003 TRIPS 
waiver released any least developed country member and any other WTO 
member that had notified the TRIPS Council from the requirements that 
normally restrict the use of compulsory licensing with respect to phar-
maceutical products. Another example of this type of waiver is the GATT 
practice of permitting preferential tariff treatment in accordance with the 
General System of Preferences as agreed upon in UNCTAD as well as pref-
erential trade arrangements among developing countries, which were later 
replaced by the Enabling Clause and now form a permanent part of the 
GATT 1994.871
A third major objective in adopting waivers is to coordinate WTO rules with 
other international legal regimes. Thus, for instance, the collective Harmo-
nized System (HS) waivers mentioned above have been adopted in order to 
suspend GATT Article II for WTO members that have implemented changes 
to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System in their 
domestic tariffs but require additional time to adapt their GATT schedules 
868 WTO Secretariat, ‘Goods Council approves waivers for Mongolia, US’, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/good_counc_9july07_e.htm (visited 
on 10 June 2018).
869 Isabel Feichtner, ‘The Law and Politics of WTO Waivers: Stability and Flexibility in Public 
International Law’, Law’ (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 124.
870 Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement: to grant exclusive marketing rights to pharmaceu-
tical products.
871 Generalized System of Preferences, Decision of 25 June 1971, L/3545, 28 June 1971. Trade 
Negotiations Among Developing Countries, Decision of 26 November 1971, L/3636, 30 
November 1971.
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of concessions accordingly.872 More specifically, most WTO members cannot 
completely adapt these schedules to HS changes before those changes are 
able to take effect on account of the administrative complexity involved 
and the need for tariff renegotiations.873 An HS collective waiver can, then, 
legalize the domestic implementation of HS changes before those changes 
have been made to the schedules of concessions; otherwise, the changes 
could be inconsistent with the prohibition under GATT Article II of a change 
in a domestic tariff that negatively impacts tariff reduction commitments.
Instructive here as well is the collective waiver legalizing trade measures 
that were mandated under the 2002 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
for Rough Diamonds, the aim of which was to suppress trade in so-called 
conflict or blood diamonds. The measure at issue, under which participants 
in the scheme could neither import rough diamonds from nor export them 
to non-participants, had the potential to violate several WTO obligations, 
including the obligation to grant most-favoured-nation treatment under 
GATT Article I:1, the prohibition on quantitative restrictions under Article 
XI:1, and the requirement that quantitative restrictions be non-discrimina-
tory under Article XIII:1. To avoid the norm conflict, a waiver was granted 
by the General Council on 15 May 2003 that suspended Articles I:1, XI:1, 
and XIII:1 retroactively from the date on which the scheme was launched 
until 31 December 2006. 874
Waivers have one major disadvantage that amendments do not, namely that 
they are granted only on a time-bound basis and can be modified or termi-
nated by a simple majority of WTO members during annual reviews. For 
this reason, WTO members seeking a permanent and definitive reduction 
of their obligations cannot rely on waivers alone. It is noteworthy, however, 
that the 2003 TRIPS waiver decision did not specify a termination date as 
required by Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement but rather stated that the 
waiver would terminate for each member when the amendment replacing 
the decision took effect. This practice speaks to the role of waivers as an 
interim instrument in the pursuit of a permanent suspension of obligations 
through the adoption of an amendment, which shed light on how to perma-
nently allow China to use export duties for environmental purposes under 
WTO law.
872 Up to the end of 2010, twenty-six collective Harmonized System waivers (including 
extension decisions) have been adopted by the WTO General Council. Collective 
waivers see the Secretariat, Committee on Market Access, Situation of Schedules of WTO 
Members, G/MA/W/23/Rev. 6, 19 March 2009.
873 Isabel Feichtner, ‘The Law and Politics of WTO Waivers: Stability and Flexibility in Public 
International Law’, Law’ (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 149.
874 General Council, Decision of 15 May 2003, WT/L/518, 27 May 2003. The waiver deci-
sion was extended until 31 December 2012 by a second decision of 15 December 2006. 
General Council, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certifi cation Scheme for Rough 
Diamonds, Decision of 15 December 2006, WT/L/676, 19 December 2006.
178 Part III: Final Analysis
7.6.2.2 Feasibility to waive China’s export duty commitments
The above practice of waivers shows that this instrument could be a feasible 
option for China to address urgent environmental issues. Moreover, since a 
waiver is a more temporary exception than an amendment, the consensus 
requirement, as discussed in the previous section, may be met more easily 
than is the case with the approval of an amendment for reasons as follows.
Articles IX:3 and IX:4 of the WTO Agreement stipulate that a waiver should 
be granted in exceptional circumstances and that any such decision should 
specify the conditions to which it applies and the date on which it is to 
expire. WTO members could, then, in order to prevent China from misusing 
Article XX for an industrial purpose, set conditions stricter than the article 
itself by permitting export duties to be imposed only in conjunction with 
identical or at least similar restrictions on domestic consumption. In this 
way, China’s domestic industry is less likely to receive preferable access to 
raw materials, an outcome that has been a major concern in regard to the 
three cases challenging its export duties.
More importantly, any waiver granted for a period of more than a year 
is, as alluded to earlier, subject to annual review, in the context of which 
WTO members have the opportunity to determine whether the exceptional 
circumstances justifying it persist. Thus, if a simple majority of members 
were to conclude that an absolute prohibition on export duties has not 
been or is no longer a cause of environmental concern in China, any 
relevant waiver could be modified or allowed to expire.875 These proce-
dures regarding the approval and monitoring of waivers may help China 
to convince other members to allow the use of export duties in exceptional 
circumstances, such as for the purpose of tackling carbon leakage.
Alternatively, China could offer a political package deal in which export 
duties and other, unrelated items are combined in a manner sufficiently 
attractive to members who have opposed its imposition of the duties. In this 
context, the waiver at issue could function as an enforcement mechanism 
to ensure China’s compliance with the other commitments included in the 
package deal. Thus, for instance, China has recently been considering a 
new export control law designed to protect ‘important strategic resources’ 
by placing ‘sensitive products’ on the Export Control List. In so doing, 
China has raised concerns that it may restrict exports of essential industrial 
inputs by invoking GATT security exceptions. In order to prevent such an 
outcome, WTO members could in exchange permit China to use export 
duties for environmental purposes in the form of a waiver. In this way, 
China’s dropping of its plans to restrict the exports of raw materials for 
875 Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement.
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security reasons would represent, not a formal precondition for the granting 
of the waiver, but rather a form of political engagement with China based 
on its need to secure the votes of the other WTO members. To be sure, this 
particular exchange as just described would not likely be of insufficient 
interest to China, which would want to see other elements as part of the 
package deal, the nature of which is beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion.
As a further alternative means to obtain recognition of its right the use 
export duties to combat climate change, China could request a collective 
waiver allowing for the adoption of WTO-inconsistent measures with refer-
ence to the exceptional circumstances created by climate change.876 One the 
one hand, an import border tax adjustment on carbon-intensive products, 
for instance, especially those varying in terms of the carbon intensity of their 
production, could violate GATT Article I (regarding most favoured nation), 
Article II (non-tariff duties or charges), or Article III (national treatment).877 
On the other hand, an export rebate that returns any carbon taxes paid in 
connection with domestic production could render it an export subsidy, 
something prohibited under the SCM Agreement. The export rebates, 
unlike import BTAs, if found to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, 
may not be justified under Article XX, which pertains to violations of the 
SCM prohibitions on export subsidies. In exchange for China’s agreement 
to waive those obligations, though, WTO members could allow it to use the 
prohibited export duties as a climate policy instrument.
7.6.3 Article IX:2: an authoritative interpretation as a flexible correction
An authoritative interpretation, which was not part of the GATT 1947, 
would appear to be a necessary instrument amid the checks and balances of 
judicial interpretation adopted by the AB.878 The space for judicial interpre-
tations has increased owing to the differing systems of checks and balances 
that distinguish the GATT from the WTO.879 To begin with, under the GATT 
dispute settlement system, individual members can veto the adoption of a 
judicial interpretation. Thus, for instance, the US has blocked the adoption 
of judicial interpretation that made what it considered to be inappropriate 
876 James Bacchus, ‘The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver’, Centre for International Gover-
nance Innovation Special Report, 2 November 2017.
877 Joel P. Trachtman, ‘WTO Law Constraints on Border Tax Adjustment and Tax Credit 
Mechanisms to Reduce the Competitive Effects of Carbon Taxes’, RFF Discussion Paper 
16-3 (2016).
878 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, ‘The Authoritative Interpretation Under 
Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, 
Practice and Possible Improvements’, 8(4) Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 
at 812.
879 Richard H. Steinberg, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and 
Political Constraints’, 98(2) The American Journal of International Law (2004), at 263.
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claims.880 Under the current WTO dispute settlement system, by contrast, a 
consensus is required to block the adoption of such an interpretation. The 
formation of this sort of consensus is unlikely, however, because the victo-
rious party in a dispute at least can be expected to refuse to join in blocking 
a report favourable to itself. In this context, an authoritative interpretation 
could have been widely used to correct judicial interpretation because 
Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement only requires a three-fourths superma-
jority of members for the adoption of an authoritative interpretation that 
binds all of them, including those who voted in opposition.
However, only one request has yet been made for an authoritative interpre-
tation. This single request, by the EU, was for a clarification of the relation-
ship between Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU.881 The US, however, objected 
that the requested interpretation would have contradicted the final sentence 
of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, which states that an authoritative 
interpretation ‘shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the 
amendment provisions of Article X’.882 This argument, however, fails to 
take into account the divergence of views among WTO members regarding 
the correct application of the DSU rules at issue, which divergence itself 
suggests that the rules lack sufficient clarity and that an authoritative inter-
pretation represents a better solution than an amendment.883
Unconvincing though it may be, this argument could also be extended to 
the interpretation of the silence on the relationship between Article XX and 
China’s export duty commitments. As has been seen, the AB held in the 
China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths cases that this silence does not 
justify China’s use of export duties under Article XX. From China’s perspec-
tive, since the AB’s interpretation was in error, it would be reasonable to 
request an authoritative interpretation that would clarify the relationship at 
issue. The members that had prevailed in the disputed cases, and perhaps 
others, conversely, would almost certainly block China’s request by arguing 
that granting it would amount to an amendment and therefore be beyond 
the scope of an authoritative interpretation. In theory, China does not neces-
sarily have to win the support of all members because Article IX:2 only 
requires a three-fourths supermajority of members for the adoption of an 
authoritative interpretation that binds all of them. In practice, however, 
WTO members may prefer not to break the general taboo against formal 
voting.
880 Ibid.
881 Request of an Authoritative Interpretation pursuant to Article IX:2 of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the WTO, 25 January 1999, WT/GC/W/133.
882 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, ‘The Authoritative Interpretation Under 
Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, 
Practice and Possible Improvements’, 8(4) Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 
at 814.
883 Ibid.
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7.6.4 Article IV:1: a more flexible alternative
The very infrequency appears to suggest that authoritative interpretations 
are not desirable in practice.884 One possible reason is to avoid the discus-
sion of the demarcation line with amendments. As an alternative, China 
may thus request the Ministerial Conference to take a decision under Article 
IV:1 of the WTO Agreement updating its accession protocol regarding the 
use of export duties to protect the environment. This decision may consti-
tute a subsequent agreement on the interpretation of a provision of a WTO 
agreement within the meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(a).
In practice, Ministerial Decisions or Declarations have been found to qualify 
as subsequent agreements in US – Clove Cigarettes and Australia – Tobacco 
Plain Packaging. In the former case, the AB found that Paragraph 5.2 of the 
Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns 
constitutes a ‘subsequent agreement between the parties’ within the 
meaning of VCLT Art. 31(3)(a). The AB thus held that the measure allowing 
only three months between the publication and the entry into force of the 
technical regulation at issue was inconsistent with TBT Article 2.12 because 
Paragraph 5.2 required a minimum of six months in that situation.885 
In the AB’s view, a Ministerial Decision may qualify as a ‘subsequent 
agreement between the parties’ if ‘(i) the decision is, in a temporal sense, 
adopted subsequent to the relevant covered agreement; and (ii) the terms 
and content of the decision express an agreement between Members on the 
interpretation or application of a provision of WTO law’.886 In a more recent 
example of Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging, the panel qualified the Public 
Health Declaration, which ‘was adopted by a consensus decision of WTO 
Members, at the highest level, on 14 November 2001 on the occasion of the 
Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO’, as a ‘subsequent agreement 
between the parties’.887 To support its analysis, the panel referred to the 
US – Clove Cigarettes AB report.888
The idea that Ministerial Decisions or Declarations may substitute for 
authoritative interpretations to clarify WTO rules seems to gain support 
from EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 
– US). In these cases, the AB stated that ‘in the WTO context, multilateral 
interpretations adopted pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement are 
most akin to subsequent agreements within the meaning of Article 31(3)
(a) of the Vienna Convention’.889 In other words, once Ministerial Decisions 
884 Ehlermann and Ehring (2005), above n 850.
885 AB Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras 241–75.
886 Ibid., para 262.
887 Panel Report, Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging, para 7.2409.
888 Ibid., footnote 5010.
889 AB Report, EC — Bananas III, para 390.
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or Declarations are found to constitute subsequent agreements, they may 
function as authoritative interpretations.
The challenge here is that such a Ministerial Decision or Declaration as a 
subsequent agreement may not legally correct the absolute ban on China’s 
export duties. As the AB emphasised in US – Clove Cigarettes, authorita-
tive interpretations under Article IX:2 and subsequent agreements within 
the meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(a) ‘serve different functions and have 
different legal effects under WTO law’.890 A strict reading of the AB’s 
reasoning seems to suggest that subsequent agreements cannot take over 
the role of authoritative interpretations to correct an AB interpretation.
This problem could be solved by introducing an update that does not explic-
itly contradict the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions. 
As discussed in Section 7.4, the AB is likely to accept an implicit correc-
tion that draws a line between export duties of the sort at issue in the two 
previous cases, which exclusively restrict the exports, and ‘export duties 
plus’ that are adopted in combination with supplementary restrictions on 
domestic consumption. For the same reason, WTO members, especially the 
victorious parties in the two cases, may find it easier to accept a ministerial 
update that does not explicitly alter the WTO ban on China’s export duties. 
Moreover, in order to make such updates more attractive, such updates 
could also include a redefinition of other commitments in China’s accession 
protocol such as subsidies or technology transfer which are of the interest to 
the rest of the WTO membership.
To sum up, all political options are constrained in practice by the orga-
nization’s de facto consensus requirement. China might find it easier to 
seek a consensus for a waiver as a stopgap measure, the legal effects of 
which would be conditional and temporary, rather than an amendment 
or an authoritative interpretation. This much is suggested by Mongolia’s 
successful request for a waiver of its export duty commitments on raw cash-
mere and by the fact that waivers have been adopted much more often than 
amendments (of which there have been only two) or authoritative interpre-
tations (which to date have not been used at all). In terms of a long-term 
solution, an authoritative interpretation is more flexible than an amendment 
which generally requires formal acceptance.891 Given the unpopularity of 
authoritative interpretations in practice, China may request the Ministerial 
890 AB Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para 257.
891 As discussed in Section 7.6.1.2, it has been argued that China’s accession protocol 
could be seen as a bilateral treaty between China and the WTO.  In this scenario, once 
the WTO as a contracting party agrees to amend China’s export duty commitments, no 
such further formal acceptance as ratifi cation by individual WTO members would be 
required. This alternative reading, however, comes with a considerable degree of uncer-
tainty because neither Article X (Amendments) nor Article XII specifi es the procedure for 
amendments to an accession protocol.
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Conference to take a decision updating its accession protocol regarding 
the use of export duties to protect the environment. To make such updates 
more attractive, they may not need to explicitly contradict the China—Raw 
Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions but rather to distinguish them by 
drawing a line between export duties and ‘export duties plus’.
7.7 Conclusions
This chapter has offered a thorough analysis of the judicial and political 
options for creating desirable policy space for China’s export duties. Thus, 
to begin with, the AB could adopt a new interpretation that allows China 
to adopt export duties for environmental purposes. On the one hand, the 
evolving context of China’s export duties could provide the AB with good 
reasons to reconsider its prior decisions in this regard. As the survey of the 
practice of selected tribunals in this chapter suggests, the AB could choose 
either to distinguish (the most feasible option) or to overrule (the second-
best) the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths rulings.892
There remain, on the other hand, substantive and feasible arguments 
regarding the applicability of Article XX to export duties. Thus China could 
argue from the perspective of non-WTO norms that the assumption that it 
has signed away its rights under Article XX is inconsistent the principle of 
good faith or that the denial of its rights under Article XX is inconsistent 
with the prohibition of abuse of rights under Article 3(10) of the DSU. 
However, both of these interpretative options would require the AB to over-
rule its prior decisions explicitly and for this reason constitute second-best 
choices.
A more feasible interpretative option, and one based on WTO norms, has 
been proposed in this chapter. This new interpretation involves drawing 
a line between regular export duties applied exclusively to exports on the 
one hand and ‘export duties plus’—those adopted in conjunction with 
corresponding restrictions on domestic consumption—on the other. This 
interpretation could allow the AB to provide China with the policy space 
to adopt export duties for environmental purposes without reversing its 
China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions. Alternatively, the 
AB could distinguish between regular export duties and those adopted 
892 Unlike the option of overruling which in effect repeals an earlier judgement, the tech-
nique of distinguishing aims to amend a previous judgement, by adding to conditions 
necessary for applying such a judgement, which is considered less judicial radical and 
more commonly used by international, regional, and domestic tribunals when avoiding 
an awkward situation that is to be caused by a prior decision. See Neil Duxbury, ‘Distin-
guishing, overruling and the problem of self-reference’, in ‘The Nature and Authority of 
Precedent’, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 115.
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for the purpose of combatting climate change. However, while this option 
would provide China with the space to enact policies that would be of 
benefit to the entire world, it would also, as has been seen, send the unwel-
come message that China could only impose export duties in circumstances 
in which its domestic environmental concerns pose an international threat. 
For this reason, the distinction between regular export duties and ‘export 
duties plus’ is preferable.
Turning now from judicial to political options, China could request 
an amendment, waiver, or authoritative interpretation permitting the 
imposition of export duties for environmental purposes. Considering the 
challenges raised by the WTO’s de facto consensus requirement to pursue 
such political options, the simplest approach for China might be to seek 
a consensus for an individual waiver, as Mongolia was able to do in 2007. 
Such a waiver could be part of a package deal that includes additional 
commitments by China to liberalize trade. Alternatively, a collective waiver 
could be sought covering all of the climate change measures that have been 
considered inconsistent with WTO law. Using this approach, China might 
be able to garner support from the US and EU, which might themselves 
wish to impose BTAs on carbon-intensive products at some point in the 
future.
While waivers could be useful as a stopgap measure, China may request 
amendments or authoritative interpretations as a long-term solution in 
order to better accommodate the climate considerations.893 Given the 
rigidity of amendment processes and the deep unpopularity of authorita-
tive interpretations in practice, this thesis has proposed a more flexible 
alternative based on Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement.894 China thus may 
request the Ministerial Conference to take decisions updating its accession 
protocol under which ‘export duties plus’ could be adopted in a manner 
consistent with Article XX.
Should the environmental exceptions under Article XX become available 
with respect to China’s export duty commitments, its policy space to use 
these duties to protect the environment would be subject to the fairly 
strict tests specified in Article XX. A practical question for China therefore 
concerns the manner in which its export duties could be justified under 
these exceptions. This issue is taken up in the following chapter, which 
concludes with some policy recommendations.
893 ‘Thus without a commitment or fall-back mechanism (like an import border adjus-
ment), export taxes cannot be regarded as an equivalent tool to the long-term EU carbon 
pricing’. Dröge (2009), above n 225, at 68.
894 These decisions may constitute subsequent agreements on the interpretation of a provi-
sion of a WTO agreement within the meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(a).
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Table 10:  Moves by tribunals at the international, regional, and national levels to deviate 
from precedents
Tribunals Moves to deviate from undesirable precedents
International level
International 
Criminal 
Tribunal for 
the Former 
Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) 
Overruling
Case Practice Reasons
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal 
Judgement (2004) 
Explicitly overruled the 
Krstić Appeal Judgement 
(2004) and Vasiljević 
Appeal Judgement (2004)
‘The Appeals Chamber 
considers that cogent 
reasons warrant a 
departure from this 
jurisprudence as an 
incorrect application of 
the Čelebići test to intra-
Article 5 convictions’ 
(para 1040).
The precedents incorrectly 
apply the legal test 
relating to cumulative 
convictions as set out in 
the Čelebići case.
To ‘ensuring that the 
convictions entered fully 
reflect his criminality’ 
(para 1033).
Žigić Appeal Decision 
(2005) 
Explicitly overruled the 
Čelebići Appeal 
Judgement (2001)
‘In light of these 
considerations, the 
Appeals Chamber has 
come to the view that 
cogent reasons in the 
interests of justice 
demand its departure 
from the majority opinion 
in the Čelebići Judgement 
on Sentence Appeal’ 
(para 9).
The precedent is 
inconsistent with the 
ICTY Statute.
To protect the ‘the 
interests of justice’ to the 
victims or convicted 
person.
Šainović et al. Appeal 
Judgement (2014) 
Explicitly overruled the 
Perišić Appeal Judgement 
(2013)
‘Consequently, the 
Appeals Chamber, 
Judge Tuzmukhamedov 
dissenting, unequivocally 
rejects the approach 
adopted in the Perišić 
Appeal Judgement as it is 
in direct and material 
conflict with the 
prevailing jurisprudence 
on the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting liability and 
with customary 
international law in this 
regard’ (para 1650).
The precedent is 
inconsistent with 
prevailing jurisprudence 
and customary 
international law 
regarding the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting 
liability.
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Distinguishing
Case Practice Reasons
Strugar Trial Judgement 
(2005) 
Explicitly distinguished 
the Čelebići Appeal 
Judgement (2001)
‘A strict application of the 
above mentioned Appeals 
Chamber test would allow 
cumulative convictions... 
...’(para 449); ‘Counts 4 
and 5 really add no 
materially distinct 
element, given the 
particular circumstances 
in which these offences 
were committed.’ (para 
454).
Due to the ‘particular 
circumstances’ concerning 
the offences, some of the 
essential criminal 
conducts are ‘directly and 
comprehensively 
reflected’ in the others. 
Thus, the precedent 
should be amended in 
order to preserve the 
‘interests of justice and the 
purposes of punishment’ 
(para 454).
International 
Court of 
Justice (ICJ)
Overruling
Case Practice Reasons
Libya—Malta Judgement 
(1985) 
Implicitly overruled the 
North Sea Continental Shelf 
Judgement (1969)
‘However to rely on this 
jurisprudence would be to 
overlook the fact that 
where such juris prudence 
appears to ascribe a role to 
geophysical or geological 
factors in delimitation, it 
finds warrant for doing so 
in a régime of the title 
itself which used to allot 
those factors a place 
which now belongs to the 
past, in so far as sea-bed 
areas less than 200 miles 
from the Coast are 
concerned’ (para 40).
The 1969 Judgement, 
which stepped away from 
the equidistance method, 
appeared to cause 
uncertainties.
NATO Judgement (2004) Implicitly overruled the 
Genocide Judgement (2003)
The majority had formed 
in 2004 within the ICJ 
wanted to use the 2004 
case to ‘sink’ the 2003 
judgement.
Distinguishing
Case Practice Reasons
Genocide Judgement (2008) Implicitly distinguished 
the NATO Judgement 
(2004)
Not available.
Chapter 7 Is There a Legal Path to a Desirable Policy Space for China Under WTO Law? 187
Regional level
European 
Court 
of Human 
Rights 
(ECtHR)
Overruling
Case Practice Reasons
Huber v. Switzerland (1990) Implicitly overruled 
Schiesser v. Switzerland 
(1979)
‘Clearly the Convention 
does not rule out the 
possibility of the judicial 
officer who orders the 
detention carrying out 
other duties, but his 
impartiality is open to 
doubt ... if he is entitled to 
intervene in the 
subsequent criminal 
proceedings as a 
representative of the 
prosecuting authority. 
Since that was the 
situation in the present 
case, there has been a 
breach of Article 5(3)’, 
para 43.
Not available.
Borgers v. Belgium (1993) Implicitly overruled 
Delcourt v. Belgium (1970)
‘In conclusion, having 
regard to the requirements 
of the rights of the defence 
and of the principle of the 
equality of arms and to 
the role of appearances in 
determining whether they 
have been complied with, 
the Court finds a violation 
of Article 6(1)’, para 29.
Not available.
Vilho Eskelinen and Others 
v. Finland (2007)
Explicitly overruled 
Pellegrin v. France (1999)
‘The Court can only 
conclude that the 
functional criterion, as 
applied in practice, has 
not simplified the analysis 
of the applicability of 
Article 6 in proceedings to 
which a civil servant is a 
party or brought about a 
greater degree of certainty 
in this area as intended 
(see, mutatis mutandis, 
Perez v. France [GC], no. 
47287/99, x 55, ECHR 
2004-I.)’, para 55.
‘It is against this back-
ground and for these 
reasons that the Court
finds that the functional 
criterion adopted in the 
case of Pellegrin must be 
further developed,’ 
para 56.
The original approach 
was found unable to bring 
about ‘a greater degree of 
certainty in this area as 
intended’.
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Kudla v. Poland (2002) Explicitly overruled 
Kamasinski v. Austria 
(1991)
‘In the Court’s view, the 
time has come to review 
its case-law in the light of 
the continuing 
accumulation of 
applications before it in 
which the only, or 
principal, allegation is 
that of a failure to ensure 
a hearing within a 
reasonable time in breach 
of Article 6(1),’ para 148.
The original approach 
was reconsidered ‘forcing 
applicants to bring their 
Article 6(1) unreasonable 
delay complaints to 
Strasbourg rather than 
having them resolved 
domestically’.
Christine Goodwin—United 
Kingdom (2002) 
Explicitly overruled the 
Rees Judgement (1986) 
and Cossey Judgement 
(1990)
‘…… it should not depart, 
without good reason, 
from precedents laid 
down in previous cases 
(see, for example, 
Chapman v. the United 
Kingdom [GC], no. 
27238/95, ECHR 2001-I, 
§ 70). However, since the 
Convention is first and 
foremost a system for the 
protection of human 
rights, the Court must 
have regard to the 
changing conditions 
within the respondent 
State and within 
Contracting States 
generally and respond, for 
example, to any evolving 
convergence as to the 
standards to be achieved’, 
para 74.
In order to take into 
account ‘the changing 
conditions’ within the 
contracting states and to 
ensure that the rights 
under the Conventions 
continued to be ‘practical 
and effective’, para 74.
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Distinguishing
Case Practice Reasons
Kopecký (2003) Explicitly distinguished 
the Malhous Grand 
Chamber Judgement 
(2000) and Gratzinger and 
Gratzingerova Grand 
Chamber Judgement 
(2002)
‘In this respect the present 
case should be 
distinguished from the 
cases of Malhous v. the 
Czech Republic and 
Gratzinger and 
Gratzingerova v. the Czech 
Republic referred to above 
or the case of Brezny & 
Brezny v. Slovakia 
(application no. 23131/93, 
Commission decision of 
4 March 1996, DR 85, pp. 
65-83) in which the Court 
and the Commission 
respectively found that 
the applicants’ claims for 
restitution of property did 
not amount to a legitimate 
expectation in the sense 
of the Court’s case-law. In 
those cases the applicants 
were excluded from the 
very beginning from the 
possibility of having the 
property restored as it 
was obvious either that 
they failed to meet the 
relevant requirements or 
that their claim clearly fell 
outside the relevant law’ 
(para 27).
In order to prevent the 
protection of the rights 
under the European 
Conventions on Human 
Rights and its protocols 
from being revealed 
‘ineffective and illusory’.
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Court of 
Justice of the 
European 
Union 
(CJEU)
Overruling
Case Practice Reasons
HAG II Judgement (1990) Explicitly overruled the 
HAG I Judgement (1974)
‘Bearing in mind the 
points outlined in the 
order for reference and in 
the discussions before the 
Court concerning the 
relevance of the Court’s 
judgment in Case 192/73 
Van Zuylen v HAG [1974] 
ECR 731 to the reply to 
the question asked by the 
national court, it should 
be stated at the outset that 
the Court believes it 
necessary to reconsider 
the interpretation given in 
that judgment in the light 
of the case-law which has 
developed with regard to 
the relationship between 
industrial and commercial 
property and the general 
rules of the Treaty, 
particularly in the sphere 
of the free movement of 
goods’ (para 10).
The precedent was out of 
step with subsequent 
developments in the case 
law on intellectual 
property rights and out of 
step with the evolving 
perception of the internal 
market.
‘... ...given in that 
judgment in the light of 
the case-law which has 
developed with regard to 
the relationship between 
industrial and commercial 
property and the general 
rules of the Treaty, 
particularly in the sphere 
of the free movement of 
goods’ (para 10).
Metock Judgement (2008) Explicitly overruled the 
Akrich Judgement (2003)
‘It is true that the Court 
held in paragraphs 50 and 
51 of Akrich that, in order 
to benefit from the rights 
provided for in Article 10 
of Regulation No 1612/68, 
the national of a non-
member country who is 
the spouse of a Union 
citizen must be lawfully 
resident in a Member 
State when he moves to 
another Member State to 
which the citizen of the 
Union is migrating or has 
migrated. However, that 
conclusion must be 
reconsidered. The benefit 
of such rights cannot 
depend on the prior 
lawful residence of such a 
spouse in another 
Member State (see, to that 
effect, MRAX, paragraph 
59, and Case C-157/03 
Commission v Spain, 
paragraph 28)’ (para 58) .
In order to protect the 
right of EU citizens and 
their family members to 
move and reside freely 
within the EU.
‘The benefit of such rights 
cannot depend on the 
prior lawful residence of 
such a spouse in another 
Member State’ (para 28).
Wouters Judgement (2002) Implicitly overruled the 
Métropole Judgement 
(2001) by ignoring it.
The Court did not explain.
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Distinguishing
Case Practice Reasons
Keck Judgement (1993) Explicitly distinguished 
the Dassonville Judgement 
(1974) and Cassis de Dijon 
Judgement (1979)
‘By contrast, contrary to 
what has previously been 
decided, the application 
to products from other 
Member States of national 
provisions restricting or 
prohibiting certain selling 
arrangements is not such 
as to hinder directly or 
indirectly, actually
or potentially, trade 
between Member States 
within the meaning of the
Dassonville judgment 
(Case 8/74 [1974] ECR 
837), so long as those 
provisions apply to all 
relevant traders operating 
within the national 
territory and so long
as they affect in the same 
manner, in law and in fact, 
the marketing of domestic
products and of those 
from other Member 
States’ (para 16).
In order to address 
concerns regarding 
potential abuse of Article 
34.
‘In view of the increasing 
tendency of traders to 
invoke Article 30 of the 
Treaty as a means of 
challenging any rules 
whose effect is to limit 
their commercial freedom 
even where such rules are 
not aimed at products 
from other Member 
States, the Court considers 
it necessary to re-examine 
and clarify its case-law on 
this matter’ (para 14).
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  Steenhorst-Neerings 
Judgement (1993), 
Johnson Judgement (1994), 
and Fantask Judgement 
(1997) 
Explicitly distinguished 
the Emmott Judgement 
(1991)
‘However, as was 
confirmed by the 
judgment in Case 
C-410/92 Johnson v Chief 
Adjudication Officer [1994] 
ECR 1-5483, at paragraph 
26, it is clear from Case 
C-338/91 Steenhorst-
Neerings v Bestuur van de 
Bedrijfsvereniging voor 
Detailhandel, Ambachten en 
Huisvrouwen [1993] ECR 
1-5475 that the solution 
adopted in Emmott was 
justified by the particular 
circumstances of that case, 
in which the time-bar had 
the result of depriving the 
applicant of any 
opportunity whatever to 
rely on her right to equal 
treatment under a 
Community directive (see 
also Haahr Petroleum, cited 
above, paragraph 52, and 
Joined Cases C-114/95 
and C-115/95 Texaco and 
Olieselskabet Danmark 
[1997] ECR 1-4263, 
paragraph 48)’ (para 51).
Critics of the Emmott 
judgment seem to have 
prevailed over time, for 
the Court ended up 
distancing itself from this 
judgement.
Alimanovic Judgement 
(2015) 
Explicitly distinguished 
the Brey Judgement (2013)
‘It must be stated in this 
connection that, although 
the Court has held that 
Directive 2004/38 requires 
a Member State to take 
account of the individual 
situation of the person 
concerned before it adopts 
an expulsion measure or 
finds that the residence of 
that person is placing an 
unreasonable burden on 
its social assistance 
system (judgment in Brey, 
C-140/12, EU:C:2013:565, 
paragraphs 64, 69 and 78), 
no such individual 
assessment is necessary in 
circumstances such as 
those at issue in the main 
proceedings’ (para 59).
The Court did not explain.
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Altmark Judgement (2003) Implicitly distinguished 
the Ferring Judgement 
(2001)
‘It follows from those 
judgments that, where a 
State measure must be 
regarded as compensation 
for the services provided 
by the recipient 
undertakings in order to 
discharge public service 
obligations, so that those 
undertakings do not enjoy 
a real financial advantage 
and the measure thus 
does not have the effect of 
putting them in a more 
favourable competitive 
position than the 
undertakings competing 
with them, such a 
measure is not caught by 
Article 92(1) of the Treaty’ 
(para 87).
In order to prevent 
member states from 
abusing the Ferring 
formula.
Domestic level
United 
Kingdom
Overruling
Case Practice  Reasons
Conway v Rimmer (1968) Explicitly overruled 
Duncan v Cammell Laird 
and Co (1942)
In order to prevent the 
ministry from abusing the 
claim of public interest.
R v Shivput (1987) Explicitly overruled 
Anderton v Ryan (1985)
The precedent was 
considered to be 
inconsistent with the 
Criminal Attempts Act 
1981.
Knauer v Ministry of Justice 
(2016)
Explicitly overruled 
Cookson v Knowles (1979) 
and Graham v Dodds (1983)
Because of a material 
change in the legal 
landscape concerning 
damages for death. 
Distinguishing
Case  Practice Reasons
Quin v Leatham (1901) Explicitly distinguished 
Allen v Flood (1898)
The Court did not explain.
Japan
Overruling
Case Practice Reasons
Confiscation of the Third 
Party Property Supreme 
Court Judgement (1962) 
Explicitly overruled a 
1960 Supreme Court 
Judgement
The Court did not explain.
Parricide Supreme Court 
Judgement (1973) 
Explicitly overruled a 
1950 Supreme Court 
Judgement
Heavier criminal 
punishment against 
parricide, to securing 
respect for parents, had 
been rejected by many 
countries and the heavier 
penalty at issue that 
disallowed any chance to 
suspend the enforcement 
of the imprisonment 
sentence was 
unreasonable.
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All Forest and Agricultural 
Public Workers, Police 
Office Act Amendment 
Opposition Supreme Court 
Judgement (1973) 
Implicitly overruled the 
All Postal Workers, Tokyo 
Central Post Office 
Supreme Court 
Judgement (1966) 
Possibly due to the strong 
criticism from 
conservative politicians in 
the ruling party and the 
change in the composition 
of the Supreme Court.
Distinguishing
Case Practice Reasons
Niigata Prefecture Public 
Safety Ordinance Supreme 
Court Judgement (1960) 
Implicitly distinguished 
the Tokyo Public Safety 
Ordinance Supreme Court 
Judgement (1954)
In order to prevent a 
danger to the public 
safety.
Overseas Voters Supreme 
Court Judgement (2005) 
Implicitly distinguished 
the Voting at Home 
Supreme Court 
Judgement (1985)
The condition to permit a 
recovery of damages 
against an 
unconstitutional 
government action as set 
out in the 1985 Judgement 
was too stringent to 
practically prevent the 
public from seeking 
damages.
China
Overruling
Case Practice Reasons
Supreme People’s Court’s 
Decision regarding the 
Repeal of Some Judicial 
Interpretations
The most recent such 
decision, titled the 
‘Supreme People’s Court’s 
Decision regarding the 
Repeal of Some Judicial 
Interpretations and 
Judicial Interpretation-
Type Documents (11th 
Batch)’, was adopted in 
2017 in order to explicitly 
abolish 15 judicial 
interpretations that had 
been issued in the period 
from 1988 to 2013.
Ranging from the juridical 
interpretations at issue 
conflicting with new 
legislation to the changing 
conditions within China.
Distinguishing
Case Practice Reasons
When necessary, the Court does not hesitate to explicitly ‘overrule’ its judicial 
interpretations by issuing decisions regarding their repeal and thus it has fewer 
incentives to rely on the technique of distinguishing.
8 China’s Policy Space for Adopting 
‘Export Duties Plus’ Under GATT 
Article XX
Following the judicial or political options as suggested in the previous 
chapter, while export duties, which exclusively restrict exports, should 
be prohibited outright, ‘export duties plus’ that are adopted in combina-
tion with supplementary restrictions on domestic consumption would be 
allowed for pursuing environmental purposes subject to the scrutiny of 
Article XX. An important follow-up question concerning China’s policy 
space for adopting ‘export duties plus’ is whether Article XX requires 
‘export duties plus’ to always treat domestic and foreign consumers in 
an identical manner. In other words, if differential ‘export duties plus’ are 
proved to reduce pollution, would these duties necessarily be prohibited 
under Article XX.
It has been argued that China should impose equivalent charges on prod-
ucts destined for domestic consumption in order to justify its export duties 
under Article XX.895 At least from an economic point of view, the price 
of targeted products under ‘export duties plus’ should be same for both 
Chinese and foreign consumers in order to allocate those products to the 
most efficient consumers.896 Moreover, identical ‘export duties plus’ would 
also dismiss the suspicion that ‘export duties plus’ are actually adopted 
to provide Chinese downstream industries with favourable access to raw 
materials.
This thesis generally subscribes to the above view and suggests that ‘export 
duties plus’ should be adopted identically in most cases. One exception, 
however, might be found in the climate change regime where the parties 
listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC have explicitly committed to take a greater 
895 Bond and Trachtman (2016), above n 147, at 199. ‘Economic effi ciency suggests a simple 
solution, which is that the price of Chinese products should be the same for both Chinese 
and foreign consumers. The reduced output under the conservation policy should be 
allocated to its most productive uses, which requires consumers in all locations facing the 
same price’.
896 When a large proportion of products is exported, one may argue that effi ciency cost of 
export duties is relatively low because there are not many consumers in China anyway. 
Given that export duties have less administrative cost than identical ‘export duties plus’ 
or production taxes, when the increase of administrative effi ciency outweighs the loss of 
economic effi ciency, export duties might make economic sense. But this is an exceptional 
case for export duties rather than differential ‘export duties plus’.
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mitigation role than non-Annex I countries like China in light of the prin-
ciple of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.897
The requirement of identical ‘export duties plus’ seems to be at odds with 
the differentiated obligations of Annex I and non-Annex I countries because 
it may in effect require China to adopt the same climate measures as those in 
place in Annex I countries. The reason is that, when it comes to combating 
climate change, identical ‘export duties plus’ constitute a de facto economy-
wide carbon tax. Thus, for instance, when ‘export duties plus’ are used 
to counter BTAs involving carbon-outsourcing countries, which are most 
likely listed in Annex I, the requirement of identical restrictions in effect 
would impose upon China a mitigation policy as stringent as that in place 
in Annex I countries. This result may be inconsistent with the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.898
Alternatively, China may impose identical ‘export duties plus’ in a 
less stringent manner. This, however, may not solve the problem of carbon 
leakage because the carbon cost of Chinese exports remains lower compared 
with those from Annex I countries. Such an outcome contradicts the funda-
mental goal of deploying ‘export duties plus’ as a more feasible alternative 
to address the concern of carbon leakage.899
This dilemma shows the unique features of the climate change problem. On 
the one hand, compared with other global environmental problems, cutting 
carbon emissions is more costly and complicated. For instance, while 
countries can achieve the goal of protecting ozone layer under the Montreal 
Protocol by ‘switching one set of chemicals for another’, there are currently 
no straightforward solutions to replace fossil fuels with low carbon energy 
897 For instance, all parties have committed to take general actions under UNFCCC Article 
4(1), whereas only Annex I parties have agreed to follow more stringent rules under 
Article 4(2). For a comprehensive analysis of this issue, see Jutta Brunnée and Charlotte 
Streck, ‘The UNFCCC as a negotiation forum: towards common but more differentiated 
responsibilities’, 13(5) Climate Policy (2013).
898 For instance, Hertel has argued that BTAs requiring non-Annex I countries to adopt 
mitigation policies that are ‘comparable in effect to those’ adopted by Annex I countries 
are inconsistent with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and 
thus cannot be justifi ed under Article XX. See Michael Hertel, ‘Climate-Change-Related 
Trade Measures and Article XX: Defi ning Discrimination in Light of the Principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ 45(3) Journal of World Trade (2011). Annex 
I countries are thus generally advised to adopt BTAs that distinguish countries in light 
of the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. See Michael A. Mehling, 
Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das, Susanne Droege and Cleo Verkuijl, ‘Designing Border 
Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action’, 113(3) American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2019), at 469. Fabio C. Morosini, ‘Trade and Climate Change: Unveiling the 
Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities from the WTO Agreements’, 42 
George Washington International Law Review (2010), at 747.
899 See Chapter 6.
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sources.900 This appears to be the rationale behind the legal distinction 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC.901 On 
the other hand, China’s position as both a non-Annex I party as well as 
the largest emitter and exporter of carbon dioxide emissions adds another 
layer of complexity. Any ambitious climate action taken by Annex I coun-
tries may fail to effectively tackle carbon leakage if China is exempted from 
adequately targeting its carbon-intensive exports.
The present chapter takes up the question of whether Article XX is flexible 
enough to accommodate the unique characteristics of the climate change 
issue. Given that neither Articles XX(b) or XX(g) requires identical treat-
ment, Section 8.1 focuses on the comparison of different policy spaces for 
adopting ‘export duties plus’ under these subparagraphs. In Section 8.2 and 
8.3, the issue of whether differential ‘export duties plus’ would necessarily 
constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or ‘disguised restriction 
on international trade’ under the chapeau is addressed. These findings are 
applied to China’s current environmental policy in Section 8.4. This analysis 
serves in turn as the basis for a series of policy recommendations.
8.1 Tests under Articles XX(b) and XX(g)
Articles XX(b) and XX(g) do not necessarily prohibit differential ‘export 
duties plus’ because the tests under these subparagraphs examine the 
measures as a whole, not merely their discriminatory aspects.902 Thus at 
least two discriminatory measures in the past have been successfully justi-
fied under Articles XX(b) or XX(g). In the Brazil—Retreaded Tyres case, an 
import prohibition on retreaded tyres together with exemption of retreaded 
tyres imported from MERCOSUR countries was found consistent with 
Article XX(b). In the US—Gasoline case, a gasoline rule that applied different 
methods to domestic and imported gasoline was justified under Article 
XX(g). That being said, however, different treatment may undermine the 
effectiveness of ‘export duties plus’ in terms of reducing pollution because 
they could incentivise the manufacture of targeted products for Chinese 
consumers. This section examines the feasibility of justifying ‘export duties 
plus’ under Articles XX(b) and XX(g). The findings serve in turn as the basis 
for a comparison of different policy spaces for adopting ‘export duties plus’ 
under these subparagraphs.
900 ‘That makes persuading people to act on climate change a lot harder than simply 
switching one set of chemicals for another’. Carbon Brief, ‘Why we may never get a 
Montreal protocol for climate change’, 12 September 2014, https://www.carbonbrief.
org/why-we-may-never-get-a-montreal-protocol-for-climate-change (visited on 13 
August 2019).
901 There is no such a distinction, for instance, under the Montreal Protocol.
902 Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau, Julia Reinaud, ‘The Interface between the Trade and 
Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues’, 46(3) Journal of World Trade (2012), at 509.
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8.1.1 Article XX(b): local pollution
Article XX(b) permits WTO members to adopt measures that are ‘neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’, a provision easily 
connected to the goal of reducing local pollution associated with the manu-
facture of high-polluting products.903 To succeed in a claim under Article 
XX(b), China must first show that the challenged ‘export duties plus’ are 
specifically designed to protect the environment or public health. This 
purpose test, as shown in the China—Rare Earths case, requires the text of 
the challenged measures to demonstrate a link between ‘export duties plus’ 
and the avowed environmental purpose.904 One such link is to show that 
export duties may reduce various negative environmental impacts associ-
ated with the manufacture of the targeted products. Thus, for instance, as 
the panel in China—Rare Earths recognized, environmental harm caused 
by the manufacture of high-polluting products can take the form of water 
pollution.905
Once the harm arising from the manufacture of high-polluting products 
has been proved, China needs to demonstrate that ‘export duties plus’ 
are designed and structured to reduce their manufacture, a fact relevant 
to domestic and foreign demand alike. Export duties, however, can only 
decrease foreign demand. Therefore, their potential to reduce the produc-
tion of the targeted products is proportional to the extent to which they are 
consumed outside China. One essential aspect of proving the environmental 
purpose of ‘export duties plus’ is accordingly the proportion of the targeted 
products destined for export.
Also essential to proving the environmental purpose of ‘export duties plus’ 
is the restriction on domestic consumption. Absent an identical restriction, 
the price differential between foreign markets and the Chinese market could 
generate an increase in domestic consumption that would undermine the 
capacity of ‘export duties plus’ to reduce the manufacture of the targeted 
products in China.906 In this case, the adverse effect would reduce the ability 
to prove the environmental purpose of differential ‘export duties plus’.
Analysis of the purpose test would be complicated if the targeted prod-
ucts include industrial inputs. In this situation, a lower price on products 
destined for domestic consumption than on those for exports could provide 
industry in China with preferential access to these industrial inputs. Thus, 
in the China-Rare Earths case, the panel suspected China of having adopted 
the challenged export duties in order to incentivise the domestic use of 
903 Ibid. at 512.
904 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para 7.165.
905 Ibid. para 7.152 and 7.156.
906 Ibid. para 7.169. 
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the targeted raw materials, thereby raising the question of whether these 
duties would still pass the purpose test if they in effect offered advantages 
to domestic industry.
The answer appears to be affirmative, at least according to the Brazil—
Retreaded Tyres case, in which the panel, while recognizing that the import of 
used tyres through court injunction (which in effect benefitted the domestic 
retreaded tyres industry which needs used tyres as industrial inputs) could 
undermine the effectiveness of the import ban in terms of reducing waste 
tyres in Brazil,907 nevertheless found that the ban at issue had been adopted 
for an environmental purpose under Article XX(b).908 In light of this ruling, 
differential ‘export duties plus’ on industrial inputs may stand chance of 
passing the purpose test.
If ‘export duties plus’ are found to have been adopted for an environmental 
purpose, the necessity test under Article XX(b) requires China as a first step 
to prove that the environmental interests at stake are significant. Significant 
interests could include the nation’s public health, as claimed in China—Raw 
Materials and China—Rare Earths. Relevant in this context is the AB’s state-
ment in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres that ‘few interests are more vital and impor-
tant than protecting human beings from health risks, and . . . protecting 
the environment is no less important’.909 China’s ‘export duties plus’ on 
high-polluting products seem likely to meet this requirement.
Another requirement under the necessity test is the demonstration that 
‘export duties plus’ have made or are likely to ‘make a material contribu-
tion’ to the furtherance of reducing local pollution, which represents a 
higher threshold than the aforementioned purpose test. To estimate such a 
contribution, an analysis could rely on either quantitative projections into 
the future or on qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypotheses that are 
tested and supported by sufficient evidence.910 In either of these methods 
for assessing the material contribution of ‘export duties plus’, the two essen-
tial elements mentioned above in the context of the purpose test, namely 
export proportions and restrictions on domestic consumption, also play 
important roles. One may argument that the more the targeted products are 
consumed abroad, the more policy space for China to adopt ‘export duties 
907 The import ban on retreaded tyres (which are produced by using used tyre casings) in 
dispute aims to reduce waste tyres in Brazil. However, the court injunctions at issue leads 
to imports of used tyres which thus could undermine the effectiveness of the former 
measure. Panel Report, Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, para 7.107 For instance, ‘The European 
Communities argues that this discriminates in favour of domestic retreaded tyres made 
from imported used tyres, which generate the same waste as that arising from imported 
retreads’. Panel Report, Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, para 7.241.
908 Ibid., para 7.215.
909 AB Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, paras 144 and 179.
910 Low, Marceau and Reinaud (2012), above n6, at 509.
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plus’. It is noteworthy that the requirement of material contribution does 
not necessarily prohibits differential ‘export duties plus’. In the Brazil—
Retreaded Tyres case, a discriminatory measure was nevertheless found to 
make a material contribution to the protection of public health.
The necessity test would further examine the trade restrictiveness of ‘export 
duties plus’, assessing whether they are necessary to protect the alleged 
environmental interests. The China—Raw Materials case shows that the 
trade-restrictive effects depend in part on the market size of the exporting 
country.911 Since China, as the world’s largest exporter, has a large export 
share for many products, its export duties may be found to have a large 
trade-restrictive impact. The analysis of trade restrictiveness is, however, 
irrelevant to the discriminatory aspects of differential ‘export duties plus’.
If ‘export duties plus’, be it identical or differential, are found to be neces-
sary on a preliminary basis, it is for the complaining governments to show, 
in the first instance, that there are no reasonably available alternatives.912 
Thus the complainants need to prove, first, that the proposed alternatives 
are financially or practically within China’s reach and, second, that these 
alternatives are capable of achieving at least the same level of environ-
mental protection as the ‘export duties plus’ at issue.913
For the purpose of reducing local pollution, the complainants in China—
Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths identified various alternative 
measures such as a pollution tax that restrict the production in general. In 
response to China’s argument that many of these measures had already 
been implemented, the panel suggested that they could be strengthened.914 
Indeed, China after the China—Rare Earths decision, for instance in 2015, 
replaced the export duties with increased environmental protection taxes 
on the production of the minerals in dispute.915 In a future case, it would 
accordingly be difficult for China to explain why it could not likewise 
increase environmental protection taxes instead of imposing ‘export duties 
plus’. China may argue that, compared with such demand-side measures as 
environmental protection taxes, ‘export duties plus’ as a type of demand-
side control measure could enable lifestyle and behavioural change.
When it comes to differential ‘export duties plus’, however, it seems to be 
very difficult for China to explain why this discriminatory measure could 
not be replaced by identical ‘export duties plus’. One possible argument 
911 Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para 7.563.
912 AB Reports, US — Gambling, para 309
913 Patrick (2012), above n6, at 514
914 Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para 7.186.
915 Notice on Imposing Resources Taxes in 2015, the Ministry of Finance, Cai Shui [2015] 
No.52.
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might be based on potential financial difficulties. For instance, assuming 
that Chinese consumers can only afford 15% consumption taxes on Product 
A, China may impose 15% ‘export duties plus’ in an identical manner. If 
such identical ‘export duties plus’ are proved to be too weak to limit the 
manufacture of Product A, China may decide to impose differential ‘export 
duties plus’ including 20% export duties together with 15% consumption 
taxes. The persuasiveness of this argument may depend on the proportion 
of targeted products that is consumed abroad.
In short, compared with identical ‘export duties plus’, differential ‘export 
duties plus’ may undermine their effectiveness in reducing local pollution 
and, thus, reduce their chance of being justified under Article XX(b). The 
biggest challenge here seems to be the necessity test, which requires proof 
that alternative measures consistent with the WTO not be reasonably avail-
able. In contrast, there is no such a test under Article XX(g) as discussed 
below.
8.1.2 Article XX(g): global pollution
Article XX(g) permits WTO members to adopt measures relating to ‘the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources’. The US—Gasoline decision 
shows that clean air, which naturally falls under the ‘natural resources’ 
category, could be affected by pollutants, for which reason regulation of 
pollutant-emitting gasoline combustion was justifiable. Following this 
line of reasoning, Article XX(g) could be relevant to ‘export duties plus’ 
that reduce global pollution such as carbon emissions; for preserving the 
global climate could be considered analogous to the preservation of clean 
air or to addressing potentially dangerous levels of carbon and other green-
house gases in the atmosphere.916 Alternatively, the loss of biodiversity as 
a result of climate change may also qualify as the exhaustion of a natural 
resource.917
In a manner similar to the purpose test under Article XX(b), the term 
‘relate to’ under Article XX(g) also requires ‘a close and genuine relation-
ship’ between ‘export duties plus’ and their purpose of reducing global 
pollution.918 As the AB held in the US – Gasoline case, ‘a close and genuine 
relationship’ requires that a measure should be directed primarily at the 
conservation of such resources.919 Thus ‘export duties plus’, be it identical 
916 Bradly J. Condon, ‘Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law’, 12(4) Journal of 
International Economic Law (2009), at 911-12.
917 Jochem Wiers, ‘French Ideas on Climate and Trade Policies’, 2(1) Carbon & Climate Law 
Review (2008), at 25.
918 AB Report, US – Shrimp, para 136.
919 AB Report, US – Gasoline, at 17.
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or differential, would fall within the scope of Article XX(g) if they were 
adopted primarily for reducing global pollution.
The feasibility of passing the purpose test largely depends on the contribu-
tion of ‘export duties plus’ to reduce the manufacture of targeted products, 
such as those energy-intensive ones, in China. Again, as discussed above, 
this contribution is closely related to the export proportion of the targeted 
products and to the restriction on their domestic consumption. Therefore, 
although the purpose test does not require ‘export duties plus’ to be iden-
tical, different treatment may decrease the feasibility of justifying ‘export 
duties plus’ under Article XX(g). It is noteworthy that, according to the 
panel report in the 1987 Herring and Salmon case, which was referred to 
by the panel in US—Gasoline, ‘primarily aimed at the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource’ does not require a measure to be ‘necessary 
or essential’ to the conservation purpose.920 This ruling appears to suggest 
that the purpose test under paragraph XX(g) sets a lower threshold than the 
‘necessity test’ under paragraph XX(b).
Although Article XX(g) does not include a ‘necessity test’, this paragraph 
requires explicitly that China should prove ‘export duties plus’ to have been 
‘made effective in conjunction with domestic restrictions on production 
or consumption’. As the AB noted in US—Gasoline, a meaningful parallel 
domestic restriction needs to be imposed in an even-handed manner.921 This 
so-called ‘even-handedness’ requirement, however, does not necessarily 
prohibit differential ‘export duties plus’.
The China—Raw Materials decision shows that a complementary measure 
that restricts domestic production alone is not even-handed because such 
a restriction affects both foreign and domestic consumers, whereas export 
duties affect foreign consumers exclusively.922 In this context, ‘export 
duties plus’ may include a parallel restriction on domestic consumption, 
which can be fiscal in nature (e.g. consumption taxes) or quantitative (e.g. 
consumption quotas). Such a restriction on domestic consumption does not, 
however, need to be identical with export duties. In the US—Gasoline case, 
a measure that imposed greater costs on foreign producers than domestic 
producers (thereby favouring the latter over the former) was still found to 
meet the requirement of even-handedness despite having failed to pass the 
tests under the chapeau of Article XX. Indeed, as the AB stated in China – 
Rare Earths, the so-called ‘even-handedness’ requirement merely prohibits 
‘a significantly more onerous burden on foreign consumers or producers’.923
920 Panel Report, US — Gasoline, at 15.
921 AB Report, US – Gasoline, at 20-21.
922 Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para 7.465.
923 AB Report, China – Rare Earths, para 5.134.
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8.1.3 Comparing different policy spaces under Articles XX(b) and XX(g)
The above analysis shows that, compared with Article XX(b), Article XX(g) 
generally provides more policy space for adopting ‘export duties plus’. In 
terms of identical ‘export duties plus’, they would certainly meet the ‘even-
handedness’ requirement under Article XX(g). In contrast, even if ‘export 
duties plus’ domestic and foreign consumers in an identical manner, they 
might still be found to fail the necessity test under Article XX(b). In other 
words, Article XX provides China with more policy space to adopt identical 
‘export duties plus’ for reducing global pollution.
This result makes economic sense because global negative environmental 
externalities are more difficult to solve than local ones. Local environmental 
problems, such as water or soil pollution, arguably improve after a sufficient 
level of income has been reached.924 In other words, the negative impacts on 
local environments caused by trade may be outweighed by the benefits of 
trade in the long run. In contrast, global negative environmental externali-
ties may worsen as a consequence of international trade at any given level 
of income;925 for, unlike local pollution, which can be tackled at the national 
level, such pressing issues as ozone depletion, air pollution, and carbon 
emissions cannot be addressed effectively on a country-by-country basis 
because of the free rider problem.926 It is thus reasonable to provide China 
with more policy space to tackle global environmental problems.
When it comes to differential ‘export duties plus’, Article XX(g) seems 
to provide more policy space in most cases. The ‘even-handedness’ test 
requires ‘export duties plus’ to not impose ‘a significantly more onerous 
burden on foreign consumers or producers’.927 According to this standard, 
one may argue that a 1/4 difference between export duties (20%) and 
domestic charges (15%) might be permitted under Article XX(g), whereas 
a 1/2 difference (20% export duties plus 10% domestic charges) could be 
prohibited. The former one, however, might still be found to fail the neces-
sity test under Article XX(b). In this case, Article XX(g) provides more 
policy space for adopting differential ‘export duties plus’ to reduce global 
pollution. In exceptional cases where the products at issue are primarily 
consumed abroad, the ‘export duties plus’ that are not even-handed under 
Article XX(g) might nevertheless be found necessary under Article XX(b) 
(see Chart 2).
Compared with identical ‘export duties plus’, differential ‘export duties 
plus’ that are provisionally justified under Articles XX(b) or XX(g) need to 
924 Frankel (2012), above n 27, at 25.
925 Ibid.
926 Ibid.
927 Ibid.
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be further assessed under the chapeau of Article XX. The next two sections 
discuss whether those differential ‘export duties plus’ would necessarily 
constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or ‘disguised restriction 
on international trade’.
Chart 2: Different policy space under Articles XX(b) and XX(g)
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8.2 First condition of the chapeau: ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail’
After differential ‘export duties plus’ have been provisionally justified 
under Articles XX(b) or XX(g), they must further meet the requirements 
under the chapeau, the aim of which is to prevent abuse of the excep-
tions described in Article XX. These requirements have proven decisive in 
justifying a measure with a discriminatory aspect, an example being the 
US—Gasoline case, in which, although the US was permitted to impose 
certain standards on gasoline in order to protect clean air under Article 
XX(g), the gasoline rule eventually failed to meet the conditions under the 
chapeau because of its different methods applied to domestic and imported 
gasoline.928 The discussion that follows explores the feasibility of differen-
928 Another example is the Brazil—Retreaded Tyres case.
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tial ‘export duties plus’ meeting the requirements concerning ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination’.
8.2.1 Do ‘the same conditions’ prevail?
The chapeau prohibits ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail’; this language suggests that 
there are two separate conditions that could justify differential ‘export 
duties plus’. First, China would need to prove that the ‘the same conditions’ 
that prevail domestically do not prevail in in countries that are importing 
the products at issue. Alternatively, China would need to prove that the 
discrimination caused by differential ‘export duties plus’ is not ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable’. This subsection examines the feasibility of meeting the first 
condition.
That differences in the prevailing conditions in various countries are 
relevant to the analysis under the chapeau was made clear when the AB 
held in the EC—Seal Products case that the particular policy objective of 
the applicable subparagraph of Article XX provided ‘pertinent context’.929 
This interpretation appears to suggest that the conditions in China and the 
importing countries at issue could be examined in the context of the envi-
ronmental purposes of ‘export duties plus’. If the conditions prevailing in 
China and in these importing countries differ with respect to reducing local 
or global pollution, differential ‘export duties plus’ would not constitute 
discrimination within the meaning of the chapeau.
The panel in China-Rare Earths assumed that the same conditions indeed 
prevailed across China and the complaining countries in terms of the use 
of export restrictions to reduce local pollution. As a result, China’s export 
duties were found to constitute discrimination under the chapeau solely 
based on the difference in treatment accorded to products destined for 
domestic consumption and those destined for exports.930
Possible support for this assumption could be that the specific goal of 
reducing pollution generated by the production of certain products is 
served irrespective of where the products are consumed. Thus, for instance, 
the consumption of high-polluting products manufactured in China by 
either a Chinese consumer or a consumer abroad would generate the same 
amount of pollution associated with the manufacture of these products. In 
other words, at least for the purpose of reducing pollution, the conditions 
prevailing in China and in importing countries seem to be the same.
929 AB Report, EC – Seal Products, para 5.300.
930 Panel Reports, China—Rare Earths, para 7.190.
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One exception, however, might be found in the climate change regime 
where the parties listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC have explicitly 
committed to take a greater mitigation role than non-Annex I parties like 
China in light of the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsi-
bilities’. Unlike the vague and thus controversial distinction between devel-
oping and developed countries under WTO law,931 the distinction between 
Annex I and non-Annex I parties is clearly recorded in the UNFCCC.932 In 
terms of substantial commitments, for instance, all parties have committed 
to take general actions under Article 4(1) of that convention, whereas only 
Annex I parties have agreed to follow more stringent rules under Article 
4(2).933 Given the important position of the UNFCCC as a framework treaty 
for fighting climate change, it may provide ‘pertinent context’ to assess the 
conditions in China and the importing countries.934 In other words, for the 
purpose of fighting climate change, the conditions prevailing in China and 
in Annex I parties might not be the same.
That being the case, differential ‘export duties plus’ for fighting climate 
change would not constitute discrimination within the meaning of the 
chapeau. Indeed, as the AB recognized in US—Shrimp, differing conditions 
may call for different approaches.935 If, however, the conditions in China 
and the importing countries were found to be the same, China would need 
to prove that the national treatment-type discrimination associated with 
differential ‘export duties plus’ is not ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ under the 
chapeau, as is discussed as follows.
8.2.2 Is such discrimination ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’?
Once a measure is found to constitute discrimination within the meaning 
of the chapeau, it is very challenging to prove such discrimination is not 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’. At least six GATT-inconsistent measures have 
931 Anabel González, ‘Bridging the Divide between Developed and Developing Countries in 
WTO Negotiations’, PIIE, 12 March 2019, at https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-invest-
ment-policy-watch/bridging-divide-between-developed-and-developing-countries-wto 
(visited on 15 July 2019).
932 ‘Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries 
with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the 
Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States’. UNFCCC, ‘Parties & 
Observers’, at https://unfccc.int/parties-observers (visited on 15 July 2019).
933 For a comprehensive analysis of those different commitments, see Brunnée and Streck 
(2013), above n 836.
934 Scholars generally support that a proper interpretation of the chapeau should take into 
account the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. For instance, Hertel 
(2011); Mehling, van Asselt, Das, Droege and Verkuijl (2019), above n 837.
935 AB Report, US – Shrimp, para 164-65.
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been provisionally justified under Article XX,936 but only two were found 
not to constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ under the 
chapeau, namely the ban on asbestos in the EC—Asbestos case and the 
revised guidelines prohibiting the import of shrimp and shrimp products 
from non-certified countries in US—Shrimp (Article 21.5—Malaysia). Neither 
of them has a discriminatory aspect. In contrast, other such measures with 
a discriminatory aspect were eventually found to discriminate arbitrarily, 
unjustifiably, or in both respects against the products of the complaining 
WTO members.
A major challenge to justify differential ‘export duties plus’ is to articulate 
why the different treatment towards domestic and foreign consumers 
relates to the reduction of local or global pollution. In the Brazil—Retreaded 
Tyres case, although the panel acknowledged that the MERCOSUR excep-
tion and the imports of used tyres constitute discrimination, it still found 
that the measure as a whole met the requirements of the chapeau.937 In 
particular, in its analysis of the justifiability of the MERCOSUR exception 
or the court injunction under the chapeau, the panel held that, as long as 
the achievement of the environmental purpose was not ‘significantly under-
mined’ by such discriminatory aspects, they should not constitute ‘arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination’.938
This quantitative approach was later rejected by the AB on the grounds that 
there was no support for it in the text of Article XX.939 In the view of the AB, 
if the alleged rationale behind a discriminatory provision does not relate 
to the pursuit of, or would contravene, an objective that had been justified 
provisionally, the discrimination cannot be justified under the chapeau 
to any degree.940 The AB accordingly found that both the MERCOSUR 
exception and the court injunction constituted ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination’ and that the injunction in addition constituted a ‘disguised 
restriction on international trade’ because the purposes for the measures 
bore no relationship to the claimed purpose of the import ban on retreaded 
tyres relating to Article XX.941
Following this line of reasoning, differential ‘export duties plus’ would 
constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ unless China could 
prove that the discrimination against foreign consumers actually relates 
to the purpose of reducing pollution. China may not be able to succeed in 
936 US — Shrimp (DS58), US — Gasoline (DS2), EC — Asbestos (DS135), Argentina — Hides and 
Leather (DS155), Brazil—Retreaded Tyres (DS 332), and EC—Seal Products (DS 400; DS401).
937 Panel Report, Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, paras 7.356-7.357.
938 Ibid. paras 7.288-7.289; 7.348-7.349.
939 AB Report, Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, para 229 and para 239.
940 Ibid. para 228.
941 AB Report, Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, para 247 and para 251.
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most cases because, as discussed above, the reduction of pollution seems to 
be served irrespective of where the products are consumed. China might 
argue that its consumers may not be able to bear the same environmental 
costs as those in developed countries. This argument, however, does not 
seem relevant to the reduction of pollution because it is based on economic 
considerations. Moreover, such economic considerations could be accom-
modated if China chooses to impose identical ‘export duties plus’ in a less 
stringent manner. Indeed, although the Preamble to the WTO Agreement 
suggests that WTO members may adopt various approaches to protecting 
the environment ‘in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development’, it does not authorise 
China to discriminate consumers in developed countries. As a result, differ-
ential ‘export duties plus’ are prohibited in most cases.
Again, one exception might be found in the climate change regime where, 
compared with Annex I parties of the UNFCCC, China together with other 
non-Annex I parties have only made less stringent commitments. This 
difference might serve as a justification for charging a lower carbon price 
for products consumed in China. In other words, higher carbon price might 
be charged for products consumed in Annex I countries because they have 
explicitly committed to take a greater mitigation role. To effectively tackle 
carbon leakage by equalising the carbon costs among China’s exports and 
those from Annex I countries, the requirement of identical ‘export duties 
plus’, as a de facto economy-wide carbon tax, may in effect require China to 
adopt the same climate measures as those in place in Annex I countries. This 
result seems to be inconsistent with the principle of ‘common but differenti-
ated responsibilities’.942 If China chooses to impose identical ‘export duties 
plus’ in a less stringent manner, the carbon cost of Chinese exports remains 
lower compared with those from Annex I countries. The issue of carbon 
leakage is thus failed to be effectively addressed.943 Given these consider-
ations, ‘export duties plus’ might be allowed to differentiate Annex I and 
non-Annex I parties for the purpose of fighting climate change.
It has been argued that the AB appeared to have softened its zero-tolerance 
stance on measures with disconnected purposes in the EC—Seal Products 
case.944 This raises the question of whether the aforementioned economic 
considerations might be accommodated under the chapeau. In EC—Seal 
Products, to balance the public moral concerns on seal welfare and the 
942 For instance, it has been argued that any measure requiring non-Annex I countries to 
adopt mitigation policies that are ‘comparable in effect to those’ adopted by Annex I 
countries is inconsistent with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibili-
ties’ and thus cannot be justifi ed under Article XX.
943 See Chapter 6.
944 Gracia Marín Durán, ‘Measures with Multiple Competing Purposes after EC–Seal 
Products: Avoiding a Confl ict between GATT Article XX-Chapeau and Article 2.1 TBT 
Agreement’, 19(2) Journal of International Economic Law (2016).
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protection of Inuit cultural identity, the EU had banned the sale of seal and 
seal-containing products while carving out exceptions, including one for 
such products derived from hunts conducted by Inuit or other indigenous 
communities (the IC exception). The AB faulted the measure based on the 
reason that the rationale behind the IC exception was not connected to 
achieving seal welfare and other ‘additional factors’.945 This finding was in 
contrast with the earlier decision in the Brazil—Retreaded Tyres case, in which 
the AB faulted the measure based solely on the lack of connection.946 In this 
context, the additional inquiry into ‘additional factors’ might indicate that 
the AB implicitly accepted the purpose of the IC exception as legitimate. In 
other words, the EU’s ban might be justified under the chapeau despite the 
lack of a rational connection between protecting the Inuit on the one hand 
and protecting seals on the other.947 This interpretation may not, however, 
gain support from the concluding paragraph of the AB’s analysis, which 
seems to suggest that the rational connection requirement is decisive in 
determining the arbitrariness or unjustifiability of a discrimination case.948
Moreover, even if the AB were to allow a justification based on irrelevant 
purposes under the chapeau, the scope of legitimate purposes to justify 
discrimination under the chapeau would remain unclear. Bartels has 
proposed four interpretive options for justifying discrimination based on 
(i) one of the reasons set out in the subparagraphs of Article XX (even if 
the reason for such discrimination were to differ from the reason for the 
measure itself), (ii) reasons recognized elsewhere in the GATT 1994 or other 
WTO agreements, (iii) reasons recognized in international standards, and, 
least likely, (iv) legitimate objectives without reference to other normative 
considerations.949 The economic considerations behind favourable treat-
ment for Chinese consumers, however, do not appear to fall within any of 
these categories.
Although the differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I parties 
might be found relevant to fighting climate change, China may need to 
consult with its trading partners before the adoption of such differential 
‘export duties plus’. In the US — Shrimp case, the import ban on shrimp 
products was found to constitute ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ because the 
US failed to engage negotiations with other WTO members ‘with the objec-
tive of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection 
945 AB Report, EC — Seal Products, para 5.321.
946 Donald H. Regan, ‘Measures with Multiple Purposes: Puzzles from EC—Seal Products’ 
AJIL Unbound (25 June 2015); Julia Y. Qin, ‘Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives 
under WTO Law: Reflections on EC—Seal Products’ AJIL Unbound (25 June 2015); 
Bartels (2015), above n 53, at 119.
947 Bartels (2015), above n 53, at 117.
948 Durán (2016), above n 872, at 480.
949 Bartels (2015), above n 53, at 118.
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and conservation of sea’.950 The AB made it clear in the US — Shrimp(Article 
21.5— Malaysia) case that WTO members need to make serious efforts, in 
good faith, to engage in negotiations with other members.951 Such efforts 
may prevent ‘export duties plus’ from being ‘unjustifiable discrimination’.
8.2.3 Differential ‘export duties plus’ might be permitted for fighting 
climate change
This section shows that differential ‘export duties plus’ for reducing local 
or global pollution may constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ 
in most cases. On the other hand, given that Annex I parties have generally 
agreed to follow more stringent rules under the UNFCCC, ‘export duties 
plus’ might be permitted to differentiate Annex I and non-Annex I parties 
for the purpose of fighting climate change in two ways in light of the prin-
ciple of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.952
The first option for China is to argue that the same conditions do not 
prevail between China and Annex I parties. The UNFCCC, as a framework 
treaty for fighting climate change, may provide ‘pertinent context’ to this 
argument. In this way, the difference between charges on energy-intensive 
products destined for Chinese consumers and for consumers in Annex I 
countries does not even constitute ‘discrimination’ within the meaning of 
the chapeau.953 Alternatively, if differential ‘export duties plus’ are found to 
be discriminatory, China may argue that the different commitments made 
by Annex I and non-Annex I parties of the UNFCCC in light of the principle 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ serves as a justification for 
charging a higher carbon price for products consumed in Annex I countries. 
This may provide justification for the discrimination associated with differ-
ential ‘export duties plus’.
In the context of the assessment of subparagraphs (b) and (g), the differen-
tial ‘export duties plus’ that do not impose ‘a significantly more onerous 
burden’ on consumers in Annex I countries, for instance, a 1/4 difference 
between export duties (20%) and domestic charges (15%), might meet the 
first condition of the chapeau. Speculatively, as discussed in the previous 
section, the differential ‘export duties plus’ that impose ‘a significantly more 
onerous burden’ on foreign consumers might be justified under Article 
950 AB Report, US — Shrimp, para 166.
951 AB Report, US — Shrimp(Article 21.5— Malaysia), paras 115-134.
952 For a general view that a proper interpretation of the chapeau should take into account 
the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, see Hertel (2011), and 
Mehling, van Asselt, Das, Droege and Verkuijl (2019), above n 837.
953 Julia Y. Qin, ‘Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives under WTO Law: Refl ections 
on EC—Seal Products’ AJIL Unbound (25 June 2015), available at https://www.asil.
org/blogs/accommodating-divergent-policy-objectives-under-wto-law-refl ections-
ec%E2%80%94seal-products, (visited 4 December 2017).
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XX(b), provided that the products at issue are primarily consumed abroad. 
This raises the question of whether such significant level of differentiation, 
for instance, export duties (20%) together with domestic charges (5%), could 
also be justified for the purpose of fighting climate change.
Although the answer appears to be affirmative,954 such a situation can 
hardly occur. In order to effectively reduce carbon emissions, China needs 
to impose ‘export duties plus’ on a range of products. Given China’s huge 
domestic market, targeted products are very unlikely to be primarily 
consumed abroad. In this sense, the above speculation is actually irrel-
evant to the analysis of differential ‘export duties plus’ for fighting climate 
change.
After differential ‘export duties plus’ has met the first condition of the 
chapeau, they could still be found to constitute a ‘disguised restriction 
on international trade’ under the second condition. The reason is that if 
differential ‘export duties plus’ cover raw materials, the difference between 
charges on products destined for domestic consumption and those destined 
for Annex I countries could provide Chinese downstream producers with 
preferential access to industrial inputs. This issue is examined in the next 
section.
8.3 Second condition of the chapeau: ‘disguised restriction on 
international trade’
The AB in US – Gasoline implies that the concepts of ‘disguised restriction 
on international trade’ and ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ may 
overlap because the former one ‘includes disguised discrimination in 
international trade’.955 The term ‘disguised restriction’, however, has not 
been clearly defined in WTO jurisprudence. If the requirement regarding 
‘disguised restriction on international trade’ prohibits any measure that 
could potentially benefit domestic industry, then differential ‘export duties 
plus’ should perhaps exclude upstream products in order to eliminate any 
chance of favouring Chinse downstream producers. This result would, 
however, undermine the effectiveness of this measure because many 
954 This result is indeed odd because it is diffi cult to rationalize why should a measure 
targeting XX(b)-related global pollution could differentiate more than the one targeting 
XX(g)-related global pollution under the chapeau. This odd result is, however, consistent 
with case law. The fi rst condition of the chapeau is ‘qualitative’, whether a discriminatory 
aspect relates to the legitimate objective of the measure, rather than ‘quantitative’, how 
much greater a differential could be accepted (e.g. the even-handedness test). Thus, even 
though it is tempting to suggest that a measure targeting XX(b)-related global pollution 
should not be allowed to differentiate more than the one targeting XX(g)-related global 
pollution, this conclusion may not be supported by case law.
955 AB Report, United States – Gasoline, at 25.
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carbon-intensive products exposed to trade are ‘at or near the beginning of 
the value chain’.956 The following two subsections thus argue that favouring 
domestic industry is not dispositive of a violation of the second condition 
of the chapeau. That being said, however, it is equally important to address 
concerns that China might circumvent WTO rules by providing Chinese 
producers with cheaper industrial inputs. The final subsection therefore 
proposes additional limits on the use of differential ‘export duties plus’ for 
fighting climate change.
8.3.1 Distinguishing between active discrimination and passive 
discrimination
The AB held in Japan—Alcoholic Beverages that, although a protectionist aim 
is difficult to establish, the protective application of a measure can most 
often be discerned based on the ‘design, architecture and revealing struc-
ture’, which is in turn essential in determining whether a measure consti-
tutes a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’.957 The term ‘disguised 
restriction’ thus appears to suggest that a challenged measure has a mixture 
of a claimed purpose, that is, the one to be justified under the subpara-
graph and a hidden purpose that is likely to be protective.958 The question 
in light of these considerations is whether the requirement regarding 
‘disguised restrictions on international trade’ prohibits only measures with 
an entirely or primarily hidden protective purpose or should also include, 
more broadly, measures with any protective purpose, even if the hidden 
protective purpose is minor compared with the legitimate purpose.959 In the 
former case, China may still have policy space to impose differential ‘export 
duties plus’ on industrial inputs that are energy-intensive.
Relevant here is the panel’s explicit support for the former condition in 
Brazil—Retreaded Tyres. In that case, it found that, as long as the achieve-
ment of the environmental purpose of the import ban on retreaded tyres 
was not ‘significantly undermined’ by the imports of used tyres protected 
by the court injunction (and that in effect favoured domestic producers 
of retreaded tyres), the ban did not constitute a ‘disguised restriction on 
international trade’.960 In other words, the panel recognized that a measure 
should not be considered a ‘disguised restriction’ under the chapeau if 
the hidden protective purpose—in this case that associated with the court 
injunction—is minor in comparison with the environmental purpose of the 
956 Aaron Cosbey, Susanne Droege, Carolyn Fischer, Julia Reinaud, John Stephenson, Lutz 
Weischer and Peter Wooders, ‘A Guide for the Concerned: Guidance on the elaboration 
and implementation of border carbon adjustment’, entwined November 2012, at 13, 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/bca_guidance.pdf (visited on 19 August 2019).
957 AB Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, at 27-29.
958 Bartels (2015), above n 53, at 123.
959 Ibid.
960 Panel Report, Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, paras 217-219.
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import ban. This quantitative approach was, however, explicitly rejected by 
the AB in the same case.
Nevertheless, the quantitative approach might still apply to differential 
‘export duties plus’ because their discriminatory aspect differs from the 
discriminatory aspect of the measure at issue in Brazil—Retreaded Tyres. 
Unlike in the latter case, in which the Brazilian government through the 
court injunction rendered its import ban on used tyres discriminatory, the 
discriminatory aspect of export duties is inherent, requiring the adoption of 
a complementary measure to counter this effect. Such passively discrimina-
tory side effects, it could be argued, deserve a more lenient approach. As 
the panel held in EC—Asbestos, favouring domestic industry is ‘a natural 
consequence of prohibiting a given product and in itself cannot justify the 
conclusion that the measure has a protectionist aim, as long as it remains 
within certain limits’.961 In this context, differential ‘export duties plus’ 
could be allowed to target industrial inputs if they are adopted primarily 
for fighting climate change.
8.3.2 The irrelevance of the hidden protectionist aim
Alternatively, as the following analysis shows, the AB does not even need to 
consider the hidden protective purpose of China’s export duties under the 
chapeau. It is noteworthy that the AB has never tried to determine whether 
a measure at issue has a hidden protective aim under the chapeau. The AB 
in the US—Gasoline case, in finding that the discriminatory aspect of cost 
considerations constituted a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’,962 
criticized the ‘omission’ on the part of the US in failing to account for the 
costs to foreign refiners.963 Similarly, in the Brazil—Retreaded Tyres case, 
when the AB found that the imports of used tyres, as raw materials in the 
production of retreaded tyres, constituted a ‘disguised restriction on inter-
national trade’ owing to the court injunction discussed earlier, it faulted 
the rationale for the disconnection of the injunction from the purpose of 
protecting public health rather than hiding a protective aim, namely to 
promote the domestic retreaded tyres industry.
961 Panel Report, EC — Asbestos, para 8.239.
962 In the US—Gasoline case, the US, as part of an effort to prevent and control air pollution, 
had adopted the Clean Air Act, which required its Environmental Protection Agency 
to establish an individual and a statutory baseline for gasoline. Under this regime, 
domestic gasoline was subject to the individual baseline, while imported gasoline was 
automatically subject to the statutory baseline except under certain conditions. To justify 
the discriminatory aspect of the gasoline baselines under the chapeau, the US argued that 
it would have been impossible in terms of cost for domestic refi ners to meet the statutory 
baselines. This argument was rejected by the AB, which found that the US had failed to 
account for the same cost considerations for foreign refi ners.
963 Ibid., US – Gasoline, at 29.
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A similar approach can also be found in other jurisdictions. In CJEU juris-
prudence, for instance, the Ladbrokes case concerns a measure reserved a 
gambling licence to a single operator for the combined aims of preventing 
gambling addiction and fighting fraud.964 Although the two purposes could 
be justified under Article 52 TFEU, there was concern that the Member 
States might use these purposes of as a mask for protectionism which 
results in ‘arbitrary state monopolisation’.965 The court, however, did not 
try to examine the potential protectionist aim of the measure at issue but 
looked only at the most suitable purposes of the measure.966 The ruling 
in the Ladbrokes case thus allowed a Member State to provide gambling 
services relating to fighting fraud as long as this function did not under-
mine the purpose of preventing addiction.967 One possible reason behind 
the reluctance of the AB or CJEU to look into the measure’s hidden protec-
tive aim could be that doing so would place an undue burden of proof on 
the party to demonstrate the existence or nonexistence of a protectionist aim 
in a measure ‘which sometimes can be indiscernible’.968
For the same reason, the panel and the AB in the past refused to examine 
the ‘regulatory intent’ and thus rejected the ‘aim-and-effect’ approach. 
In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, the panel criticized the ‘aim-and-effect’ 
approach for its ‘important repercussion on the burden of proof imposed on 
the complainant’ because the burden was on the complainant to prove the 
protectionist aim of a measure. The panel found it difficult to evaluate the 
determinative aims of the measure owing to the common practice regarding 
‘a multiplicity of aims that are sought through enactment of legislation’.969 
This rejection was then implicitly affirmed by the AB in the same case.970 
Therefore, should differential ‘export duties plus’ on industrial inputs 
be justified provisionally and do not constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination’, the AB may choose not to examine their hidden protec-
tionist purpose under the chapeau.
964 Case C-258/08 Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming and Ladbrokes International [2010] ECR 
I-4757. See Stefaan Van den Bogaert and Armin Cuyvers, ‘“Money for nothing”: The case 
law of the EU Court of Justice on the regulation of gambling’, 48(4) Common Market Law 
Review (2011), at 1202.
965 Justin Franssen and Frank Tolboom, ‘Practical Implications Of The Santa Casa Judgment’, 
in Alan Littler, Nele Hoekx, Cyrille J.C.F. Fijnaut, and Alain-Laurent Verbeke (eds), ‘In the 
Shadow of Luxembourg: EU and National Developments in the Regulation of Gambling’, (Brill, 
2011), at 96.
966 Stefaan Van den Bogaert and Armin Cuyvers, ‘“Money for nothing”: The case law of the 
EU Court of Justice on the regulation of gambling’, 48(4) Common Market Law Review 
(2011), at 1208. 
967 Ibid. at 1202.
968 Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.16.
969 Ibid., para. 6.16.
970 AB Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, at 115.
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8.3.3 Additional limits on the use of differential ‘export duties plus’
Admittedly, the above analysis does not sufficiently address an important 
concern that China might circumvent WTO rules by exclusively targeting 
carbon-intensive industrial inputs. In this way, differential ‘export duties 
plus’ may unfairly benefit Chinese downstream producers. To prevent 
China from abusing such policy space, this thesis proposes additional limits 
on the use of differential ‘export duties plus’ for fighting climate change in 
two scenarios (see Chart 3).
First, China may adopt differential ‘export duties plus’ as part of its 
climate initiative. In this scenario, the second condition of the chapeau may 
prohibit an exclusive coverage of upstream products. Objective criteria 
should instead be used to define the coverage of goods in the ‘export duties 
plus’ regime. A good example is the recommended criteria for carbon-
outsourcing countries, namely carbon intensity and trade sensitivity, to 
decide scope of their BTAs.971 Differential ‘export duties plus’ thus should 
cover both upstream and downstream products from sectors with high 
carbon intensity and trade exposure. This additional limit would prevent 
China from cherry-picking the carbon-intensive products that could poten-
tially benefit Chinese downstream producers.
Second, differential ‘export duties plus’ may be adopted to counter a BTA. 
In this scenario, the second condition of the chapeau may require China to 
adopt its countermeasure in accordance with the scope of the BTA. The EU 
in 2019 issued a list of sectors that ‘shall be deemed to be at risk of carbon 
leakage for the period 2021 to 2030’.972 If the EU decides to impose a BTA 
on China’s exports from the listed sectors, ‘export duties plus’ should at 
least cover those products. If the EU decides to adopt its BTA on a narrower 
scope of sectors,973 to achieve a more ambitious climate target, China 
may also go beyond the coverage of the EU BTA, provided that the broad 
coverage of goods is defined in accordance with the objective criteria as 
discussed above.
971 Cosbey (2012), above n 885, at 13.
972 Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2019/708 of 15 February 2019 supplementing 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
determination of sectors and subsectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage for the period 
2021 to 2030 (Text with EEA relevance.), L 120/20, 8 May 2019, at https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D0708&from=EN (visited on 19 
August 2019).
973 It has been argued that BTAs should avoid over-broad sectoral coverage. See Cosbey 
(2012), above n 885, at 13.
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Chart 3: Feasibility of justifying differential ‘export duties plus’ under the chapeau
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8.4 A reality check on China’s environmental policies targeting 
consumption
The above analysis shows that the feasibility of justifying ‘export duties 
plus’ largely relies on the degree of restriction on Chinese consumption. On 
the one hand, if ‘export duties plus’ treat domestic and foreign consumers in 
an identical manner, there is a good chance of justifying them under Article 
XX. If, on the other hand, fewer charges are imposed on products destined 
for domestic consumption, such differential ‘export duties plus’ might 
only be justified for the purpose of fighting climate change. An overview 
of China’s environmental policies is thus offered here in order to identify 
the existing environmental measures that target consumption. This analysis 
serves in turn as a basis for policy recommendations.
To begin with, a major goal of China’s environmental policies is to reach the 
targets set out in China’s Five-Year Plan.974 The Guidelines of the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) included three specific targets for pollution 
reduction: the air pollutant sulphur dioxide (SO2); chemical oxygen demand 
(COD), which is a useful measure of water pollution; and GDP per unit of 
energy use, or ‘energy intensity’. The Guidelines of the Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan (2011-2015) added another four reduction targets: ammoniacal nitrogen 
(N-NH3), which is a useful measure of water pollution; nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), a generic term for the forms of these compounds that contribute 
significantly to air pollution; greenhouse gases per capita and per unit of 
974 For further information, see Chapter 5.
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GDP, or ‘carbon intensity’; and the proportion of primary energy consump-
tion represented by non-fossil energy, or ‘non-fossil energy consumption’.975 
These changes were followed in the Guidelines of the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan (2016-2020).
The central government distributes those pollution reduction targets to 
each region. Thus, for instance, in accordance with the national reduction 
targets established in the Guidelines of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-
2015), the 2011 General Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Pollutant 
Discharge Reduction and the 2011 Work Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Control set the air and water pollution quotas, energy intensity reduction 
targets, and carbon intensity levels for 32 regions for the period from 2011 to 
2015.976 The 2016 General Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Pollutant 
Discharge Reduction in addition specifies energy consumption quotas for 
the 32 regions and an energy-intensity reduction target for various types of 
industry.
These regional targets are further distributed to each producer, with partic-
ular attention to those from the so-called ‘high-polluting and high-energy 
consumption’ industries. To increase the enforcement of these reduction 
targets, a new provision was added to the Environmental Protection Law of 
the People’s Republic of China in 2014 that requires the establishment of a 
pollution permission management system under which companies can only 
discharge pollutants in accordance with their permissions.977 This manage-
ment system was implemented at the end of 2016 in accordance with a 
notice from the State Council requiring companies in the thermal power and 
paper industries to apply for pollution permissions.978 In 2017, companies 
from major high-polluting industries began to be covered under this pollu-
tion permission management system.979 The reduction of carbon emissions, 
by contrast, has been regulated under China’s national emissions trading 
system since 2017. This system sets carbon emission quotas for companies 
involved in the petrochemical, chemical, building materials, steel, nonfer-
975 Guidelines of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), adopted on 14 March 2011, avail-
able at http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838_2.htm, (visited 4 December 2017).
976 Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Work Plan on Controlling Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions during the Period of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), adopted on 
1 December 2011, available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-01/13/content_2043645.
htm, (visited 4 December 2017).
977 Article 45 of the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China.
978 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the 
Implementation Plan of the Permit for Control of Emission of Pollutants, adopted on 
10 November 2016, available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-11/21/
content_5135510.htm, (visited 4 December 2017).
979 Ibid.
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rous metals, paper, electricity, or aviation industries that consume energy 
equivalent to more than 10,000 tons of standard coal.980
In addition to the above quantitative restrictions, China also requires 
companies to pay pollution fees. The recently introduced Environmental 
Protection Tax Law calls for the replacement of pollution fees by environ-
mental protection taxes, which are easier to enforce. 981 These taxes are 
applied to four main categories of taxable items, including air pollutants, 
water pollutants, solid waste, and noise pollution.982 The scheme of envi-
ronmental protection taxes is, however, unlikely to be extended to carbon 
emissions as suggested by China’s Minister of Finance.983
Although the above measures may generally increase the environmental 
costs in China, none of them, however, serves to specifically restrict Chinese 
consumption. To target consumption, one quantitative option is to restrict 
the access of firms in China to certain products. Thus, for instance, in late 
2014, the Ministries of Commerce, Environmental Protection, and Industry 
and Information Technology issued Green Purchasing Guidelines to 
encourage the consumption of environment-friendly and energy-saving 
raw materials, products, and services, such as those certified by the China 
Environmental United Certification Center and China Energy Conservation 
Program.984 Article 15 of this measure explicitly discourages companies 
from purchasing products on the Environmentally Unfriendly List and 
other high-polluting and high-energy-consumption products, though 
this directive is not legally binding.985 China may consider making these 
requirements mandatory.
With respect to fiscal restrictions on Chinese consumption, it is noteworthy 
that the consumption of recycled industrial inputs is encouraged in China 
in the form of a VAT rebate in order to conserve natural resources and 
reduce pollution and carbon emissions. In 2015, the Ministry of Finance 
980 Notice of the General Office of the State Development and Reform Commission on 
Earnestly Enhancing the Key Work of Starting the Emission Trading Market in China, 
available at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201601/t20160122_772123.html, 
(visited 4 December 2017).
981 The Environmental Protection Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on 25 
December 2016, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2016-12/25/
content_2004993.htm, (visited 4 December 2017).
982 Ibid., Article 43.
983 Xinhuanet, ‘China will not specifi cally tax carbon emissions’, available at http://energy.
people.com.cn/n1/2016/0321/c71661-28214363.html, (visited 4 December 2017).
984 Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Environmental Protection and Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, issuing the Green Purchasing Guideline, available at 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/h/redht/201412/20141200846975.shtml, (visited 
4 December 2017).
985 Article 15 of the Green Purchasing Guideline.
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and the State Administration of Taxation provided recyclers a VAT rebate 
ranging from 30% to 100% relating to the use of various recycled indus-
trial inputs, such as ferrous scrap.986 However, although this favourable 
tax treatment may provide producers in China with incentives to increase 
resource utilization, it may not adequately restrict Chinese consumption of 
high-polluting and high-energy-consumption products.
In contrast, the experience with the consumption tax in China suggests a 
more effective alternative for restricting domestic consumption of high-
polluting and high-energy-consumption products. The NDRC thus in 2013 
called for the inclusion of those products within the scope of consumption 
taxes as a means to fulfil targets for reducing pollution and carbon emis-
sions.987 Following this suggestion, certain batteries and coatings with high 
levels of volatile organic compounds have since 2015 been added to prod-
ucts covered by China’s consumption tax at a rate of 5% in order to reduce 
pollution and carbon emissions.988 The Guidelines of the Thirteenth Five-
Year Plan (2016-2020) call for continued improvements in China’s consump-
tion tax system,989 and one interpretation of this commitment might be to 
cover more high-polluting and high-energy-consumption products.990
8.5 Conclusions
There is a good chance of justifying identical ‘export duties plus’ under 
Article XX for the purposes of reducing local pollution under subparagraph 
(b) or global pollution under subparagraph (g). Compared with Article 
XX(b), Article XX(g) provides more policy space because identical ‘export 
duties plus’ would certainly meet the ‘even-handedness’ requirement. Such 
‘export duties plus’ might, however, fail the necessity test under Article 
XX(b) if, for instance, a less trade-restrictive alternative is available. Article 
XX(g) thus provides China with more policy space to adopt identical ‘export 
duties plus’ for targeting global pollution.
986 Favourable Value-added tax List of Products and Services Concerning Comprehensive 
Utilization of Resources, available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/
c1703758/content.html, (visited 4 December 2017).
987 Notice of National Development and Reform Commission on Enhancing its Work to 
Ensure Targets and Objectives of Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in 2013, avail-
able at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201308/t20130827_555124.html, (visited 4 
December 2017).
988 Circular on Consumption Taxes on Battery Coatings, available at http://www.mof.gov.
cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/wg2015/wg201503/201507/t20150722_1344546.
html, (visited 4 December 2017).
989 Chapter 15 Section 3 of the Guidelines of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020).
990 Xinhuanet, ‘The Next Step of Tax Reform in China: Consumption Tax’, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-08/04/c_1121428785.htm, (visited 4 Decem -
ber 2017).
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In contrast, differential ‘export duties plus’ would be generally prohibited 
under Article XX because they discriminate against foreign consumers. On 
the one hand, although Articles XX(b) and XX(g) do not necessarily require 
identical treatment, more charges on products for export could incentivise 
Chinese consumption. This result would undermine the effectiveness 
of ‘export duties plus’ to reduce pollution and thus decrease chance of 
justifying them. In most cases, Article XX(g) seems to provide more policy 
space.991
If, on the other hand, differential ‘export duties plus’ are provisionally 
justified under Articles XX(b) or XX(g), they would generally fail to satisfy 
the first condition of the chapeau which prohibits ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’. As an 
exception, however, ‘export duties plus’ might be permitted to differentiate 
Annex I and non-Annex I parties for the purpose of fighting climate change 
because Annex I parties have agreed to follow more stringent rules in light 
of the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ under the 
UNFCCC. China thus may argue that ‘the same conditions’ do not prevail 
between China and Annex I parties. Alternatively, the discrimination 
against Annex I parties might be found not ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ 
because the more stringent commitments made by those parties could serve 
as a justification for charging a higher carbon price for products consumed 
there.
That being said, however, it is equally important to address concerns 
that China might use differential ‘export duties plus’ to provide Chinese 
downstream producers with favourable access to industrial inputs and thus 
circumvent WTO rules. This concern could be addressed by the second 
condition of the chapeau regarding ‘disguised restriction on international 
trade’, which has not been clearly defined in WTO jurisprudence. This 
requirement may prohibit China from exclusively targeting carbon-
intensive upstream products. For the purpose of fighting climate change, 
differential ‘export duties plus’ should instead cover both upstream and 
downstream products from sectors with high carbon cost and trade sensi-
tivity.
Finally, a reality check on China’s environmental policies shows that 
domestic consumption has not been adequately restricted for environmental 
purposes. This situation is understandable because, given the China – Raw 
Materials and China – Rare Earths decisions that absolutely prohibit China’s 
export duties, the sole restriction on Chinese consumption may induce 
companies to produce more high-polluting or energy-intensive products 
991 In exceptional cases where the products at issue are primarily consumed abroad, the 
‘export duties plus’ that are not even-handed under Article XX(g) might nevertheless be 
found necessary under Article XX(b). For further information, see Section 8.1.
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for foreign consumers.992 This is no longer a concern, however, because, 
as suggested in this thesis, ‘export duties plus’ could be part of China’s 
demand-side environmental policies. A feasible option for restricting 
domestic consumption could involve broadening the existing scope of 
products that are subject to consumption taxes.
992 It has been argued that China may use quotas to restrict export. However, ‘While it is 
possible to construct a policy package that uses an export quota in conjunction with 
consumption taxes, such a package would require continual adjustment of policies in 
response to changes in market conditions to avoid discriminatory outcomes.’ See Bond 
and Trachtman (2016) above n 147, at 202. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, given 
the three major disadvantages of quantitative restrictions compared with duties, such 
arguments do not seem to make economic sense as well.

9 Implications of ‘Greening’ the WTO Ban 
on China’s Export Duties
This thesis was designed to answer the questions of whether China 
should be allowed to use export duties as part of demand-side policies for 
environmental protection and, if so, how to provide the necessary policy 
space despite the prohibitions affirmed in the China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths decisions. The short answer to the first question is in 
the affirmative, for export duties have the potential to address both local 
and global environmental concerns under certain circumstances. Moreover, 
China’s recent practice, in particular its prioritization of environmental 
concerns with regard to export duties in its most recent five-year plan, 
seems to suggest that the country could adopt these duties as a genuine 
environmental measure especially in the context of climate change. This 
consideration leads to the second question, regarding how the absolute ban 
on China’s export duties might be rendered more flexible. It indeed appears 
possible to ‘green’ the WTO ban, though doing so would likely be quite 
challenging. The final chapter to the thesis discusses the major implications 
of the findings. The discussion begins with a review of the findings of the 
previous chapters in order to draw lessons regarding how best to address 
trade-related environmental concerns and avoid extreme judicial outcomes. 
Next, in Section 9.2, the interpretative techniques employed by other tribu-
nals to temper the rigidity of stare decisis are identified as a moderate alter-
native response to the AB crisis within the WTO framework. In Section 9.3, 
some of the findings are presented as a basis for the creation of mechanisms 
that would prevent China from abusing the proposed ‘export duties plus’. 
Lastly, in Section 9.4, it is argued that the very possibility of ‘greening’ the 
absolute ban on China’s export duties does not only indicate that the WTO 
is not standing in the way of environmental protection but also encourage 
global efforts to combat climate change.
9.1 Lessons for addressing trade-related environmental 
concerns
In this section, the discussion focuses on the key lessons of the conflict 
between China and its trading partners, in particular regarding ways to 
address trade-related environmental concerns that could, in turn, inform 
future cooperative efforts to deal with cross-border issues. The first lesson 
is that addressing trade-related environmental concerns often requires the 
balancing of environmental and economic interests—and that doing so can 
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require some finesse. Second, environmental justification should not be 
used to circumvent WTO rules; this may provoke extreme responses. Third, 
because it could prove costly and difficult to moderate extreme outcomes, 
this path should probably be avoided.
9.1.1 Balancing environmental and economic interests
Environmental measures often have negative economic effects that elicit 
opposition, especially from developing countries. A feasible pollution 
control measure, therefore, must take economic considerations into account 
if it is to garner public support. In fact, when it comes to addressing global 
environmental concerns, even for countries with advanced economies such 
as the EU and the US, economic interests play an important role. Thus, for 
instance, various proposed carbon border tax adjustments have included 
free emissions allowances or even export rebates designed to address the 
issues of carbon emission outsourcing and competitiveness simultane-
ously.993
While the influence of economic considerations does not necessarily 
delegitimise an environmental measure, policymakers need to prevent 
non-environmental considerations from outweighing environmental goals. 
A recent empirical study has shown, for instance, that China at one point 
reduced export VAT refund rates in earnest as a type of demand-side 
control measure that ‘discourages exports of waste water, ammonium 
nitrogen, SO2 and energy intensive products’.994 Export duties, however, 
being a similar instrument, have been more often ‘motivated by an attempt 
to protect downstream producers in China’.995 Indeed, a textual analysis of 
the Guidelines of China’s Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plans (covering 
the years 2006-2010 and 2011-2015) suggests that, in the past, the country 
imposed export duties on so-called ‘high-energy-intensive, high-pollution, 
and resources-based’ products primarily as a means to pursue industrial 
purposes.996 A more environment-oriented policy would have also 
restricted the domestic consumption of those products.
Although the aforementioned duties were not primarily adopted for envi-
ronmental purposes, some of them might have helped reduce pollution 
up to a point. Especially in the context of climate change, China’s export 
duties on steel, aluminium, coal, chemical products, and fertilizers were 
applauded by some commentators, who see their potential to tackle the 
993 Madison Condon and Ada Ignaciuk, ‘Border Carbon Adjustment and International 
Trade: A Literature Review’, No. 6 OECD Working Paper (2013), at 4.
994 Sabrina Eisenbarth, ‘Is Chinese Trade Policy Motivated by Environmental Concerns?’, 82 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2017), at 95.
995 Ibid., at 96.
996 For further information, see Chapter 5.
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problem of carbon leakage in China as the largest emitter and exporter 
of carbon dioxide emissions.997 Those positive environmental effects may 
have incentivized China to try its luck under Article XX. For China, while 
its export duties were not environment-oriented, they might have indeed 
reduced the pollution associated with the manufacture of targeted prod-
ucts.998 Based on those good side-effects, China was trying to glamorize its 
duties.
9.1.2 Hard cases make bad law
China’s questionable litigation tactic thus provoked the complaining 
governments to ‘minimize China’s chances of prevailing’ by denying its 
right to impose export duties in a manner consistent with Article XX.999 This 
was an obvious tit-for-tat response, for the complainants could have based 
their arguments ‘on the merits of China’s contention that its export duties 
were justified for environmental reasons’.1000 Article XX provides fairly 
strict tests that could be used to prevent China from using the duties for 
protectionist purposes; thus the duties at issue in the China—Raw Materials 
and China—Rare Earths cases did not even pass the first-tier test under 
Article XX.
The extreme stance of the complaining governments also steered these cases 
away from a conventional issue—namely the design of an environmental 
measure so as to meet the requirements under Article XX—and towards a 
very controversial issue—the applicability of Article XX to China’s WTO-
plus commitments. The panel and the AB, apparently swayed by the uncon-
vincing nature of China’s arguments, ruled in favour of the complaining 
governments.
This outcome has incurred strong criticism over the unfairness, especially 
given that most WTO members remain free to impose duties on exports for 
any purpose.1001 More importantly, this thesis shows that an absolute ban 
on China export duties would also have negative environmental impacts. 
The practice of WTO members shows that export duties can be useful to 
reduce local or global pollution under certain circumstances, possibly 
because the theoretically first-best environmental policies are not always 
feasible in financial or practical terms. The environmental regulatory 
997 For further information, see Chapter 6.
998 For instance, China adduces two empirical studies in China – Raw Materials which show 
that ‘elimination of the export duty of 20% on manganese metal would imply an increase 
in production by 4.28%’; ‘eliminating the 40% export duty on coke would increase 
domestic production of coke by 2.2%’. Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, paras 7.519-
7.520.
999 Bronckers and Maskus (2014), above n 19, at 402.
1000 Ibid.
1001 For further information, see Chapter 3.
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autonomy with respect to export duties is thus always preserved for WTO 
members at both the multilateral and regional levels.1002 For instance, the 
EU’s proposal generally prohibiting the use of export duties did recognize 
the environmental regulatory autonomy of WTO members by incorporating 
Article XX.
An investigation of the actual motives behind China’s export duties shows 
that those duties could be part of China’s climate policy to curtail carbon 
leakage.1003 Although this problem could also be addressed by duties on the 
carbon-intensive imports from China, this type of solution has never been 
put into practice largely owing to well-founded fear of sparking a trade 
war. Thus the potential role of China’s export duties has been encouraged 
by a number of climate studies including the well-known Stern Review on 
the economics of climate change, its follow-up article, and a World Bank 
research paper, especially in the context of China as ‘the world’s most 
unbalanced virtual emissions’ trader, for its emissions associated with its 
exports being eight times those associated with its imports. 1004 In this sense, 
the absolute ban on China’s export duties would risk undermining interna-
tional cooperation on climate change and thus serves as a good example of 
the lawyer’s adage that ‘hard cases make bad law’.
9.1.3 Moderation of extreme judicial outcomes is possible but would be 
difficult
With regard to expanding the desirable policy space in light of the China—
Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions, this thesis provides a 
comprehensive assessment of the feasibility of moderating the absolute 
ban on such duties through either a judicial or a political approach.1005 The 
conclusions reached are that the AB’s decisions are not easily altered and 
that considerably more effort would be required to temper the negative 
environmental implications of the ban than would have been required to 
avoid producing the ban in the first place.
A judicial approach requires a new interpretation to alter the absolute ban 
on China’s export duties. Given that the AB has never, in its more than 20 
years of jurisprudence, explicitly reversed itself, a more nuanced approach 
has been proposed in this thesis that draws a line between duties that 
are applied exclusively to exports on the one hand and so-called ‘export 
duties plus’, which are adopted in conjunction with corresponding but not 
identical restrictions on domestic consumption, on the other. By permit-
ting China to justify the use of ‘export duties plus’ under Article XX, this 
1002 For further information, see Chapter 4.
1003 For further information, see Chapter 5.
1004 For further information, see Chapter 6.
1005 For further information, see Chapter 7.
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interpretation would moderate the negative environmental impact of the 
absolute ban.
Admittedly, such a judicial correction would still require the AB to go 
beyond its preferred strict textual approach. Such a move could incur oppo-
sition from WTO members that distrust China, something that the AB may 
prefer to avoid, especially at this moment when, as discussed, the process 
by which its members are appointed and reappointed has been blocked 
by the US for more than two years. To the extent, however, that the AB’s 
membership crisis is the result of US concerns over its interpretations of 
certain cases, the AB (when it is still functional) could rely on the distin-
guishing technique as a less aggressive way to correct judicial decisions 
within the WTO framework. If the AB were in this way to support the more 
nuanced approach—the one that implicitly departs from the absolute ban 
on China’s export duties—it would perhaps paradoxically send a positive 
message to the US of its willingness to engage in self-correction should a 
WTO member provide it with sufficient reasons to do so. A detailed account 
of how use of distinguishing technique could help to resolve the AB crisis is 
discussed in Section 9.2.
Given the AB’s membership crisis, it is probably not the best time to rely 
on a judicial approach. In terms of political solutions, China could follow 
the lead of Mongolia, which made a successful request in 2007 for a 
waiver of its export duty commitments on raw cashmere for the purpose 
of responding to ‘extensive environmental damages and desertification’ 
by limiting the growth of goat herds.1006 China’s chances of obtaining such 
a waiver would, however, be relatively small in practice given the WTO’s 
de facto consensus requirement. Thus China would also need to convince 
the parties that prevailed in China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earths to 
view its export duties, not as a means to protect domestic industry, but 
in a new light, as a policy instrument designed to curb environmentally 
destructive practices. The argument here has been that China’s best chance 
for success in this effort would be to apply for a collective waiver allowing 
for the adoption of all climate policies that could potentially violate WTO 
rules. The disadvantage of such a waiver is that, as observed earlier, it could 
carry the unwelcome political implication that WTO law generally prevents 
China, and other countries, from protecting the environment in the absence 
of a supplementary agreement.
While waivers could be useful as a stopgap measure, China may request 
amendments or authoritative interpretations as a long-term solution in 
order to better accommodate the climate considerations.1007 The latter one is 
1006 Communication from Mongolia, ‘Request for a Waiver ’, on 26 January 2007, 
G/C/W/571.
1007 Dröge (2009), above n 225, at 68.
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recommended because it is more flexible than amendments which generally 
require formal acceptance.1008 But, given the deep unpopularity of authori-
tative interpretations in practice, China is advised to avoid the discussion of 
whether authoritative interpretations are a proper instrument to correct the 
China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions. Alternatively, it may 
request the Ministerial Conference to take a decision updating its accession 
protocol regarding the use of export duties to protect the environment as a 
‘fudge’.1009 To make such updates more acceptable to the victorious parties 
in the two cases, they may avoid explicitly contradicting the China—Raw 
Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions but rather to distinguish them by 
drawing a line between export duties and ‘export duties plus’. Moreover, 
in order to make such updates even more attractive to the WTO’s member-
ship at large, they could also include a redefinition of other commitments in 
China’s accession protocol such as subsidies or technology transfer.
9.2 Loosening the grip of precedent within the WTO’s legal 
framework
In addition to shedding light on the ‘greening’ the absolute ban on China’s 
export duties, the analysis of the feasibility of various options for correcting 
an AB decision serves to identify ways to resolve the persistent blocking 
of the appointment of AB members by the US. The latter country’s actions 
in this regard have had a detrimental impact on the operation of WTO’s 
dispute-resolution mechanism for the obvious reason that it is resulting in 
a shortage of AB members. The minimum number of members to review 
a case on appeal is three. Should the US continue to prevent any new 
members from joining the board, only one will be left by 10 December 2019.
The US has justified its obstructionism in this regard with reference to 
‘systemic concerns’ over the ‘adjudicative approach and proper role’ of the 
AB in certain cases.1010 Thus, for example, a 2016 US statement blocking the 
reappointment of an AB member raised concerns regarding both the obiter 
1008 As discussed in Chapter 7, it has been argued that China’s accession protocol could be 
seen as a bilateral treaty between China and the WTO.  In this scenario, once the WTO as 
a contracting party agrees to amend China’s export duty commitments, no such further 
formal acceptance as ratifi cation by individual WTO members would be required. This 
alternative reading, however, comes with a considerable degree of uncertainty because 
neither Article X (Amendments) nor Article XII specifi es the procedure for amendments 
to an accession protocol.
1009 For general discussion of the decision-making in the WTO, see Pieter (2009) and Footer 
(2006), above n 851.
1010 Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
Geneva, 23 May 2016, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_stat-
ment_dsbmay16_e.pdf (visited on 1 January 2019).
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dicta in AB reports1011 and the AB’s approach to reviewing WTO members’ 
domestic laws.1012 The US, then, has generally criticized the AB for failing 
to perform its assigned role under WTO law, at least in certain cases. An 
analysis of the merit of these concerns is, however, beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
The discussion here takes up a more general issue, namely the WTO’s prec-
edent system, which the US raised at the beginning of 2018. This issue plays 
an important role in the current AB crisis in relation to fears on the part of 
the US that the AB’s allegedly incorrect interpretations would be further 
exacerbated by the de facto stare decisis regime underlying the WTO’s dispute 
resolution mechanisms.1013 In other words, owing to the rule of precedent 
in the WTO, what the US views as a problematic approach would impact 
future cases. So it was that, late in 2018, the US even began to challenge the 
precedential value of the AB’s decisions at the DSB meeting.1014 From the 
perspective of the US, the AB’s decisions cannot be treated as precedent 
under WTO law.
However, even the US has recognized that the AB’s decisions ‘can provide 
valuable clarification of the covered agreements’.1015 In this sense, complete 
dismissal of the precedential value of the AB’s decisions would inevitably 
undermine their capacity to clarify WTO law, thereby further rendering 
interpretation inconsistent.1016 Put another way, legal clarification would 
obviously be of no benefit in future cases if it were limited to the case at 
hand. This result seems to be contrary to the mandate of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system, which calls for ‘providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system’.1017
1011 Ibid., at 3
1012 Ibid.
1013 Tetyana Payosova, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Jeffrey J. Schott, ‘The Dispute Settlement 
Crisis in the World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures’, March 2018, https://piie.
com/system/fi les/documents/pb18-5.pdf (visited on 1 January 2019).
1014 Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
Geneva, 18 December 2018, https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/
sites/290/Dec18.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.fi n_.public.pdf (visited on 1 January 2019).
1015 Offi ce of the United States Trade Representative, ‘2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 
Annual Report’, March 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/
Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.PDF, (visited on 1 January 
2019), at 28
1016 Simon Lester, ‘What Is the Precedential Value of Appellate Body Reports?’, 1 March 
2018, https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/what-is-the-preceden-
tial-value-of-appellate-body-reports.html, (visited on 1 January 2019).
1017 ‘The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system’. Article 3.2 of the DSU.
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Indeed, one of the problems of the old GATT dispute settlement system, 
which did not include the AB, was inconsistency among the clarifications 
provided in panel reports.1018 To avoid this outcome, WTO members, 
including the US, have frequently cited AB reports in their submissions in 
what amounts to a clear recognition of their precedential value in ensuring 
that clarifications remain consistent.
This perception echoed during the reform negotiations of the investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) system, which in its current form has been 
criticized for ‘inconsistency and lack of coherence’ in regard to its arbitral 
awards to an extent that could further undermine ‘the reliability, effec-
tiveness and predictability of the ISDS regime and its credibility’.1019 The 
consensus decision from the US and other UNCITRAL members last year 
to move forward in considering possible ISDS reforms shows that the US 
seeks a precedent system that, on the one hand, avoids ‘unjustified incon-
sistency’ and, on the other, accommodates ‘divergent decisions’ justified by 
‘for example, rules of treaty interpretation or different facts and evidence 
before the tribunal’.1020 The reasoning is that ‘in certain cases you may have 
the same treaty, same provision, and you may have different treatment of 
it’.1021 However, given that the AB has both upheld all of its prior decisions, 
at least explicitly, and also repeatedly reversed decisions by the panel that 
have departed from the AB’s reports, the US has reason to suspect that the 
AB would not support a more nuanced precedent system. Therefore, in 
order to create a situation in which ‘divergent decisions’ are available, the 
US has sought to deny the precedent system in the WTO as a whole, even 
at the cost of interpretative consistency, though it could have made good 
use of authoritative interpretations as a means to correct judicial interpre-
tation.1022
It has been demonstrated in this thesis that the US could achieve its objec-
tive of allowing for interpretations that, while reasonably divergent, are not 
so divergent as to undermine the predictability of the WTO system. The 
technique of distinguishing, which has been commonly used by tribunals at 
the international, regional, and national levels, has the dual benefits of, on 
the one hand, injecting valuable flexibility into the WTO’s precedent system 
1018 Lester (2018), above n 983.
1019 UNCITRAL, ‘Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS): Consistency 
and related matters’, 28 August 2018, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commis-
sion/working_groups/3Investor_State.html (visited on 1 January 2019), at 3.
1020 Ibid., at 2.
1021 Anthea Roberts, ‘UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Consistency, Predict-
ability and Correctness’, 5 June 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-
reforms-concerns-about-consistency-predictability-and-correctness/ (visited on 1 
January 2019).
1022 Only one request has yet been made for an authoritative interpretation which was 
rejected by the US itself.
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and, on the other, not requiring the AB to depart explicitly from its previous 
decisions. Thus, were the US to prove a divergent interpretation to be justi-
fied based on, for instance, new facts and evidence, the AB could distin-
guish its prior decisions. In this way, the AB’s legal clarifications would be 
consistent by default, thereby ensuring the security and predictability of 
the WTO system. Furthermore, this technique could serve to address the 
concerns raised by the US over the AB’s interpretations of certain cases—
provided, of course, that these concerns have merits.1023
Although the AB is currently not able to review any new appeals,1024 the 
proposed judicial correction remains relevant for bilateral appeal arrange-
ment advocated by the EU or for panel decisions.1025 If the AB is revived in 
the future, it may consider the use of distinguishing in order to temper the 
rigidity of its precedent system.1026
9.3 Preventing circumvention of WTO rules: aluminium sector as 
an example
While this thesis challenges a simple ban on China’s export duties for the 
sake of the environment, it is equally important to acknowledge concerns 
that China might use export duties to unfairly favour its downstream 
producers and thus circumvent WTO rules. A more sophisticated approach 
is thus offered to balance environmental and economic interests. It begins 
with a distinction between export duties and the ‘export duties plus’ that 
are imposed in combination with restrictions on Chinese consumption. The 
environmental exceptions under GATT Article XX would only apply to the 
latter one, which are by nature much less protectionist than those imposed 
exclusively on exports. Furthermore, Chapter 8 suggests that ‘export duties 
plus’ should generally treat domestic and foreign consumers in an identical 
manner in order to stand the best chance of satisfying the requirements of 
Article XX. For the purpose of fighting climate change, however, given the 
different commitments that are made by Annex I and non-Annex I parties 
under the UNFCCC, the treatment between the two categories might thus 
1023 Thus, US support for the judicial or political correction of the China—Raw Materials and 
China—Rare Earths decisions would serve as a good example to alter other questionable 
precedents that are more troubling for the US.
1024 The AB no longer had a quorum to hear new appeals because the mandates of two of the 
three remaining members was expired on 10 December 2019.
1025 EU has signed agreements on interim dispute resolution with Canada and Norway. 
Although China has not joined this interim appeal system, it might agree to this interim 
solution in order to correct the ban on China’s export duties or other precedents.
1026 Compared with a clear change in jurisprudence, a change made in disguise, which seems 
to be preferred by the AB, is more likely to reduce predictability. See Frieder Roessler, 
‘Change in the Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body during the past Twenty Years’, 
No. 72 EUI Working Papers (2015), at 14.
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differ under Article XX (Chart 4). This proposed solution is very unlikely to 
be abused in practice as shown in the below example of ‘export duties plus’ 
covering aluminium sector.
Chart 4: A more sophisticated approach to balance environmental and economic interests
(i) export duties are absolutely prohibited 
(ii) ‘export duties plus’ could be justified for environmental purposes under GATT Article XX 
Export 
Duties  
Plus 
Export 
Duties 
    (i) identical ‘export duties plus’ could be justified for reducing local or global pollution under Article XX 
    (ii) differential ‘export duties plus’ based on objective criteria might be justified for fighting climate change 
Identical 
Differential 
I: Creating environmental policy space 
Distinguishing between export duties and 
‘export duties plus’ 
II: Preventing circumvention of WTO rules 
Distinguishing between identical and differential 
‘export duties plus’ 
The production of primary aluminium metal consists of bauxite mining, 
refining bauxite into alumina, and smelting alumina into aluminium.1027 
Various environmental issues are associated with these operations. In the 
first stage of bauxite mining, for instance, the activities of clearing and 
removal of land may cause air pollution.1028 Moreover, bauxite washing 
may also cause serious water quality problems.1029 In contrast, the energy 
demand associated with the extraction of bauxite is much lower compared 
with the other two stages.1030 To refine bauxite, for instance, could be 
1027 Aluminium metal is further processed into thousands of fi nal products.
1028 Noor Hisham Abdullah, Norlen Mohamed, Lokman Hakim Sulaiman, Thahirahtul 
Asma Zakaria, and Daud Abdul Rahim, ‘Potential Health Impacts of Bauxite Mining in 
Kuantan’, 23(3) Malaysian Journal of Medical Sciences (2016), at 2.
1029 Ibid. Also see BBC, ‘Bauxite in Malaysia: The environmental cost of mining’, 19 January 
2016, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35340528 (visited on 20 July 
2019).
1030 Possibly because drilling or blasting operations are generally not required owing to the 
soft earthy nature of many bauxite deposits. See U.S. Department of Energy, ‘U.S. Energy 
Requirements for Aluminum Production: Historical Perspective, Theoretical Limits and 
Current Practices’, February 2007, available at https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/
fi les/2013/11/f4/al_theoretical.pdf (visited on 20 July 2019), at 16.
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energy-intensive.1031 The red mud disposal and storage involved in the 
refining process may also cause the pollution of soil and water.1032 The third 
stage of smelting is the most energy-intensive one largely owing to the elec-
trolysis process involved.1033 This process may also cause air pollution.1034 
Given the strong growth in China’s aluminium sector, ‘export duties plus’ 
could be imposed on (i) bauxite, alumina, or aluminium to reduce local or 
global pollution, and (ii) alumina and aluminium to fight climate change.
Such ‘export duties plus’ may be designed to treat domestic and foreign 
consumers in an identical manner. As a result, Chinese downstream 
producers would not gain favourable access to bauxite, alumina, or 
aluminium. A Swedish tax on natural gravel provides a similar example. 
This tax has been introduced by Sweden since 1996 in order to conserve 
natural gravel which is crucial for providing clean drinking water.1035 
Unlike those taxes adopted in Denmark and the UK where exports are 
relieved from the taxes,1036 both the extraction consumed in Sweden and 
extraction for export are covered by the same natural gravel charges.1037 
Identical ‘export duties plus’ thus would not raise concerns over circumven-
tion.
If China decides to impose differential ‘export duties plus’, the analysis 
provided in Chapter 8 suggests that they might only be allowed for the 
purpose of fighting climate change. Bauxite thus should be excluded even 
though the production of it may cause air pollution.1038 With respect to 
the differential ‘export duties plus’ on alumina and aluminium, the ‘even-
1031 ‘This broad range of energy intensity refl ects both bauxite quality (alumina content) and 
refi nery design’. Ibid.
1032 Valentina Dentoni, Battista Grosso and Giorgio Massacci, ‘Environmental Sustainability 
of the Alumina Industry in Western Europe’, 6 Sustainability (2014), at 9478.
1033 The production of one tonne of sawn primary aluminium ingot requires 37 GJ of 
thermal energy and 58 GJ of electricity, whereas the processes of bauxite and alumina 
only requires (i) 0.02 GJ and 10 GJ of thermal energy, and (ii) 0.003 GJ and 0.65 GJ of 
electricity. J.A. Moya, A. Boulamati, S. Slingerland, R. van der Veen, M. Gancheva, K.M. 
Rademaekers, J.J.P. Kuenen, A.J.H. Visschedijk, ‘Energy Effi ciency and GHG Emissions: 
Prospective Scenarios for the Aluminium Industry’, Publications Offi ce of the European 
Union, 2015, available at http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/
JRC96680/ldna27335enn.pdf (visited on 20 July 2019), at 7-8.
1034 Stephen Claude Martin and Claude Lariviere, ‘Community Health Risk Assessment 
of Primary Aluminum Smelter Emissions’, 56(5) Journal of Occupational and Environ-
mental Medicine (2014).
1035 Patrik Söderholm, ‘Taxing Virgin Natural Resources: Lessons from Aggregates Taxation 
in Europe’, 55(11) Resources, Conservation and Recycling (2011).
1036 ECOTEC Research & Consulting, ‘Study on Environmental Taxes and Charges in the 
EU’, April 2001, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/taxation/pdf/ch11_aggre-
gated_taxes.pdf (visited on 1 April 2019), at 213.
1037 Ibid., at 205. Exporters are not allowed to reclaim the natural gravel tax.
1038 Differential ‘export duties plus’ for the purpose of reducing air pollution cannot be justi-
fi ed under the fi rst condition of the chapeau. For further information, see Chapter 8.
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handedness’ requirement under Article XX(g) prohibits ‘a significantly 
more onerous burden on foreign consumers or producers’.1039 Hypotheti-
cally, one may argue that a 1/4 difference between export duties (20%) and 
domestic charges (15%) might be permitted, whereas a 1/2 difference (20% 
export duties plus 10% domestic charges) could be prohibited. Chinese 
downstream producers thus are unlikely to have considerable advantages 
of acquiring alumina and aluminium. In addition, the second condition of 
the chapeau regarding ‘disguised restriction on international trade’ may 
prohibit China from exclusively targeting alumina according to the objec-
tive criteria of carbon-intensity and trade sensitivity. 1040 The advantages of 
Chinese aluminium producers would thus be further weakened by charges 
on their aluminium exports, though, admittedly, the additional benefit may 
not be completely eliminated. This result, however, as the panel held in 
EC—Asbestos, ‘in itself cannot justify the conclusion that the measure has a 
protectionist aim, as long as it remains within certain limits’.1041
Another scenario is that differential ‘export duties plus’ are used to counter 
a carbon border adjustment. For instance, the EU’s carbon border measure 
may cover the listed sectors that could be ‘at risk of carbon leakage for the 
period 2021 to 2030’.1042 Comparable ‘export duties plus’ should then be 
imposed to cover those products. If the EU’s measure focuses on a narrower 
scope of sectors by, for instance, only targeting cement, steel, and primary 
aluminium,1043 to achieve a more ambitious climate target, China may go 
beyond this coverage by including alumina and other products based on 
the objective criteria of carbon intensity and trade sensitivity.
Besides the fairly strict tests specified in Article XX, the findings of this 
thesis also indicate that a non-judicial approach may address concerns 
about the abuse of ‘export duties plus’ in three respects. First, the abuse 
could be forestalled during the drafting of China’s Five-Year Plan. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, past Five-Year Plans (2006-2015) have priori-
tized the economic purposes of export restrictions, for which reason the 
restrictions were disputed as protectionist, but the current Five-Year Plan 
(2016-2020) marks an explicit shift to environmental protection. The envi-
1039 AB Report, China – Rare Earths, para 5.134.
1040 In 2018, 2% alumina and 16% aluminium were exported from China. Reuters, ‘China Dec 
alumina exports at 177,430 tonnes - customs’, 23 January 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
article/china-economy-trade-alumina/china-dec-alumina-exports-at-177430-tonnes-
customs-idUSB9N1ZB001(visited on 1 April 2019). Reuters, ‘China December aluminum 
production surges to record monthly high’, 21 January 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-china-economy-output-aluminium/china-december-aluminum-production-
surges-to-record-monthly-high-idUSKCN1PF0C2(visited on 1 April 2019).
1041 Panel Report, EC — Asbestos, para 8.239.
1042 Commission Delegated Decision (2019), see above n 939.
1043 It has been argued that carbon border measures should avoid over-broad sectoral 
coverage. See Cosbey (2012), above n 885, at 13.
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ronmental rationale behind these duties could thus be further specified so 
as to ensure that subsequent versions of the duties will be environmentally 
oriented. This increased transparency regarding China’s policy rationale 
could also help to allay the suspicions of its trading partners, and scholars 
have an important role to play in explicating the environmental rationale 
during the public consultation and expert review stages of the formula-
tion of Five-Year Plans. Second, after the adoption of a Five-Year Plan, any 
remaining potential for abuse could be addressed in the formulation of the 
export duties themselves. The infrastructure is already in place, for, in the 
immediate aftermath of the China—Rare Earths decision, China established a 
compliance system that empowers its Ministry of Commerce to examine the 
compatibility of any proposed trade-related measures with WTO law and to 
reject any duties not clearly justified under Article XX. Third, after the adop-
tion of ‘export duties plus’, any doubts about the environmental rationale 
behind them could be further explained by the Ministry of Commerce to the 
WTO in good faith and with the support of a clear rationale or evidence. 
In the past, by contrast, China has offered only summary dismissals of 
countervailing arguments, a response that should be avoided in the future.
Admittedly, China’s trading partners are unlikely to alter their established 
perceptions of its export duties without considerable effort by China to 
show its good faith. With time, though, other countries may begin to reas-
sess the environmental merit of the duties.
9.4 Final remarks
The proper balance between trade liberalization and environmental protec-
tion has long been a matter of debate.1044 A key issue in this discussion 
concerns the policy space of WTO members to adopt trade-related measures 
designed to address environmental concerns, especially those with an 
extraterritorial reach. It has been argued that WTO law would not prevent 
countries from taking such unilateral actions as carbon border adjustments, 
and therefore the WTO is no excuse for countries with powerful markets 
to forego incentivising their less environmentally advanced counterparts to 
join in international cooperative efforts.1045 So also it is argued here that the 
WTO’s legal regime is likewise no excuse to prevent the latter ones such as 
China from actively taking steps to protect the environment.
1044 The link between trade and environmental protection was recognized as early as 1970. 
See WTO, ‘Early years: emerging environment debate in GATT/WTO’, https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm (visited on 1 January 2019).
1045 For instance, Barbara Cooreman, ‘Global Environmental Protection through Trade: A Syste-
matic Approach to Extraterritoriality’ (Edward Elgar, 2016), at 281.
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The findings in this thesis particularly stand to benefit global efforts to 
combat climate change in three respects. First, given that a large portion 
of China’s carbon emissions results from the manufacture of products for 
export, ‘export duties plus’ that reduce this source of emissions would 
contribute to the achievement of global carbon reduction targets. Second, 
the proper use of export duties as a climate measure by China would set 
a good example for other pollution-outsourced countries, such as India, 
where 20% of the emissions are related to exports.1046 As it is, while China 
has been working to reduce its emissions, it has done so in part by pushing 
some of its more carbon-intensive activities onto such neighbouring coun-
tries as Cambodia, Vietnam, and India.1047 In this game of ‘whack-a-mole’, 
export duties could represent an appealing option for carbon-outsourced 
countries seeking to join in the global effort to combat climate change. 
Third, ‘export duties plus’ would also address the competitive concerns of 
Western nations so that they would be better able to win public support for 
more ambitious climate actions.1048 For instance, while a ‘Carbon Border 
Tax’ involved in the European Green Deal has been proposed to ensure 
a level playing field for EU companies, its ultimate goal is to strengthen 
the current Emissions Trading System.1049 The option of export duties as a 
countermeasure may also be extended to other countries that are covered 
by carbon border adjustments. This offer representing good faith from the 
West, then, could both temper political opposition from other countries and 
increase the chances that their extraterritorial actions would be justified 
under Article XX.1050
We should never let the perfect become the enemy of the good. The 
world’s slow progress in fighting climate change is in part attributable to 
countries’ obsession with the first-best climate policies, such as an effective 
carbon tax.1051 While the debate over the enormous difficulties involved 
with adopting the ideal environmental tools shows no sign of abating, the 
problems associated with climate change are worsening more rapidly than 
experts had expected just a few years ago. A recent IPCC report thus has 
1046 Brad Plumer, ‘You’ve Heard of Outsourced Jobs, but Outsourced Pollution? It’s Real, and 
Tough to Tally Up’, 4 September 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/climate/
outsourcing-carbon-emissions.html,  (visited on 1 January 2019).
1047 Ibid.
1048 Mattoo and Subramanian (2013), above n 51. The more recent development shows that 
the EU may indeed have prepared to impose a carbon border tax. See Alan Beattie, 
‘Carbon border tax sends signals for trade deals’, FT, 29 May 2019, https://www.ft.com/
content/016adba8-82ed-11e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b, (visited 15 June 2019).
1049 Von der Leyen (2019), above n 12, at 5.
1050 For instance, the US Rep. Bill Pascrell has proposed to draw the link between climate 
change and national security. ‘Pascrell Calls for National Security Investigation of 
Carbon Pollution’, 12 March 2019, https://pascrell.house.gov/news/documentsingle.
aspx?DocumentID=3855, (visited on 1 April 2019).
1051 Justin Gillis, ‘Forget the Carbon Tax for Now’, 27 December 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/12/27/opinion/carbon-tax-climate-change.html, (visited on 1 January 2019).
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called for ‘rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented’ actions on the part of 
all nations.1052 China’s ‘export duties plus’ targeting carbon consumption 
could be among these actions.1053
1052 ‘Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented 
changes in all aspects of society’. See IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special 
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C approved by governments’, 8 October 2018, https://
www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-
warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments/, (visited 14 November 2018).
1053 As suggested by the same report, demand-side solutions would play a key role in miti-
gating climate change through enabling lifestyle and behavioural change. IPCC, ‘Chapter 
4: Strengthening and implementing the global response’, at 8, https://www.ipcc.ch/
site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_Approval_Chapter_4.pdf, (visited on 23 
August 2019).
 Moreover, according to an EU research project, given that ‘upward drivers of GHG emis-
sions come from consumption’, demand-side measures can complement current climate 
actions focusing on production. European Commission, ‘Carbon emission mitigation by 
Consumption-based Accounting and Policy’, 2013, https://cordis.europa.eu/project/
rcn/110539/factsheet/en, (visited on 23 August 2019).

Summary
According to the very controversial China—Raw Materials and China—Rare 
Earths decisions, China is prohibited from using export duties to address 
any environmental problems, including those associated with climate 
change, because GATT Article XX, a general exceptions clause, is found 
inapplicable to China’s export duty commitments. This thesis argues that 
there is a need to consider ‘greening’ the absolute ban on China’s export 
duties. It accordingly proposes that, while export duties, which exclusively 
restrict exports, should be prohibited outright, ‘export duties plus’ that 
are adopted in combination with supplementary restrictions on domestic 
consumption should be allowed for pursuing environmental purposes 
subject to the strict scrutiny of Article XX.
Prior to the discussion of the legal options to adjust the WTO ban on China’s 
export duties, this thesis first delivers a preliminary analysis of whether the 
ban even merits being corrected from an environmental perspective. This 
issue has been missing from the current discussion. Chapter 3 shows that 
much of the criticism of the ban focuses on the concerns over the inequity 
(WTO members are generally free to impose export duties) or the rigidity of 
the strictly textual approach adopted by the AB regarding the applicability 
of Article XX to China’s export duty commitments. In contrast, the potential 
negative environmental impact caused by such a ban receives much less 
attention, largely owing to the perception that doubts (i) the potential of 
using export duties to protect the environment and (ii) the genuineness of 
China’s intent to use export duties as part of its environmental policy. This 
gap is unfortunate because the environmental concern is of great impor-
tance in deciding whether the WTO members or the AB should support a 
change of the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions.
The preliminary analysis of this thesis fills the gap in the literature by 
revealing the potential environmental problems associated with the ban on 
China’s export duties. To begin with, Chapter 4 surveys the practice of WTO 
members to restrict exports for environmental purposes (2009-2016) and the 
provisions limiting the use of export restrictions in WTO agreements and 
50 select regional trade agreements (2012-2016). The findings show that 
any arguments in favour of an absolute ban on export duties are inconsis-
tent with the practice of WTO members in two respects. First, the actual 
examples of country practices show that export duties could be useful to 
reduce local or global pollution under certain circumstances, because the 
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theoretically first-best environmental policies are not always feasible in 
financial or practical terms. The environmental regulatory autonomy with 
respect to export duties is thus always preserved for WTO members at both 
the multilateral and regional levels, except for the controversial ban on 
China’s export duties. Accordingly, when the EU proposed more stringent 
multilateral rules regulating export duties, it also provided countries with 
that environmental regulatory autonomy by incorporating Article XX. 
Second, the suggestion that duties should be substituted by export quotas 
seems to lack any sound theoretical basis. In sharp contrast, an OECD Trade 
Policy Paper actually suggested the contrary, possibly owing to the major 
disadvantages of quantitative restrictions compared with duties: (i) the loss 
of resources through rent-seeking activities, (ii) the risk of corruption, and 
(iii) the loss of government revenue.
Therefore, at least in theory, an absolute ban on export duties could hamper 
China’s efforts for enacting effective measures to protect the environment. 
Relevant to these considerations is the issue of China’s actual motive for 
seeking to impose export duties, which is taken up in Chapter 5. Following 
a legally-based approach that investigates the formation process of export 
duties in China and the relevant Five-Year Plans, Chapter 5 shows that 
China had prioritized the industrial purposes of export duties in the past. 
This role, however, has been substantially altered in the Guidelines of the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) which make clear that export duties 
in combination with other taxes on production or consumption could 
form part of a new ‘eco-tax system’. An analysis of the relevant subsector 
five-year plans shows further the increasing role of China’s export duties 
to curtail carbon leakage, which occurs when energy-intensive industries 
shift production to countries that have weaker or no such controls in order 
to evade the effects of a state’s carbon pricing policies. The same chapter 
also explains why these plans can be a trustworthy indicator by discussing 
a series of observations on the drafting, enactment, and implementation 
stages of them.
The potential of China’s export duties to combat climate change has 
received inadequate attention in the literature on China—Raw Materials or 
China—Rare Earths. This neglect is unfortunate because a number of climate 
studies, including the well-known Stern Review on the economics of 
climate change, its follow-up article, and a World Bank research paper, have 
suggested that export duties could be useful for curtailing carbon leakage, 
especially in the context of China as ‘the world’s most unbalanced virtual 
emissions’ trader, for its emissions associated with its exports being eight 
times those associated with its imports. In this regard, Chapter 6 shows that 
an absolute ban on China’s export duties undermines global efforts to fight 
climate change. On the one hand, export duties could be a more feasible 
alternative to the controversial carbon border adjustments such as the one 
recently proposed by the upcoming President of the European Commission. 
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On the other hand, China, as the largest emitter and exporter of carbon 
emissions, has incentives to genuinely adopt export duties as part of its 
demand-side climate policy targeting consumption.
Based on the findings reported above, the preliminary conclusion is offered 
that the WTO ban on China’s export duties constrains its policy space to 
protect the environment, particularly in the context of climate change. 
Chapter 7 thus offers a thorough analysis of the judicial and political 
options for creating desirable policy space for China’s export duties. 
In a judicial way, the AB could adopt a new interpretation to correct the 
China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths rulings. As the survey of the 
practice of selected tribunals at the international, regional, and national 
levels suggests, the AB could choose either to distinguish (the first-best) or 
to overrule (the second-best) the ban on China’s export duties. The most 
feasible interpretative option has been proposed in this thesis to draws a 
line between export duties of the sort at issue in the previous cases, which 
exclusively restrict the exports, and ‘export duties plus’ that are adopted 
in combination with supplementary restrictions on domestic consumption. 
China may use the latter one to address environmental issues in a manner 
consistent with Article XX.
Given the AB’s membership crisis, it is probably not the best time to rely on 
a judicial approach. Turning to political options, the most feasible option 
for China is to seek a consensus for a waiver, as Mongolia was able to do 
for deviating from its export duty commitments in 2007. Such a waiver 
could be part of a package deal that includes additional commitments by 
China. While waivers could be useful as a stopgap measure, China may 
need a long-term solution in order to better accommodate the climate 
considerations. It thus may request the Ministerial Conference to take a 
decision updating its accession protocol regarding the use of export duties 
to protect the environment. To make such updates more acceptable to the 
victorious parties in the two cases, they may avoid explicitly contradicting 
the China—Raw Materials and China—Rare Earths decisions but rather to 
distinguish them by drawing a line between export duties and ‘export 
duties plus’. Moreover, in order to make such updates even more attrac-
tive, they could also include a redefinition of other commitments in China’s 
accession protocol such as subsidies or technology transfer which are of the 
interest to the WTO membership at large.
Should the environmental exceptions under Article XX become available 
with respect to ‘export duties plus’, an important follow-up question 
concerning China’s policy space is whether Article XX requires ‘export 
duties plus’ to always treat domestic and foreign consumers in an identical 
manner. Chapter 8 suggests that the first condition of the chapeau prohib-
iting ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail’ generally requires China to impose equivalent 
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charges on products destined for domestic consumption. A feasible option 
for restricting Chinese consumption could involve broadening the existing 
scope of products that are subject to consumption taxes.
One exception, however, might be found in the climate change regime 
where the parties listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC have explicitly 
committed to take a greater mitigation role than non-Annex I countries like 
China. Differential ‘export duties’ thus might be justified for the purpose of 
fighting climate change. This result would strengthen multilateral efforts 
to tackle carbon leakage because it balances the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ with the urgent need for effectively tackling 
the carbon-intensive exports from China, the largest exporter of carbon 
emissions. That being said, however, it is equally important to address 
concerns that China might use differential ‘export duties plus’ to provide 
Chinese downstream producers with favourable access to industrial inputs 
and thus circumvent WTO rules. This concern could be addressed by the 
second condition of the chapeau prohibiting ‘disguised restriction on inter-
national trade’, according to which differential ‘export duties plus’ should 
cover both upstream and downstream products from sectors with high 
carbon cost and trade sensitivity.
With the aim of balancing environmental and economic interests, this thesis 
has proposed a more sophisticated approach to adjust the simple ban on 
China’s export duties. It begins with a distinction between export duties 
and ‘export duties plus’ that are imposed in combination with restrictions 
on Chinese consumption. The environmental exceptions under Article 
XX would only apply to the latter one, which are by nature much less 
protectionist than those imposed exclusively on exports. Furthermore, 
while Article XX generally requires ‘export duties plus’ to treat domestic 
and foreign consumers in an identical manner, ‘export duties plus’ might 
be justified for differentiating between consumers from Annex I and non-
Annex I parties under the UNFCCC. China may thus use export duties to 
effectively tackle carbon leakage, which accordingly tempers the competi-
tive concerns of Western nations so that they would be better able to win 
public support for more ambitious climate actions. On the other hand, 
this proposed solution is unlikely to be abused in practice as shown in the 
example of ‘export duties plus’ covering the aluminium sector in Chapter 9.
The same chapter also discusses other positive implications of ‘greening’ 
the absolute ban on China’s export duties.
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
‘Hoe het WTO verbod op China’s 
Uitvoerheffingen te vergroenen
Zou WTO recht Chinese uitvoerheffingen moeten toelaten 
om het milieu te beschermen, en zo ja, op welke manier?
In de controversiële China-Raw Materials en China-Rare Earths beslissingen, is 
het China verboden om uitvoerheffingen te hanteren om milieuproblemen, 
waaronder klimaatverandering, te adresseren. Dit verbod is gebaseerd op 
het feit dat China geen beroep kan doen op de algemene uitzonderings-
clausule van Artikel XX GATT. Dit proefschrift beargumenteert dat het voor 
alle betrokken partijen van essentieel belang is om dit absolute verbod op 
Chinese uitvoerheffingen te ‘vergroenen’. Hoewel protectionisme voor-
komen moet worden, is het in niemands belang dat een van de grootste 
vervuilers ter wereld een onmisbaar instrument wordt ontnomen om 
klimaatverandering te bestrijden. Om die reden introduceert dit proef-
schrift het concept van ‘uitvoerheffingen plus’. Dit zijn uitvoerheffingen 
die zijn aangenomen in combinatie met bijkomstige, maar minder vergaande, 
beperkingen op binnenlandse consumptie. Hoewel uitvoerheffingen die exclusief 
de export beperken volledig verboden moeten blijven, zouden Chinese 
‘uitvoerheffingen plus’ toegestaan moeten worden om milieudoestellingen 
na te streven, en waar ook aan de overige strikte voorwaarden van Artikel 
XX GATT voldaan is.
Alvorens de verschillende juridische opties te bespreken om het huidige 
WTO verbod op Chinese uitvoerheffingen te vergroenen, analyseert deze 
thesis eerst of het ecologisch gezien verstandig zou zijn om het huidige abso-
lute verbod op Chinese uitvoerheffingen aan te passen. Dit is een belang-
rijke preliminaire vraag die tot nu toe in de discussie ontbreekt. Hoofdstuk 
3 toont in dat kader aan dat veel van de huidige kritiek op het absolute 
verbod voor China zich met name focust op bezwaren rondom de ongelijke 
behandeling van China ten opzicht van andere WTO leden (die gewoonlijk 
vrij zijn om uitvoerheffingen op te leggen) en op de te strikte tekstuele inter-
pretatie van de Apellate Body (AB) inzake de toepasselijkheid van Artikel XX 
GATT op China. De negatieve ecologische impact van dit verbod ontvangt 
daarentegen veel minder aandacht, grotendeels omdat menig commentator, 
impliciet en onterecht, aanneemt dat i) uitvoerheffingen nooit geschikt zijn 
om het milieu te beschermen en ii) China’s uitvoerheffingen niet daadwer-
kelijke (mede) tot doel hebben om het milieu te beschermen maar louter 
protectionistisch van aard zijn. Deze lacune in de literatuur is betreurens-
waardig, zowel vanwege het cruciale belang van milieubescherming in het 
algemeen als vanwege het feit dat het milieuperspectief een belangrijke 
dimensie toevoegt aan de discussie over de vraag of de WTO of de AB de in 
China-Raw Materials en China – Rare Earths gekozen koers moet aanhouden 
of wijzigen.
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Dit proefschrift adresseert deze lacune in de literatuur door aan te tonen 
hoe het absolute verbod op Chinese uitvoerheffingen in de weg staat aan 
wenselijke en noodzakelijke milieumaatregelen. Hiertoe onderzoekt hoofd-
stuk 4 eerst hoe meerdere WTO leden in de periode 2009-2016 uitvoerbe-
perkingen gebruikten om het milieu te beschermen. Ook wordt gekeken 
naar de toepassing van andere bepalingen in WTO-verbintenissen die het 
gebruik van uitvoerbeperkingen limiteren en worden 50 regionale handels-
overeenkomsten die gesloten zijn in de periode 2012-2016 onderzocht op 
dit punt. De bevindingen tonen aan dat een absoluut verbod op uitvoerhef-
fingen onverenigbaar is met zowel de doelstellingen van de WTO, als de 
huidige praktijk binnen de WTO, en dan met name op twee aspecten.
Ten eerste toont de huidige praktijk aan dat onder bepaalde omstan-
digheden uitvoerheffingen nuttig kunnen zijn om lokale en globale 
vervuiling te verminderen. Dit is met name het geval in situaties waarin 
de theoretisch optimale milieustrategieën niet haalbaar zijn om financiële 
of praktische redenen. Uitvoerheffingen vormen dan noodzakelijke second-
best instrumenten. Op China na hebben de overige WTO leden dan ook de 
wetgevende autonomie behouden om uitvoerheffingen te gebruiken, zowel 
op multilateraal als regionaal niveau, en wordt van deze autonomie ook 
daadwerkelijk gebruik gemaakt. Een duidelijk voorbeeld is dat de EU zelf, 
toen zij strengere multilaterale regels voorstelde om uitvoerheffingen te 
reguleren, wel afdoende ruimte liet aan andere landen om uitvoerheffingen 
te gebruiken voor milieudoeleinden door Artikel XX GATT te incorporeren.
Ten tweede toont het eerste deel van het proefschrift aan dat voor de 
stelling dat uitvoerheffingen vervangen zouden moeten worden door 
uitvoerquota’s geen solide theoretische basis bestaat. Sterker nog, een recent 
OECD Trade Policy Paper beargumenteert met kracht van argumenten juist 
het omgekeerde, onder andere vanwege de grote nadelen van kwantitatieve 
beperkingen ten opzichte van uitvoerheffingen, waaronder (i) het verlies 
van middelen door rent-seeking, (ii) het risico van corruptie, en (iii) het 
verlies van inkomsten voor de exporterende staat.
Gezien bovenstaande bevindingen kan een absoluut verbod op Chinese 
uitvoerheffingen de capaciteit van China om effectieve milieumaatregelen 
te nemen belemmeren. Deze bevinding wint aan relevantie wanneer men 
beseft dat China in toenemende mate ook daadwerkelijk milieudoelstel-
lingen nastreeft met haar uitvoerheffingen, zoals hoofdstuk 5 laat zien. Dit 
hoofdstuk berust op een gedetailleerde analyse van de wijze waarop de 
uitvoerheffingen in China tot stand zijn gekomen, waaronder een analyse 
van de relevante Vijf-Jaren Plannen. Deze analyse laat zien dat China in 
het verleden inderdaad primair industriële doelstellingen prioriteerde. 
Deze focus op industriële doelstellingen is echter aanzienlijk veranderd met 
de Guidelines of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). Deze richtsnoeren 
laten zien dat uitvoerheffingen, in combinatie met andere belastingen op 
productie of op consumptie, deel uit kunnen gaan maken van een nieuw 
‘eco-belastingsysteem’. Een analyse van de relevante vijf-jaren plannen 
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demonstreert ook de groeiende rol van China’s uitvoerheffingen in het 
streven om de zogeheten ‘carbon leakage’, in te perken. Dit is het fenomeen 
waarbij sterk gereguleerde landen hun CO2 productie de facto verplaatsen 
naar landen met minder strikte regelgeving, zoals China. Als laatste laat 
hoofdstuk 5 zien waarom deze recente vijfjaren plannen, en de daar bijbe-
horende stukken, een betrouwbare indicatie geven van het toenemende 
belang dat milieuoverwegingen spelen in de Chinese besluitvorming, dit 
onder andere door nader in te gaan op de wijze waarop deze plannen 
zijn opgesteld, zijn besproken en worden uitgevoerd. Dit kijkje achter de 
schermen van de Chinese ‘black-box’ laat zien dat een gezond wantrouwen 
vanzelfsprekend aangewezen blijft, maar dat het niet langer reëel is om alle 
Chinese milieuregelgeving af te doen als verkapt protectionisme.
Zoals aangegeven heeft deze potentie van Chinese uitvoerheffingen 
om klimaatveranderingen te bestrijden tot nu toe onvoldoende aandacht 
gekregen in de uitgebreide literatuur rondom China – Raw Materials or China 
– Rare Earths. Dit is betreurenswaardig omdat een aantal klimaatstudies, 
inclusief de welbekende Stern Review inzake de economie van klimaat-
verandering en een World Bank onderzoek nu juist hebben geopperd dat 
uitvoerheffingen nuttig zouden kunnen zijn om carbon leakage in te perken, 
met name in de Chinese context. China is immers ‘werelds meest oneven-
wichtige virtuele uitstotende’ handelspartner: de Chinese aan uitvoer 
gerelateerde uitstoot ligt maar liefst acht keer hoger dan die voor invoer. 
Mede in dit licht toont hoofdstuk 6 derhalve aan dat een absoluut verbod 
op China’s uitvoerheffingen de globale inspanningen tegen klimaatveran-
dering ondermijnt. Zo zouden uitvoerheffingen een haalbaarder alternatief 
zijn dan de controversiële koolstof grensaanpassingen die de President van 
de Europese Commissie recent heeft voorgesteld. Ook heeft China, als de 
grootste vervuiler en ‘importeur’ van koolstofuitstoot, afdoende drijfveren 
om uitvoerheffingen aan te nemen met een oprecht klimaatdoel, mede als 
onderdeel van haar op de vraagzijde gericht klimaatbeleid.
Gebaseerd op deze bevindingen kan daarom geconcludeerd worden dat 
het absolute WTO verbod op uitvoerheffingen China’s beleidsruimte om 
het milieu te beschermen op een mogelijk gevaarlijke wijze aantast. In een 
tijd waarin de wereld gezamenlijk klimaatverandering probeert tegen te 
gaan, wordt het een van de grootste vervuilers deels onmogelijk gemaakt 
milieumaatregelen te treffen. Gezien deze onwenselijke situatie bevat 
hoofdstuk 7 een uitgebreide en gedetailleerde analyse van de verschillende 
juridische en politieke opties om alsnog afdoende beleidsruimte te creëren 
voor Chinese uitvoerheffingen die het milieu beschermen zonder daarmee 
een onacceptabel risico op misbruik en protectionisme te creëren. Op het 
juridische vlak kan de AB een nieuwe interpretatie aannemen om de China 
– Raw Materials en China – Rare Earths beslissingen te nuanceren. Om deze 
optie te verkennen vergelijkt dit proefschrift hoe verschillende rechterlijke 
instanties op internationaal, regionaal en nationaal niveau in het verleden 
zijn omgegaan met precedenten die wellicht als te nauw of strikt werden 
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ervaren. Deze vergelijking laat zien hoe de AB ervoor zou kunnen kiezen 
om het verbod op China’s uitvoerheffingen ofwel te nuanceren (distin-
guishing), ofwel geheel te herroepen, waarbij de eerste optie de voorkeur 
lijkt te hebben. De meest haalbare en elegante optie lijkt daarbij om de 
eerste uitspraken nauw te interpreteren, waardoor zij alleen van toepas-
sing zijn op uitvoerheffingen die exclusief de uitvoer beperken maar niet op 
‘uitvoerheffingen plus’ die uitvoerheffingen combineren met bijkomstige 
beperkingen op binnenlandse consumptie. Zonder China – Raw Materials 
en China – Rare Earths geheel te herroepen zou China daarmee alsnog 
afdoende beleidsruimte krijgen om het milieu te beschermen op een wijze 
die verenigbaar is met artikel XX GATT en die tegelijkertijd protectionisme 
afdoende tegengaat.
Dit proefschrift erkent tegelijkertijd natuurlijk dat het gezien de huidige 
crisis rondom de benoeming van leden van de AB wellicht lastig zal zijn om 
een juridische oplossing te vinden. Mede om die reden wordt ook ingegaan 
op de verschillende politieke opties om China de vereiste beleidsruimte te 
geven. Hier lijkt de meest pragmatische optie om consensus te zoeken voor 
een vergunning van de overige WTO leden, zoals Mongolië heeft gedaan 
in 2007 om af te kunnen wijken van haar eigen verbintenissen inzake 
uitvoerheffing verbintenissen. Een dergelijke vergunning zou deel kunnen 
uitmaken van een breder akkoord dat ook verschillende bijkomstige verbin-
tenissen van China omvat. Hoewel dergelijke vergunningen nuttig kunnen 
zijn als een korte termijn stopgap maatregel, heeft China waarschijnlijk een 
lange termijn oplossing nodig om klimaatproblemen te kunnen (blijven) 
bestrijden. Hiertoe zou China de Minsterial Conference kunnen verzoeken 
om een beslissing te nemen om haar toetredingsprotocol te actualiseren en 
daarbij het gebruik van uitvoerheffingen om het milieu te beschermen toe 
te laten. Om een dergelijke actualisering relatief meer acceptabel te maken 
voor de winnende partijen in de twee rechtszaken, zou de Ministerial Confe-
rence kunnen overwegen om iedere expliciete verwijzing naar de China – 
Raw Materials en China – Rare Earths beslissingen te vermijden, bijvoorbeeld 
door wederom enkel te spreken over ‘uitvoerheffingen plus’. Daarnaast, 
om een actualiseringen aantrekkelijker te maken, zou de Ministerial Confe-
rence ook een herdefinitie kunnen toevoegen van andere verbintenissen in 
China’s toetredingsprotocol, zoals die inzake subsidies of technologie trans-
fers, die van belang zouden kunnen voor het Chinese WTO-lidmaatschap 
meer in het algemeen.
Zelfs indien China ruimte zou krijgen voor ‘uitvoerheffingen plus’, zij 
het via de juridische of de politieke route, rijst echter nog de belangrijke 
vervolgvraag of Artikel XX GATT zou vereisen dat dergelijke ‘uitvoorhef-
fingen plus’ binnenlandse en buitenlandse consumenten steeds op identieke 
wijze te behandelen. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden geeft hoofdstuk 8 
eerst aan waarom de eerste voorwaarde van de chapeau, die ‘willekeurige 
of ongerechtvaardigde discriminatie tussen landen waar dezelfde voor-
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waarden gelden’ verbiedt, in het algemeen vereist dat China gelijkwaardige 
lasten oplegt op producten bestemd voor binnenlandse en buitenlandse 
consumptie.
Vervolgens wordt echter beargumenteerd hoe een uitzondering op 
deze verplichting tot gelijke behandeling wellicht gevonden kan worden 
in de context van klimaatverandering en de internationale akkoorden ter 
bestrijding van klimaatverandering . In Annex I van de UNFECC hebben 
partijen zich bijvoorbeeld expliciet verbonden om een grotere bijdrage te 
leveren in de bestrijding van klimaatverandering dan non-Annex I landen 
zoals China. Voortbouwend op deze internationale verplichtingen en 
akkoorden zouden zelfs enigszins discriminatoire ‘uitvoerheffingen-plus’ 
gerechtvaardigd kunnen zijn om klimaatverandering te bestrijden. Een 
dergelijke benadering zou de multilaterale inspanningen om carbon leakage 
te bestrijden kunnen versterken, onder andere omdat het toe zou laten om 
het principe van ‘gelijke maar onderscheidende verantwoordelijkheden’ 
af te wegen tegen de dringende noodzaak om doeltreffend de koolstof-
intensieve uitvoer van China te bestrijden. Vanzelfsprekend moet er voor 
worden gewaakt dat het toelaten van ‘uitvoerheffingen-plus’ China niet 
in staat stelt om Chinese downstream producenten voordelige toegang te 
verschaffen tot grondstoffen om daarmee de WTO-regels en de eerlijke 
concurrentie te omzeilen. Dit gevaar zou kunnen worden beperkt door het 
effectief en strikt handhaven van de tweede voorwaarde van de chapeau, die 
‘verborgen beperkingen tot internationale handel’ verbiedt, volgens welke 
‘uitvoerheffingen’ zowel upstream als downstream producten zouden 
omvatten van sectoren met hoge koolstofkosten en handelsgevoeligheid.
Op bovenstaande wijze formuleert dit proefschrift een concreet voorstel om 
China afdoende beleidsruimte te geven voor oprechte en broodnodige mili-
eumaatregelen zonder dat andere WTO leden voor verkapt protectionisme 
hoeven te vrezen. De haalbaarheid van dit voorstel wordt in hoofdstuk 9 
bovendien nader onderbouwt met het praktische voorbeeld van ‘uitvoer-
heffingen-plus’ in de aluminiumsector. Daarnaast bespreekt hoofdstuk 9 
bovendien ook nog enkele andere positieve gevolgen van het ‘vergroenen’ 
van het absolute verbod op China’s uitvoerheffingen.
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